SHAWANA WILLIAMS V AUTO CLUB GROUP INS CO (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHAWANA WILLIAMS,
UNPUBLISHED
August 23, 2011
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant-Appellee,
v
No. 294511
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-009905-CK
AUTO CLUB GROUP INS. CO., a/k/a AAA
MICHIGAN,
Defendant/Cross-DefendantAppellant,
and
NEW FALLS CORPORATION,
Intervening-Defendant/CrossPlaintiff.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and WHITBECK and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Auto Club Group Ins. Co., a/k/a AAA Michigan, appeals as of right a
judgment for plaintiff Shawana Williams in a suit arising from defendant’s failure to compensate
her for damages resulting from a fire in her home. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by
denying its post-trial motions for set-off and remittitur. We affirm in part, and reverse in part.
I.
In 2003, plaintiff purchased a home in Grand Rapids, executed a mortgage and, in an
adjustable rate note, promised to pay $84,455, plus interest, to her lender, Metro Center
Mortgage, Inc. (“MCM, Inc.”). The home was insured by defendant when a fire occurred at the
home on May 25, 2005.
Donald Swartz, a claim representative for defendant, testified that plaintiff stayed at the
Residence Inn from the night of the fire until June 6, 2005, resulting in additional costs of
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approximately $3,000, which defendant paid before trial. Plaintiff thereafter moved to an
apartment, which cost $757 per month, where she stayed for one year. At the same time as
plaintiff was renting the apartment, plaintiff testified that she received bills from Homecomings
Financial1 and in turn sent $670 mortgage payments every month.
Defendant’s loss claims specialist determined that $60,135.56 would restore the home to
its original condition, but the actual cash value of the claim was $46,965.33. The restoration
estimate was mailed to Homecomings Financial, which in turn sent a sworn statement and proof
of loss to defendant. Thereafter, defendant paid a portion of the cash value ($7,064) to the City
of Grand Rapids under MCL 500.2845,2 and the remaining $39,901.33 to Homecomings
Financial. Homecomings Financial then had 180 days to make the repairs to the home, which
would require payment by defendant of the remaining $13,170.23 in the restoration estimate.3
We note that a key issue before the trial court, and now on appeal, is whether defendant properly
paid Homecomings Financial because the insurance policy provides that loss shall be payable to
“any mortgagee named on the Declaration Certificate,” but the only Declaration Certificate in the
record identifies the “Mortgage Servicing Company/Mortgagee” as Household Bank FSB.
The mortgage was assigned by MCM, Inc. to New Falls Corporation (NFC) on April 12,
2007. NFC’s account officer, Denise Harkless, subsequently learned that defendant had paid
$39,901.33 to Homecomings Financial. Harkless testified that NFC did not receive that payment
with the mortgage assignment. Harkless was unsure what happened to the payment, but she
1
It is unclear from the record what role Homecomings Financial played in the mortgage process.
There was some testimony from an account officer of an assignee of the mortgage, New Falls
Corporation, that Homecomings Financial could have been a servicing agent for MCM, Inc.
There was other evidence that Homecomings Financial claimed that it was plaintiff’s lender.
However, according to a title search, as well as the plain language of the note and the mortgage,
MCM, Inc. was the lender at the time of the fire and Homecomings Financial was not listed in
these documents as a servicing agent.
2
MCL 500.2845 provides, in relevant part:
(1) If a claim is filed for a loss to insured real property due to fire or explosion
and a final settlement is reached on the loss to the insured real property, an insurer
shall withhold from payment 25% of the actual cash value of the insured real
property at the time of the loss or 25% of the final settlement, whichever is less . .
. At the time that 25% of the settlement or judgment is withheld, the insurer shall
give notice of the withholding to the treasurer of the city, village, or township in
which the insured real property is located, to the insured, and to any mortgagee
having an existing lien or liens against the insured real property, if the mortgagee
is named on the policy. In the case of a judgment, notice shall also be provided to
the court in which judgment was entered.
