PEOPLE OF MI V LAWRENCE ANTWONE JACKSON (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 28, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 298420
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 10-000302-FC
LAWRENCE ANTWONE JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and O’CONNELL and SERVITTO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, MCL
750.529, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and receiving or concealing stolen property, MCL
750.535(4). He was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to
concurrent prison terms of 20 to 35 years for each robbery conviction, two to five years for the
felon in possession conviction, and one year for the receiving stolen property conviction, all to
be served consecutive to a two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. He
appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the robbery of Andre Hampton and Andrew Williams
outside a house where the two men were installing a door. The evidence indicated that defendant
was accompanied by one other man, while a third acted as a lookout, but only defendant pointed
a firearm at the complainants and demanded their belongings. After the robbery, Hampton
followed defendant to a house, the police were summoned, and they brought out four men from
that residence. Hampton and Williams both identified defendant as the person who robbed them
at gunpoint. The defense theory at trial was that the complainants’ identifications were
inconsistent and not credible.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to identify him as one of
the robbers. We disagree.
In ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a conviction,
this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven
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beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992),
amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising
from the evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v
Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325, 337; 553 NW2d 692 (1996). “[A] reviewing court
is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the [trier
of fact’s] verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
Identity is an essential element in a criminal prosecution, People v Oliphant, 399 Mich
472, 489; 250 NW2d 443 (1976), and the prosecution must prove the identity of the defendant as
the perpetrator of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Kern, 6 Mich App 406,
409-410; 149 NW2d 216 (1967). Positive identification by a witness may be sufficient to
support a conviction for a crime. People v Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617 NW2d 381
(2000). The credibility of the identification testimony is for the trier of fact to resolve and this
Court will not resolve it anew. Id.
In this case, both complainants had an opportunity to observe their assailant, and they
both positively and unequivocally identified defendant as the armed robber. Hampton testified
that as he was outside installing a side door at a home, defendant and a second man approached
him and defendant demanded his belongings while pointing a gun at him. He observed that
defendant was wearing a thin “short little mask” below his nose and a hooded sweatshirt, which
left his eyes, nose, and hairline clearly exposed. Hampton relinquished his wallet, $300, and his
cell phone, as directed. Williams was subsequently called outside and also emptied his pockets
at defendant’s direction. As defendant fled the scene on foot, defendant’s hood came off, giving
the complainants an opportunity to fully see defendant’s hair. As Hampton pursued the men,
intending to regain his identification, he observed the last of the men run into a particular house.
The police were summoned and arrived within minutes, Hampton pointed out the house, and the
police escorted four men from that house. Both Hampton and Williams immediately identified
defendant as the person who pointed a gun and robbed them.
Both complainants testified that they had no problems seeing their assailant during the
criminal episode. The robbery occurred as it was getting dark, but it was not yet fully dark.
Hampton testified that the area was “lit up.” According to both complainants, the area was
illuminated by lights on the side and front of the home, as well as a large, florescent drop light
that provided lighting through the opened side door. Hampton testified that he had an
opportunity to observe defendant for 15 or 20 minutes, and from a distance of approximately 12
to 15 feet; Williams had an opportunity to observe defendant from about six to eight feet. While
defendant wore a small mask and a hood, defendant’s nose, eyes, and hairline were exposed.
Both Williams and Hampton observed that defendant had distinctive “slanted” eyes, and thick
hair that was pushed back underneath his hood. After defendant’s hood came off, Hampton
observed that defendant had a “medium afro,” while Williams described defendant as having
“wild looking hair.” When defendant was subsequently brought out of the house, he was easily
recognizable to the complainants because of his distinctive eyes and hairstyle. Hampton and
Williams both testified that they had no doubt that defendant was the person who robbed them at
gunpoint. In addition, Hampton’s cash, credit cards, and cell phone were found in the basement
of the house in close proximity to defendant.
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Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to permit
a rational trier of fact to reasonably infer that defendant was the person who robbed the
complainants at gunpoint. Although defendant provides reasons why the trial court should not
have accepted the complainants’ identification, it was up to the trial court, as the trier of fact, to
evaluate the evidence and, for purposes of resolving defendant’s sufficiency challenge, this Court
is required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Wolfe, 440 Mich at
515. There was sufficient evidence of defendant’s identification to support his convictions for
armed robbery.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial in
numerous ways. Again, we disagree. Because defendant did not raise an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim in the trial court, our review of this issue is limited to mistakes apparent on the
record. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Sabin (On
Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). Effective assistance of
counsel is presumed and defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. People v
Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67,
69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for
counsel’s error. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713 (2007). Defendant must
also overcome the presumption that the challenged action or inaction was sound trial strategy.
