MICHELLE DOUCETTE V CITY OF MARQUETTE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHELLE DOUCETTE and REATHA
TWEEDIE,
UNPUBLISHED
August 9, 2011
Plantiffs,
and
GERALD R. PETERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 293124
Marquette Circuit Court
LC No. 07-044543-CZ
CITY OF MARQUETTE,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and SERVITTO and GLEICHER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order denying his motion for summary
disposition and granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition. 1 Because defendant
breached its contract with plaintiff, we reverse and remand.
1
Plaintiff Gerald Peterson and defendant City of Marquette are the only parties to this appeal.
As such, we will use the singular “plaintiff” to refer to Peterson and the singular “defendant” to
refer to the City of Marquette.
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Plaintiff is the former city manager of defendant. He was employed for over nine years
by defendant, leaving his employment to retire in August 2005. According to plaintiff, he was
entitled to the payment of his health insurance premiums by defendant in his retirement years.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant did pay his health insurance premiums for approximately one
year after his retirement, then abruptly discontinued the payments. Plaintiff thereafter initiated
the instant lawsuit, asserting claims of estoppel, breach of contract, and a violation of equal
protection. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and
plaintiff moved for partial summary disposition in his favor under the same sub-rule. The trial
court granted defendant’s motion, finding that plaintiff’s separation agreement with defendant
did not bind the city to provide him with retiree health care benefits, and that because plaintiff
knew or should reasonably have known that defendant could not be expected to extend the
disputed benefits under a practice never adopted by defendant’s city commission, defendant was
not estopped from denying plaintiff the retiree health insurance benefit. This appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion
for summary disposition and dismissing his breach of contract claim. We agree.
On appeal, a trial court’s decision whether to grant a motion for summary disposition is
reviewed de novo. Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 551; 739 NW2d 313 (2007). If the motion is
brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence
submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brown, 478 Mich at
551-552. Our review is limited to the evidence that was presented to the trial court at the time
the motion was decided. Peña v Ingham Co Rd Comm, 255 Mich App 299, 313 n 4; 660 NW2d
351 (2003). A MCR 2.116(C)(10) motion is properly granted when the proffered evidence fails
to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Brown, 478 Mich at 552.
The proper interpretation of a contract is a question of law that is reviewed de novo on
appeal. Henderson v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 460 Mich 348, 353; 596 NW2d 190 (1999).
Whether contract language is ambiguous is also a question of law that will be reviewed de novo.
Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co v Nikkel, 460 Mich 558, 563; 596 NW2d 915 (1999).
A contract must be interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Holmes v
Holmes, 281 Mich App 575, 593; 760 NW2d 300 (2008). “The fundamental goal of contract
interpretation is to determine and enforce the parties’ intent by reading the agreement as a whole
and applying the plain language used by the parties to reach their agreement.” Dobbelaere v
Auto-Owners Ins Co, 275 Mich App 527, 529; 740 NW2d 503 (2007). If contractual language is
clear and unambiguous, its meaning is a question of law, and courts must interpret and enforce
the contract as written. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105, 111; 595 NW2d 832
(1999). However, if contractual language is ambiguous, its meaning is a question of fact for the
jury to decide. Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 469, 663 NW2d 447
(2003).
A contract is ambiguous if it allows two or more reasonable interpretations, or if the
provisions cannot be reconciled with each other. Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App
700, 721-722; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). If the contract, although inartfully worded or clumsily
arranged, fairly admits of but one interpretation, it is not ambiguous. Id. A court may not
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rewrite clear and unambiguous language under the guise of interpretation. Rather, courts “must
give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a contract and avoid an interpretation that would
render any part of the contract surplusage or nugatory.” Klapp, 468 Mich at 468.
