MARY O DENNIS V HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARY O. DENNIS,
UNPUBLISHED
July 28, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 298103
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-022781-NH
HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM, d/b/a
HENRY FORD HOSPITAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and FITZGERALD and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action for medical malpractice, defendant appeals by leave granted from a circuit
court order denying its motion for summary disposition that was brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7) (statute of limitations). We reverse.
The material facts are not disputed. The alleged malpractice occurred on May 2, 2006,
when plaintiff had a colonoscopy at Henry Ford Hospital. On September 11, 2008, while
plaintiff was hospitalized for another issue, a group of doctors informed her, in the presence of
her daughter, that she had colon cancer that had existed for at least five years. When plaintiff
asked the doctors why the cancer was not detected when she had her colonoscopy in 2006, they
did not answer. At her deposition, plaintiff agreed that as of September 11, 2008, she “had a
question in [her] mind as to why this cancer had not been diagnosed through the colonoscopy in
2006[.]” More than six months later, plaintiff’s attorney served defendant with a NOI
concerning the May 2, 2006, colonoscopy. The NOI is dated March 19, 2008. Plaintiff filed her
complaint on September 16, 2009.
Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s action was
barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed more than two years after the alleged
malpractice, MCL 600.5805(6), and more than six months after plaintiff discovered or should
have discovered the existence of her claim, MCL 600.5838a(2). Plaintiff did not dispute that her
action was filed more than two years after the alleged malpractice, but argued that it was timely
under the six-month discovery provision. The trial court rejected defendant’s argument that the
six-month discovery period began to run on September 11, 2008, when plaintiff was informed
that she had colon cancer that had been present for at least five years based on its size, and
inquired why it had not been discovered two years previously. Rather, the court ruled that the
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period did not commence until plaintiff was released from the hospital on September 23, 2008,
because she was not in a position to pursue any claim before that date. Because plaintiff served
her NOI less than six months later, and the NOI tolled the limitations period, the trial court
denied defendant’s motion.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Summary disposition may be
granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) when a claim is barred because of the statute of
limitations. “If the pleadings or other documentary evidence reveal no genuine issues of material
fact, the court must decide as a matter of law whether the claim is statutorily barred.” Holmes v
Mich Capital Med Ctr, 242 Mich App 703, 706; 620 NW2d 319 (2000).
“In general, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must bring [a] claim within two
years of when the claim accrued or within six months of when he [or she] discovered, or should
have discovered, [the] claim.” Solowy v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 454 Mich 214, 219; 561 NW2d
843 (1997); MCL 600.5805(6); MCL 600.5838a(2). The parties do not dispute that plaintiff
failed to bring her claim within two years after it accrued. Rather, the parties agree that the
timeliness of plaintiff’s action depends on the six-month discovery rule in MCL 600.5838a(2),
which states:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an action involving a
claim based on medical malpractice may be commenced at any time within the
applicable period prescribed in section 5805 or sections 5851 to 5856, or within 6
months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the
claim, whichever is later. However, except as otherwise provided in section
5851(7) or (8), the claim shall not be commenced later than 6 years after the date
of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim. The burden of proving that
the plaintiff, as a result of physical discomfort, appearance, condition, or
otherwise, neither discovered nor should have discovered the existence of the
claim at least 6 months before the expiration of the period otherwise applicable to
the claim is on the plaintiff. A medical malpractice action that is not commenced
within the time prescribed by this subsection is barred. . . . [Emphasis added.]
“[T]he discovery rule period begins to run when, on the basis of objective facts, the plaintiff
should have known of a possible cause of action.” Solowy, 454 Mich at 222. “‘Once a claimant
is aware of an injury and its possible cause, the plaintiff is aware of a possible cause of action.’”
Id., quoting Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 23-24; 506 NW2d 816 (1993) (emphasis
omitted). The standard “does not require that the plaintiff know that the injury [], in the form of
the advancement of the disease process, was in fact or even likely caused by the defendant
doctors’ alleged omissions.” Solowy, 454 Mich at 224.
There is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff actually discovered the existence
of her claim on September 11, 2008, when doctors informed her that she had colon cancer in a
size indicative of its existence for five years. Her question concerning the failure to diagnosis
the cancer during the 2006 colonoscopy demonstrates that she “was armed with the requisite
knowledge to diligently pursue her claims.” Solowy, 454 Mich at 225. Plaintiff’s arguments that
she did not “genuinely” know of her cause of action until after “reflection and consultation with
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other medical authority(ies)” is incompatible with the statute and Solowy. Plaintiff discovered
her cause of action on September 11, 2008, which is more than six months before she filed her
NOI.
The trial court and parties may have confused the discovery rule with a tolling provision.
Under some circumstances, the running of limitations periods may be tolled, generally for the
purpose of protecting people under certain kinds of disabilities that preclude them from being
able to commence a suit. See Klida v Braman, 278 Mich App 60, 71; 748 NW2d 244 (2008).
For example, the Legislature has addressed a claimant’s inability to pursue a claim in provisions
such as MCL 600.5851 (the insanity saving provision), MCL 418.381 (incapacity under the
Worker’s Disability Compensation Act), and MCL 691.1404(3) (incapacity to provide requisite
notice under the defective highway exception to governmental immunity). Even if the discovery
rule contained an incapacity provision, which it does not, plaintiff actually discovered her cause
of action. As it is, we do not agree that plaintiff was disabled or incapacitated within the
meaning of any tolling provision merely because she was hospitalized. Nothing in the record
indicates that she was, for example, in a coma, declared incompetent or insane, medicated to the
point of obliviousness, incommunicado, or otherwise unable to take any steps to protect or
pursue her rights.1 Even if the trial court and the parties had properly identified the issue as one
of tolling rather than discovery, no basis exists here for tolling the period within which to file
suit.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiff’s NOI was not served until more than six
months after plaintiff discovered or should have discovered on September 11, 2008, that she had
a claim for malpractice arising from the May 2006 colonoscopy. Accordingly, the six-month
discovery period had already expired by the time the NOI was served. The trial court erred in
denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
1
There may be a number of other possible reasons why a person might realistically be unable to
pursue a claim. We do not purport to decide what those situations might be. We merely hold
that it is not per se enough just to be hospitalized, as the trial court apparently found.
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