MARION BEDNARSKI V STEVEN E SMITH (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARION BEDNARSKI,
UNPUBLISHED
July 12, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
STEVEN E. SMITH d/b/a STEVEN SMITH &
ASSOCIATES,
No. 296979
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-015271-NM
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and FITZGERALD and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the circuit court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition and dismissing his legal malpractice claim. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The cause of this controversy is simple: plaintiff desired to open an adult entertainment
club; but after obtaining the necessary zoning approval for the club’s construction, plaintiff was
unable to obtain any interest in the club from his putative partners. Plaintiff blames defendant,
his former attorney, for the failure to secure his interests. Defendant counters that plaintiff
cannot prove that his alleged “bad advice” caused plaintiff’s damages.
The events underlying this case stretch back to 2003. In December of that year,
defendant submitted an application on plaintiff’s behalf to the Lincoln Park planning commission
to operate an “adult cabaret” on Lot 25 (the north lot on Papalas Drive) in the city of Lincoln
Park. Defendant also assisted plaintiff in forming corporate entities – Oval Office Investment,
L.L.C. and MB & CK, Inc., for the club’s operation. Although the commission eventually
approved the application, plaintiff’s relationship with his business partner apparently soured and
the two did not proceed with their plans.
Several years later, in 2006, plaintiff and another investor, Charles Shattelroe, discussed
entering into a joint venture to form a new adult entertainment club. A subsequent “letter of
understanding” between those parties dated May 10, 2006, showed that plaintiff owned Lot 25
and reflected the parties’ intent that Shattelroe and possibly others would invest in plaintiff’s
“business enterprise” to open “an adult entertainment facility/bar” and become a 50/50
partner(s). Notably, the letter also indicated that Shattelroe and his investors were free to
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abandon the transaction “at any time before execution of definitive transaction documents
without any liability to [plaintiff].”
Despite this putative arrangement, on June 23, 2006, the Lincoln Park community
planners declined to approve plaintiff’s subsequent application for a site plan review on Lot 25
because plaintiff’s prior approval from the planning commission had lapsed as construction had
failed to commence within one year of the original approval, and because approval had since
been granted for the construction of a church within 450 feet of Lot 25 – a fact that would
preclude construction of an adult business on Lot 25 under city ordinances.
Around this same time, Shattelroe entered into a partnership with Frank Didario and
formed Papalas Drive Development, L.L.C. (“Papalas”). Plaintiff averred that these investors
were previously unable to obtain approval for a club and therefore wanted to make a deal with
plaintiff because he was “well-connected” in Lincoln Park. According to defendant, plaintiff
informed him that he had a new club deal with new investors, and left defendant with the
understanding that the investors would own the club building through Papalas, while plaintiff
would have a 20 percent share in the profits through Elliptical, L.L.C. Thus, with plaintiff
having failed to obtain approval for Lot 25, Papalas purchased the adjacent property, Lot 24,
with the hope that plaintiff could have his prior approval “reissued but transferred” to that lot.
According to plaintiff, Shattelroe and Didario were clear that plaintiff and defendant were
responsible for obtaining approval for Lot 24, and plaintiff was under the impression that he
would receive a 20 percent interest in equity or profits. To negotiate this arrangement, plaintiff
hired two attorneys that did not include defendant; however, neither was ultimately successful in
obtaining an agreement. Notably, Didario testified that defendant did not negotiate on plaintiff’s
behalf, and plaintiff admits that defendant was not one of the attorneys he hired to negotiate with
Papalas.
Papalas subsequently contacted defendant in October 2006 to obtain approval from the
planning commission due to his proven expertise in obtaining the prior approval for Lot 25.
Although he had not seen a signed document, defendant testified that he was under the
impression that plaintiff and Papalas had reached an agreement and indicated at the November 8,
2006, planning commission hearing that he represented both Papalas and plaintiff since “they
were a team” and he considered them “one and the same.” Plaintiff, however, claimed that he
had retained defendant before the hearing and that on the night of the hearing defendant had
advised him that although there was no written agreement with Papalas, plaintiff’s interests were
protected because the approval would be issued in plaintiff’s name. Plaintiff averred that but for
this advice, he would not have proceeded with the hearing to obtain the necessary approval.
The planning commission subsequently granted approval to build an adult entertainment
club on Lot 24, but it was not issued in plaintiff’s name. When negotiations to reach a deal
between plaintiff and Papalas faltered, Papalas sued plaintiff alleging in part that plaintiff had
attempted to extort Papalas rather than accept a minority interest in the new club project.
Plaintiff filed a counterclaim and impleaded Shattelroe and Didario, claiming that he was misled
or lied to regarding his compensation or ownership interest in the club venture and that his
relationship with defendant Smith was manipulated.