Plaintiff claimed breach of contract and promissory estoppel, alleging that he is entitled
to “retiree health insurance” from defendant.2 The trial court addressed plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim as follows:
As to his breach of contract claim, Plaintiff Peterson contends the City
breached his separation agreement under which he expected to receive retiree
health insurance benefits. That separation agreement, does not explicitly refer to
retiree health insurance benefits, but states only that “employees’ rights and
benefits with respect to the qualified retirement plan sponsored by the city shall
be controlled by the plan documents establishing such plans.” At the time of that
contract, Plaintiff Peterson knew there was no record of the city commission
establishing a retiree health insurance plan. In Sittler v Board of Control of MTU,
333 Mich 681 (1952), the Supreme Court held that a letter written by a
department head offering a contract of employment to a professor did not
constitute a binding contract on the Board of Control. Under then existing law,
the only agency with authority to contract with professors was the MTU Board of
Control and any contract not approved by the Board of Control was not a valid,
binding contract enforceable against the University. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff
Peterson contends the separation agreement contractually binds the city to provide
him with retiree health insurance benefits under a plan that was not approved by
the city commission, that contract commitment is not binding on the Defendant
because the plan referred to was never approved by the city commission.
Peterson’s contract claim, as to breach of retiree health insurance benefits,
therefore, fails and is unenforceable.
We note first that plaintiff did not contend that the city breached his separation
agreement. In his complaint, his motion for partial summary disposition, and now on appeal, he
consistently contended that the city breached the employment contract, which he entered into
with the city and which was undisputedly approved by the commission. The only relation the
separation agreement has to the proceedings is whether it somehow altered or replaced the
agreement, which we shall address later.
Plaintiff’s employment contract stated that he was entitled to the fringe benefits typically
provided to department heads. Instead of delineating these benefits, his employment contract
referred to the “the executive package of fringe benefits provided to Marquette City Department
2
Under the “retiree health insurance plan,” defendant paid 100% of the insurance premiums for
former employees and their dependents, so long as the former employee was withdrawing funds
from his or her pension. We will use “retirement health insurance” to refer to the benefits, and
“retiree health insurance plan” to refer to the overall plan.
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Heads.” The fact that the city commission did not properly enact these benefits for department
heads is irrelevant to plaintiff’s rights under his employment contract, which was made directly
with the commission. Contrary to the trial court’s decision, the city commission’s failure to
enact a retiree health insurance plan for department heads does not nullify the provision of
plaintiff’s employment contract that gives him the same benefit, because defendant’s city
commission agreed to provide that benefit to plaintiff. The city charter authorized the
commission to appoint the city manager and set the city manager’s compensation (Marquette
Charter, § 4.6). Thus, everything in plaintiff’s subsequently ratified employment contract was
properly enacted per se, and is binding on defendant. See MCL 117.3(d).
The commission could have, had it wished, offered the same benefits to plaintiff even
though they were not available to any other employee; the reference used in the employment
contract is simply a shorthand method of referring to the fringe benefits for which plaintiff
contracted. Thus, the trial court’s reliance on Sittler v Board of Control of the Mich College of
Mining and Technology, 333 Mich 681; 53 NW2d 681 (1952), is misplaced. It is uncontested
that the commission had the authority to bind defendant to the contract with plaintiff. And even
though the department head retirement health benefit package was never formally adopted by the
commission, there can be no serious question that they were aware that this benefit existed. A
line item for this benefit would have been included in the city’s budget, which the commission
would have had to repeatedly approve, and plaintiff sent a memorandum concerning the benefits
to the mayor and city commissioners in 2000.
At the time plaintiff entered into his 1998 employment contract, the executive package of
fringe benefits included retiree health insurance for an “employee receiving pension.” The only
issue, then, is whether plaintiff was “receiving pension” when he began to draw benefits under
the defined contribution plan.3
Whether plaintiff was receiving pension when he began to draw benefits under his
defined contribution plan is addressed by plaintiff’s 1996 and 1998 employment contracts. The
1996 contract states:
The City Manager shall be entitled to the executive package of fringe
benefits provided to Marquette City Department Heads which includes pay for
work related injuries, sick leave, funeral leave, holidays, personal days,
hospitalization, a paid $50,000.00 whole term life insurance policy, paid pension
(MERS-Plan B-4), a City match of employee contributions to a voluntary
deferred compensation plan . . . .”
