PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY BOLES (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 28, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 296684
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 09-032163-FH
ANTHONY BOLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of larceny in a building,
MCL 750.360, and conducting a criminal enterprise, MCL 750.159i(1). The trial court
sentenced defendant as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison
terms of 78 months to 15 years for the larceny convictions and 78 months to 20 years for the
criminal enterprise conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for vacation of defendant’s conviction and sentence for conducting a criminal
enterprise.
I. BASIC FACTS
On September 9, 2008, Jennie Sumner, a surgical assistant for two oral surgeons, saw a
male walk out of the surgeons’ interior office and leave the building through a back door. The
man drove away in a “black older style Lincoln, Cadillac type” vehicle. After the man left, it
was discovered that $300 from an employee’s purse, a laptop, and a cellular telephone were
missing.
On September 13, 2008, Ellen Haelein, an employee of Angela’s flowers, heard the
store’s delivery door open. After she heard the delivery door “close again,” Haelein walked to
the back room. She did not see anybody, but she noticed that her purse was gone. The contents
of her purse included a digital camera, eyeglasses, and $180. That same day, Michael
Westendorf, an employee of Barewood Furniture, and Kim Gregory, owner of Spartan Pools,
encountered a man in a backroom of the respective businesses. The man drove away from
Barewood Furniture and Spartan Pools in a black Cadillac.
A police officer observed a 1995 Cadillac at a party store near Spartan Pools; the driver
of the vehicle was defendant. Haelein’s digital camera and eyeglasses were found in the
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Cadillac, and Haelein’s purse was found in a nearby dumpster. In addition, the tread of the shoes
defendant was wearing matched shoeprints left at Spartan Pools. Defendant was driven to
Spartan pools for “identification or elimination.” Gregory identified defendant as the man he
saw in the store’s backroom.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that the on-the-scene identification procedure at Spartan Pools was
unduly suggestive, violating his right to due process. We disagree.
A trial court’s decision to admit identification evidence is reviewed for clear error.
People v Harris, 261 Mich App 44, 51; 680 NW2d 17 (2004). “Clear error exists if the
reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.
An identification procedure violates a defendant’s right to due process when, under the
totality of the circumstances, “it is so impermissibly suggestive that it gives rise to a substantial
likelihood of misidentification.” People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 111; 577 NW2d 92 (1998);
People v Colon, 233 Mich App 295, 304; 591 NW2d 692 (1998). This Court has repeatedly
recognized the importance of on-the-scene identifications. In People v Libbett, 251 Mich App
353, 359; 650 NW2d 407 (2002), it stated that on-the-scene identifications are “reasonable,
indeed indispensable, police practices because they permit the police to immediately decide
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the suspect is connected with the crime, and subject
to arrest, or merely an unfortunate victim of circumstance” (quotations marks and citation
omitted). See also People v Purofoy, 116 Mich App 471, 480; 323 NW2d 446 (1982); People v
Johnson, 59 Mich App 187, 189-190; 229 NW2d 372 (1975). Here, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that the police acted for any reason other than to determine whether defendant
was connected to the crimes. Libbett, 251 Mich App at 363. Police officers brought defendant
to Spartan Pools for identification by Gregory less than 20 minutes after defendant was stopped
by the police. In addition, while the police officers informed Gregory that they had a suspect
they wanted him to identify, they made no suggestive comments during the identification
procedure. Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err in allowing
the identification testimony.
Defendant also argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial
counsel did not object to Brian Wakeman’s identification of him as the perpetrator of a 2006
breaking and entering. According to defendant, Wakeman’s pretrial identification of defendant
was unfairly suggestive because Wakeman had been told by a police officer that his description
of the perpetrator matched defendant. We disagree.
Because no Ginther1 hearing has been held on defendant’s ineffective assistance claim,
our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350,
352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000). Here, defendant relies on the transcript of the hearing on his motion
to suppress identification in the 2006 case concerning the breaking and entering of the Wakeman
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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Funeral Home. The transcript is not a part of the record in this case and, therefore, cannot be
considered. People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 21; 776 NW2d 314 (2009). There is nothing in the
record to suggest that counsel’s failure to object to Wakeman’s identification of defendant at trial
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. People v Uphaus (On Remand), 278 Mich
App 174, 185; 748 NW2d 899 (2008).2 We find no merit to defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Next, defendant argues that his conviction for conducting a criminal enterprise was not
supported by sufficient evidence because there was no evidence that he was associated with or
employed by someone other than himself. We agree.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that
the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Ericksen,
288 Mich App 192, 196; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). We review de novo issues of statutory
interpretation. People v Tennyson, 487 Mich 730, 735; 790 NW2d 354 (2010).
MCL 750.159i(1) provides: “A person employed by, or associated with, an enterprise
shall not knowingly conduct or participate in the affairs of the enterprise directly or indirectly
through a pattern of racketeering activity.” A “person” is defined by MCL 750.159f(d) as “an
individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, cooperative, association, corporation, limited liability
company, personal representative, receiver, trustee, assignee, or other legal or illegal entity.” An
“‘[e]nterprise’ includes an individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, limited
liability company, trust, union, association, governmental unit, or other legal entity or a group of
persons associated in fact although not a legal entity. . . .” MCL 750.159f(a).
