PEOPLE OF MI V DAMON ROSHAWN HORNER (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 26, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 297658
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2009-227905-FH
DAMON ROSHAWN HORNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and METER and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of third-degree fleeing and
eluding, MCL 257.602a(3), felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, two counts of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), second offense,
MCL 750.227b, felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police
officer, MCL 750.81d. Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL
769.12, to 76 months to 20 years’ imprisonment for the fleeing and eluding and felon in
possession of a firearm convictions, 18 months to 15 years’ imprisonment for the felonious
assault and assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer convictions, and five years’
imprisonment for the felony-firearm convictions. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court’s implementation of a jury-reform pilot project
denied defendant his constitutional right to due process. Defendant claims that aspects of the
project that permitted jurors to ask questions of witnesses and to discuss the case during trial
recesses deprived him of his right to fair jury deliberations and improperly lessened the
prosecution’s burden of proof. We disagree.
Whether the implementation of the jury-reform pilot project violated defendant’s right to
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is a constitutional question that this Court reviews
de novo. People v Wilder, 485 Mich 35, 40; 780 NW2d 265 (2010). Because defendant did not
preserve his challenge to the portion of the pilot program permitting the jurors to ask questions,
this Court reviews that aspect of the issue for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Also, this Court reviews for an abuse
of discretion a trial court’s decision to permit juror questions. See People v Heard, 388 Mich
182, 188; 200 NW2d 73 (1972).
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In Administrative Order No. 2008-2, the Michigan Supreme Court authorized several
trial judges, including the trial judge in this case, to implement a pilot project to study the effects
of a jury-reform proposal. Two aspects of AO 2008-2 are relevant here. Subsection (I) provides
for juror questions:
The court may permit the jurors to ask questions of witnesses. If the court
permits jurors to ask questions, it must employ a procedure that ensures that such
questions are addressed to the witnesses by the court itself, that inappropriate
questions are not asked, and that the parties have an opportunity outside the
hearing of the jury to object to the questions. The court shall inform the jurors of
the procedures to be followed for submitting questions to witnesses.
In addition, subsection (K) addresses juror discussion:
After informing the jurors that they are not to decide the case until they
have heard all the evidence, instructions of law, and arguments of counsel, the
court may instruct the jurors that they are permitted to discuss the evidence
among themselves in the jury room during trial recesses. The jurors should be
instructed that such discussions may only take place when all jurors are present
and that such discussions must be clearly understood as tentative pending final
presentation of all evidence, instructions, and argument.
Also, we note that MCR 6.414(E) expressly permits juror questions at the discretion of
the trial court: “The court may, in its discretion, permit the jurors to ask questions of witnesses.
If the court permits jurors to ask questions, it must employ a procedure that ensures that
inappropriate questions are not asked, and that the parties have the opportunity to object to the
questions.”
In Heard, 388 Mich at 188, the Michigan Supreme Court held that “the questioning of
witnesses by jurors, and the method of submission of such questions, rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court.” The Supreme Court noted that while less than half the states had
spoken on the question at that time, all but one had recognized the right of jurors to ask
questions. Id. at 186. “The basic reason underlying the decisions of these Courts is that the
jurors are the finders of fact and any questions they may ask may help them in reaching their
ultimate determination.” Id. at 187. The Supreme Court further explained that “in certain
circumstances, a juror might have a question which could help unravel otherwise confusing
testimony. In such a situation, it would aid the fact-finding process if a juror were permitted to
ask such a question.” Id. at 187-188.
In People v Stout, 116 Mich App 726, 732-733; 323 NW2d 532 (1982), this Court
rejected the defendant’s argument that Heard permitted juror questions only if the questions
would unravel otherwise confusing testimony. The Stout Court stated, “Although the Heard
opinion specifically referred to juror questions which ‘help unravel otherwise confusing
testimony’ we do not believe that the Court meant to limit juror questions to only those
situations, but, rather, was merely posing an example of where juror questions might aid in the
fact-finding process.” Id. at 733.
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In State v Doleszny, 176 Vt 203, 209; 844 A2d 773 (2004), the court stated that the vast
majority of other states that have considered this issue allow juror questioning in some form.
