PEOPLE OF MI V RANDALL SCOTT LACHNIET (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July19, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 297836
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 09-10175-FC
RANDALL SCOTT LACHNIET,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and WHITBECK and OWENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this case, defendant Randall Scott Lachniet appeals as of right from his convictions
following a four-day jury trial of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, torture, MCL 750.85, unlawful
imprisonment, MCL 750.349b, third-degree fleeing from a police officer, MCL 257.602a, and
interfering with electronic communications, MCL 750.540(5)(a). The trial court sentenced
defendant as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 60 to 100
years on all offenses, except for interfering with electronic communications, for which he
sentenced defendant to 8 to 15 years imprisonment, to be served consecutively. We affirm.
On September 7, 2008 the 80-year-old victim was home alone when defendant appeared
at her side door. The victim recognized defendant as one of the men who had done some odd
jobs and roofing work at her house a few weeks earlier, and let him in. Defendant asked to use
the telephone.
After he hung up the phone, defendant turned around and held a knife up to the victim’s
throat and demanded that she give him her ATM card. The victim told defendant, “[y]ou are
going to have to kill me first.” Defendant then kicked her feet out from under her, and
repeatedly hit her in the face with a closed fist. The victim bit defendant on his hand. Defendant
punched her again, and she struck her head on the ground and lost consciousness. Defendant tied
her hands and feet with cords cut from the window shades and from the telephone.
With her hands and feet bound, defendant dragged the victim down to the basement in
order to conceal her from neighbors. Defendant left, and after about 30 minutes, the victim was
able to free herself from the cords, and go upstairs and outside to get help from a neighbor.
Defendant had taken her wallet with her credit cards, as well as her car and cell phone.
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Defendant’s theory of the case was that he did indeed commit robbery, unlawful
imprisonment, fleeing from a police officer, and interfering with an electronic communication.
However, he contended at trial that the knife was not present during the assault and robbery, but
he merely used it to cut the window shade cords in order to tie up the victim. Also, defendant
contended that he only hit the victim because she was biting his finger and he needed to get her
to release him. He contended that he did not torture the victim.
As a result of the beating, the victim suffered a broken jaw, broken bones of the maxillary
sinuses, extensive soft tissue swelling, hemorrhages in the scalp, and a subdural hematoma. She
suffered some hearing loss, facial scarring, cannot chew well because some of her teeth were
knocked out, and she has a permanent drool on one side of her mouth.
Defendant’s first argument is that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
defendant’s motion for a mistrial. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. People v Schaw, 288 Mich App 231, 236, 791 NW2d 743 (2010). A mistrial should
be granted only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the defendant’s rights and impairs his
ability to receive a fair trial. Id.
At trial, defendant’s daughter Nina Anttila testified that she had spoken to her father on
the date of the attack, and that her caller I.D. showed that he was calling from the victim’s home.
The prosecutor asked Anttila if she had a close relationship with her father and how often she
would see him, to which Anttila replied, “when he would get out of prison.” Defense counsel
immediately moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The trial court instructed the jury
to disregard the statement and that the statement was “not to play any impact in your
deliberations in this matter whatsoever.” Later, when defendant took the stand in his own
defense, he was impeached with his prior convictions for breaking and entering and for two
counts of felony larceny.
“As a general rule, unresponsive testimony by a prosecution witness does not justify a
mistrial unless the prosecutor knew in advance that the witness would give the unresponsive
testimony or the prosecutor conspired with or encouraged the witness to give that testimony.”
People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 531; 455 NW2d 358 (1990); citing People v Barker, 161
Mich App 296, 305-306, 307; 409 NW2d 813 (1987). The trial court noted that the looks of
shock and surprise on the prosecutors’ faces after they heard Anttila’s testimony indicated to the
trial court that they had not conspired with the witness. Furthermore, it is not necessary “to
reverse a conviction where isolated, improper remarks did not cause a miscarriage of justice.”
