PEOPLE OF MI V PERRY O'NEAL CARTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 9, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 298148
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-018245-FC
PERRY O’NEAL CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and WILDER and OWENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree murder, MCL
750.316(1)(b) (felony murder), carjacking, MCL 750.529a, assault with intent to rob while
armed, MCL 750.89, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony (“felonyfirearm”), MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced, as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11,
to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction, 30 to 45 years’ imprisonment for the
carjacking conviction, 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment for the assault conviction, and two years’
imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions related to
two separate events that occurred on the night of June 13, 2009. Specifically, defendant
maintains that there was insufficient identification evidence to prove that he was the person who
committed the charged crimes. We disagree.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo and in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine “whether any rational trier of fact could have found
that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v
Cline, 276 Mich App 634, 642; 741 NW2d 563 (2007). “All conflicts with regard to the
evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to prove the elements of the crime.” People v
Wilkens, 267 Mich App 728, 738; 705 NW2d 728 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
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A. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO ROB WHILE ARMED
At around 10:00 p.m. on June 13, 2009, Robin Veronica Winston and her boyfriend,
Richard Marshall, drove to the Detroit Liquor Store, located at 11414 Livernois in the city of
Detroit. Winston waited inside her minivan, while Marshall walked into the store. As Marshall
entered the store, two black males exited, one of which had a much lighter complexion than the
other male. The two males walked away from the store, but at some point, turned around and ran
towards Winston in her car. The lighter-skinned male was wielding a small handgun and had it
pointed inches away from Winston’s head. Winston screamed and quickly put the car in reverse.
After backing up, the two men ran away across Livernois to the west.
There was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant committed this crime. First, Winston positively identified defendant at trial as the
person who wielded the gun and assaulted her.1 Second, the liquor store’s video tape showed the
armed man wearing pants that had distinctive stripes on the lower legs. When defendant was
arrested later that night, he was wearing brown jogging pants with stripes on the lower legs.
Thus, a jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant was the person who assaulted
Winston.
B. FELONY MURDER AND CARJACKING
Shortly after the two men ran away, Winston drove to Detroit’s Tenth Precinct, which
was located just a few blocks away on Livernois, where she reported the attempted carjacking to
Officer Melvin Williams. As Winston was talking with Williams, Anthony Horton walked into
the precinct, announced that he had been shot, and collapsed.
Horton expressed that he was shot and his wife’s car was taken from him. Before dying,
Horton described that he was robbed by two black men, with one being shorter and having a
much lighter complexion than the other man. Winston immediately recognized the descriptions
as matching the men who just attempted to rob her.
Sergeant Benjamin Wagner called Horton’s wife and obtained the description of her car,
a four-door, silver 2003 Chrysler Sebring, along with its license plate number. Shortly
thereafter, the police encountered the reported Sebring. Defendant was driving the vehicle and
attempted to evade the police. While driving, defendant admitted to the passengers that he “did
some hot stuff in this car” and “I ain’t going to jail.” After driving a few blocks, defendant
jumped out of the still-rolling vehicle and ran away. Officer Jesse Wilson gave chase but was
unable to apprehend defendant. Wilson noted, however, that the driver was wearing brown pants
that had striping at the bottom. Shortly thereafter, another police officer located defendant and
arrested him. Defendant was wearing a black tank top with brown sweat or jogging pants that
had three stripes towards the bottom, which matched the appearance on the Detroit Liquor Store
video.
1
Additionally, evidence was introduced that Winston also identified defendant out of a lineup a
couple weeks after this event and identified him again at the preliminary examination.
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Then, after defendant was administered his Miranda2 rights, he decided to show police
where the handgun was located. As a result, defendant led them to a nearby house, where Keron
Robinson3 lived. Police recovered a .32-caliber handgun hidden in Robinson’s bedroom.
Subsequent testing confirmed that the bullet retrieved from Horton was shot from this handgun.
As a result, there was sufficient evidence to prove that defendant murdered Horton during
the commission of a larceny. First, the jury reasonably could infer that defendant’s flight from
the police was evidence of a consciousness of guilt. Second, defendant was the person who led
police to the murder weapon at Robinson’s house. Third, Horton said that the light-skinned one
of the two assailants was the one to pull the trigger, and defendant did have a much lighter
complexion than Robinson. Fourth, defendant was driving Horton’s Sebring just minutes after
the shooting. Thus, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury
reasonably could have inferred that defendant was the person who shot Horton.
Likewise, with respect to the carjacking crime, in addition to the above evidence,
defendant made the following admission. While in a holding cell after his arrest, defendant
admitted that he “hit a lick” and took a car from “a crack head.” It is important to note that in
Horton’s autopsy results, it was established that Horton had cocaine in his system. Thus, this
was further evidence that defendant carjacked Horton. As a result, there was sufficient evidence
to establish that defendant was the person who committed these crimes, and this claim fails.
II. JURY INSTRUCTION
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it gave a clarifying instruction in
response to a note from the jury. But “[a] party must object or request a given jury instruction to
preserve the error for review.” People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 657;
620 NW2d 19 (2000). Not only did defendant fail to object to the clarified jury instructions,
defendant waived the issue by expressly approving the response. People v Chapo, 283 Mich
App 360, 372-373; 770 NW2d 68 (2009).
Waiver of an issue will extinguish any error. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612
NW2d 144 (2000). Waiver has been defined as the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The doctrine of waiver is
presumed to be applicable in both constitutional and statutory provisions. Id. at 217-218.
Here, after the jurors initially were instructed on the law and started their deliberations,
the jury submitted a question to the trial court, “Can second degree murder be made as a separate
account and also charged with carjacking, armed robbery, felony firearms?” The trial court was
not entirely clear on what the jury was asking. The trial court sought advice from both attorneys
on how to respond.
2
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
3
Robinson was a codefendant but pleaded guilty before the start of trial to second-degree
murder, MCL 750.317, and assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89.
-3-
THE COURT: Do we want to bring them out and ask them? I don’t know
how we ask them in writing – that’s my problem, and I don’t really want to put
the Foreperson on the spot.
[The Prosecutor]: All right. Then why doesn’t the Court simply re-read
the instruction and see if that helps.
THE COURT: And maybe ask them if that doesn’t do it then they can ask
for a more specific –
[The Prosecutor]: Right; re-note, sure. That should fly. That should fly.
[Defense Counsel]: Agreed.
The trial court then decided to slightly modify the instruction that it had given earlier,
hoping that it would clarify the situation for the jury. After reading the proposed, modified
instruction, the trial court explained it also would reissue the instruction detailing that the four
crimes defendant was being charged with were to be decided independently.4 Both the
prosecutor and defense counsel replied, “Okay.”
Because defense counsel expressed satisfaction with the trial court’s answer to the jury’s
question, any issues related to this response was waived, and any error is extinguished.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Donald S. Owens
4
Defense counsel earlier had suggested that this instruction, which states that the jury could find
defendant guilty of all, some, or none of the crimes would be a “good one to [re-]read.”
-4-
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