HORST EHRLER V FRANKENMUTH MOTEL INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HORST EHRLER and KAREN GODLEWSKI,
UNPUBLISHED
August 2, 2011
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 296908
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 09-005138-NO
FRANKENMUTH MOTEL, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: DONOFRIO, P.J., and BORRELLO and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs Horst Ehrler and Karen Godlewski appeal as of right the trial court’s award of
summary disposition to defendant Frankenmuth Motel, Inc. Plaintiffs’ claims arose after they
were injured by falling on a glaze of ice that blanketed the premises of defendant’s motor
courtyard motel following an ice storm. At issue is whether defendant motel owed plaintiffs a
duty of due care with respect to the safety of the premises two hours after the ice storm struck.
The trial court granted summary disposition to defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse
and remand.
I
On January 3, 2009, plaintiffs went to Frankenmuth to shop, have dinner, and stay the
night at defendant’s motel. According to defendant’s front desk attendant Tonya Blanford, as
she was driving to work the next morning she encountered a misty rain. She arrived at the motel
at approximately 6:40 a.m. to begin work and prepare for the complimentary continental
breakfast and coffee service in the front office. At approximately 6:55 a.m., as she prepared to
open the front office, Blanford stepped outside to retrieve something from her car. She noticed
that the rain had turned to ice, resulting in a layer of ice covering the premises. Blanford testified
that she believed a private contractor would arrive that morning to de-ice. She admitted,
however, that she was mistaken about the private contractor; the de-icing service was only
contracted to come to the motel if specifically called to de-ice. Blanford did not call the private
contractor, and no one came to de-ice the parking lot. Nevertheless, Blanford knew that the
motel’s clientele was “older” and she wanted to make sure that the motel guests had a way to get
coffee in the meantime, so she decided to apply salt to areas around the front office, the ramp
leading to the office door, areas around the guests’ cars, and the walkways leading to their
rooms. It was her expectation that the private contractor would arrive to salt the rest of the
parking lot. Blanford admitted that there were no signs advising guests where it was safe to
-1-
walk. She hoped they would decide to get in their cars and drive across the parking lot to the
front office for breakfast, rather than attempting to walk.
Arleen Cronk, the general manager of the motel, testified at deposition that defendant had
no written guidelines regarding de-icing. According to Cronk, Blanford should have called
Nancy Krick, the assistant general manager, if the de-icing service was needed, but she could not
recall if that general guideline was ever conveyed to Blanford. Because she was not at the motel
at the time of the accident and did not want to speculate, Cronk declined to state whether the deicing service should have been called that morning.
At approximately 9:00 a.m., a little over two hours after the motel had become covered
with ice, then 64-year old Godlewski left her motel room and headed to the front office because
she did not want to miss out on the breakfast service.1 Godlewski testified at deposition that she
walked straight across the parking lot to the office because the office was within walking
distance of her room. Walking across the parking lot was the most direct route. Godlewski
noticed “a sheet of ice” covering the parking lot and she walked slowly. She did not recall
seeing salt in the areas where she walked. Godlewski testified, in part:
A.
So I informed [Blanford] because I don’t remember it being, to the best of
my knowledge, it wasn’t salted or anything, you know, because when something’s
salted, you see like little white holes in the ice. And to the best of my knowledge,
I don’t recall seeing any of that. That’s why I said something to her. I didn’t
know if she realized it was that bad [emphasis added.]
***
Q.
Do you remember any salt in the parking lot immediately outside your
door?
A.
I don’t remember any salt at all no place.
Q.
[On the diagram of the premises, i]n the middle of the parking lot, there is
some X marks and there is some testimony that there was some salt in that area.
Do you remember that?
A.
I don’t remember any salt.
Q.
And then as you get closer, there is some X marks in front of the office
and next to the office. Do you remember any [salt] in that area?
A.
1
No.
Ehrler was not quite ready, so Godlewski left ahead of him.
-2-
Q.
And it’s my understanding from your testimony that this area that you
walked that you refer to on Exhibit No. 3, the line in and the line out back to the
X where you fell, was there any salt in that area?
A.
Not to the best of my knowledge, no. No.