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After that case settled, plaintiff filed the malpractice complaint underlying this appeal on
November 6, 2008. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant (1) failed to advise plaintiff of
his conflict of interest with Papalas, (2) failed to encourage plaintiff to seek alternative counsel
due to this conflict of interest, (3) failed to advise plaintiff against seeking transfer of the
approval of Lot 25 to Lot 24 until obtaining an enforceable agreement providing an ownership
interest in Papalas, (4) sought the transfer of approval without first obtaining an agreement from
Papalas securing plaintiff’s ownership interest, and (5) engaged in representation of both plaintiff
and Papalas despite a conflict of interest. Defendant answered and, following discovery, filed a
motion for summary disposition and sought sanctions for a frivolous lawsuit.
In his motion, defendant argued that plaintiff could not show that defendant’s
representation of plaintiff before the planning commission was the proximate cause of his
damages where plaintiff had retained other counsel to secure an ownership interest agreement
with Papalas, plaintiff’s prior approval of Lot 25 had already lapsed (and thus no “transfer” could
occur), and plaintiff had yet to obtain an ownership interest in the new club from Papalas at the
time of the planning commission meeting. Additionally, defendant noted that his representation
of plaintiff was limited to obtaining plan approval for Lot 24, and therefore matters pertaining to
the negotiation of his ownership interest with Papalas were outside the scope of the attorneyclient relationship.
Plaintiff responded that defendant’s failure to secure an agreement from Papalas detailing
plaintiff’s interest in the club was the proximate cause of his damages given that any attorney
would know to obtain such an agreement. Additionally, plaintiff alleged a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of the scope of defendant’s
representation in light of defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s goal to obtain an interest in such a
club coupled with the large retainer defendant charged ($4,500).
At the ensuing motion hearing, the circuit court – after noting its familiarity with the
underlying litigation between plaintiff and Papalas – ruled that summary disposition was
appropriate considering that: no transfer had actually occurred, plaintiff’s claim was speculative,
plaintiff had failed to object to the alleged conflict of interest, and plaintiff was represented by
other counsel for negotiations. As the court explained:
[T]he claim is that [defendant] should not have let [plaintiff] “transfer” the
site plan approval from lot 25 to 24 without an enforceable agreement with
Papalas Drive. That would be giving [plaintiff] an ownership interest in the
Papalas Drive and the business on lot 24. First of all, there was no transfer. The
site approval was null and void because the construction had not begun within the
12 months. And in addition to that within the 12 months a church site had been
approved and the ordinance say[s] that lot 25 was within 450 feet of where the
church was going to be. [Plaintiff] never had a chance to build anything on lot 25.
I think plaintiff’s claim is so speculative there is no evidence to support that but
for [defendant’s] omission plaintiff would have resulted [sic] a profitable
relationship with Papalas Drive. The underlying lawsuit was aggressively
litigated by both parties. With many allegations the least of which was lot 24.
[Plaintiff is] basically arguing the breach by quote [defendant] [sic] caused a
third-party to breach this “alleged agreement” which there never was; there was a
letter of intent. In addition to that plaintiff himself was at this meeting where they
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approved lot 24 and never objected to Smith appear[ing] at the hearing on behalf
of himself and Papalas Drive. The other – in addition to that [plaintiff] did have
other attorneys that were representing him on this letter of intent with Papalas
Drive, Inc. Your motion is granted.
Despite this ruling, the court declined to award sanctions although it found the prospect
“tempting.”
After entry of the order reflecting this ruling, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the court’s ruling constituted palpable error where there was no evidence that
Papalas sought a transfer of the Lot 25 approval and defendant’s representation of plaintiff had
been ongoing despite defendant’s own denial that he was representing plaintiff whom he realized
was seeking approval in exchange for an ownership interest in the club. Dispensing with oral
argument, the court issued an order denying this motion pursuant to MCR 2.119(F)(3) on
February 19, 2010. This appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
As he did below, plaintiff argues on appeal that but for defendant’s advice, which was
given despite a conflict of interest, he would not have sought approval for the club without a
written agreement from Papalas securing his interest in the club.
The Court reviews de novo an appeal from an order granting a motion for summary
disposition. Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). A motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) should be granted when the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A genuine issue of material fact
exists when reasonable minds could differ after drawing reasonable inferences from the record.
West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). In reviewing this issue,
the Court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other
documentary evidence and construe them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). If the nonmoving party
would bear the burden of proof at trial, that party must show there is a genuine issue of material
fact by setting forth satisfactory evidence. Karbel v Comerica Bank, 247 Mich App 90, 97; 635
NW2d 69 (2001).
