PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH LEE CASE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 21, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 294091
Roscommon Circuit Court
LC Nos. 08-005597-FC;
08-005645-FH
KENNETH LEE CASE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and FITZGERALD and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a consolidated jury trial, a jury convicted defendant in docket number 08005645-FH of three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL
750.520c(1)(b)(iii) (actor in position of authority) (LC No. 08-005597-FC), and acquitted him of
three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I). The jury convicted defendant in
docket number 08-005597-FC of seven counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC III),
MCL 750.520d(1)(e)(i) (actor is teacher, substitute teacher, or administrator). The trial court
exceeded the sentencing guidelines in sentencing defendant to concurrent prison terms of 10 to
15 years on each count. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Defendant was a teacher and administrator at the victim’s school. Outside of school, the
victim played in a band with defendant and his wife. The victim would spend the night at
defendant’s residence after practicing with the band on Thursday nights. The victim also
travelled with defendant and his family to various performances, as well as on vacations to Nova
Scotia and Europe. The victim testified that she was age 15 when defendant began to touch her
sexually and have her touch him. According to the victim, the sexual activity increased to
include digital penetration and oral sex and, once she reached the age of 18, the two began to
engage in sexual intercourse. Defendant admits to having a consensual affair with the victim
after she turned 18, but denies any sexual activity while the victim was underage. He argues that
she fabricated the allegations after it became clear that he would not leave his wife.
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II. RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE AND
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
Defendant argues that he was denied the right to present a defense and his right of
confrontation by the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and comments about the length of the trial.
The federal Constitution protects an accused’s right to present a defense as an element of due
process. Washington v Texas, 388 US 14, 18-19; 87 S Ct 1920; 18 L Ed 2d 327 (1967).
Mindful that evidentiary error may deprive an accused of his constitutional rights, People
v Adamski, 198 Mich App 133, 137-138; 497 NW2d 546 (1993), courts should not
mechanistically apply evidentiary rules “where constitutional rights directly affecting the
ascertainment of truth are implicated.” Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302; 93 S Ct 1038;
35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973). Nevertheless, “an accused’s right to present evidence in his defense is
not absolute.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 250; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
Defendant argues that the trial court infringed upon constitutionally protected interests by
preventing him from introducing evidence suggesting that he was falsely accused. Specifically,
defendant claims the trial court “disemboweled” his defense by preventing him from submitting
the “purple book”1 as evidence, restricting his expert’s testimony, preventing inquiry into
previous false allegations, confining defendant’s attempts to show motive for the false
accusations, and repeatedly commenting that defendant’s questions to witnesses were wasting
time.
The victim testified that she wrote the purple book for defendant and his wife as she was
preparing to leave for college as a way to express her feelings about the time she had spent with
them. When the prosecution raised a hearsay objection to a question about the contents of the
book, the court stated, “I am not sure I am going to allow the entire book in,” but did allow
defendant to ask whether the book included any references to defendant touching the victim
inappropriately. The victim testified that the purple book did not reference any sexual abuse.
Defendant’s trial counsel then moved on to question the victim about the existence of a journal
referred to in the purple book. The victim indicated that she had no recollection of a journal.
Defendant contends that he intended to show that the contents of the purple book were
completely at odds with the plausibility of the accusations leveled against him because the victim
wrote in glowing terms of her time with defendant and his wife. Defendant argues that the trial
court effectively ruled the purple book inadmissible by making clear that it would not allow the
book to come in into evidence. However, defendant did not move to admit the book, nor did he
inquire about the passages he now deems critical. Although the court commented that it was
“not sure” it would allow the entire book into evidence when the prosecutor presented a hearsay
objection, the court did not preclude defense counsel from asking questions about relevant
1
The purple book was a book of remembrances written by the complainant for defendant and his
wife when complainant left for college.
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material found within the book. Further, defendant provides no authority in support of his
argument that he effectively moved for admission of the book by marking it as an exhibit.
People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). We see no error in the
court’s handling of the matter.
Defendant also challenges the trial court’s limitation of testimony by his expert witness,
Katherine Okla, Ph.D. The trial court originally prohibited Okla from testifying that, as a routine
matter, mental health practitioners normally ask a victim is he or she had suffered any abuse and
that most victims will tell the truth. Ultimately, the trial court allowed testimony about the
percentage of victims who report abuse when asked. Defendant argues that the court limited the
testimony because it was concerned about the length of the trial. The record reveals, however,
that the trial court clearly stated that it based its ruling on relevancy. The court stated that there
was no evidence of record that anyone had directly asked complainant if she had been abused
and, therefore, it was irrelevant whether most abuse victims would tell the truth. MRE 702. The
court did mention “waste of time,” but only within the context of citing MRE 403. And under
MRE 403, the court is completely within its rights to exclude evidence that it feels will merely be
a waste of time. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Okla’s testimony. People
v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
Defendant also sought to question the victim about prior accusations of sexual assault to
show that she had made false accusations in the past. The court barred this line of questioning
based on both the rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j, and the court’s belief that the questions
would lead to a trial-within-a-trial about incidents of limited probative value. The rape shield
statute generally precludes admission of evidence regarding a victim’s past sexual conduct.2 Our
Supreme Court has held, though, that a “defendant should be permitted to show that the
complainant has made false accusations of rape in the past.” People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338,
348; 365 NW2d 120 (1984). However, the defendant is first obligated to make an offer of proof
including concrete evidence that the victim made a prior false accusation. Id. at 350; People v
Williams, 191 Mich App 269, 273; 477 NW2d 877 (1991). In this case, defendant did not offer
any evidence that complainant had made previous false accusations. The trial court did not err
by prohibiting defendant from inquiring about alleged prior false accusations.