3
A section pertaining to property insurance in plaintiff’s mortgage allows a lender to make a
proof of loss and hold insurance proceeds for restoration and repair.
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nevertheless testified that she credited plaintiff’s payoff amount with $39,901.33 because, as she
explained, it is NFC’s policy to err on the side of the debtor. Harkless maintained that the payoff
amount after this credit was $61,967.59.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging that defendant had failed to timely
pay plaintiff’s claim for coverage resulting from the fire. Defendant responded that the policy
was void, maintaining that plaintiff intentionally set the fire to fraudulently collect insurance
payments from defendant. NFC intervened as a named insured on the insurance policy. Among
other claims unrelated to this appeal, NFC alleged that plaintiff had stopped making payments on
the note and that plaintiff’s default entitled NFC to acceleration of the amount of the security
interest.
Following trial, a jury reached a verdict finding that plaintiff was not involved with arson
and she did not engage in fraud, falsely swear, or make material misrepresentations to the
insurance company. Thus, the jury found that plaintiff was entitled to $60,135.56 in damages for
the structure, $60,000 in damages for personal contents, and $7,570 in damages for additional
expenses. The jury found that plaintiff was liable to NFC for $21,000 on the security interest.
Defendant thereafter filed a motion for remittitur with respect to the jury’s award for
additional living expenses, which the trial court denied. Defendant also filed a motion for set-off
from the $60,135.56 in damages for the structure, arguing that plaintiff already enjoyed the
benefit of its $7,064 payment to the City of Grand Rapids and its $39,901.33 payment to
Homecomings Financial in light of NFC’s credit of that amount to the payoff amount. Plaintiff
did not contest the $7,064 set-off, which the trial court granted, but the trial court denied the
motion for set-off of $39,901.33. The trial court reasoned that the payment to Homecomings
Financial “loomed” over the case, but “the proofs to this day are unclear . . . concerning whether
the proper mortgagee was paid.”
We consider first defendant’s argument, with respect to the trial court’s denial of the
motion for set-off, that the judgment awarding $60,135.56 in damages to the structure will result
in double recovery for plaintiff. We agree.
Generally, under Michigan law, only one recovery is allowed for an injury.
Chicilo v Marshall, 185 Mich App 68, 70; 460 NW2d 231 (1990); Great
Northern Packaging, Inc v General Tire & Rubber Co, 154 Mich App 777, 781;
399 NW2d 408 (1986). To determine whether a double recovery has occurred,
this Court must ascertain what injury is sought to be compensated. Chicilo, 185
Mich App at 70. Thus, where a recovery is obtained for any injury identical with
another in nature, time, and place, that recovery must be deducted from the
plaintiff's other award. Great Northern Packaging, 154 Mich App at 781.
[Grace, 253 Mich App at 368-369.]
Even though NFC’s attorney maintained in his closing argument that it was entitled to the full
payoff amount without the credit, $101,868.94, the only evidence regarding the payoff amount
that is properly before this Court is Harkless’s testimony that plaintiff was in fact credited for the
$39,901.33, reducing the payoff amount to $61,967.59. Because, according to the record
evidence, plaintiff ultimately enjoyed the benefit of the $39,901.33 payment by defendant to
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Homecomings Financial for damage to the structure, and because $60,135.56 equaled the cost to
restore the home, we conclude that, having been awarded the full $60,135.56 for damage to the
structure, plaintiff received a double recovery as to the $39,901.33 payment already credited to
plaintiff. Id. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for set-off
and remand for the trial court to set off $39,901.33 from the judgment. Given our holding here,
we decline to address defendant’s remaining arguments concerning the set off and payments
allegedly due Homecomings Financial.
Defendant also argues on appeal that the $7,570 award for additional living expenses is
not supported by the evidence and the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion for
remittitur. Taylor v Kent Radiology, PC, 286 Mich App 490, 522; 780 NW2d 900 (2009). We
disagree.