According to Godlewski, upon reaching the office, she told Blanford that something
should be done about the ice, and Blanford told her that she had placed a call an hour before for
de-icing. Godlewski testified that she suddenly realized she had to use the bathroom and was
told by Blanford that there were no public restrooms in the office.2 Godlewski left the office to
walk back to her room in order to go to the bathroom. Blanford testified that she did not recall
having a conversation with Godlewski about using the bathroom, although she confirmed that
there were no public restrooms in the office area. Instead, according to Blanford, Godlewski was
upset about the icy condition of the parking lot and told Blanford that she was going to have a
lawsuit on her hands. After their conversation, Blanford left to fill a pitcher of orange juice and
when she returned, Godlewski had left the office and was walking in the direction of her room.
After she left the front office, Godlewski fell on ice somewhere between the office door
and the parking lot. She fell on the sidewalk along the front office. Blanford did not see exactly
where Godlewski fell. Blanford testified that she did not salt the area where Godlewski claimed
she fell and that she had told Godlewski to use a different route—the ramp—when exiting the
office. According to Blanford, the route Godlewski took from her room to the office, i.e.,
walking directly across the parking lot, was the ordinary route a guest would take, but the route
Godlewski took to actually enter the office was abnormal, in that she stepped onto the sidewalk
from the side of the office building instead of walking up the ramp, which was directly in front
of the office door and which Blanford testified she had salted and kept clear of ice. Godlewski
testified that she exited the office the same way that she entered, which she thought was the
ramp. After Godlewski fell, Blanford and another guest, who was inside the office at the time of
the fall, went outside to attend to Godlewski. Blanford then called 9-1-1 and moved her car in
front of Godlewski to block any cars that might further injure her.
Matthew Wright of Mobile Medical Response arrived at the scene to attend to
Godlewski. He testified at deposition to the conditions he encountered when he arrived. The
parking lot was “very icy,” the conditions when walking from the ambulance to Godlewski were
“extremely treacherous,” and he could “barely walk” at the scene. When asked whether he
remembered any salt being out there, he testified that he was not sure, but described the
conditions as “extremely slippery” and stated, “I just remember how icy it was everywhere.” He
assumed that Godlewski had fallen where he found her—on the sidewalk—because there was no
way that she could have walked in her condition. It was later determined that Godlewski had
broken several ribs and suffered a collapsed lung.
2
Godlewski testified that the urge to use the bathroom comes on suddenly, and that she was sure
she had used the restroom before she left her motel room.
-3-
At the time of Godlewski’s accident, Ehrler was finishing getting ready for the day.
Approximately 20 minutes after Godlewski left the room, Ehrler stepped outside and noticed the
icy conditions. Because he did not feel safe walking, Ehrler decided to take his car across the
parking lot (he had driven to the motel; Godlweski had ridden with him and did not have her own
car). When asked how he knew that Godlewski had fallen, Ehrler testified that while de-icing
the car, he turned towards the office and saw the flashing lights of the ambulance. After he
drove over to the scene of the accident, Ehrler got out of his car, put both feet on the ice, and fell.
Blanford, however, testified that when Ehrler first came to the scene, she told him that
Godlewski needed her purse so she could tell the medical team what medications she was taking.
According to Blanford, Ehrler then drove quickly back across the parking lot, retrieved
Godlewski’s purse, and came back to the scene.3 As Ehrler exited the car the second time, he
fell and was injured. Ehrler testified that as a result of his fall, he had surgery on his left rotator
cuff and suffered a swollen right knee.
On May 6, 2009, plaintiffs filed suit against defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant
breached its duty of care when it failed to inspect and detect the ice on the premises, failed to
warn them of the dangerous condition, failed to take measures to correct the dangerous
condition, and allowed the ice to remain on the premises when it had knowledge of the
unreasonable risk of harm. Defendant asserted, among various affirmative defenses, that
plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the open and obvious danger doctrine.