Defendant next argues that the trial court prevented him from attempting to develop a
motive for false allegations by showing that the victim’s relationship with defendant’s wife
became strained and was marked by fights. After defendant’s wife described one fight with the
victim and began to describe another, the prosecutor raised a relevancy objection. Defense
counsel argued that the evidence was relevant to the victim’s motive to make false accusations.
The court sustained the objection “because of undue delay, waste of time, needless presentation
2
Defendant does not address the rape shield statute on appeal, and thereby abandons any
argument to the contrary. Kelly, 231 Mich App at 640-641.
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of cumulative evidence.” MRE 403.3 The court did not strike the previous testimony by
defendant’s wife, nor did it prohibit defendant from inquiring if or how often she and the victim
had fought. Indeed, the court stated, “I think you can ask if there was a fight.” The court limited
defendant from inquiring into the details of each individual fight.
Thus, the record shows that defendant was able to introduce evidence of personal friction
between his wife and the victim. Further, it appears that the court would have allowed additional
evidence on the subject (i.e., whether there had been a fight) as long as the details of the fight
were not examined. The court simply balanced the probative danger of the evidence against its
logical relevance, MRE 401, and concluded that the best balance to be struck would be to limit
inquiry into the details of each fight. This decision is within the continuum of reasonable
outcomes. Babcock, 469 Mich at 269.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly excluded evidence that defendant’s
mother was capable of climbing stairs, contrary to the victim’s testimony. However, defendant’s
wife was, in fact, allowed to testify on this point.
Finally, defendant argues that his defense was “short-circuited” by the trial court’s
repeated expressions of impatience with the length of the trial and that these comments
demonstrated a pattern of judicial bias. However, “judicial remarks during the course of a trial
that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases,
ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.” Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich
470, 497 n 30; 548 NW2d 210 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nor is
there any indication that the court’s remarks improperly influenced the jury. First, some of the
comments were clearly made in the context of applying MRE 403. Second, some of the
comments complained of were not made in front of the jury. Third, some of the comments were
directed at the prosecutor and defense counsel alike, and the court’s comment that it “couldn’t
stand another four or five days of this” was directed at the prosecutor alone. Fourth, the jury
instructions included an admonishment that the court’s “comments, rulings, questions, and
instructions are not evidence,” and “[i]f you believe I have an opinion about how you should
decide this case, you must pay no attention to that opinion.” A jury is presumed to follow the
court’s instructions, including those intended to cure any prejudicial effect of inappropriate
statements. Unger, 278 Mich App at 235. Thus, defendant has not overcome the “heavy
presumption of judicial impartiality.” Cain, 451 Mich at 497.
In sum, there is no evidence of any misconduct or bias by the court, nor were any of its
evidentiary rulings erroneous. Accordingly, defendant was not denied his constitutional rights to
present a defense and to confront the witnesses against him.
3
By citing MRE 403, which addresses the exclusion of relevant evidence, the court implicitly
acknowledged the relevancy of the evidence.
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III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact
and law. People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 139; 659 NW2d 611 (2003). There is a
strong presumption that defendant’s counsel was effective. People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67,
69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense so as to deny defendant a fair trial.” People v Smith, 456
Mich 543, 556; 581 NW2d 654 (1998). Counsel’s performance only falls below the objective
standard of reasonableness if he “makes errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v Washington, 466 US
668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). The second component requires the defendant
to show “the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884
(2001). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id.
The burden of proving the necessary facts is on the defendant. People v Hoag, 460 Mich
1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). If the necessary facts are not in the record, the defendant may move
for a new trial and create a separate record to support his claims. People v Ginther, 390 Mich
436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). Defendant argues that some of the necessary facts are not
before this Court, and seeks remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.4
Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to admit the purple
book into evidence and for failing to seek review the victim’s additional counseling records.
Normally, choices about what evidence to present and which witnesses to call are presumed to be
matters of trial strategy, and the decision not to seek Stanaway5 review of the additional therapy
records would fall under this heading. People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308
(2004). In this case, defendant’s trial counsel has provided an affidavit to the effect that he
intended to move for admission of the purple book and to seek to review the therapy records, and
that if he failed to do so it was an oversight and not trial strategy.