There is no binding case law analogous to the present situation. Consequently, whether
defendant’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence is entirely dependent on statutory
interpretation. In interpreting a statute, this Court’s primary goal is to determine and effectuate
the legislature’s intent. People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 250; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). When
ascertaining the legislature’s intent, we first look to the language used in the statute. People v
Droog, 282 Mich App 68, 70; 761 NW2d 822 (2009). Plain and unambiguous language, like
that present in this statute, must be enforced as written, People v Barbee, 470 Mich 283, 286;
681 NW2d 348 (2004), and we must enforce all the words contained in the statute. State
Treasurer v Schuster, 456 Mich 408, 417; 572 NW2d 628 (1998); Helder v North Pointe Ins Co,
234 Mich App 500, 504; 595 NW2d 157 (1999).
We hold that the evidence contained in the record was not sufficient to convict defendant
of operating a criminal enterprise. Under the plain terms of the statute, defendant clearly could
be an “enterprise”, because that term includes an individual, and clearly he is a “person” because
that also includes an individual. However, the statute requires that a person be “employed by, or
2
Similarly, defendant fails to establish that there is a reasonable probability that, absent
Wakeman’s identification of him, the result of his trial would have been different. Uphaus, 278
Mich App at 185.
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associated with, an enterprise”, and here there is no evidence that defendant was employed by or
associated with an enterprise while committing these crimes.
“Associate” means “to come together as partners, friends or companions.” Webster’s
New Collegiate Dictionary (8th Edition, 1980). This definition recognizes that to associate with
means to “come together” with someone else, whether it be an individual, sole proprietorship, or
other entity coming within the statutory definition of enterprise. MCL 750.159f(a). Clearly
defendant was not “associated” with an enterprise because he did not come together with anyone
falling within the definition of enterprise.
In order to have been properly convicted, then, defendant would have to have been
“employed by” an enterprise. Using the applicable definitions, the jury would have to conclude
that defendant (“a person” which means an “individual”) was “employed by” defendant (an
“enterprise”, which also means an “individual”). To “employ”, however, means “to use or
engage the services of” an individual. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (8th Edition, 1980).
In the normal course of things, one does not “use or engage the services of” oneself. But, any one
of the other entities (or other individual) set forth in the definition of “enterprise” could “use or
employ the services” of an individual. Had defendant been operating a business entity of some
form, such as a “sole proprietorship” or other entity or group defined as an enterprise, and
utilized that entity while engaging in a pattern of criminal behavior, defendant’s conviction could
be sustained.3 But, where this defendant was not associated with any distinct enterprise as
defined by statute, we cannot conclude that this statute is applicable to this defendant’s actions.
Additionally, because a sole proprietorship means “a business in which one person owns
all the assets, owes all the liabilities, and operates in his or her personal capacity,” Black’s Law
Dictionary (7th Edition, 1990), the statute’s reference to “individual” in the definition of
enterprise cannot cover a self-employed individual, otherwise the inclusion of “sole
proprietorship” in that same definition would be surplusage. We cannot read the statute in such a
manner, Priority Health v Comm of Office of Fin and Ins Serv, 489 Mich 67, ___; ___ NW2d
___ (2011), as we must give effect to all the words contained in the statute. State Treasurer v
Shuster, 456 Mich at 417.
Accordingly, defendant’s conviction of conducting a criminal enterprise is not supported
by sufficient evidence and is therefore reversed.4
3
Thus, for example, an individual operates a sole proprietorship by himself, but with such an
entity there exists some evidence of a business operation, and no such evidence exists here.
Defendant was merely driving his vehicle and committing larcenies.
4
We need not address defendant’s argument that due process requires correction of the
presentence investigation report (PSIR) because the PSIR inaccurately listed defendant’s 1976
conviction for burglary as a felony. Defendant has already received the relief requested. After
this Court granted in part defendant’s motion for remand, People v Boles, unpublished order of
the Court of Appeals, entered January 21, 2011 (Docket No. 296684), the trial court entered an
order requiring correction of the PSIR.
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III. STANDARD 4 BRIEF
Defendant claims that his right against self-incrimination was violated when he was
subjected to interrogation in the back of a police car without being advised of his Miranda5
rights. “Statements of an accused made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless
the accused voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights.”
Harris, 261 Mich App at 55. “[I]nterrogation refers to express questioning and to any words or
actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.” People v Marsack, 231 Mich App 364, 374; 586
NW2d 234 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, defendant fails to identify any
statements made by him that were used against him. Instead, he complains that the police
violated his right against self incrimination when they compared his shoes to photographs of
shoeprints taken at Spartan Pools. This is not a Miranda issue. Defendant’s argument that his
right against self incrimination was violated is without merit.
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to withdraw his no contest plea to a 2006
breaking and entering charge. The issue is not related to defendant’s convictions in this case.
Therefore, it is not properly before the Court and will not be addressed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for vacation of defendant’s conviction
and sentence for conducting a criminal enterprise.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
5
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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