PEOPLE OF MI V COLLIN DENNARD PITTMAN (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 28, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 297391
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2009-226631-FC
COLLIN DENNARD PITTMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and JANSEN and SAAD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b(1)(b)(ii), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520c(1)(b)(ii). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual offender, MCL
769.13, to concurrent sentences of 273 to 480 months in prison for each conviction. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss. The
record reflects that the Department of Corrections (DOC) failed to comply with MCL
780.131(1), which provides:
Whenever the department of corrections receives notice that there is
pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint
setting forth against any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal
offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, the
inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of
corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in
which the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is pending written notice
of the place of imprisonment of the inmate and a request for final disposition of
the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint.
The only statutory trigger for the running of the 180-day period is the DOC’s notice to the
prosecutor. People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 256, 259; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). Defendant
contends that the DOC’s failure to notify the prosecutor violated his right to a speedy trial
because the 180-day rule was never triggered. Because defendant did not raise a due process
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argument before the trial court,1 our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 508; 674 NW2d 366 (2004).
Due process requires that a criminal defendant be given reasonable notice of the charge
against him and an opportunity to be heard. People v McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 699; 672
NW2d 191 (2003). “Whether an accused is accorded due process depends on the facts of each
case.” Id. at 700. To establish a due process violation requiring reversal, a defendant must prove
prejudice to his defense. Id. Defendant does not claim that his defense was prejudiced as a
result of the DOC’s failure to comply with MCL 780.131, nor do the facts support that
conclusion. Defendant’s case moved forward promptly and he went to trial 6-1/2 months after
charges were filed. Under the circumstances, defendant has not shown he was prejudiced as a
result of the DOC’s failure to comply with MCL 780.131. Therefore, the trial court correctly
denied his motion to dismiss. McGee, 258 Mich App at 700.
II. PRIOR INCARCERATIONS
Defendant contends that repeated references to his prior incarcerations were unnecessary
and deprived him of a fair trial. Defendant concedes, however, that evidence of his
incarcerations was a critical part of his alibi defense. We review defendant’s claim for plain
error affecting his substantial rights. Knox, 469 Mich at 508. Defendant cites as one example of
a reference to his incarceration the victim’s remark, “He was still out; he was still around.”
However, defendant acknowledges that references to him “being away” or “making it home”
were non-prejudicial and the victim’s remark is the same kind of indirect reference to his
incarceration. Defendant complains that the subject of his incarceration again arose during
testimony about defendant’s exchange of letters with the victim. However, this was a subject
raised by defendant. Thus, defendant opened the door and cannot now claim error on appeal.
People v Riley, 465 Mich 442, 448; 636 NW2d 514 (2001). For the same reason, defendant
cannot now claim that mention of his incarceration during defense counsel’s examination of
Detective McDougal or the prosecutor’s closing argument was error.
Defendant also claims his attorney’s failure to object to the incarceration evidence
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Because he did not raise it before the trial court,
our review is limited to mistakes apparent from the record. People v Jordan, 275 Mich App 659,
667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that counsel’s performance fell below objective standards of reasonableness, and that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have
been different. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713 (2007). Defense counsel
has wide discretion as to matters of trial strategy. People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 415; 740
NW2d 557 (2007).
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An objection on one ground is insufficient to preserve an appellate attack based on a different
ground. People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 309; 684 NW2d 669 (2004).
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Here, defense counsel questioned witnesses about letters exchanged between defendant
and the victim in an attempt to discredit her, which was sound trial strategy. Also, from the
record, it appears that the prosecutor, defense counsel, and witnesses made a concerted effort not
to refer to defendant being in prison. We further observe that the decision not to object to
oblique references appears to have been a strategic decision to avoid highlighting defendant’s
incarceration. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 242, 253; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
Accordingly, the record does not support defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Defendant raises several prosecutorial misconduct claims. We review de novo
defendant’s preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct to determine if he was denied a fair
and impartial trial. People v Mann, 288 Mich App 114, 119; 792 NW2d 53 (2010). The issues
are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the reviewing court must examine the record and
evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context. Id. We review the unpreserved claims for plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Knox, 469 Mich at 508.
Defendant claims that the prosecutor elicited impermissible other-acts evidence when she
questioned the victim’s mother about defendant’s violent behavior. To be admissible under
MRE 404(b), other-acts evidence (1) must be offered for a proper purpose, (2) must be relevant,
and (3) must not have a probative value substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice. Knox, 469 Mich at 509. Evidence is relevant and admissible if it is helpful in
shedding light on any material point. People v Murphy (On Remand), 282 Mich App 571, 580;
766 NW2d 303 (2009). The credibility of witnesses is always a material issue. People v
McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 637; 709 NW2d 595 (2005).