The elements of a legal malpractice claim are: “(1) the existence of an attorney-client
relationship; (2) negligence in the legal representation of the plaintiff; (3) that the negligence was
the proximate cause of an injury; and (4) the fact and extent of the injury alleged.” Manzo v
Petrella & Petrella & Assoc, PC, 261 Mich App 705, 712; 683 NW2d 699 (2004). Central to
plaintiff’s claim is the element of causation.1 As our Supreme Court has explained:
1
In addressing the central issue of causation, we proceed with the assumption that an attorneyclient relationship between plaintiff and defendant in fact existed. Indeed, despite defendant’s
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Often the most troublesome element of a legal malpractice action is
proximate cause. As in any tort action, to prove proximate cause a plaintiff in a
legal malpractice action must establish that the defendant’s action was a cause in
fact of the claimed injury. Hence, a plaintiff must show that but for the attorney’s
alleged malpractice, he would have been successful in the underlying suit.
[Charles Reinhart Co v Winiemko, 444 Mich 579, 586; 513 NW2d 773 (1994)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).]
Plaintiff hinges his entire theory of causation on an exchange allegedly occurring
between himself and defendant just prior to the planning commission meeting. Specifically,
plaintiff alleges that defendant advised him to proceed despite not having obtained a written
agreement from Papalas because the approval would subsequently be issued in plaintiff’s name
thereby securing his interests. Plaintiff averred that defendant also assured him that defendant
would prepare a written agreement the following day and record the ensuing negotiation with the
Papalas investors.2 As previously noted, defendant stated that he proceeded to the hearing under
the belief that plaintiff’s agreement with Papalas was already completed. But even after
resolving these versions of events in plaintiff’s favor, plaintiff cannot show that but for his
reliance on defendant’s alleged advice, he would have obtained an enforceable agreement from
Papalas.
For starters, even if plaintiff had elected against advocating for the commission’s
approval of the Lot 24 site plan, plaintiff cannot show that Papalas would not have otherwise
obtained the approval. Indeed, defendant explained that the planning commission was required
to give site plan approval if the proposed project met their criteria irrespective of the identity of
the applicant. Thus, while plaintiff’s advocacy before the commission certainly may have been
advantageous for Papalas, plaintiff’s advocacy was not the dispositive factor concerning the
board’s granting the approval.
This fact is important given plaintiff’s explanation that his value to Papalas was his
ability to secure the Lot 24 site plan approval.3 Thus, bearing in mind that plaintiff was not
dispositive in obtaining the approval, plaintiff can show nothing more than a mere possibility
that but for defendant’s advice, he would have obtained an enforceable agreement. “A mere
possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation
testimony that he considered himself as representing only Papalas, he told the planning
commission that he represented both parties.
2
As we address later in this opinion, defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s averments
contradicted his prior deposition testimony goes to whether there was a conflict of interest, rather
than whether defendant provided the alleged “bad advice.” Additionally, we decline to consider
as evidence mere allegations contained in Papalas’s lawsuit that plaintiff refused to engage in
good faith negotiations.
3
Plaintiff claims the trial court erred in framing the issue as whether there had been a legal
transfer of the approval from Lot 25 to Lot 24. However, it was plaintiff who injected the issue
of transfer into this case, having alleged throughout his complaint that both he and the planning
commission treated the issue as one involving the transfer of approval. Regardless, the issue of
transfer has no bearing on whether defendant’s alleged advice caused plaintiff’s damages.
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or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to
direct a verdict for the defendant.” Pontiac Sch Dist v Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, 221
Mich App 602, 615; 563 NW2d 693 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Such
speculation or conjecture is likewise insufficient to oppose a motion for summary disposition.
Libralter Plastics, Inc v Chubb Group, 199 Mich App 482, 486; 502 NW2d 742 (1993).
Further revealing the speculative nature of plaintiff’s claim is the fact that negotiations
between plaintiff and Papalas continued through January 2007 – nearly two months after the
commission granted the approval. On this very point, Didario even testified that “we were trying
to fit [plaintiff] into a piece of the operation” long after the commission granted approval. To
counter this, plaintiff offers only the naked assertion that he lost his “bargaining chip” by
obtaining the site approval. However, this falls far short of plaintiff’s burden to “present
substantial evidence from which a jury may conclude that more likely than not, but for the
defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff’s injuries would not have occurred.” Pontiac Sch Dist, 221
Mich App at 614 (quotation and citation omitted). Moreover, not a shred of evidence exists
showing that defendant’s alleged advice caused these subsequent negotiations to fail. Thus, we
are again left with only the possibility that defendant’s alleged advice was responsible for
plaintiff’s damages.