Thereafter, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10),
asserting that under the open and obvious danger doctrine, a premises owner does not have a
duty to warn or protect against dangers that are open and obvious. Defendant argued that
Quinlivan v The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, Inc, 395 Mich 244; 253 NW2d 732 (1975),
which holds that a premises owner must take reasonable measures within a reasonable amount of
time to diminish the dangers of ice and snow to an invitee, see id. at 261, does not stand for the
proposition that a premises owner must take all conceivable measures to abate the dangers of
Michigan winters. In response, plaintiffs argued that according to Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc,
464 Mich 512, 517; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), “if special aspects of a condition make even an open
and obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, the premises possessor has a duty to undertake
reasonable precautions to protect invitees from that risk.” Plaintiffs argued that the dangerous
condition was effectively unavoidable and that defendant took little or no action to abate the
dangers. During the motion hearing, plaintiffs argued that there was a question of fact as to
3
After the accident, Blanford wrote an incident report, including a detailed statement of the
events of the morning of January 4, 2009. The statement was generally in accord with her
testimony at deposition, save one discrepancy. In Blanford’s statement, she described Ehrler
going back to his room to get Godlewski’s purse, stating: “[Godlewski] sent him back up to the
room to get her purse and that is when I told them not to worry about their stuff in the room it
would be fine.” At deposition, however, Blanford testified: “I told [Godlewski] that the
ambulance is going to need to know if she’s on medications or anything like that. And so she
told me to tell him, ’cause he was hard of hearing, that her purse and medication list was in the
room.”
-4-
whether defendant actually salted the premises. But the trial court granted defendant’s motion,
stating:
Okay. Well, I’m going to grant the motion. It appears that this was not such a
special aspect or unique, that the approach to the office had been salted, and kind
of aside from that, it was certainly a general condition that applied, salt or no salt,
everywhere, and a condition that was well-known to the parties, that would be
probably enough by itself.
But the fact that there were efforts to salt the area of where people park in front of
the door, walk into the door, suggests that it’s not a special aspect. The area to the
sides of the door, partially occupied by planters, and it’s kind of a decorative
mode, so in any event, for those reasons I’ll deny the motion.
***
I mean grant the motion.
Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court committed palpable error
in failing to take into account the question of fact whether Blanford salted the premises and in
failing to consider Ehrler’s separate claim. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion.
II
The question before us is not whether defendant breached a duty of care in the manner in
which it handled the ice storm conditions, but rather, whether defendant owed a duty of due care
to plaintiffs in the first place. We find that it did. Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial court
erred in granting defendant summary disposition. We agree with plaintiffs.
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Because
the trial court did not specify the subsection on which it relied in granting the motion and
considered matters outside the pleadings, we construe the motion to have been granted under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). See Driver v Hanley, 226 Mich App 558, 562; 575 NW2d 31 (1997). We
review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109,
118-120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Maiden, 461 Mich at 119. If the evidence fails to
establish a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id. at 120. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of
reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might
differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).
-5-
To sustain an action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of care. Fultz v Union-Commerce Assocs, 470 Mich 460, 463; 683 NW2d 587
(2004). The guest of an innkeeper is considered a business invitee. See Benton v Dart Props
Inc, 270 Mich App 437, 440; 715 NW2d 335 (2006) (“[a] person invited on the land for the
owner’s commercial purposes or pecuniary gain is an invitee”); Graves v Warner Bros, 253
Mich App 486, 494; 656 NW2d 195 (2002) (equating the special relationship between an
innkeeper and guest to that between a business invitor and invitee). Thus, an innkeeper has the
duty to warn guests of any known danger and make the premises safe by inspecting the premises
and repairing or warning of known dangers. Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich
591, 597; 614 NW2d 88 (2000). This duty does not generally apply to the removal of dangers
that are so open and obvious that the invitee should reasonably be expected to discover them.
Lugo, 464 Mich at 516. Snow- and visible ice-covered surfaces are considered open and obvious
dangerous conditions due to their inherent slipperiness. Ververis v Hartfield Lanes, 271 Mich
App 61, 67 and n 2; 718 NW2d 382 (2006). However, “if special aspects of a condition make
even an open and obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, the premises possessor has a duty to
undertake reasonable precautions to protect invitees from that risk.” Lugo, 464 Mich at 517. A
special aspect of a condition is found, for example, if the danger is effectively unavoidable, or if
it presents a substantial risk of death or severe injury. Id. at 518. In determining whether a
special aspect exists, a court must evaluate the objective nature of the condition, not the
subjective degree of care used by the plaintiff or other idiosyncratic factors related to the
plaintiff. Bragan ex rel Bragan v Symanzik, 263 Mich App 324, 332; 687 NW2d 881 (2004),
citing Lugo, 464 Mich at 523-524.
Here, the trial court stated that the icy conditions on the motel premises did not present a
special aspect because “the approach to the office had been salted” and the ice was “a condition
that was well known to the parties.” The court further stated that “the fact that there were efforts
to salt the area of where people park in front of the door, walk into the door, suggests that it’s not
a special aspect.” It is not entirely clear whether the trial court determined that efforts to salt
(assuming this was true) made the condition effectively avoidable—thus no duty existed—or
whether the court presumed that a duty of due care existed and that no reasonable juror could
find that defendant breached its duty. Either way, we disagree.
