MANCIE L GIPSON V BELVEDERE CONSTRUCTION INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MANCIE L. GIPSON,
UNPUBLISHED
July 7, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 296765
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-718351-CH
BELVEDERE CONSTRUCTION, INC., a/k/a
VERONA ACCEPTANCE, INC.,
Defendant,
and
MAURICE J. LEZELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
MANCIE L. GIPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 296769
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-718351-CH
BELVEDERE CONSTRUCTION, INC., a/k/a
VERONA ACCEPTANCE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MAURICE J. LEZELL,
Defendant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and JANSEN and SAAD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
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In Docket No. 296765, defendant, Maurice J. Lezell (Lezell), appeals as of right from a
judgment for plaintiff. In Docket No. 296769, defendant Belvedere Construction, Inc.
(Belvedere), a/k/a Verona Acceptance, Inc., appeals as of right from the same judgment. For the
reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgments.
This case arises from a mortgage given to plaintiff by defendant Belvedere on July 22,
1991 for her home in Detroit. The mortgage was given to secure indebtedness on the home
created by an installment home improvement contract. Although the total cost of the home
repair project was $5,900, the amount of the mortgage was $8,260. Defendant Lezell was the
president and treasurer of Belvedere.
Following execution of the mortgage, the mortgage was sold and bought by various other
entities. Significant for purposes of this case is that plaintiff paid off the mortgage in a timely
fashion. However, despite having paid off the mortgage in April of 1996, ten years later,
Belvedere began foreclosure proceedings against the property in 2006. The property went to
auction with a deputy sheriff acting as auctioneer, and Belvedere was given a sheriff’s deed
conveying the property to them. Before the redemption period expired, plaintiff instituted suit
against defendants.1 Prior to trial, defendants admitted that the foreclosure proceedings were a
“mistake” and that plaintiff had paid off her mortgage in 1996.
Following motions for summary disposition, the case proceeded to a bench trial. On the
third day of trial, the trial court commented that a count for “slander of title is conspicuously
absent.” Plaintiff’s counsel argued that he had been arguing a slander of title case, and requested
that the trial court allow plaintiff to amend their complaint to allege a slander of title claim. The
trial court granted leave to amend on the basis that the amendment was to allow the claims to
conform to the evidence. The trial court further reasoned that the representation element was
common to both fraud and slander of title, and that the proof would not be any different, thus no
prejudice would inure to defendants. Plaintiff never amended her complaint.
Following the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court made findings of fact. The
trial court found clear and convincing evidence of fraud by defendants in foreclosing. Regarding
slander of title, the trial court found that “[d]efendants could not have honestly believed or
reasonably believed they had a legitimate claim to the property.” Special damages took the form
of attorney fees incurred by plaintiff in the amount of $60,000, which were necessary, according
to the trial court, for plaintiff to protect her home. The trial court also found against defendant
Lezell stating that at the time of foreclosure, Lezell had sold Belvedere but remained active, so
there was no corporate veil for the court to pierce. Despite having sold the company, the trial
court found that Lezell continued to use the sold corporate person as his alter ego.
1
Plaintiff filed a complaint containing five counts: (1) quiet title; (2) refusal to discharge a
mortgage (in violation of MCL 565.44); (3) fraud; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) declaratory
relief.
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Following the trial court’s rulings, plaintiff filed a motion for damages including costs
and attorney fees. The trial court granted her motion and awarded $96,000 in attorney fees and
costs of $2,640. This appeal ensued.
On appeal, defendants first argue that the trial court clearly erred in finding that
defendants committed fraud upon plaintiff when, in 2006, they foreclosed on a mortgage given
by plaintiff in 1991 to Belvedere, which had been assigned by Belvedere in 1991 to another
entity, and which had been paid off by plaintiff in 1996.
Following a bench trial, this Court reviews the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo,
and its findings of fact for clear error. Mettler Walloon, LLC v Melrose Twp, 281 Mich App 184,
195; 761 NW2d 293 (2008). A finding is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. AFSCME Int’l Union v Bank One, NA, 267 Mich App
281, 283; 705 NW2d 355 (2005).
This issue is moot. The trial court did not award any damages for fraud. Rather, all of
the damages awarded were attorney fees, as special damages for the slander of title that the trial
court found had been committed by defendants. We are not obliged to decide moot questions.
Mettler Walloon, LLC, 281 Mich App at 221.
Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred in suggesting during trial that plaintiff
amend her complaint to add a slander of title claim. A judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety, and should perform the duties of the office impartially. Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3. Here, however, plaintiff’s trial counsel represented to the trial court,
as an officer of the court, that a slander of title claim had been discussed prior to trial.