People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 24, 776 NW2d 314 (2009). Not every instance of inappropriate
subject matter being mentioned before the jury warrants a mistrial. People v Griffin, 235 Mich
App 27, 36, 597 NW2d 176 (1999), overruled on other grounds People v Thompson, 477 Mich
146, 148, 157–158, 730 NW2d 708 (2007).
In addition, the trial court provided a comprehensive curative instruction to the jury.
Because jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given, People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App
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702, 717; 645 NW2d 294 (2001), the curative instruction alleviated any possible prejudice to
defendant. People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 180 n 1; 561 NW2d 463 (1997).
Additionally, defendant testified on his own behalf and was impeached with four prior
convictions. Although defendant argues that he was forced to testify because of his daughter’s
statement about his past time in prison, we note that defendant’s theory of the case was not that
he did not commit most of these crimes, just that he did not use a knife and only punched an 80year-old woman because she bit him. It is highly doubtful any of the jurors were greatly
surprised or influenced by the knowledge that defendant had been convicted of previous crimes
and had spent time in prison for them.
Next, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file the witness list
in a timely manner. We disagree.
This issue is preserved only to the extent that mistakes are apparent from the record.
People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658–659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). In
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we may not substitute our judgment for
that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, or assess counsel’s competence with the
benefit of hindsight. People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). We
review de novo the ultimate question whether counsel’s ineffective assistance deprived a
defendant of his constitutional right to counsel. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640
NW2d 246 (2002). Whether a defendant has received the effective assistance of counsel
comprises a mixed question of fact and law. Id. We review for clear error a trial court’s findings
of fact, if any, regarding the conduct of defense counsel, while we consider de novo questions of
constitutional law. Id.
Defendant’s argument is based entirely on trial counsel’s failure to endorse, prior to trial,
Dr. Terrence W. Campbell. Dr. Campbell is a PhD, whom defense counsel said would testify
“about the physiology of the brain and how memories are stored in the brain.” Defense counsel,
in response to the prosecutor’s objection to the late notice, said he did not anticipate testimony
addressing the victim’s specific memory, but instead would present “a general sort of medical
factual inquiry about the processes and functioning of the brain.”
“ ‘[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ “ United
States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 654; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984), quoting McMann v
Richardson, 397 US 759, 777 n 14; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763 (1970). In Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), the United States
Supreme Court held that a convicted defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
includes two components: “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.” To establish the first component, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. People
v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004).
With respect to the prejudice aspect of the test for ineffective assistance, the defendant
must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the
proceedings would have differed. Id. at 663–664. The defendant must overcome the strong
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presumptions that his “counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of professional assistance,”
and that his counsel’s actions represented sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 US at 689. A
defense counsel possesses “wide discretion in matters of trial strategy.” People v Odom, 276
Mich App 407, 415; 740 NW2d 557 (2007).
We conclude that even if trial counsel had filed a timely expert witness list, the results of
the trial would not likely have been different had the expert witness been allowed to testify. As
plaintiff noted, the expert witness was not planning to talk specifically about the victim’s
memory, but about the impact of aging and head trauma on memory. The concept that as people
age, their ability to remember changes, and the concept that a head injury can impact memory are
both fairly basic and well understood concepts. It is unlikely that having an expert explain those
ideas would have much of an impact on the jury in this case give the additional volume of
evidence against defendant. Furthermore, trial counsel asked the victim several times about her
memory of the events and she was unshakeable and quite confident about what she remembered.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow
defendant’s expert witness to testify where defendant failed to properly disclose the expert under
MCL 767.94a(2). We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding the appropriate remedy for failure to
comply with a discovery order for an abuse of discretion. People v Davie (After Remand), 225
Mich App 592, 597-598; 571 NW2d 229 (1997).
