SUSAN MARIE ENGERMAN V MATTHEW J ENGERMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SUSAN MARIE ENGERMAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 7, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 295687
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-010434-DM
MATTHEW J. ENGERMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: TALBOT, P.J., and GLEICHER and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This highly contentious divorce proceeding is before this Court for a second time. The
defendant husband originally appealed the circuit court’s unequal division of marital property,
and the award of spousal support and attorney fees to the plaintiff wife. In defendant’s initial
appeal, this Court affirmed the spousal support order, but remanded to the circuit court to make
specific findings of fact regarding the value of the financial accounts encompassed in the
property division. This Court instructed the circuit court to explain how it reached those values
and to specify whether it considered the effects of taxation. Engerman v Engerman, unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 12, 2009 (Docket No. 281292), slip
op at 3-4. This Court also instructed the circuit court to “explain the basis for its determination
that plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees” and to make findings of fact “regarding either
plaintiff’s ability to pay or the delays in litigation defendant caused.” Id., slip op at 5. Because
the circuit court failed to follow this Court’s instructions, we remand once again for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
On remand from this Court’s 2009 opinion and order, the circuit court continued to award
defendant a severance package and stock options that he earned during the course of the
marriage. The court determined that:
The full value of the stock options of $247,252 should be credited to [defendant’s]
side of the ledger. . . . Similarly [defendant] received a severance package of
$32,000 . . . and that package was also kept by [defendant]. That should also be
included as his asset. These assets total $279,252.
The “full value” used by the circuit court was intended to represent the pre-tax gross value of the
stock options and severance package despite the fact that defendant had already paid the taxes
and tax penalties on the proceeds from these assets. The circuit court based its decision on
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defendant’s fault in causing the breakdown of the marriage and in prolonging the divorce
proceedings, as well as his reprehensible treatment of plaintiff. The court further found that
defendant had secretly exercised the stock options, sold the stock and “used the funds for his
own benefit.” The court also continued to award the parties’ remaining financial assets, with a
pre-tax gross value of $451,931, to plaintiff. The court noted that this amounted to a 62/38
allocation in favor of plaintiff. In relation to all the financial assets, the court indicated that it
relied on the values provided by the only expert witness, Dennis DeKok, who was hired by
plaintiff.
In relation to attorney fees, the court found “that virtually all of the assets awarded to
[plaintiff] are relatively illiquid [sic] and would have significant tax consequences if [plaintiff]
were forced to liquidate them for payment of her attorneys’ fees.” The court further noted that
defendant’s “persistent obstruction and non-cooperation” caused plaintiff to incur otherwise
unnecessary legal fees. Given the disparity in the parties’ incomes, the court found that
defendant should pay $38,000 towards plaintiff’s attorney fees.
Defendant again appeals the circuit court’s division of property and the award of attorney
fees to plaintiff. We agree that the circuit court committed clear error in valuing the financial
assets awarded to defendant. Accordingly, we remand to the circuit court for further review
consistent with the instructions provided in this opinion. We retain jurisdiction to ensure that the
circuit court resolves this matter expeditiously to prevent the continued waste of the marital
estate on legal fees. Both parties have been less than cooperative in explaining the true values of
the marital financial assets and the circuit court has made cursory and inaccurate findings of fact
on the record. These errors have unreasonably extended this litigation to the detriment of the
parties and the court system.
I. PROPERTY DIVISION
Defendant challenges the circuit court’s division of marital property. In relation to a
property division, we review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. We then examine
whether the division is “fair and equitable in light of the facts.” Olson v Olson, 256 Mich App
619, 622; 671 NW2d 64 (2003). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous, if after reviewing all the
evidence, this Court “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415, 429; 566 NW2d 642 (1997). In considering whether
the trial court committed clear error, we must give “special deference” to its assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses. Id. “The dispositional ruling is discretionary and should be affirmed
unless this Court is left with the firm conviction that the division was inequitable.” Id. at 429430. A property division need not be mathematically equal in order to be equitable “as long as
there is an adequate explanation for the chosen distribution.” Washington v Washington, 283
Mich App 667, 673; 770 NW2d 908 (2009). In Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 158-159; 485
NW2d 893 (1992), our Supreme Court held that a trial court has “broad discretion” to fashion an
equitable property division based on a consideration of the following factors:
(1) duration of the marriage, (2) contributions of the parties to the marital estate,
(3) age of the parties, (4) health of the parties, (5) life status of the parties, (6)
necessities and circumstances of the parties, (7) earning abilities of the parties, (8)
past relations and conduct of the parties, and (9) general principles of equity.
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There may even be additional factors that are relevant to a particular case. For
example, the court may choose to consider the interruption of the personal career
or education of either party. The determination of relevant factors will vary
depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. [Id. at 159-160 (internal
citation omitted).]