MCR 2.118(C) governs the issue of the grant of plaintiff’s motion to amend her
complaint. MCR 2.118(C)(1) permits amendments of pleadings to conform to the evidence,
even after a judgment:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they are treated as if they had been raised by the pleadings.
In that case, amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence and to raise
those issues may be made on motion of a party at any time, even after judgment.
[MCR 2.118(C)(1).]
Accordingly, the issue is whether the issue of slander of title was tried by the implied
consent of the parties. Count IV of the complaint expressly pleaded that defendants’
misrepresentations were made intentionally and maliciously. Malice was the only element of the
slander of title claim (other than the type of damages available) that was not already a part of the
fraud claim. B & B Investment Group v Gitler, 229 Mich App 1, 8; 581 NW2d 17 (1998) (the
elements of common-law slander of title are a false statement regarding the plaintiff’s title,
malice, and special damages). Additionally, the trial court offered to give defense counsel
additional time to “get it together.” See MCR 2.118(C)(2) (where a party objects at trial to
evidence on the ground that the evidence “is not within the issues raised by the pleadings,” the
trial court “may grant an adjournment to enable the objecting party to meet the evidence”).
Defense trial counsel declined.
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Defendants cite City of Bronson v American States Ins Co, 215 Mich App 612, 619; 546
NW2d 702 (1996). In City of Bronson, the plaintiff specifically refused to consent to the
inclusion in the case of claims concerning whether the defendant had a duty to defend the
plaintiff in an underlying EPA proceeding concerning contamination of a landfill. Id. Given that
objection, the appellate panel concluded, under MCL 2.118(C), that the trial court’s action, in
“effectively sua sponte amend[ing] plaintiff’s complaint to add an additional claim,” was
erroneous, because the parties did not consent. Id. However, we find City of Bronson
distinguishable from this case. There, the plaintiff specifically objected to the amendment. City
of Bronson, 215 Mich App at 619. Here, plaintiff pleaded malice by defendants in their
foreclosing in 2006, on the mortgage that Belvedere had assigned to another entity in 1991, and
that had been paid off by plaintiff in 1996.
The record reveals that plaintiff pled that defendants’ misrepresentations were made
intentionally and maliciously in Count IV of her original complaint. Plaintiff’s counsel informed
the trial court that slander of title had been discussed in advance of trial and that plaintiff had
been arguing a slander of title claim from the beginning. After allowing the amendment, the trial
court offered to give defense counsel additional time to “get it together,” which defense counsel
declined. Accordingly, the slander of title claim was tried by the implied consent of the parties.
Further, we find the fact that plaintiff never amended her complaint, following the circuit
court’s grant of permission to do so, does not mandate reversal. An amendment to a pleading, to
conform to the evidence, can occur even after a judgment has been entered. See, MCR
2.118(C)(1).
Defendants next argue that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that defendants had
committed slander of title in foreclosing in 2006, on the mortgage that Belvedere had assigned
away in 1991, and that plaintiff had paid off in 1996.
Following a bench trial, findings of fact are reviewed on appeal for clear error, and
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Mettler Walloon, LLC, 281 Mich App at 222.
The elements of common-law slander of title are (1) the defendant published a false
representation disparaging the plaintiff’s right in property; (2) malice in making the
misrepresentation; and (3) special damages caused by the misrepresentation. B & B Investment
Group, 229 Mich App at 8. Defendants published a false representation disparaging plaintiff’s
right in her home. Nonjudicial foreclosure requires a newspaper notice, which is a notice to all
the world that the foreclosure is taking place. Defendants’ nonjudicial foreclosure was
unmistakably a representation of the following facts: (1) Belvedere held the mortgage; (2)
plaintiff had defaulted; and (3) the mortgage had not been paid off. A foreclosure is a
representation of these three facts because a foreclosure cannot occur if the foreclosing party
does not hold the mortgage, or the mortgagor has not defaulted, or the mortgagor has paid off the
mortgage.
Defendants admitted that these representations were false. Belvedere assigned the
mortgage in 1991, plaintiff never defaulted, and plaintiff paid off the mortgage in 1996.
However, they claim that these representations were a simple “mistake.” Thus, the issue left to
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decide this claim was malice. On the issue of malice, the trial court drew an adverse inference
from defendant Lezell’s failure to testify. M Civ JI 6.01(a) authorizes this.
The [defendants] in this case [have] not offered [the testimony of Lezell].
As this evidence was under the control of the [defendants,] and could have been
produced by [them,] and no reasonable excuse for the [defendants’] failure to
produce the evidence was given, [the trier of fact, here the trial court judge] may
infer that the evidence would have been adverse to the [defendants]. [M Civ JI
6.01(a).]