Throughout the trial, defendant attempted to attack the victim’s credibility because of her
delay in disclosing his conduct. The forensic interviewer explained that fear of the offender
could be a reason for a victim’s failure to immediately report a crime. The victim testified that
one of the reasons she did not disclose the abuse was because she was afraid of defendant. She
testified that defendant acted crazy and often got into trouble. The prosecutor offered the
testimony of the victim’s mother to show that the victim had witnessed defendant’s violent
behavior and that, therefore, her fear of defendant was rational. This testimony was both
relevant and was offered for a proper purpose. Further, it had significant probative value as
corroboration for the victim’s fear of defendant. A prosecutor’s good-faith effort to admit
evidence does not constitute misconduct. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 70; 732 NW2d
546 (2007).
Defense counsel objected when the prosecutor cross-examined defendant’s brother about
defendant’s assault and drug-related convictions and he argues that this constituted misconduct.
Under MRE 405(a), the accused can present favorable character evidence in the form of
reputation or opinion evidence. To rebut this evidence, the prosecutor may cross-examine the
defendant’s witness in order to test his knowledge and candor. For that purpose, he may be
asked if he has heard of specific acts of misconduct. People v Champion, 411 Mich 468, 471;
307 NW2d 681 (1981) (quotations and citation omitted). Here, to test his credibility and the
basis of his favorable opinion of defendant, the prosecutor asked defendant’s brother whether he
was aware of defendant’s involvement with drugs, assaultive behavior, and related convictions.
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This was permissible under MRE 405(a), and there was no misconduct. Dobek, 274 Mich App
at 70.
Defendant makes the unpreserved claim that the following remark by the prosecutor
during closing argument constituted misconduct: “Now, do we know if it’s because he just got
home, was he out on a night of partying, was there drugs involved? I don't know. I don't know.”
A prosecutor is free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they
relate to his theory of the case. Unger, 278 Mich App at 236. There was evidence that defendant
had been sent to prison more than once for drug-related offenses, but not that he had used drugs.
Nevertheless, given the victim’s testimony that defendant was not acting like himself the night
he molested her, a reasonable inference could be made that defendant was possibly under the
influence of drugs at the time. Therefore, this did not rise to the level of misconduct. Because
there was no error, defendant’s corresponding ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without
merit. People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions because
evidence showed that he was incarcerated when the victim claimed the offenses occurred. In
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that
the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Harrison,
283 Mich App 374, 377-378; 768 NW2d 98 (2009).
To prove defendant committed first and second-degree criminal sexual conduct, the
prosecutor had to show that defendant engaged in sexual penetration and sexual contact with the
victim, who was at least 13 but less than 16 years of age at the time of the offense and related by
blood to defendant. MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(ii); MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(ii). Time is not a material
element of CSC charges involving a child victim, even if the defendant presents an alibi defense.
Dobek, 274 Mich App at 83. The victim gave conflicting testimony regarding when the offenses
occurred. However, some of her testimony coincided with periods defendant was not
incarcerated. All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. People
v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008). Further, a reviewing court must
“draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.”
People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). The jury could have determined
that the victim was confused about the precise date of the offenses because they occurred years
before her disclosure in 2007 and the trial in 2009. In any event, it was reasonable for the jury to
conclude that the offenses occurred at a time when defendant was out of prison and the victim’s
conflicting testimony was not fatal to the prosecution’s efforts to establish the elements of the
offenses. Accordingly, defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.
V. SENTENCE
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously scored offense variable 4 (OV 4) at ten
points. We review a scoring decision to determine whether the sentencing court properly
exercised its discretion and whether there was any evidence to adequately support the score.
People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 680; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). The court should score
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ten points for OV 4 if the victim suffered serious psychological injury that may require
professional treatment. However, the fact that treatment is not sought is not conclusive when
scoring the variable. MCL 777.34(1)(a); MCL 777.34(2). The trial court may consider a
victim’s demeanor while testifying to determine whether the victim suffered a serious
psychological injury. See People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App 728, 740-741; 705 NW2d 728
(2005).
Here, the young teenage victim was molested by her favorite uncle, with whom she had a
close relationship. Afterwards she found blood on her nightgown and underwear. She blamed
her significant behavioral problems, to which her mother testified, on defendant’s assault. Also,
at trial, the victim appeared to become so overwhelmed while testifying about the assault that she
simply stopped answering questions and cried. Further, the victim’s mother indicated that the
victim would not provide an impact statement because it was still very hard for her to talk to
anyone about what happened. Based on the foregoing, it was reasonable for the trial court to
deduce that the victim suffered a serious psychological injury. Therefore, it did not abuse its
discretion in scoring OV 4 at ten points.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Henry William Saad
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