PEOPLE OF MI V KEONDO SHAMAAR TAYLOR (Per Curiam Opinion)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 28, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 296915
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 08-004311-FH
KEONDO SHAMAAR TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct,
MCL 750.520d(1)(a). Before trial started, defendant pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex
offender, MCL 28.723. The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender, second
offense, MCL 769.10, to concurrent prison terms of 15 to 22½ years on the criminal sexual
conduct conviction and 3 to 6 years on the failing to register conviction. Defendant appeals as of
right. We affirm defendant’s conviction for criminal sexual conduct, but vacate his sentence and
remand for resentencing.
On appeal, defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court closed
the courtroom to all unnecessary persons during a portion of the victim’s testimony. According
to defendant, the closure of the courtroom violated MCL 600.2163a and his constitutional right
to a public trial.
A defendant has a sixth amendment right to a public trial. Presley v Georgia, 558 US
___; 130 S Ct 721, 723; 175 L Ed 2d 675 (2010). “However, this right is not self-executing: the
defendant must timely assert the right. . . . [T]he failure to timely assert the right to a public trial
forecloses the later grant of relief.” People v Vaughn, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___
(2010). In Vaughn, this Court held that where defense counsel did not object to the trial court’s
decision to close the courtroom during jury selection, the trial court’s error did not warrant relief
for the defendant.
In this case, defense counsel initially objected to the prosecutor’s request that the
courtroom be closed for the remainder of the victim’s testimony. But he ultimately left the
matter up to the court’s discretion, stating that he would “leave this in the discretion of the
-1-
court.” A defendant may not acquiesce in a ruling by the trial court and then raise the ruling as
an issue on appeal. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 111; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).
Accordingly, defendant waived any issue regarding the trial court’s decision to close the
courtroom for a portion of the victim’s testimony.
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to be resentenced because the trial court erred in
scoring ten points for offense variable (OV) 3. We agree.
“A sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points to be scored,
provided that evidence of record adequately supports a particular score.” People v Hornsby, 251
Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). We will uphold a scoring decision for which there
is any evidence in support. Id.
Ten points may be scored for OV 3 if “[b]odily injury requiring medical treatment
occurred to a victim.” MCL 777.33(1)(d). In scoring 10 points for OV 3, the trial court relied on
the statement from the presentence investigation report that the victim “was having trouble
breathing and kept losing consciousness.” However, nothing in the record indicates that the
victim’s breathing troubles and inability to maintain consciousness were related to a physical
injury to her body sustained in the sexual assault, rather than to the psychological damage of
being sexually assaulted and then having to give the details of the assault. The emergency room
physician testified that she observed no physical injury to the victim. We note that ten points
were scored for OV 4, MCL 777.34, for the psychological injury suffered by the victim. Given
that ten points were scored for OV 4 and the lack of evidence showing a physical injury to the
victim, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the victim suffered a
bodily injury and scoring ten points for OV 3. Because the error in scoring OV 3 alters the
appropriate guidelines range, defendant is entitled to be resentenced. People v Francisco, 474
Mich 82, 88-92; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). We therefore vacate defendant’s sentence for the
criminal sexual conduct conviction and remand for resentencing.1
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
1
Because we conclude that defendant is entitled to be resentenced, we need not address his claim
that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the scoring of OV 3 at the initial sentencing
hearing.
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.