Defendants argue that the adverse inference was not required, and that it was contradicted by the
actual proofs. This argument lacks merit. Defendants do not cite any law indicating that, in a
bench trial, the judge cannot draw an adverse inference from a party’s failure to testify. Given
the lack of authority from defendants to suggest that such an inference cannot be drawn in a
bench trial, defendants have not shown an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
Accordingly, the circuit court’s adverse inference about what Lezell would have said, had
he testified, supports the trial court’s finding that defendants acted with malice. Since Belvedere
is not a natural person, it could only act (or have intent) through its officers and agents. See
Mossman v Millenbach Motor Sales, 284 Mich 562, 568; 280 NW2d 50 (1938). Belvedere’s
agents and officers included Lezell. Hence, the trial court’s adverse inference applied equally to
Lezell and to Belvedere.
Malice, like fraud, can be proven by circumstantial evidence. Compare Foodland Distrib
v Al-Naimi, 220 Mich App 453, 458; 559 NW2d 379 (1996) (circumstantial evidence of fraud
can be sufficiently clear and convincing evidence). Besides the adverse inference, there is other
circumstantial evidence of malice. Daisy Day (plaintiff’s sister, who was acting for plaintiff)
contacted defendants and told them that the mortgage had been paid off. Yet defendants refused
to cease foreclosure. Plaintiff hired an attorney, who wrote defendants, indicating that the
mortgage had been paid off.
On September 8, 2006, plaintiff contacted Belvedere, and indicated that she had paid the
mortgage in full. Later, on January 17, 2007, counsel for plaintiff sent a letter to counsel for
defendants, again indicating that the mortgage was paid off. Defendants still refused to cease
their efforts to collect a paid-off debt and to foreclose a mortgage they had not held for several
years. The evidence that defendants were repeatedly informed that the mortgage was paid off,
yet continued their collection efforts, contributed to the showing of malice. The trial court was
the trier of fact, and that conclusion is not clearly erroneous, but reasonable in light of both oral
and documentary evidence.
In addition, there was evidence that Belvedere’s ledger card for plaintiff’s account might
have been altered. While somewhat speculative, this testimony and its credibility were for the
trial court to resolve. E.g., In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).
Reviewing all of the factors presented to the trial court on this issue, we hold that the trial court
was entitled to draw the adverse inference that defendants acted with malice. M Civ JI 6.01(a).
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Lastly, defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding Lezell personally liable for
the torts committed against plaintiff through the attempted seizure of her home.
A corporation is a person in its own right, entirely separate and apart from its
shareholders, even if there is only one shareholder. Foodland Distrib, 220 Mich App at 456.
Normally, shareholders are not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation. MCL
450.1317(4). But this is not always true. MCL 450.1317(4) provides: “Unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable
for the acts or debts of the corporation[,] except that he or she may become personally liable by
reason of his or her own acts or conduct.” (Emphasis added.) We conclude that Lezell was
acting in his personal capacity when he foreclosed on plaintiff’s paid-off mortgage. Our decision
in Kroll v Crest Plastics, Inc, 142 Mich App 284, 287-288; 369 NW2d 487 (1985), leads us to
this conclusion. A corporate secretary signed a promissory note that said “we promise to pay”
the amount. The corporation was not validly incorporated at the time the note was signed. The
panel held that the evidence of the foregoing sufficed to support a finding that the secretary
signed the note in her personal capacity, and could be held personally liable. Id. at 289-290.
The evidence in the present case is analogous to Kroll. Peter DiVito, Jr., who came to
work for Belvedere in 1997, testified that from February 1, 1999, Belvedere was not taking on
new construction jobs. Rather, the new work was done under the auspices of Belvedere LLC.
DiVito testified that one of the ways he was compensating Lezell for his buyout of Lezell’s
interests in Belvedere, was that Belvedere LLC was still “servicing his [Lezell’s] paper.” Thus,
DiVito bought Belvedere and the Belvedere name, and Belvedere was dissolved in 2001, but
Lezell retained the right to receive payments on “his” (Lezell’s) paper. With Belvedere having
been dissolved in 2001, Lezell was acting on his own behalf in these collection efforts. Given
this testimony by DiVito, the trial court’s conclusion that Lezell was acting in his personal
capacity is not clearly erroneous. See Kroll, 142 Mich App at 289-290. Additionally, because
Belvedere had dissolved in 2001, thereafter, there was no corporate veil to shield Lezell from
personal liability.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Henry William Saad
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