PEOPLE OF MI V WALTER BANKS JR (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 30, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 298168
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 07-030096-FH
WALTER BANKS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 298169
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 07-030095-FH
MARC BRENNON BANKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and MARKEY and K. F. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In docket number 298168, defendant, Walter Banks, Jr., appeals as of right his jury trial
convictions for assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer causing injury, MCL
750.81d(2), and disarming a police officer (non-firearm), MCL 750.479b(1). Walter Banks was
sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to three years’ probation with the first
year to be served in prison. In docket number 298169, codefendant, Marc Brennon Banks,
appeals as of right his jury trial conviction for aiding and abetting Walter Banks in resisting and
obstructing a police officer causing injury, MCL 750.81d(2). Marc Banks was sentenced as a
third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to three years’ probation, the first year to be served in
prison. We affirm, but remand for resentencing with regard to Walter Banks.
I. BASIC FACTS
This case concerns a disturbance at Marc Banks’ home early in the morning on
September 2, 2007. Buena Vista Police Officer Jamie Villanueva was working alone , when she
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responded to a complaint about loud noise at 1801 Ribble Street in Buena Vista Township. At
the time, she was carrying a .40 glock firearm, a taser, pepper spray, two pairs of handcuffs, and
a baton. Upon arrival at the house in her police vehicle at 3:45 a.m., Villanueva heard loud
music and saw young teenagers standing in the yard. Villanueva exited the police car and told
the kids to get the homeowner. Eventually, Marc Banks and Walter Banks came out of the rear
of the house. Villanueva told them that they needed to turn their music down and the kids
needed to remain in the house because of the late hour. Marc Banks replied that he did not need
to do anything. Marc Banks and Villanueva began yelling at each other. Seeing neighbors
emerging from their homes, Villanueva advised Marc Banks and Walter Banks that they needed
to lower their voices because they were making a scene. Villanueva also called for back-up.
Villanueva advised Marc Banks that she was placing him under arrest for a drunk and
disorderly charge. Villanueva tried to put the handcuffs on Marc Banks, but she was only able
to place one before Marc Banks started putting up a fight. Walter Banks had a cell phone and
began recording the arrest of Marc Banks. When Villanueva had one cuff on Marc Banks,
codefendant, Nancy Estep,1 came out of the house and began yelling at Villanueva and telling
her not to arrest Marc Banks. Estep swung her arms at Villanueva and tried to pull her away
from Marc Banks. Walter Banks joined Estep in trying to prevent the arrest of Marc Banks.
Villanueva fought with all three, and she successfully handcuffed Marc Banks. After
handcuffing Marc Banks, Villanueva used her taser on him four times because he continued to
fight back. Eventually, Villanueva forced Marc Banks to the ground with the taser. Estep and
Walter Banks continued swinging their fists at Villanueva, and Walter Banks grabbed
Villanueva. Villanueva tried to taser Walter Banks, but inadvertently tasered Estep in the
mouth. Afterward, Estep returned to the house. Villanueva used pepper spray on Walter Banks,
but he still got hold of the taser and threw it on the ground. Walter Banks also forced Villanueva
to the ground by grabbing her around the waist. Eventually, while Villanueva was struggling
with Walter Banks, back-up police officers arrived.
Bridgeport Township Police Officer Justin Walker responded to Villanueva’s call for
help. Upon arrival, Walker witnessed Villanueva and Walter Banks fighting. Walker told
Walter Banks to stop or he was going to use a taser on him. Walker proceeded to taser Walter
Banks. Walter Banks fell to the ground and refused to follow Walker’s instructions. Walker
tasered him again. In total, Walker tasered Walter Banks four times.
Saginaw Police Officer Jonathan Brown also responded to Villanueva’s call for back-up.
Brown arrived at the scene at 3:51 a.m., and he saw Villanueva and Walker attempting to
handcuff Walter Banks. Villanueva asked Brown to go into the house and arrest Estep, which he
did.
After being tasered by Villanueva, Marc Banks remained on the ground for a while.
Eventually, while Villanueva and Walker were attempting “to subdue” Walter Banks, Marc
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Estep was tried with Walter Banks and Marc Banks and was convicted of assaulting, resisting
or obstructing a police officer. There is no indication that she filed an appeal in her case.
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Banks stood up, told Villanueva to come and catch him, and ran off. As he was running, Marc
Banks tripped and fell on his face. To control Marc Banks, Brown tasered him.
As a result of the struggle with Walter Banks and Marc Banks, Villanueva suffered neck,
back, and elbow “abrasions” and a bruise on her hip. She obtained medical treatment at Saint
Mary’s Hospital. She was unable to work for a month.
