HOSFORD BROTHERS CONCRETE INC V MARK PREMER (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HOSFORD BROTHERS CONCRETE, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
July 26, 2011
Plaintiff/Counter Defendant,
v
MARK PREMER d/b/a PREMER BUILDERS,
and PREMER DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Defendants/Cross Plaintiffs/Cross
Defendants-Appellants,
and
SHAFER REDI-MIX, INC., SHAFER BROS.,
INC., and MARK BURLEY EXCAVATING,
INC.,
Defendants/Cross Plaintiffs,
and
MID-MICHIGAN FOUNDATION, INC.,
Defendant/Cross Plaintiff,
and
WILLIAM M. MORRIS and LAURIE L.
MORRIS,
Defendants/Cross DefendantsAppellees,
and
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER & INDUSTRY
SERVICES BUREAU OF WORKERS’ &
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, and
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
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No. 298492
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 09-000537-CH
Defendants.
Before: BECKERING, P.J., and FORT HOOD and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this suit involving a claim of unjust enrichment, appellants Mark Premer (d/b/a Premer
Builders) and Premer Development, LLC (referred to collectively as “Premer”) appeal by right
the circuit court’s May 19, 2010, opinion and order, entered following a one-day bench trial and
holding that Premer had no cause of action against appellees William M. and Laurie L. Morris
(“the Morrises”). We affirm.
I. FACTS
In September 2005, Premer entered into a land contract with the Morrises under which
Premer agreed to purchase a tract of land in Eaton County known as the Morris Brooks Estates
Subdivision II (the “subdivision” or the “property”). The purchase price was $417,000, with a
down payment of $10,000 and financing on the remaining $407,000 owed at six percent annual
interest.1 The principal and interest were to be paid by September 2007. Premer was to make
interest only payments on a monthly basis and pay approximately $16,000 towards the principal
when each one of the lots it was to develop on the land sold.
In addition to the land contract, the Morrises lent Premer $350,000 at eight percent
interest so that Premer could develop the property.2 As with the land contract, Premer was to
pay approximately $16,000 toward the principal of this loan when one of the lots in the
subdivision sold. This loan was secured with a mortgage on the property. On July 24, 2007, the
parties executed an addendum to the land contract and the improvement loan agreement
containing various provisions, including the reduction of the principal owed under the land
contract and the increase of the improvement loan amount.
From 2005 to 2007, Premer performed land site preparation, installed the streets, curbs,
gutters, sewers, utilities, and otherwise got the subdivision “ready to sell.” A list of Premer’s
development expenses, totaling approximately $622,000, was introduced at trial. Premer also
built a “Parade of Homes” house (the “parade house”) on lot 31 for “about $208,000.” Premer
sold lot 17 in November 2007 for $53,000 and lot 24 in July 2008 for $54,000.
1
The parties later amended the contract to reduce the principal owed after the down payment
from $407,000 to $374,440.
2
The parties later agreed to increase the loan amount to $367,050.
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Premer eventually defaulted on both contracts and owed the Morrises approximately
$37,000 in interest. The Morrises filed a land contract forfeiture proceeding in district court,
seeking possession of the land. 3 Premer did not respond, and the district court entered a default
judgment on December 9, 2008. Premer did not redeem the contract during the 90-day statutory
period, see MCL 600.5744(3), and on March 9, 2009, the district court entered an order of
eviction.
Eventually, contractors filed suit against Premer in the circuit court to foreclose on
construction liens. The Morrises paid a little over $44,000 to remove those liens. Premer then
filed a cross-claim against the Morrises, claiming that they had been unjustly enriched from the
improvements Premer made to the property. On February 26, 2010, a one-day bench trial was
held on Premer’s unjust enrichment claim. The circuit court subsequently entered a judgment of
no cause of action in favor of the Morrises. Premer now appeals.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE RULES
As noted above, this case involves among other items a land contract between the parties
and Premer’s forfeiture of the contract. However, while the forfeiture of land contracts are in
part governed by statute, the parties do not cite to any statutory provision or other default rule
governing the forfeiture of improvement loan agreements. Thus, we will address this issue using
general contract principles.