3
The defined contribution plan did not exist at the time plaintiff entered into his employment
contract. The plan that existed when plaintiff signed his employment agreement was the defined
benefit plan, also called the MERS-Plan B-4. In June 1998, the commission replaced the MERSPlan B-4 defined benefit plan with a defined contribution plan, and plaintiff converted to the
defined contribution plan pursuant to his employment contract. After his separation with
defendant, plaintiff began to draw benefits from the defined contribution plan.
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The same provision from the 1998 contract states:
The City Manager shall be entitled to the executive package of fringe
benefits provided to Marquette City Department Heads which includes pay for
work related injuries, sick leave, funeral leave, holidays, personal days,
hospitalization, and $50,000.00 life insurance policy, paid pension (MERS-Plan
B-4 or other as may be adopted), a City match of employee contributions to a
voluntary deferred compensation plan . . . .
*
*
*
If the City authorizes the adoption of a defined contribution pension
plan under the Michigan Employees Retirement System (MERS), the City
Manager shall be permitted to convert one half of his earned sick days as a
contribution to the plan. All contributions to the defined benefit plan made by the
City on his behalf plus a minimum 5% interest shall be transferred at his option to
a defined contribution plan if generally adopted for management employees.
Minimum contributions by the City shall be 12% of pay. [1998 employment
agreement, p 1 (emphasis added).]
Based on the clear language of these provisions, “pension” referred to the “MERS-Plan B-4 or
other as may be adopted.” Thus, plaintiff was “receiving pension” when he began to draw
benefits under the defined contribution plan later adopted by the commission. As such,
defendant was obligated under the 1998 employment contract to pay plaintiff retiree health
insurance.
While not specifically stated in its brief, defendant appears to suggest that plaintiff
somehow “snuck in” the change from a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan that
significantly shortened the vesting period (to two years) to benefit himself. However, the
commission approved the change to a defined contribution plan. And, that the two-year vesting
period benefitted plaintiff does not alter the terms of the separate contract that the commission
entered into with plaintiff. The commission contributed to the language of, and had ultimate
approval over, both the employment contract and the change to a defined contribution plan. It is
difficult to follow how plaintiff could have fleeced the commission in such circumstances. We
hold that a valid contract existed, and defendant is liable for damages for breaching plaintiff’s
employment agreement when it stopped paying plaintiff retiree health insurance in July 2006.
The language contained in the separation agreement does not alter this conclusion. The
separation agreement contains a provision, at paragraph 3, indicating that plaintiff’s rights and
benefits with respect to the qualified retirement plan sponsored by the City “shall be controlled
by the plan documents establishing such plans.” The health insurance benefits provided to
retirees are not, though, a part of the qualified retirement plan. Indeed, as we indicated with
respect to plaintiff, the entitlement to retiree health insurance benefits is a separate, contractually
agreed upon employment provision. Thus paragraph 3 does nothing to modify the 1998
employment contract. And, paragraph 6(b), provides, “The releases in this paragraph do not
affect any vested right Employee may have under all current City policies or the terms of
qualified retirement plan sponsored by the City . . .” Under the terms of the qualified retirement
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plan, plaintiff was undisputedly vested in his pension. The pension, then, was a vested right. As
previously indicated, because plaintiff’s 1998 employment contract provided for retiree health
insurance for an employee receiving pension and plaintiff was, in fact, receiving pension,
defendant breached plaintiff’s employment agreement when it stopped paying plaintiff retiree
health insurance in July 2006.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for determination of damages in proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Given our resolution of defendant’s legal breach of contract claim,
it is not necessary to address his equitable, promissory estoppel claim.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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