PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN HENRY GRANDERSON (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 25, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 297838
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 09-032961-FH
JOHN HENRY GRANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and FITZGERALD and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of receiving or concealing a stolen
firearm, MCL 750.535b, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felonyfirearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of nine months to two
years’ imprisonment for the stolen firearm conviction, and two years for the felony-firearm
conviction, to be served consecutively. Defendant appeals as of right. We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant’s receiving or concealing a stolen firearm conviction stems from the theft in
February 2009 of six weapons owned by Robert and Shelia Burk—two rifles, an AR-15 and an
“AK-47 style,” as well as four handguns, a Springfield XD-9 (a 9-millimeter), a Springfield XD45 (a .45), a Walther P-22, and a Ruger SP101 (a .357). The theft was detected on February 13,
2009, when the owner of the home where the weapons were stored in a gun safe discovered his
home had been burglarized.
Several of the weapons were ultimately used in shootings on February 24, 2009 at
Bridgeport High School, and on March 5, 2009 in Saginaw, Michigan. The Springfield XD-45,
Springfield XD-9, and Ruger .357 were recovered by police from a vehicle after a fight at BASE
alternative school in Bridgeport on February 26, 2009. The car from which they were recovered
was registered to codefendant Aaron Smith’s parents. The “AK-47 style” rifle was recovered
from a backyard after the March 5, 2009 shooting.
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Officers investigating these incidents became aware of photographs posted on MySpace
of Alontae Smith, Aaron’s Smith’s brother, holding the rifle. The user’s profile name was “King
Lontae.”1 According to statements made by “King Lontae” on MySpace, the photographs of the
weapons were removed because “[t]hey were aware that the police were looking into it.”
The police then obtained a search warrant for Alontae Smith’s home because:
Alontae Smith’s name came up in the shots fired, in the fight at the high
school, and the fact that both Alontae Smith and Aaron Smith were arrested in
Bridgeport where the three recovered handguns were found by Bridgeport where
the three recovered handguns were found by Bridgeport Township officers.
In light of the pictures that had been posted on the internet that showed a room and some
individuals, including Aaron Smith, holding weapons, the police were looking for both
photographs and weapons.
Aaron and Alontae Smith were both at the home when the warrant was executed, as were
their parents and another brother. The room in the pictures turned out to be Aaron Smith’s
bedroom. It was located in the basement and was easily identifiable because it was bright red
with black blinds. No weapons were found in the room, but a camera, cell phone, laptop, and
other items were seized from the home. The camera was taken from Aaron Smith’s pants’
pocket. The computer was retrieved from Aaron Smith’s bedroom. The computer was believed
to be Aaron Smith’s because his father called “wanting to know when I [Alontae] was going to
be finished with the computer because Aaron needed it back for school.”
The prosecution admitted pictures into evidence that had been on the camera. The people
in the photographs, one of whom was defendant, appeared to be posing and an officer indicated
that the fingers they were holding up were gang signs. One of the photographs was of Alontae
Smith holding the “AK-47 style” rifle with codefendant Clarence Thomas on the bed apparently
reaching out for it. The photographs had what appeared to be a date-stamp of 3/1/09, but no one
was certain whether that was when the pictures were taken.
Although defendant appeared in the photographs, the officers were unfamiliar with him,
so a photograph was broadcast on several television stations to ask for help determining his
identification. That information led the police to defendant. Defendant’s mother, Lorise
Granderson, identified defendant in two photographs in which he was holding a firearm. She
testified that defendant was 19 at the time of the photograph, that she had not seen the firearm
before, and that she had not known him to own or purchase such a weapon.
Defendant, Clarence Thomas, and Aaron Smith were all tried together before a single
jury. Each defendant stated on the record that he did not want to testify. Each was charged with
1
It appears that the photograph was actually the user-profile’s icon and, therefore, was extremely
small, but had the same background (i.e. Aaron Smith’s bedroom) as the other photographs.
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receiving or concealing stolen property and felony-firearm. The jury found Clarence Thomas not
guilty, but found defendant and Aaron Smith both guilty on both counts.