Contesting that his damages are speculative, plaintiff points to an email from Papalas’s
attorney as well as defendant’s own affidavit. Both acknowledge that plaintiff would receive a
“substantial” 20 percent interest in the club. Plaintiff’s argument, however, misses the key to the
causation analysis: it is not whether the amount of the interest at stake was speculative, but
whether but for defendant’s alleged advice, plaintiff would have obtained that interest.
Regardless, both the email and defendant’s affidavit reveal that the interest at stake was only
potential in nature: the email “anticipated” a 20 percent investment return for the venture’s
members and the affidavit indicated defendant’s belief that plaintiff “would become a 20 percent
owner . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) This is also consistent with the Letter of Intent detailing that
Shattelroe and his investors were free to abandon the transaction “at any time before execution of
definitive transaction documents without any liability to [plaintiff].” Consequently, the email
and affidavit of defendant merely reveal the status of the ongoing negotiations and hardly present
a basis upon which to conclude that but for defendant’s advice, plaintiff would have had an
enforceable agreement.
Additionally, we reject plaintiff’s claim that summary disposition was inappropriate
because defendant acted in violation of the conflict of interest rule, Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.7(a)(1).4 See Beattie v Firnschild, 152 Mich App 785, 791; 394 NW2d 107 (1986)
(although MRPC 1.0 provides that violations of the MRPC do not give rise to a cause of action,
violations of the MRPC may create a rebuttable presumption of malpractice). Indeed,
notwithstanding that plaintiff hired two other lawyers expressly for the purposes of negotiating a
deal with Papalas, plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he authorized defendant to seek
4
That rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client would
be directly adverse to another client unless, “the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client.” MRPC 1.7(a)(1).
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approval of the Lot 24 site plan on behalf of plaintiff and Papalas “as partners.” This is
consistent with defendant’s understanding that plaintiff and Papalas were acting as “a team,” and
as “one and the same,” and had already reached an agreement.5
Before moving on, we note that plaintiff appears to argue that summary disposition was
inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact existed based on evidence that plaintiff
“would have shown” had the case gone to trial.6 However, a party opposes a motion for
summary disposition by setting forth specific facts, not pledging to do so at some future date.
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455, 455 n 2; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). And, without any
record citations from plaintiff on this score, we will not scour the record in the vain hope of
finding implicit support for plaintiff’s claim. Mudge v Macomb Co, 458 Mich 87, 105; 580
NW2d 845 (1998). This argument is wholly without merit.
This brings us to plaintiff’s final assignment of error: that the circuit court erred in
denying his motion for reconsideration. A motion for rehearing or reconsideration under MCR
2.119(F) requires the moving party to “demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and the
parties have been misled and show that a different disposition of the motion must result from
correction of the error.” We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for reconsideration
for an abuse of discretion. In re Beglinger Trust, 221 Mich App 273, 279; 561 NW2d 130
(1997). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is outside the range of reasonable
and principled outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809
(2006).
In raising this issue, plaintiff either reiterates arguments previously presented in opposing
summary disposition, or fails to provide any citation to the record in support of his argument that
an official from the City of Lincoln Park opined that no ordinance precluded construction of an
adult cabaret club on Lot 25. As for the former, a motion for reconsideration that merely
presents the same issues already ruled on by the court generally will not be granted, Herald Co,
Inc v Tax Tribunal, 258 Mich App 78, 82-83; 669 NW2d 862 (2003); as for the latter, plaintiff
has abandoned his argument, Mudge, 458 Mich at 105. There was no abuse of discretion.
5
We decline to construe plaintiff’s affidavit (in which he averred that defendant gave him “bad
advice”) as an objection to the purported conflict of interest since it is clear such an interpretation
would conflict with his prior deposition testimony noted supra. See Casey v Auto Owners Ins
Co, 273 Mich App 388, 396; 729 NW2d 277 (2006) (“a witness is bound by his or her deposition
testimony, and that testimony cannot be contradicted by affidavit in an attempt to defeat a motion
for summary disposition.”). By this same token, it is of no moment that defendant is alleged to
have stated that he was “representing the other side” (i.e., Papalas) even though he informed the
planning commission that he represented both Papalas and plaintiff, or that defendant allegedly
received retainers from both parties, given plaintiff’s deposition testimony.
6
That evidence included: that expired site plan approvals are often reinstated; that Lincoln Park
city officials had opined that the existence of a church would not have precluded an adult
entertainment club on Lot 25; and that plaintiff did in fact object to the purported conflict of
interest.
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Affirmed.
Defendant may tax costs, having prevailed in full. MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
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