“As a prelude to [a] property division, a trial court must first make specific findings
regarding the value of the property” involved in the divorce dispute. Olson, 256 Mich App at
627. The “court’s valuation of an asset is a finding of fact” that we review for clear error.
Lesko v Lesko, 184 Mich App 395, 403 n 3; 457 NW2d 695 (1990). Generally, it is within a trial
court’s discretion to consider tax consequences when valuing property. Nalevayko v Nalevayko,
198 Mich App 163, 164; 497 NW2d 533 (1993). If there is sufficient evidence to calculate the
taxes without resorting to speculation, the court may do so in valuing the asset. Id. In Hanaway
v Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 300-301; 527 NW2d 792 (1995), for example, this Court
affirmed the trial court’s decision against weighing tax effects in valuing the defendant’s stocks.
This Court found “no clear error or abuse of discretion,” because the parties were not planning a
“sale or other taxable event” in the foreseeable future. Id.
In this case, it is not disputed that defendant already liquidated the stock options and
collected his severance package, and already paid taxes on the proceeds. Thus, sufficient
information exists in the record for the circuit court to calculate the after-tax value of these assets
without speculation. Accordingly, the circuit court committed clear error in valuing defendant’s
assets on a pre-tax basis. See Nalevayko, 198 Mich App at 164. We instruct the circuit court to
correctly value these marital assets on an after-tax net basis.1
The circuit court also clearly erred in assigning a gross value to defendant’s assets that
was not based on the record evidence.2 We instruct the circuit court to avoid making the same
errors on remand and to carefully consider the record evidence before assigning an after-tax
value to defendant’s stock options and severance package. To assist in that endeavor, we note
that the after-tax net values assigned by DeKok consider only federal, and not state, taxes.
Defendant has already paid state taxes on these assets and may present his state tax forms into
evidence to establish the actual value. We further recommend that the circuit court ease its
burden on remand by ordering both parties to prepare detailed proposed findings of fact
regarding their assets and incomes, including mathematical calculations.
1
The circuit court correctly valued plaintiff’s financial assets on a pre-tax gross basis because
plaintiff has not stated her intent to liquidate these assets and any calculation of the tax
consequences would be purely speculative.
2
The circuit court apparently relied on plaintiff’s proposed findings of fact to assign a gross
value to defendant’s stock options at $247,252 and severance package at $32,000. However, the
actual gross values of these assets are $285,371.18 and $30,416 respectively. Those values are
supported by the documentary evidence, DeKok and defendant’s testimony at trial, and by our
independent review and calculation.
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Although we find that the circuit clearly erred in its valuation of the marital assets, we
confirm that the court has discretion to divide the estate unequally in order to reach an equitable
result. The goal of property division “is to reach an equitable distribution of property in light of
all the circumstances.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 716-717 (2008). In reaching that
goal, the court may consider the factors outlined in Sparks as well as any other relevant facts. Id.
at 717. The court need not consider each factor equally, but must not place disproportionate
weight on any one factor. Id. at 717, 721.
The circuit court cited various grounds to support the unequal division of property in this
case and may continue to rely on those grounds on remand. The court noted that plaintiff had
sacrificed her career to stay home and raise the parties’ children. As a result, defendant was able
to focus on his career and increase his experience and earning potential. The court found that
plaintiff’s financial needs were greater than those of defendant as she was left to maintain the
marital home and was tasked with the ongoing support of the parties’ college-aged children.
Further, the court noted that plaintiff had shown extreme “effort and diligence” to quickly rise to
a position in which she earned $55,000 a year. Plaintiff’s future advancement was limited while
defendant, who then had a base salary of $200,000, had the potential of earning much more in
the future.3 The court noted that the parties’ economic situation had been improved during the
marriage in part because of generous financial gifts from plaintiff’s parents. These were all
proper considerations in evaluating the equitability of the proposed property division pursuant to
Sparks.
In this case, however, the circuit court must be wary not to place undue weight on the
element of fault. It is well established that the circuit court must divide marital property to
achieve equity, not to punish a party for alleged wrong-doing. See Sands v Sands, 442 Mich 30,
36; 497 NW2d 493 (1993) (“A party’s attempt to conceal assets is a relevant consideration, but it
is only one of many facts that the court must weigh.”); Berger, 277 Mich App at 722 (remanding
to the circuit court where the division of property was driven by the court’s assessment of “fault”
based on the defendant’s extramarital affair). Yet, it is also well established that a circuit court
may credit assets that actually have been dissipated or that were concealed toward the offending
party’s portion of the marital estate. Woodington v Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352, 368; 792
NW2d 63 (2010), citing 2 Michigan Family Law (6th ed, 2008 supp), Property Division, § 15.21;
Washington, 283 Mich App at 674. The circuit court must carefully balance these principles.
Here, the circuit court indicated that “virtually all of the fault for the breakdown of the
marriage lies with [d]efendant.” The court cited defendant’s extramarital affair, his “narcissistic
3
We reject defendant’s challenge to the circuit court’s factual findings regarding the parties’
earning capacities. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the spousal support award is only a
temporary remedy to equalize the parties’ incomes and plaintiff will need an equitable share of
the marital assets to support herself in the future. Further, the circuit court did not clearly err in
finding that plaintiff’s current earning ability is fairly static while defendant’s earnings have the
potential for growth.