People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996).
First, defendant makes a general claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
pursue defendant’s suggestions for cross-examining the witnesses, and for failing to visit him in
the “bullpen” during trial recesses to develop issues in the case. However, counsel’s decisions
about what questions to ask and what arguments to make are matters of trial strategy, which this
Court will not evaluate with the benefit of hindsight, People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601
NW2d 887 (1999), and mere disagreements with regard to trial strategy or professional judgment
do not establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
In a related claim, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately challenge the complainants’ identification testimony at trial. The record discloses
that, throughout the trial, trial counsel consistently and vigorously argued the primary defense
theory of misidentification. Defendant acknowledges trial counsel’s questions, but asserts that
counsel should have further “strenuously” questioned the complainants about their respective
locations, vantage points, and overall ability to observe without adequate lighting. In making
this claim, defendant ignores that codefendant’s counsel cross-examined the witnesses first, and
that the trial court specifically directed trial counsel not to “recreate the wheel” by covering the
same matters that were covered by codefendant’s counsel. Counsel specifically highlighted
problems with the complainants’ identification of defendant as one of the robbers, and elicited
testimony intended to undermine the reliability of the identification testimony. In closing
argument, trial counsel summarized the testimony and again argued that defendant’s
identification as one of the robbers was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. The record
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does not establish that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Frazier, 478 Mich at 243.
Defendant’s next ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to move to suppress the identification by Hampton. “An identification
procedure that is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification
constitutes a denial of due process.” People v Williams, 244 Mich App 533, 542; 624 NW2d 575
(2001). Here, defendant fails to explain why Hampton’s identification should be considered
improper or unduly suggestive, and our review of the record fails to disclose a pretrial
identification procedure that was improper or unduly suggestive. See People v Kurylczyk, 443
Mich 289, 302; 505 NW2d 528 (1993), and People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 466; 650
NW2d 700 (2002). Consequently, defendant has not demonstrated that defense counsel’s failure
to file a motion to suppress was objectively unreasonable, nor has he demonstrated a reasonable
probability that a motion to suppress would have been successful. Counsel was not required to
make a futile motion. See People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Defendant has also failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request the appointment of an investigator. A court-appointed investigator is not “automatically
mandatory but rather depends upon the need as revealed by the facts and circumstances of each
case.” People v Blackburn, 135 Mich App 509, 520-521; 354 NW2d 807 (1984) (citation
omitted). The trial court has discretion to determine whether an indigent defendant has
demonstrated that an investigator is necessary to ensure due process, and a defendant’s reasons
cannot rest on “pure conjecture.” People v Johnson, 245 Mich App 243, 260; 631 NW2d 1
(2001). Here, defendant does not specify what helpful or valuable information needed to be
obtained by an investigator. Consequently, defendant has not shown that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request an investigator. Snider, 239 Mich App at 425.
III. PROPORTIONALITY
We reject defendant’s claim that he is entitled to resentencing because his sentence is
disproportionate. Defendant’s sentences for his robbery convictions are within the sentencing
guidelines range of 135 to 450 months. This Court must affirm a sentence within the guidelines
range absent an error in the scoring of the guidelines or reliance on inaccurate information in
determining the sentence. MCL 769.34(10); People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310-311; 684
NW2d 669 (2004). On appeal, defendant has not demonstrated that the guidelines were
erroneously scored or that the trial court relied on inaccurate information. Accordingly, this
Court must affirm his sentences.
IV. BLAKELY V WASHINGTON
Defendant lastly argues that he must be resentenced because the trial court’s factual
findings supporting its scoring of the sentencing guidelines were not determined by a jury,
contrary to Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). We
disagree. In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court struck down as violative of the Sixth
Amendment a determinate sentencing scheme in which the sentencing judge was allowed to
increase the defendant’s maximum sentence on the basis of facts that were not reflected in the
jury’s verdict or admitted by the defendant. Our Supreme Court has determined that Blakely
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does not apply to Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme, in which a defendant’s
maximum sentence is set by statute and the sentencing guidelines affect only the minimum
sentence. People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 676; 739 NW2d 563 (2007); People v Drohan, 475
Mich 140, 162-164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006); People v Claypool, 470 Mich 715, 730 n 14; 684
NW2d 278 (2004). Although defendant argues that these cases were wrongly decided, this Court
is bound to follow decisions of our Supreme Court. People v Hall, 249 Mich App 262, 270; 643
NW2d 253 (2002).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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