“Whether a specific party has been unjustly enriched is generally a question of fact.
However, whether a claim for unjust enrichment can be maintained is a question of law, which
we review de novo. Finally, we review de novo a trial court’s dispositional ruling on an
equitable matter.” Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc, 273 Mich App 187, 193; 729 NW2d
898 (2006) (citations omitted). Findings on questions of fact are reviewed for clear error.
Capitol Props Group, LLC v 1247 Ctr Street, LLC, 283 Mich App 422, 430; 770 NW2d 105
(2009). Clear error exists if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id.
“The theory underlying quantum meruit recovery is that the law will imply a contract in
order to prevent unjust enrichment when one party inequitably receives and retains a benefit
from another.” Morris Pumps, 273 Mich App at 194. “‘However, a contract will be implied
only if there is no express contract covering the same subject matter.’” Id., quoting Belle Isle
Grill Corp v Detroit, 256 Mich App 463, 478; 666 NW2d 271 (2003).
3
See MCL 600.5726. The land contract at issue specifically provided for forfeiture as a remedy.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. EXISTENCE OF EXPRESS CONTRACT
Here, there is no express contract between the parties covering the same subject matter as
Premer’s claim of unjust enrichment. Although it is true that Premer and the Morrises had
several contracts, none of those contracts specifically dealt with the subject matter of the unjust
enrichment claim, i.e., the physical improvements Premer made to the property. The initial land
contract and mortgage dealt only with the real property. They said nothing about the physical
improvements that Premer made to the property or that the Morrises would acquire the
improvements free and clear in the event of a land contract forfeiture proceeding or foreclosure.
Likewise, the improvement loan agreement did not address the actual physical improvements in
any way. It was a simple loan agreement, whereby the Morrises lent Premer $367,000 at eight
percent interest. As such, the parties did not have an express contract covering the subject matter
of Premer’s unjust enrichment claim.
B. INEQUITABLE RETENTION BY THE MORRISES
The next issue is whether the circuit court erred in concluding that the Morrises were not
unjustly enriched. In this regard, the court concluded that Premer failed to prove that the
Morrises inequitably received and retained a benefit from Premer. The court found that both
parties had lost considerable money on the venture, that the Morrises continued to lose money,
that Premer failed to establish that it conferred any benefit on the Morrises, and that Premer’s
evidence of a financial benefit was speculative given the current economic climate.
On appeal, Premer characterizes the circuit court’s decision as a finding that Premer
presented speculative evidence and then provides two reasons why its evidence was not
speculative. First, Premer claims that the amount the Morrises were enriched could be measured
by the materials and labor Premer expended in developing the subdivision and building the
parade house. Second, Premer claims that the amount could be calculated based on expert
testimony regarding the market value of the property.
As indicated, a party claiming unjust enrichment must establish (1) that the other party
received a benefit and (2) an inequity to the party claiming unjust enrichment because of the
retention of the benefit by the other party. Morris Pumps, 273 Mich App at 194-195.
Premer is incorrect in contending that the circuit court should have used the amount
Premer expended in developing the property in order to calculate how much the Morrises were
enriched. It has long been established that the correct measure of damages in an unjust
enrichment claim is the amount the property is enhanced, not the amount the enhancing party
expended. Pakulski v Ludwiczewski, 291 Mich 502, 511; 289 NW 231 (1939) (“The measure of
[damages in an unjust enrichment claim] is not the amount of the expenditures on the property
but the amount the land has been enhanced by reason of the repairs and improvements made
upon it.”). As such, Premer’s first argument is without merit.
Premer’s second argument, that the circuit court erred in concluding that its evidence
regarding enrichment was speculative, is likewise without merit. Whether a party has been
unjustly enriched is a question of fact, Morris Pumps, 273 Mich App at 193, and we are not left
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with a definite and firm conviction that the court made a mistake in concluding that Premer
failed to prove that the Morrises were unjustly enriched by Premer’s physical improvements to
the property.
