VERNON THOMAS V VICTORIA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
VERNON THOMAS,
UNPUBLISHED
July 21, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 298243
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 09-091492-NF
VICTORIA GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and TITAN INDEMNITY
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and O’CONNELL and SERVITTO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 2008, plaintiff and his mother, Bettye Thomas, went to L.A. Insurance Agency
to obtain an automobile insurance policy. The first page of the insurance application named
Bettye as the applicant and named plaintiff as “driver number two.” The application contained a
section requiring disclosure of driving records, on which neither Bettye nor plaintiff reported any
driving violations. In the applicant questionnaire section, Bettye initialed the statement “I attest
that the vehicle(s) listed are titled in the name of the applicant. If any vehicle(s) are not titled in
the name of the applicant, explain below.” The listed vehicles included a 1997 Buick Park
Avenue. Bettye signed the application, and, at the request of the insurance agent, plaintiff also
signed the application.
Shortly after plaintiff and Bettye signed the application, defendant Victoria General
advised L.A. Insurance Agency that the policy was being cancelled on the ground that plaintiff’s
driver’s license was invalid. The following month, plaintiff reinstated his license and presented
proof of the reinstatement to the insurance agency. Defendant Victoria General subsequently
accepted payments on the policy.
In June 2008, plaintiff was in a collision while driving the Park Avenue. He
subsequently filed this action seeking first-party coverage. Defendants moved for summary
disposition, arguing that misrepresentations in the application rendered the policy void. The
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alleged misrepresentations included: the failure to report that plaintiff’s license was invalid, and
the failure to disclose that the owner of the Park Avenue was plaintiff.
The trial court determined that plaintiff and Bettye made numerous misrepresentations on
the application. The court concluded that, in accordance with the policy provisions, defendants
were entitled to rescind the policy.
II. ANALYSIS
A trial court may grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when “there is no
genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment . . . as a matter of
law.” This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
“Where a policy of insurance is procured through the insured’s intentional
misrepresentation of a material fact in the application for insurance, and the person seeking to
collect the no-fault benefits is the same person who procured the policy of insurance through
fraud, an insurer may rescind an insurance policy and declare it void ab initio.” Hammoud v
Metro Prop & Cas Ins Co, 222 Mich App 485, 488; 563 NW2d 716 (1997). As noted by
plaintiff, a representation on an insurance application is material if “reasonably careful and
intelligent underwriters would have regarded the fact or matter, communicated at the time of
effecting the insurance, as substantially increasing the chances of loss insured against so as to
bring about a rejection of the risk or the charging of an increased premium.” Auto-Owners Ins
Co v Comm’r of Ins, 141 Mich App 776, 781; 369 NW2d 896 (1985), quoting Keys v Pace, 358
Mich 74, 82; 99 NW2d 547 (1959) (emphasis omitted).
Having reviewed the evidence presented in the summary disposition materials, we
conclude that the application contained a material misrepresentation concerning the ownership of
the Park Avenue. The application itself notified the applicant that ownership of the covered
vehicles was material to the policy, as follows:
I understand that if I have purchased non-owner coverage, NO coverage will
apply to anyone other than myself or to vehicles owned by me, my spouse or any
other member of my household or any vehicles available for my regular or
frequent use. I further agree that the provision on the Named Non-Owner
Endorsement in the policy will apply.
Bettye attested in the application that the listed vehicles were titled in her name. However, it is
undisputed that the title owner of the Park Avenue was plaintiff, not Bettye. Accordingly, the
record demonstrates that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to the
misrepresentation, and that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff contends that the representation concerning ownership of the Park Avenue was
accurate because he signed the application as an applicant. The application belies plaintiff’s
contention. First, the front page of the application identifies Bettye as the “Applicant.” Second,
the applicant questionnaire, which directs that “Applicant must complete and initial each
response,” contains only Bettye’s initials. Third, the applicant acknowledgement line in the
collision options section contains Bettye’s initials only. Thus, the attestation that “the vehicle(s)
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listed are titled in the name of the applicant” indicated that Bettye was the owner of the listed
vehicles, including the Park Avenue.
An insurer may waive the right to rescission by its actions following its discovery of a
material misrepresentation in the application for insurance. See generally Burton v Wolverine
Mut Ins Co, 213 Mich App 514; 540 NW2d 480 (1995). A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment
of a known right. McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 480 Mich 191, 204; 747 NW2d 811 (2008).
Similarly, an insured may estop an insurance company from enforcing a clause in a policy if the
insured establishes that (1) the insurer’s acts or representations induced the insured to believe
that the clause would not be enforced; (2) the insured justifiably relied on this belief; and (3) the
insured was prejudiced as a result of the reliance on the belief that the clause would not be
enforced. Id. at 204-205.
Here, plaintiff presented nothing to indicate that defendants were aware that plaintiff, not
Bettye, was the title owner of the Park Avenue. Plaintiff did present evidence to indicate that
defendants were aware that he lacked a valid driver’s license. That evidence, however, is not
pertinent to the misrepresentation regarding ownership of the Park Avenue. Absent some proof
that defendants knew of the actual ownership of the car, or that defendants induced plaintiff to
believe that the ownership provisions were immaterial, there is no evidence from which the trial
court could have found an issue concerning waiver or estoppel. Given the lack of pertinent
evidence to suggest waiver or estoppel with regard to the ownership issue, the trial court properly
declined to address waiver and estoppel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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