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense, but does not have an
absolute right to present evidence in support of his or her chosen defense. People v Hayes, 421
Mich 271, 278–279; 364 NW2d 635 (1984) (noting that there is no constitutional right to assert
an insanity defense). Rather, “an accused must still comply with ‘established rules of procedure
and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and
innocence.’ “ Id. at 279, quoting Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302; 93 S Ct 1038; 35 L
Ed 2d 297 (1973). Further, courts have upheld preclusion as a sanction for a defendant’s failure
to comply with notice and discovery requirements even though the sanction implicated a
defendant’s right to present a defense. See Hayes, 421 Mich at 283 (stating that the Legislature
could constitutionally preclude a defendant from presenting evidence of insanity where the
defendant failed to comply with the notice requirements); Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400; 108 S
Ct 646; 98 L Ed 2d 798 (1988) (upholding the use of preclusion as a sanction for a defendant’s
failure to disclose the identity of a witness); United States v Nobles, 422 US 225; 95 S Ct 2160;
45 L Ed 2d 141 (1975).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the testimony of
defendant’s expert witness, where defendant did not comply with MCL 767.94a(2). The
proposed witness was a complete surprise to the prosecution. The scientific expertise that the
witness was to impart to the jury was not a disputed scientific issue, but rather a matter of
common sense. It would have been easy for trial counsel to comply with MCL 767.94a(2).
The burden of identifying potential witnesses in advance of trial adds little to the routine
demands of trial preparation. Taylor, 484 US at 416.
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Next, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
torture under MCL 750.85(1). We disagree.
This Court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of evidence in criminal trials de novo.
People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 415; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). When reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence presented at trial in a
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational jury could find that each
element of the crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392,
399–400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that
the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440
Mich 508, 514–515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). We do not interfere with
the jury’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.
People v Passage, 277 Mich App 175, 177; 743 NW2d 746 (2007). It is for the trier of fact to
determine what inferences can be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to
be accorded to those inferences. People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158
(2002).
A person commits torture if, “with the intent to cause cruel or extreme physical or mental
pain and suffering, [he] inflicts great bodily injury or severe mental pain or suffering upon
another person within his or her custody or physical control....” MCL 750.85(1). The defendant
attacked an elderly woman. He put a knife to her throat, hit her with an uppercut, and then hit
her again breaking her jaw and other facial bones. He tied up her hands, took her to the
basement, bound her feet and caused her extreme physical and mental anguish. There is no
doubt that defendant’s conviction of torture was supported by powerful evidence. There are
photographs of the victim’s face that show her with major bruising, swelling and abrasions to her
head, face, and scalp. The victim herself testified about what happened to her, and clearly her
version of the story was much more credible than defendant’s version. It is well-settled that,
“because it can be difficult to prove a defendant’s state of mind on issues such as knowledge and
intent, minimal circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish the defendant’s state of mind,
which can be inferred from all the evidence presented.” People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594,
622; 751 NW2d 57 (2008). We conclude that defendant’s torture conviction was supported by
sufficient evidence.
Finally, defendant argues by way of a Standard 4 brief that his 60 year minimum sentence
violates Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing act because he likely will not be eligible for parole
until after his death. We disagree.
Whether a sentence violates Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing act is a question of law
that this Court reviews de novo. People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152, 156, 749 NW2d 257 (2008).
This Court likewise reviews constitutional questions de novo. LeBlanc, 465 Mich at 579.
Defendant relies on People v Moore, 432 Mich 311, 320–321, 439 NW2d 684 (1989), in
which the Supreme Court held that an indeterminate sentence is invalid if it effectively precludes
the possibility that the defendant will be eligible for parole during his lifetime. In Moore, our
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Supreme Court held that it was an abuse of discretion to impose a sentence of 100 to 200 years
for second-degree murder, because it would be impossible for the defendant to serve this
sentence. However, in People v Kelly, 213 Mich App 8, 15–16, 539 NW2d 538 (1995), this
Court recognized that our Supreme Court overruled Moore in People v Merriweather, 447 Mich
799, 527 NW2d 460 (1994).
This Court held that resentencing is not necessarily required when a defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence that is effectively a life term. Kelly, 213 Mich App at
15–16. Rather, the principle of proportionality determines the legality of the sentence. Id. at 16.
The principle of proportionality involves examining both the circumstances of the crime and the
offender’s criminal history. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 650; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Thus,
defendant’s reliance on Moore is misplaced. Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption
of proportionality and, therefore, has not shown that his sentence is unconstitutionally cruel or
unusual.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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