Walter Banks’ and Marc Banks’ descriptions of what occurred early in the morning on
September 2, 2007, vary significantly from the police officers’ accounts. Walter Banks testified
that in May 2007, he had an accident in which all the tendons in his left wrist were severed,
making it impossible for him to do the things Villanueva ascribed to him in the morning of
September 2, 2007. He denied taking the taser from Villanueva, grabbing her, or wrestling with
her. Similarly, Marc Banks claimed that he did not provoke Villanueva and, upon his arrest, he
complied with Villanueva’s commands by putting his hands behind his back. According to Marc
Banks, Villanueva tasered him four times even though he was in handcuffs and was not fighting
back. Marc Banks further denied telling Villanueva that she should try and catch him when he
was running away. Mariah Banks, Marc Banks’ daughter, also testified that Marc Banks
complied with Villanueva’s demands. She claimed that Marc Banks never raised his voice or
yelled profanities at Villanueva. She also testified that Walter Banks did not wrestle with
Villanueva.
Marc Banks and Walter Banks were convicted as charged. Marc Banks and Walter
Banks now appeal.
II. DOCKET NUMBER 298169
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Marc Banks argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
aiding and abetting Walter Banks into resisting and obstructing a police officer. When analyzing
a claim based on insufficient evidence, we review the record de novo. People v Cline, 276 Mich
App 634, 642; 741 NW2d 563 (2007). We view the evidence “in a light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The elements of the offense of assaulting, resisting or obstructing a police officer are:
“(1) the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered a
police officer, and (2) the defendant knew or had reason to know that the person that the
defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered was a
police officer performing his duties.” People v Corr, 287 Mich App 499, 502; 788 NW2d 860
(2010). Aiding and abetting is not a separate offense, but is a theory which “permits the
imposition of vicarious liability on accomplices.” People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 6; 715 NW2d
44 (2006); see MCL 767.39. To establish aiding and abetting, a prosecutor must show that:
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(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2)
the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission
of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had
knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that [the
defendant] gave the aid and encouragement. [People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
757-758; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).]
Marc Banks contends that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that he
performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime and that he
intended the commission of the crime when giving the aid and encouragement. We disagree.
Marc Banks is correct that at the time Walter Banks and Villanueva were wrestling, he was
handcuffed on the ground. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, it is clear that Marc Banks aided and abetted Walter Banks when he called out to
Villanueva while she was still attempting to control Walter Banks and told her to come and get
him and then ran off. Such an act by Marc Banks allowed Walter Banks to further obstruct
Villanueva from her job and showed intent to aid Walter Banks. As a result, there was sufficient
evidence to convict Marc Banks of aiding and abetting Walter Banks into resisting and
obstructing a police officer.
B. SPEEDY TRIAL
Marc Banks also asserts on appeal that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. We
disagree. We review unpreserved claims of constitutional error for plain error affecting
substantial rights. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 27; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
Both the United States and the Michigan Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to
a speedy trial. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. The right is also protected by statute
and court rule. MCL 768.1; MCR 6.004(A). In determining whether a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial, a court must consider: “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the
reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the
defendant.” People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 261-262; 716 NW2d 208 (2006).
In determining whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, the
pertinent period commences on the date of the defendant's arrest. Id. at 261. If the total delay
was under 18 months, the burden is on the defendant to prove that he suffered prejudice, while a
delay which exceeds 18 months is presumed to be prejudicial, and the burden is on the
prosecutor to rebut that presumption. People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 665; 780 NW2d
321 (2009). In this case, Marc Banks was arrested on September 2, 2007, but his trial did not
begin until March 18, 2010. The delay between Marc Banks’ arrest and the first day of his trial
was more than 30 months. As a result, the prosecution must rebut the presumption that Marc
Banks was not prejudiced as a result of the delay.
In determining whether a delay violated a defendant's right to a speedy trial, when
assessing the reasons for the delay, a court must examine whether each period of delay is
attributable to the prosecutor or to the defendant. Id. at 666. Unexplained delays, scheduling
delays and docket congestion are charged against the prosecutor, but scheduling and congestion
delays inherent in the court system are assigned only minimal weight when deciding whether a
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violation of a speedy trial right occurred. Id. In this case, the majority of the delay occurred as a
result of docket congestion and scheduling delays. Other delay occurred because one of Marc
Banks’ codefendants needed surgery. None of the delay occurred as a result of Marc Banks.
While the majority of the delay is attributable to the prosecution, we give it only minimal weight
in determining if there was a violation of the right to speedy trial because it primarily occurred as
a result of docket congestion and scheduling delays.