The Doleszny court indicated that ten federal circuit courts of appeal have approved the practice
in some form, see id. at 210, and in Medina v People, 114 P3d 845, 851 (Colo, 2005), the court
indicated that none of the federal circuit courts of appeal prohibit the practice. Many states have
established jury-policy commissions that support allowing juror questioning in at least some
cases, and scholarly and professional commentary is nearly unanimous in supporting the
practice. See Doleszny, 176 Vt at 211-214, and authorities cited therein. The Medina court
stated that those courts that prohibit juror questioning have done so primarily for policy reasons
rather than on constitutional grounds. See Medina, 114 P3d at 854 (noting that in State v
Costello, 646 NW2d 204, 214 n 4 (Minn, 2002), the Minnesota Supreme Court proscribed juror
questioning under its supervisory power and did not reach the defendant’s constitutional claims).
Here, the trial court complied with the requirements of AO 2008-2(I). The court directed
the jurors to submit their questions in writing. The court explained to the jurors that it would ask
a question only if it was allowed under the rules of evidence. Two juror questions were asked
during the trial. In each instance, the trial court ensured that the questions were posed by the
court itself, that no inappropriate questions were asked, and that the parties had an opportunity
outside the hearing of the jury to object to the questions.
Defendant contends that a juror question to a police officer regarding whether the
officer’s training included starter pistols, as well as the prosecutor’s follow-up question, did not
clarify existing testimony but elicited further evidence. Defendant contends that the resultant
testimony supported the prosecutor’s theory that defendant had an actual pistol during the
offenses and not a starter pistol. The officer had already testified on direct and redirect
examination, however, that he believed defendant had shot a real firearm at him. We find,
therefore, that the juror’s question and the prosecutor’s follow-up question did not elicit new
evidence that prejudiced defendant. Similarly, a juror’s question for defendant regarding why he
bought caps for the starter gun, and the trial court’s follow-up question about why defendant
bought caps if the starter gun was supposed to protect him simply by looking like a real gun,
merely permitted defendant to reinforce his earlier testimony by answering that he needed the
starter pistol because he “deal[s] with some unscrupulous people” who will “run the other way”
if “they hear a loud bang.” Defendant’s answer was consistent with his earlier testimony that
three men had previously pulled pistols on him and that defendant figured the starter pistol
looked like a real gun he could present if he ever faced a situation like that again. Because the
juror questions aided the fact-finding process by clarifying existing testimony, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by permitting the juror questions. Defendant has not established a plain
error that affected his substantial rights in connection with the juror questions.
Next, defendant contends that the aspect of the jury pilot program permitting jurors to
discuss the case during trial recesses violated his right to fair jury deliberations and alleviated the
prosecution of its burden to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument is
refuted by the trial court’s instructions in accordance with AO 2008-2(K). As required by the
administrative order, the trial court told the jurors at the beginning of trial that they must not
decide the case until they have heard all of the evidence, instructions of law, and arguments of
counsel. Further, the court instructed the jury at the beginning of trial that any discussions before
deliberations could occur only when all the jurors were present and that such discussions must be
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clearly understood as tentative pending the final presentation of all evidence, instructions, and
argument. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury at the beginning of trial that defendant
was presumed to be innocent and that “[t]his presumption continues throughout the trial and
entitles the defendant to a verdict of not guilty unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that he is guilty.” The trial court repeated this instruction in its final instructions and also
explained that “defendant is not required to prove his innocence or to do anything. If you find
the prosecutor has not proven every element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant not guilty.” Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. People v Graves, 458
Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
Defendant cites People v Hunter, 370 Mich 262, 269; 121 NW2d 442 (1963), in which
the Michigan Supreme Court stated that “jurors should not be encouraged to discuss evidence
they have heard and seen during the course of trial until all of the evidence has been introduced,
the arguments to the jury made, and the jury charged by the court . . . .”1 See also People v
Blondia, 69 Mich App 554, 557; 245 NW2d 130 (1976), in which this Court explained that
“[w]hile it is clearly the law that the trial judge should instruct the jury not to discuss the case
among themselves, the cases have held that the omission is not reversible error absent prejudice
or at least a showing of such conversations.” Here, the trial court was expressly authorized by
the Supreme Court in AO 2008-2 to instruct the jurors as it did, and the court’s instructions
carefully ensured that no final decision or conclusion would be reached until the appropriate
time. Moreover, there is no indication that the jurors actually discussed the case before
deliberations or that defendant was prejudiced. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s
implementation of the jury-reform pilot project did not deny defendant his right to fair jury
deliberations or alleviate the prosecution’s burden of proving defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.2
Defendant’s next argument is that he was denied a fair trial due to the admission of
evidence of defendant’s prior acts of fleeing from and shooting at a police officer. We disagree.