The majority of the testimony at the bench trial related to the value of the property.
Premer presented testimony from John Craig, a licensed real estate appraiser who was
recognized as an expert in that area. Craig’s appraisal report was admitted into evidence. Craig
opined that the value of the 20 remaining lots in the subdivision was $942,500, assuming that a
final coat of asphalt was applied to the subdivision. The lots were valued between $39,000 and
$60,000 each. Craig’s appraisal included an estimated 15 percent profit. He estimated an
absorption rate of five years, which meant that his appraisal assumed that all 20 lots would be
sold in five years. Craig’s appraisal valued the property as of December 8, 2008, and used
comparables from 2006 and 2007. Craig said that he would be comfortable extending his
appraisal to March 9, 2009, the date the Morrises regained possession of the property, but
“definitely would like to look at additional [sales] data that may have occurred” during that
approximately 90-day time period. Craig’s appraisal did not include lot 31, which contained the
parade home, but Craig agreed that the lot and home were worth $245,000, based on an offer that
Premer had received on the home.
The Morrises presented testimony from Dennis Goff, also a licensed real estate appraiser
who was recognized as an expert in that area. Goff’s appraisal report was also admitted into
evidence. Goff opined that the value of the 20 remaining lots in the subdivision was $586,000.
Goff estimated a 20-year absorption rate, given that there were 20 lots and one lot sold in 2007,
one lot sold in 2008, and zero lots sold in 2009. Goff’s appraisal valued the property as of
February 3, 2010, and primarily used comparables from 2009, with one comparable from 2008.
There were problems with both parties’ evidence regarding the value of the property.
First, both appraisals were based on a time period other than March 9, 2009, the date the
Morrises regained possession of the property. Craig’s appraisal was done approximately three
months earlier and Goff’s appraisal was done nearly a year later. Although Craig said he would
be comfortable extending his appraisal ahead three months, he also recognized that one would
need to assess the sales data during that interim time period in order to be accurate, which he did
not do. Second, the five-year absorption rate in Craig’s appraisal appears rather optimistic given
that one lot sold in 2007, one lot sold in 2008, and zero lots sold thereafter. Third, Craig’s
appraisal used comparables from 2006 and 2007. Thus, it did not take into account the
subsequent large decline in the housing market.
Moreover, in its claim of unjust enrichment, Premer fails to account for the $367,050 the
Morrises lent him to develop the subdivision. Premer additionally fails to account for the initial
value of the land itself, which the Morrises originally owned, and which was worth
approximately $400,000 based on the land contract. Premer also fails to account for the
$107,000 he received when he sold lot 17 and lot 18. The Morrises also paid more than $44,000
in outstanding construction liens after gaining ownership of the property. Premer simply
presents an appraisal that values the subdivision at $942,500, and ignores the fact that the
Morrises owned the property initially, lent Premer money to develop it, and paid outstanding
construction liens. It is not this Court’s duty to calculate for Premer all of these numbers in this
rather complex transaction, to retrace the circuit court’s steps in doing so, or to entertain
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plausible alternative interpretations of the evidence presented; the test is whether the court’s
finding was clearly erroneous, and Premer fails to show where clear error occurred. See Capitol
Props Group, LLC, 283 Mich App at 430; see also Radeljak v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 475 Mich
598, 649; 719 NW2d 40 (2006) (“A party may not simply announce a position and leave it to this
Court to find support for it.”)
In light of the expenses that the Morrises were saddled with, Premer has failed to show
that the physical improvements it made brought about a windfall situation. Moreover, given its
five-year absorption rate, the appraisal Premer presented appears rather optimistic and the circuit
court was justified in discounting it as such. Premer has failed to meet its burden of showing that
the court committed clear error in finding that the Morrises were not unjustly enriched by
Premer’s physical improvements to the property.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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