A defendant's failure to assert his right to a speedy trial in a timely manner weighs
against a finding that he was denied a speedy trial. People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 112;
503 NW2d 701 (1993). In this case, Marc Banks concedes that he did not assert his right to a
speedy trial before the trial court and, therefore, this factor weighs against finding a violation of
the right to a speedy trial.
Two types of prejudice arise from delay in commencement of trial: prejudice to the
defendant's person and prejudice to the defense. Williams, 475 Mich at 264. “Prejudice to the
defense is the more serious concern.” Id. In this case, there is no indication that Marc Banks
suffered any prejudice, either to his person or to his defense, as a result of the delay. Marc Banks
was on bond during the period between his arrest and his trial and so did not suffer prejudice to
his person. Moreover, based on the record, there is no indication that the defense presented by
Marc Banks was in any way affected by the delay. Marc Banks argues that the prosecution used
the delay to question the memories of defense witnesses and to argue that they had time to get
their stories straight. There is no evidence, however, that this affected the outcome of the case.
Moreover, such arguments could also have been made by defendants with regard to the
testimony of the police officers. Further, there is no evidence that key witnesses became
unavailable as a result of the delay. Even though the burden was on the prosecution to rebut the
presumption of prejudice, we conclude that there was no evidence whatsoever of prejudice and,
as a result, Marc Banks was not denied his right to a speedy trial.
III. DOCKET NUMBER 298168
A. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Walter Banks contends that he is entitled to a new trial as a result of prosecutorial
misconduct. We disagree. “Unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for
plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights.” People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App
635, 645; 672 NW2d 860 (2003). To show plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial
rights, the defendant must prove prejudice occurred, meaning that “the error must have affected
the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id.
Prosecutors are afforded “great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct.” People
v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). They
may argue the evidence and any reasonable inferences from the evidence related to their theory
of the case. Id. A prosecutor, however, may not vouch for the credibility of his witnesses to the
effect that he has some special knowledge concerning a witness's truthfulness. People v Seals,
285 Mich App 1, 22; 776 NW2d 314 (2009). A prosecutor's remarks should be evaluated in
context, in light of defense counsel's arguments and the relationship these comments bear to the
admitted evidence. Id.
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Walter Banks contends that the following comments by the prosecutor were inappropriate
because he improperly told the jury that defendants were lying:
To believe what they’ve told, ladies and gentlemen, you have to believe that
Officer Villanueva goes over there and decides here’s a couple of guys I’ll pick a
fight with, what the heck, I got no backup, well, I’m a police officer; that’s what
you would have to believe.
And then you’d have to continue to believe that all the rest of the officers
also get in on this. Hey, what the heck? Let’s go gang up. She’s already got the
situation started. We will go there. We’ll use our tasers, too.
Bridgeport, Saginaw County Sheriff’s Department, one of her colleagues,
Shawntina Austin, also with the Buena Vista Township Police Department, racing
from Tuscola County to get there because, boy, this is going to be fun. We will
all get in on this. That’s what you would have to believe if Marc and Walter
Banks are to be believed.
Ladies and gentlemen, that makes no sense at all. It makes no sense that
Officer Villanueva had nothing better to do than to go pick a fight with a couple
of men.
Walter Banks also argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the police
officers. The prosecutor further argued to the jury in rebuttal:
Did the police lie? I would never stand here and tell you that police
officers are different from everybody else, that they never lie, but if they lied in
this situation, here’s what had to have happened. [sic]
Officer Villanueva had to go there to pick a fight with a couple of guys
alone without backup. You then had to get different departments to go in on this
with her, so somehow the sheriff’s department’s got to decide, well, we’ll go
along with Buena Vista on this and back up this lie. Bridgeport Township has to
get involved; we are going to back it up, too. No, that doesn’t make any sense,
ladies and gentlemen. It makes no sense whatsoever.
We conclude that these remarks by the prosecutor were not improper. The prosecutor
was not indicating to the jury that he had some special knowledge that defendants were lying and
the police officers were telling the truth. Instead, the prosecutor argued the evidence in the
record and the inferences that were required if defendants’ testimony was to be believed. Such
arguments were proper, and the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct.
Walter Banks further contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by shifting the
burden of proof from the prosecution to defendants. A prosecutor may not imply in closing
argument that the defendant must prove something or present a reasonable explanation for
damaging evidence, or comment on the defendant’s failure to present evidence; such arguments
impermissibly shift the burden of proof. People v Fyda, 288 Mich App 446, 463-464; 793
NW2d 712 (2010). The prosecutor stated in this case:
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If you really think there’s something on [the cell phone], if he really
thought there was something that would help out, then he could provide the code
to it. That’s within his control.