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial making the same arguments he now makes on
appeal, namely that there was insufficient evidence that defendant knew the weapon was stolen,
that the standard provided to the jury that defendant “knew or should have known” was
improper, and that, because there was no evidence that defendant did not steal the weapon, there
was insufficient evidence that he received the firearm. The trial court denied defendant’s
motion. Defendant now appeals.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. We
disagree. We review de novo a claim of insufficient evidence, taking the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v ShermanHuffman, 241 Mich App 264, 265; 615 NW2d 776 (2000), aff’d 466 Mich 39 (2002).
“Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to establish
the elements of a crime. Minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove an actor’s state
of mind.” People v Fennell, 260 Mich App 261, 270; 677 NW2d 66 (2004).
Defendant was charged under MCL 750.535b(2), which provides:
A person who receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, disposes of,
pledges, or accepts as security for a loan a stolen firearm or stolen ammunition,
knowing that the firearm or ammunition was stolen, is guilty of a felony,
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or by a fine of not more
than $5,000.00, or both.
Thus, the elements the prosecution was required to prove in this case were “that defendant (1)
received, [or] concealed . . . (2) a stolen firearm . . . (3) knowing that the firearm . . . was stolen.”
People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 593; 677 NW2d 1 (2004).
Defendant argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence of the first and
third elements. That is, instead of showing receipt or concealment, the prosecution simply
showed mere possession, and instead of actual knowledge, it showed simply that defendant had
reason to know or reason to believe that the weapon was stolen, which was insufficient.
Looking first at defendant’s argument regarding receiving or concealing versus mere
possession, the evidence in this case consisted of two photographs showing defendant holding
the rifle while in the bedroom of his codefendant Aaron Smith. Defendant argues that this is
simply evidence of possession, not receiving. We disagree. Under CJI 26.2(2), “[t]o receive
means to accept possession of property.” Here, defendant has conceded possessing the weapon.
In addition, there were photographs of other individuals holding the rife, leading to the
reasonable inference that defendant accepted possession of the rifle from someone else.
Therefore, there was sufficient evidence of defendant’s receiving the stolen rifle.
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Defendant contends that, absent evidence showing he was not the thief, he cannot be
found guilty of receiving the property. Although that was previously the rule, see People v
Kyllonen, 402 Mich 135; 262 NW2d 2 (1978), in People v Hastings, 422 Mich 267; 373 NW2d
533 (1985), our Supreme Court held that the Legislature’s amendment to the general receiving or
concealing statute, immediately following the decision in Kyllonen, to include possession and
concealment to the statute, evidenced an intent to permit a thief to also be charged under the
receiving or concealing statute. Hastings, 422 Mich at 268-272. All of the cases cited by
defendant in his brief in support of his proposition all predate Hastings and, therefore, are
inapplicable.
Defendant does not cite Hastings, but does recognize the Legislature’s 1979 amendment
to the general receiving or concealing statute. Defendant argues that the amendment is
inapplicable because the amendment added the word “possesses,” which was not added to MCL
750.535b. There are two problems with this argument. First, MCL 750.535b was added in 1991,
after Hastings was decided. Second, defendant ignores that the amendment to MCL 750.5352
added both “possesses” and “conceals,” and that “conceals” is part of MCL 750.535b, as are the
verbs “sells” and “disposes of,” among others. Thus, the reasoning behind the former
prohibition against also charging a thief with MCL 750.5353 has never applied to MCL
750.535b, and the reasoning behind Hastings4 permits the conclusion that the thief is intended to
be included.
Finally, even assuming that the prohibition applied, absent any evidence that defendant
was, in fact, the thief, there is no prohibition on charging with defendant with receiving or
concealing. Given that defendant goes to great lengths to indicate that there is no evidence that
he knew the weapons were stolen, there is clearly no evidence that he was the thief and,
therefore, nothing that precluded him from being charged or convicted of receiving or concealing
a stolen weapon.