We hold that there was a special aspect to the icy conditions in this case in that they were
effectively unavoidable. Plaintiffs had to encounter the icy conditions present at the motel that
morning if they desired to leave their room and go to the front office for the complimentary
continental breakfast,4 check out of their motel room on time, or for any other reason.5 If
4
While motels often describe their continental breakfast as “complimentary,” the cost is factored
into the motel room price charged to the patron.
5
Godlewski’s decision to leave her room and attempt to navigate the icy premises does not
eliminate defendant’s duty of due care. As stated above, in determining whether a special aspect
exists, a court must evaluate the objective nature of the condition, not the subjective degree of
care used by the plaintiff or other idiosyncratic factors related to the plaintiff. Bragan ex rel
Bragan v Symanzik, 263 Mich App 324, 332; 687 NW2d 881 (2004), citing Lugo, 464 Mich at
(continued…)
-6-
defendant’s position were accepted, motel patrons would be required to remain in their rooms
indefinitely until the dangerous conditions presented by an ice storm are completely abated or
they are apprised of a safe path of departure by motel management. This position is contrary to
current Michigan case law. The Lugo Court provided an example of a special aspect related to
the unavoidability of a dangerous condition. The Court explained that if a person is trapped
inside a building that only has one exit and that exit is blocked by a dangerous condition that is
open and obvious (in Lugo, the example was a floor covered with standing water), the condition
is effectively unavoidable and the open and obvious danger doctrine does not apply. Lugo, 464
Mich at 518. By inference, Lugo stands for the proposition that if the plaintiff attempts to
navigate through the effectively unavoidable condition, the defendant remains liable if the
plaintiff is injured in the process. To rule that the defendant no longer owes a duty if the plaintiff
attempts to navigate through the effectively unavoidable condition would render Lugo
meaningless. The only difference between the Lugo example and the circumstances of this case
is that the danger was not inside the guests’ rooms or the front office, but immediately outside
the motel buildings. There is no evidence that there was an ice-free path between the guests’
rooms and the front office. Therefore, under the reasoning of Lugo, the icy conditions in this
case were effectively unavoidable. See also, Hoffner v Lanctoe, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d
___ 2010 WL 4320340, lv pending 796 NW2d 50 (2011), slip op p 7-9; Robertson v Blue Water
Oil Co, 268 Mich App 588, 593-595; 708 NW2d 749 (2005). Because there was a special
aspect to the dangerous condition, being that it was effectively6 unavoidable, we hold that
defendant owed plaintiffs a duty of due care despite the fact that the condition was open and
obvious.
Whether defendant complied with the standard of care in responding to the conditions
presented by the ice storm presents a genuine issue of material fact for the jury. Blanford
testified that she salted around the front office, the ramp in front of the office door, around the
guests’ cars, and the walkways leading to guests’ rooms. Godlewski, on the other hand, testified
that to the best of her knowledge it was not salted anywhere she walked that morning. While no
one contradicted Blanford’s testimony about whether and where she salted, as no one witnessed
her conduct, Godlewski’s testimony, as well as that of Wright and Ehrler, raises a genuine issue
of material fact whether Blanford salted, whether she salted sufficiently and in the appropriate
places, and whether she complied with the standard of care in what she did, despite not having
called the de-icing contractor. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, we
hold that a reasonable jury could decide that defendant breached the applicable standard of care.
Thus, it is for the jury to decide whether defendant undertook “reasonable precautions to protect
invitees” from the risks presented by the ice storm, and summary disposition was inappropriate.
(…continued)
523-524. Godlewski’s conduct and any attribution of fault on her part is a matter for the jury—if
it finds that defendant breached the standard of care—when determining whether Godlewski was
comparatively negligent. The same is true of Ehrler’s conduct in attempting to assist Godlewski
after she fell and was seriously injured.
6
Note that the Supreme Court in Lugo used the qualifier “effectively” unavoidable. Lugo, 464
Mich at 518. Such deliberate use of a qualifying word defies the concept that the condition had
to be absolutely unavoidable, and that plaintiffs had to remain locked in their motel room until
the condition subsided.
-7-
See Lugo, 464 Mich at 517. Questions of proximate causation and any comparative negligence
are also for the jury.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