Taken alone, this statement might have been improper. However, taken in context, these
remarks were a proper response to the closing argument made by counsel for Walter Banks, who
stated:
Now, let’s add another dimension to this case, the cell phone. Mr. Banks
was holding his cell phone in the good hand, which is the right hand here. We got
the bad hand, which is the left hand. Now, you saw the taser video, and he was
clearly holding the phone for dear life with that good hand.
***
Now, it’s very convenient that Officer Villanueva’s taser has no camera
until Officer Walker gets there and begins tasing Mr. Banks, there would be no
account of this incident, but here we go again. The camera is located on the cell
phone that Mr. Banks is holding in the good hand, and he makes an
announcement that I’m recording this incident while his brother’s being arrested.
If you’re engaged in so many activities that you don’t want people to
know about, you certainly don’t want them to have an opportunity to see it for
themselves. If you come there with an attitude already and then you’re
confronted with the issue of being videotaped, hmm, you’re going to be
instructed, and we talked about this in voir dire, that a police officer’s testimony is
to be evaluated in the same manner that anybody else’s testimony is evaluated.
Simple because that person is a police officer, that doesn’t give that testimony any
more value or weight.
Walter Banks’ counsel is clearly arguing that the cell phone video taken by Walter Banks
contained exculpatory evidence and, for that reason, the prosecution and the police did not want
the jury to see it. It was proper for the prosecutor to highlight, in response to counsel’s
argument, that Walter Banks, and not the police, had control over the access codes to the phone.
The prosecutor’s rebuttal argument did not improperly shift the burden to defendants; it merely
responded to counsel’s argument.
Finally, Walter Banks contends that the prosecutor mischaracterized the testimony. “A
prosecutor may not make a statement of fact to the jury which is unsupported by evidence[.]”
People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 450; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). In this case, Walter Banks
argues that following statements were not supported by the evidence:
Walter Banks said he never touched anybody. Well, that’s not what the other
officers said when they arrived. Even they said they saw Walter Banks engaged –
literally engaged with Officer Villanueva, that they actually tumbled off this stoop
or this little porch, whatever you want to call it, on the ground.
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Walter Banks concedes that at least one officer, Walker, testified that when he arrived at the
scene he saw Walter Banks and Villanueva wrestling. However, no other officers besides
Villanueva testified that they saw Walter Banks and Villanueva physically engaged. The
prosecutor’s argument, therefore, was only partially supported by the record. However, such a
minor error did not amount to plain error affecting Walter Banks’ substantial rights.
Walter Banks further testified that the following remarks were not supported by the
evidence in the record:
Here’s Miss Estep now grabbing on her arm. Now, at least she has enough sense
at some point, I guess, to back off and go back to the house. There doesn’t seem
to be any dispute about all of that, although [Estep] seemed to claim she was
never outside. You can believe that or not.
Walter Banks contends that this was a misstatement of the evidence because Estep did not testify
and could not have claimed that she remained in the house. Walter Banks is correct that Estep
did not testify, but Estep’s counsel made statements and asked questions on her behalf claiming
that Estep never left the house. During his opening statement, Estep’s counsel stated, “It may
surprise you because I believe the testimony is going to show that my client, Ms. Nancy Estep,
never left the house. Multiple witnesses may, in fact, testify to that.” Estep’s counsel asked
Walter Banks if he ever saw Estep outside the house and Walter Banks testified that he did not
recall seeing her outside the house. Estep’s counsel also asked Mariah Banks if she saw Estep
outside of the house that night and Mariah Banks testified in the negative. The prosecutor’s
remark was, therefore, proper based on the statements and questions of Estep’s counsel.
Even if the statements of the prosecutor were improper, they were cured by the trial
court’s instructions to the jury. An improper argument by a prosecutor may be cured by a
cautionary instruction that the arguments of counsel are not evidence. See People v Stimage, 202
Mich App 28, 30; 507 NW2d 778 (1993). In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that it
was to decide the facts based on the evidence and “[t]he lawyers’ statement and arguments are
not evidence. They are only meant to help you understand the evidence and each side’s legal
theories.” The instruction cured any harm caused by the prosecutor’s statements.
B. SENTENCING
Walter Banks also argues that the trial court erred when it failed to respond to his
objections to the presentence investigation report (PSIR). We agree. A trial court’s response to a
claim of inaccuracy in a presentence report is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v
Lucey, 287 Mich App 267, 275; 787 NW2d 133 (2010).