2
The current version of MCL 750.535(1) provides, “A person shall not buy, receive, possess,
conceal, or aid in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted money, goods, or property
knowing, or having reason to know or reason to believe, that the money, goods, or property is
stolen, embezzled, or converted.” The previous version provided, in relevant part, “A person
who buys, receives, or aids in the concealment of any stolen, embezzled, or converted money,
goods, or property knowing the same to have been stolen, embezzled, or converted . . . is guilty
of a felony . . . .” Hastings, 422 Mich at 269.
3
To wit, “To interpret the words ‘buys,’ ‘receives,’ or ‘aids in the concealment’ of stolen
property to mean the buying or receiving from one’s self or aiding one’s self in concealment is
needlessly to corrupt a forthright and harmonious statute.” Kyllonen, 402 Mich at 145.
4
“The everyday understanding of the language presently employed in the statute now includes
the person who committed the larceny.” Hastings, 422 Mich at 271. “Prosecution of the thief
for possessing or concealing stolen property does not torture the language of the statute, as it
would have to have to read the former prohibition on buying, receiving, or aiding in the
concealment of stolen property.” Id.
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Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence that he knew the rifle was
stolen. Before we can determine whether the evidence was sufficient, we must first determine
what type of knowledge is necessary for conviction. Thus, we must determine what the statute
requires when it states that the receiving or concealing must be done “knowing that the firearm . .
. was stolen.”
We located no cases, and defendant has cited none, where the specific knowledge
requirement of MCL 750.535b is discussed. However, given that, until the 2006 amendment, the
knowledge requirement under MCL 750.535 and MCL 750.535b was identical, i.e. “knowing
[the property] was stolen,” we conclude that cases interpreting the knowledge requirement of
MCL 750.535 prior to its amendment are the most applicable to this situation.
In People v Tantenella, 212 Mich 614, 612; 180 NW 474 (1920), our Michigan Supreme
Court held, “Guilty knowledge means not only actual knowledge, but constructive knowledge,
through notice of facts and circumstances from which guilty knowledge may be fairly inferred.”
However, in Echelon Homes, LLC v Carter Lumber Co, 472 Mich 192; 694 NW2d 544 (2005),
the Court clarified its Tantenella holding:
Although the Tantenella Court characterized its analysis of these facts as
examining the defendant’s constructive knowledge, the Court was, in fact,
determining that the defendant had knowledge, proven by circumstantial
evidence, that the car was stolen. . . . The Tantenella Court used the term
“constructive knowledge” synonymously with knowledge proven through
circumstantial evidence. This, the Court’s use of the term “constructive
knowledge” is a misnomer; what the Court really meant was knowledge proven
by circumstantial evidence. [Id. at 199-200.]
Although the Court in Echelon Homes was interpreting the knowledge requirement under MCL
600.2919a, see id. at 200, the statute involved liability that only occurred “when the person
buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of any stolen, embezzled, or converted property
knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted . . . .” MCL 600.2919a (emphasis
added). Because that statutory language parallels the language of MCL 750.535 prior to its
amendment, and the Tantenella case which the Court was clarifying involved a conviction under
MCL 750.535, we conclude that the holding in Echelon Homes is dispositive of the knowledge
requirement necessary for MCL 750.535b. Accordingly, we agree with defendant that
constructive knowledge is insufficient and that actual knowledge is required.
Nevertheless, case law is also clear that actual knowledge may be proven by
circumstantial evidence. Echelon Homes, 472 Mich at 199-200; see also People v Westerfield,
71 Mich App 618, 621; 248 NW2d 641 (1976) (“Guilty knowledge, as with most states of mind,
cannot generally be proved by direct evidence absent admission by the defendant. By the very
nature of the element, it must usually be inferred from all of the various circumstances of the
case.”). After reviewing the record and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we hold that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that defendant had actual knowledge that the weapon was stolen.