The power of remittitur should be exercised with restraint. When deciding
whether to grant a motion for remittitur, the trial court must examine all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether
the evidence supported the jury’s award. “If the award falls reasonably within the
range of the evidence and within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem
just compensation, it should not be disturbed.” [Id. (citations omitted).]
Plaintiff’s insurance policy provides:
If a loss caused by a Peril We Insure Against and not otherwise excluded in this
Policy makes your residence premises untenable, we will pay the reasonable
increase in living expenses necessary to maintain your normal standard of living
while you and your resident relatives live elsewhere. We will pay for the
shortest time needed to repair or replace the damaged property; or for you to
permanently relocate.
Plaintiff defined additional expenses as, “Anything as far as when I’m out of the home. Shelter,
clothing, anything as far as however long I’m out of the home while they are repairing the
property.” Swartz told plaintiff that additional expenses constituted “any money over . . . normal
living expenses [she] would incur.” For example:
if [plaintiff] stayed in a hotel room for 30 days at a hundred dollars a day,
[defendant] would pay $3,000, less what her normal expenses would be. If she
had an electric bill, phone bill, a garbage bill, we would subtract that from the
$3,000 because those—she would have paid those . . . anyway.
Defendant maintains on appeal that it paid for five months of rent before trial, so plaintiff
could not have paid $7,570 in rent for the remaining seven months that she lived in the
apartment. Seven months of rent, at a cost of $757 per month, would total $5,299. The jury was
in the best position to determine the amount of rent plaintiff paid after the reimbursements by
defendant ended. Although defendant claims on appeal that it made reimbursements for rent
from May 25, 2005 (before plaintiff was even renting an apartment) to October 31, 2005, thus
equaling five months of reimbursements, plaintiff testified at trial that defendant reimbursed her
for three to four months’ rent and Swartz could only testify that defendant reimbursed her for at
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least three months’ rent. The jury was free to reject this less than exact evidence regarding
defendant’s reimbursements and instead accept plaintiff’s figure, $7,570, representing the
amount of rent she paid after defendant stopped paying reimbursements. See Kelly v Builders
Square, Inc, 465 Mich 29, 34; 632 NW2d 912 (2001) (“Indeed, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving damages, and a jury is free to accept or reject such proofs.”). Viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to plaintiff, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s
motion for remittitur on this ground.
Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that plaintiff failed to establish that she
lived in the apartment for the shortest time needed to repair or replace the damaged property, or
for her to permanently relocate. We decline to address this portion of defendant’s argument,
Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422
(1993), because the facts necessary for its resolution have not been presented. Smith v FoersterBolser Constr, 269 Mich App 424, 427; 711 NW2d 421 (2006) (“[T]his Court may overlook
preservation requirements if the failure to consider the issue would result in manifest injustice, if
consideration is necessary for a proper determination of the case, or if the issue involves a
question of law and the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented.”). In any event,
Swartz testified that defendant agreed to pay additional living expenses until the claim was
resolved and, because of the instant litigation, plaintiff’s claim was not resolved until well after
her one-year stay in the apartment.
Defendant also maintains that, prior to the fire plaintiff incurred several hundred dollars
in expenses each month for utilities and other costs. At trial, plaintiff specifically testified that
she paid between $85 and $90 for electricity, between $90 and $100 for gas, $25 for water,
between $70 and $80 for a home telephone, and between $120 and $170 for food. Plaintiff did
not testify at trial regarding whether these expenses remained constant, increased, decreased, or
were duplicated after the fire. The thrust of plaintiff’s argument at trial was only that her living
expenses increased because she paid both her mortgage payments ($670 per month) and her rent
payments ($757 per month). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, it was
not outside the range of principled outcomes for the trial court to conclude that the other utilities
remained constant (either to maintain the fire-damaged home or to live at the apartment) and the
only increase in living expenses was that claimed by plaintiff—rent.
We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for remittitur, but we
reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for set-off and remand for the trial
court to set off $39,901.33 from the judgment for damages to the structure.
No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219, neither party having prevailed in full.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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