A sentencing court must respond to challenges to the accuracy of information in a
presentence report, but it has wide latitude in responding to these challenges. Id. “The trial court
may determine that the challenged information is accurate, accept the defendant’s version, or
disregard the challenged information as irrelevant.” Id. If the court chooses to disregard the
challenged information, it must indicate on the record that it did not consider the information
when fashioning the sentence, and must strike the information from the report. Id.
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In this case, Walter Banks objected to a criminal conviction that appeared in the PSIR.
Walter Banks stated that the charge against him was dismissed and the charge was for conspiracy
to commit larceny and was not a drinking and driving offense. The trial court did not address
Walter Banks’ objection and did not explicitly state whether it considered the criminal
conviction at issue when it sentenced Walter Banks. Because the trial court did not respond to
the objection and indicate whether it was considering it, we remand this case for resentencing of
Walter Banks to consider his previous objections.2
IV. ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Marc Banks and Walter Banks both argue that they were denied the effective assistance
of counsel. We disagree. Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of
counsel presents a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. Seals, 285 Mich App at 17.
Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, but the rulings on questions of law are reviewed de
novo. Id. As defendants did not establish a testimonial record regarding their ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v
Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant has the burden of proving
otherwise. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). Generally, to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s
performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 688, 694; 104 S
Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713 (2007).
A. FAILURE TO OBTAIN CELL PHONE VIDEO
Marc Banks and Walter Banks contend that counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate and obtain the video recording that Walter Banks captured on his cell phone. We
disagree. The failure to make a reasonable investigation can constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 625; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). However, this
Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of strategy, and there
is a presumption that defense attorney’s actions were based on reasonable trial strategy. Cline,
276 Mich App at 637.
In this case, neither Walter Banks nor Marc Banks has overcome the presumption that
defense counsels’ failure to obtain the video from the police was a matter of trial strategy.
Although Walter Banks and Marc Banks testified that Villanueva acted without instigation, there
was significant evidence from the testimony of Villanueva that Walter Banks and Marc Banks
2
Because we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to respond to Walter Banks’ objection
and the case should be remanded for resentencing, we need not reach Walter Banks’ argument
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to demand a response from the trial court to the
objection in the PSIR.
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were extremely combative towards Villanueva and physically assaulted her. The cell phone
video may not have corroborated Walter Banks and Marc Banks’ version of events, but, instead,
might have supported Villanueva’s account. As a result, the video could have been used by the
prosecution against Walter Banks and Marc Banks, and, for that reason, it was reasonable trial
strategy for defense counsel not to pursue the video. Walter Banks and Marc Banks were not
denied the effective assistance of counsel by the failure of their defense counsel to obtain the
video.
B. FAILURE TO REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION
Marc Banks further posits that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by
counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction concerning the cell phone evidence. According to
Marc Banks, defense counsel should have requested an instruction that the jury was allowed to
infer that the video was unfavorable to the prosecution given the prosecution’s failure to present
the video as evidence. We disagree. “Jury instructions must include all the elements of the
offenses charged against the defendant and any material issues, defenses, and theories that are
supported by the evidence.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 82; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
In this case, there is no indication that the instruction Marc Banks believes should have
been requested was supported by the evidence. Police Detective Greg Klecker testified that he
was never given access codes to view the video on the cell phone and never saw the video from
the cell phone. As a result, there was no indication that the prosecution was not showing the
video because the video evidence was unfavorable to it. In fact, if the video was favorable to
defendants and unfavorable to the prosecution and the prosecution knew that, the prosecution
would have violated its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence by not providing that evidence to
the defense. See People v Fink, 456 Mich 449, 453-454; 574 NW2d 28 (1998) (“Under due
process principles, the prosecution is obligated to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the
defendant and material to the determination of guilt or punishment”). The instruction was not
supported by the evidence. Giving the instruction would have implied that the prosecution acted
illegally. Moreover, it would have been futile for defense counsel to have requested the
instruction. Accordingly, Marc Banks’ argument that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel by counsel’s failure to request this instruction is without merit.
C. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Walter Banks posits that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by counsel’s
failure to object to the prosecutor’s remarks discussed in section III.A. supra. We disagree.
Counsel is not ineffective by failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection.
People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). In this case, the prosecutor
did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct and, as a result, defense counsel was not ineffective
for failing to object to the prosecutorial misconduct.
D. MISCELLANEOUS TRIAL ERRORS
Walter Banks further argues that the defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
demand a separate trial from codefendants, Marc Banks and Estep, and for failing to subpoena
Walter Banks’ eyewitness. Walter Banks has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by
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the lack of a separate trial. Moreover, Walter Banks has provided no information about the
alleged eyewitness. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Walter Banks was not
denied the effective assistance of counsel on these grounds.
Affirmed, but remand for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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