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One factor in assessing whether guilty knowledge existed in a receiving or concealing
case is whether the defendant possessed the article shortly after it was stolen. People v Salata,
79 Mich App 415, 421; 262 NW2d 844 (1977). Although this factor cannot support a conviction
by itself, see People v White, 22 Mich App 65, 68; 176 NW2d 723 (1970), it can be considered
with other evidence in order to sustain a conviction. People v Staples, 68 Mich App 220, 223;
242 NW2d 74 (1976).
Here, the photographs of defendant with the rifle appeared to be dated March 1, 2009,
which was shortly after the weapons had been stolen from the Burks and before the rifle was
used in, and disposed of after, the shooting on March 5, 2009. In addition, defendant’s mother
testified that she had not seen the weapon and had not purchased it for defendant. There was no
evidence to suggest that defendant or either of the codefendants possessed the ability or capacity
to acquire the weapon legally. Codefendants Smith and Thomas were both photographed at the
same location as defendant—Smith’s house—and both were found in vehicles containing the
other stolen firearms. Given that the three men were together and posing with the rifle, it is
reasonable to infer that defendant spoke with his codefendants regarding the rifle, and also
reasonable to infer that they told him it was stolen—hence, wanting to be photographed it.
Although this circumstantial evidence is far from overwhelming, it was sufficient to permit a
reasonable jury to infer that defendant had actual knowledge that the rifle was stolen.
Thus, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the record from which a
reasonable jury could find defendant guilty of receiving and concealing stolen property.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to realize that under MCL
750.535b, simple possession was insufficient and that actual knowledge was required. We agree.
“To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate
that counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
professional reasonableness, and that it is reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s ineffective
assistance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v Jordan, 275 Mich
App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007). Defendant bears the burden to overcome the presumption
that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy. Id.
As previously noted, MCL 750.535, the general receiving or concealing statute, and MCL
750.535b, the statute under which defendant was charged, have significant differences based on
amendments to MCL 750.535, which occurred in 2006. Namely, MCL 750.535 provides for
conviction for “possession” of the stolen property where a defendant “knew or had reason to
know or reason to believe that the property was stolen.” MCL 750.535b provides for conviction
for “receiving” or “concealing,” among others, but does not include “possession” and also
requires actual, not constructive, knowledge.
The trial court gave CJI2d 26.1, 26.2, and 26.3, all of which are patterned on the language
in MCL 750.535 and, therefore, include the elements of “possession” and “had reason to know or
reason to believe,” neither of which are contained in MCL 750.535b. Accordingly, the jury was
instructed as to elements which are not, in fact, part of MCL 750.535b. Although errors in jury
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instructions do not necessarily require a new trial, here, the jury was misinstructed as to the
elements of the charge and what the prosecution was required to prove.
Because juries are presumed to follow their instructions, People v Unger, 278 Mich App
210, 235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008), and the erroneous instruction actually lessened the
prosecution’s burden on the knowledge requirement, the instructional error undermined the
reliability of the verdict. Although there was sufficient evidence to find defendant received the
weapon with actual knowledge that it was stolen, it was even easier for the jury to conclude that
when defendant possessed the weapon he had reason to know or reason to believe that it was
stolen. Thus, it is possible that a jury would find enough evidence to convict of possession with
constructive knowledge, but not receiving with actual knowledge. Consequently, the error was
outcome determinative. See People v Hawthorne, 474 Mich 174, 181-182; 713 NW2d 724
(2006) (“An error is deemed to have been ‘outcome determinative’ if it undermined the
reliability of the verdict” [quotation marks and citations omitted].).
Having concluded that the erroneous instructions were outcome determinative error, and
being unable to think of a strategic reason for permitting jury instructions that lessen the
prosecution’s burden to prove defendant’s guilt,5 counsel’s failure to recognize that the jury
instructions were wrong and to object to them constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Jordan, 275 Mich at 667. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a new trial.
III. CONCLUSION
There was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could convict defendant of
receiving or concealing a stolen firearm with actual knowledge that it was stolen. However, the
jurors were improperly instructed as to the elements of MCL 750.535b and defense counsel’s
failure to recognize and object to the erroneous instructions constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel, entitling defendant to a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s conviction and
remand for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
5
In all fairness to both defense counsel and the trial court, there are neither separate instructions
for, nor notes indicating a need to alter the general instructions to match the elements of, MCL
750.535b. It appears that the parties and the trial court were simply not aware that MCL
750.535b had different elements than MCL 750.535. On remand, we remind the trial court and
the parties to alter the jury instructions to appropriately match the elements of MCL 750.535b.
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