Assuming, without deciding, that counsel should have moved for admission of the purple
book, he fails to show that he suffered any prejudice as a result of this error. Defendant argues
that the purpose for admitting the purple book was to show how enthusiastic complainant was
about the time she spent with the Cases. Unlike a daily diary, the purple book was not composed
contemporaneously with the alleged sexual assaults, but was written as a remembrance when the
4
During the motion for a new trial, defendant requested an evidentiary hearing, which the court
denied.
5
People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 677; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
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victim was preparing to go to college. Several entries are allegedly recreations of what the
victim had written in her personal journal, but they all deal with a time period before she turned
15. While the book depicts a fondness for the Cases and a sense of closeness to them, the victim
admitted at trial that she was very close to the Cases at trial. Therefore, defendant fails to show
the requisite prejudice.
Defendant also argues that trial counsel erred in not properly following through on his
request to seek review of the victim’s counseling and therapy records. In support, defendant
cites trial counsel’s averment that he did not remember if he had followed up on the records, and
if he did not, it was an omission on his part. Trial counsel’s equivocal statement does not
support the assertion that counsel failed to follow up on additional records. Nor is there any
indication that there actually was an additional therapist, and if so the identity of that therapist.
The record also does not support defendant’s assertions about the material provided
pursuant to an order of the court following an in camera review of submitted records. Trial
counsel avers that he provided to appellate counsel “the pages I believe I received from the court
pursuant to the January 8, 2009 order.” This issue boils down to whether trial counsel was
provided copies of three emails not included in the records given to appellate counsel. Again,
trial counsel’s equivocal statement is insufficient to establish that an error was made.
Further, defendant fails to show how he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s handling of the
records. These emails were admitted below without objection by defense counsel, and were used
during direct examination of complainant, again without objection. Arguably, three of the emails
evidence the existence of a sexual relationship. They paint a picture of a man struggling with his
sexual desire for the victim and who is having difficulty letting go of the relationship. A
decision by trial counsel not to focus on these emails would have been a reasonable strategy.
IV. STANAWAY MATERIALS
A defendant is entitled to in camera inspection of privileged material on a showing that
the defendant has a good-faith belief, based on concrete evidence, that there is a reasonable
probability that the records contain material information necessary to the defense. Stanaway,
446 Mich at 677. “Only after the court has conducted the in camera inspection and is satisfied
that the records reveal evidence necessary to the defense is the evidence to be supplied to defense
counsel.” Id. at 679. Defendant concedes that the trial court reviewed the Stanaway materials
requested in the motion to compel discovery. He argues, however, that the court improperly
reviewed the records and that further review is necessary to determine whether the trial court
missed anything. Defendant suggests that the trial judge did not do a thorough review because
the judge could not recall if the counselor ever asked the victim if she had been abused.
Defendant’s concern that the court might have missed something important in the records is
premised on a statement by the court that it did not know if complainant’s therapist had asked
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her if she had been abused.6 However, we have not find any evidence in the record of this direct
question. Defendant omits from his argument the context in which the court made the statement.
The court, counsel, and Okla engaged in a lengthy discussion regarding whether Okla would be
allowed to state her expert opinion on the phenomenon of delayed disclosure. Okla was going to
provide testimony regarding rates of disclosure when a victim is asked about abuse. But when
asked how that testimony would apply to the case at hand, Okla replied that it was her
understanding that complainant had been seen by “people in the hospital, for example, with
therapist or counselors,” who would have likely asked her about sexual abuse. It was to this that
the court responded, “Whether it should have been asked or whether it was, we can’t—as far as I
know, that was never asked. . . . The counselor has not testified, was not called as a witness in
this case.” Therefore, when the remark is placed in context, it is clear that the court was not
stating a personal belief based upon personal knowledge (or lack thereof), but was simply stating
that the proffered opinion testimony was not tied to any facts in evidence. MRE 702 (“[T]he
witness has applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”). Moreover, the trial
court stated that it reviewed the records, and provided defendant with all of the evidence
necessary to his defense. See id. at 679 (“We are confident that trial judges will be able to
recognize such evidence.”).
This Court has completed a review of the voluminous counseling records of the victim in
this case in light of defendant’s argument that the court “improperly reviewed the records and
that further review is necessary to determine whether the trial court missed anything.” The
records reveal that the trial judge clearly reviewed the records as he segregated the pages he
thought were relevant and tabbed their locations in the large box of records. Further, our review
has revealed nothing that would be exculpatory in any of these materials. To the contrary, the
records and e-mails between the victim and her counselor are replete with descriptions of the
sexual abuse and the torment it caused the victim.
Defendant also requests that he be allowed to review the files himself. This is clearly not
permitted, as it would defeat the entire purpose of the precautions embodied in the Stanaway
procedure. Stanaway, 446 Mich at 679 (“The presence of defense counsel at such an inspection
is not essential to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights and would undermine the privilege
unnecessarily”).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
6
Appellate counsel also suggests that he may have received a different number of pages from the
court than trial counsel had received. As noted above, trial counsel’s statement about the
documents he received is not a direct assertion that he did not receive the three emails in issue.
Also as noted above, all of the disputed records were admitted at trial as joint exhibits.
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