“This Court reviews evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion.” People v Martzke, 251
Mich App 282, 286; 651 NW2d 490 (2002).
MRE 404(b)(1) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
1
This language from Hunter is arguably obiter dicta.
2
We note that the Supreme Court has adopted new rules, to be effective on September 1, 2011,
that partially incorporate certain elements from the pilot project and reject other elements.
Although the new rules allow for juror questions in all cases, juror discussion before final
deliberations will be allowed only in civil cases. Nevertheless, we emphasize that the procedure
employed in the present case was authorized under law, did not deny defendant a fair trial, and
does not require reversal.
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intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
“To be admissible under MRE 404(b), bad-acts evidence must satisfy three requirements: (1) the
evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; and (3) the
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.”
People v Kahley, 277 Mich App 182, 184-185; 744 NW2d 194 (2007). Also, the trial court, on
request, may instruct the jury regarding the limited use of the evidence. People v Watson, 245
Mich App 572, 577; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). See also People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 75;
508 NW2d 114 (1993).
The trial court properly concluded that the evidence of the prior bad acts was relevant to
defendant’s intent because defendant was claiming that the shooting in this case was accidental.
A defendant’s intent is a proper purpose for admitting other-acts evidence. MRE 404(b)(1).
Moreover, the prior-act evidence was relevant to show that defendant intended to fire the weapon
to effectuate his escape from the police officer in this case. Relevant evidence is “evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” MRE 401. Defendant claimed that he was carrying a starter pistol that went off by
accident. Evidence that defendant had previously fired a gun at an officer during a similar
attempt to flee and elude that officer made it somewhat more probable that the weapon here was
discharged intentionally and that a starter pistol did not go off by accident as defendant claimed.
The prior-act evidence was also admissible for the proper purpose of showing a common
plan, scheme, or system in doing an act. In People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 63;
614 NW2d 888 (2000), the Michigan Supreme Court held that “evidence of similar misconduct
is logically relevant to show that the charged act occurred where the uncharged misconduct and
the charged offense are sufficiently similar to support an inference that they are manifestations of
a common plan, scheme, or system.” “There must be such a concurrence of common features
that the charged acts and the other acts are logically seen as part of a general plan, scheme, or
design.” People v Steele, 283 Mich App 472, 479; 769 NW2d 256 (2009) (emphasis in original).
“Distinctive and unusual features are not required to establish the existence of a common plan or
scheme.” Kahley, 277 Mich App at 185. In both the prior incident and in this case, defendant
tried to flee from a police officer during an attempted traffic stop, crashed his vehicle, fled on
foot, shot a firearm at the officer, and was later found hiding under an object, and in each case
the firearm disappeared after the shooting. Given the concurrence of common features, a logical
inference exists that the shooting in this case was part of a common plan or system of firing a
weapon to effectuate an escape from a pursuing police officer.
Further, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. The evidence was highly probative because it was relevant to the
central issue at trial regarding whether defendant accidentally discharged a starter pistol or
intentionally shot a firearm at the officer. The danger of unfair prejudice was minimized by the
trial court’s limiting instruction, in which the court told the jury that the evidence could be
considered only to decide whether defendant acted purposefully and not by accident or mistake
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and whether defendant used a plan, system, or characteristic scheme that he had used before.
The trial court emphasized that the jury could not convict defendant because it thought he was
guilty of other bad conduct. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
prior-acts evidence.
Defendant’s final argument on appeal is that his presentence investigation report (PSIR)
contains an error that was addressed at sentencing but not corrected in the report. This Court
reviews a trial court’s response to a claim of inaccuracy in the PSIR for an abuse of discretion.
People v Lucey, 287 Mich App 267, 275; 787 NW2d 133 (2010). A corrected copy of the PSIR
filed with this Court reflects that the error discussed at sentencing has been corrected as defense
counsel requested. Because the correction has been made, a remand to the trial court to make the
correction is not required.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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