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behavior” in rejecting plaintiff’s efforts to reconcile the marriage and his testimony and actions
that belittled the contributions plaintiff made to the family. The court found that defendant had
verbally and emotionally abused plaintiff at the end of their marriage. The court also found
plaintiff’s testimony to be more credible than that of defendant. The circuit court determined
that defendant secretly converted the stock options and severance package for his own use. The
court’s factual determinations are supported by the record. For example, defendant admitted that
he used a portion of the stock option proceeds to purchase a new wardrobe after he donated his
clothing from the marital residence to charity. Defendant purchased new furnishings and
exercise equipment for his new home despite plaintiff’s offer to divide the contents of the marital
home. There is also record indication that defendant used stock option proceeds to purchase a
lavish vehicle for the parties’ teenage son over plaintiff’s objection. The remaining factual
findings are based on the circuit court’s assessment of the parties’ credibility, an issue within that
court’s sound discretion. Draggoo, 223 Mich App at 429. On remand, we instruct the circuit
court to carefully avoid placing disproportionate weight on the issue of fault.
After correcting the valuation of the parties’ assets and carefully considering all relevant
factors, the circuit court must reach an equitable division of the marital property. When the
parties’ assets are valued pre-tax, as originally determined by the circuit court, plaintiff is
awarded 62% of the property while defendant received 38%. If defendant’s stock options and
severance package are correctly valued in light of the taxes that defendant actually paid, the
division of property is closer to a 70/30 split in plaintiff’s favor. Such a disparate division of
property is not per se an abuse of discretion. However, the court may not give disproportionate
weight to a party’s “fault” such that the unequal division of property serves as a punishment.
Sparks, 440 Mich at 160 (holding that “[t]he trial court erred in assigning disproportionate
weight to” a party’s fault and, therefore erred in dividing the property 75/25 in the husband’s
favor); Berger, 277 Mich App at 721-722 (holding that a 70/30 division was inequitable when
based solely on one party’s extramarital affair). On remand, we instruct the circuit court to
specifically indicate its intended property division, explain why the particular property division
is equitable, and explain how it mathematically effectuated the division.
II. ATTORNEY FEES
Defendant also continues to challenge the circuit court’s award of attorney fees. We
review a trial court’s award of attorney fees in a divorce action for an abuse of discretion. Reed v
Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 164; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). A trial court’s findings of fact regarding
an award of fees are reviewed for clear error. Id. When reviewing an award of attorney fees in a
divorce action, we must remember that the fees “are awarded only as necessary to enable a party
to prosecute or defend a suit.” Woodington, 288 Mich App at 370. “The property division and
the award of attorney fees function in tandem” in this regard. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Accordingly, a court must consider whether a party’s share of the marital assets would be
sufficient both for her support and the payment of her legal fees, rather than assuming that a
separate attorney fee award is required. Id. In this case, the circuit court must be cautious not to
inequitably reduce defendant’s share of the marital estate through its disparate property division
in addition to the award of attorney fees. We further caution the circuit court against using the
attorney fee award as another method of “punishing” defendant for his “wrong doing.”
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MCR 3.206(C) provides for the award of attorney fees in a divorce action as follows:
(1) A party may, at any time, request that the court order the other party to pay
all or part of the attorney fees and expenses related to the action or a specific
proceeding, including a post-judgment proceeding.
(2) A party who requests attorney fees and expenses must allege facts sufficient
to show that
(a) the party is unable to bear the expense of the action, and that the other
party is able to pay, or
(b) the attorney fees and expenses were incurred because the other party
refused to comply with a previous court order, despite having the ability to
comply.
On remand, the circuit court found that plaintiff was “unable to bear the expense of the
action” because the assets awarded to her were “relatively illiquid [sic] and would have
significant tax consequences if [plaintiff] were forced to liquidate them.” The circuit court also
found that the attorney fees incurred by plaintiff were “significantly greater than they should
have been as a result of the persistent obstruction and non-cooperation by [d]efendant.” The
circuit court’s findings on remand are not clearly erroneous. The record reveals that defendant
was uncooperative during discovery and that he openly threatened to prolong the proceedings.
Such obstructionist behavior surely increased plaintiff’s legal fees. Further, the record shows that
defendant earns more on an annual basis than plaintiff even when her spousal support award is
considered. Accordingly, based on income standing alone, the circuit court could reasonably
determine that defendant is able to pay while defendant is not.
The current case is akin to Kurz v Kurz, 178 Mich App 284, 298; 443 NW2d 782 (1989),
in which the court based its award of attorney fees on defendant’s limited means of support and
poor health, in comparison to plaintiff’s greater earning potential and financial means. The Kurz
Court held that the trial court implied through these factual findings that the award was necessary
to permit the defendant to defend the action. Id. Similar to the plaintiff in the current case, the
Kurz defendant’s property award was “not subject to ready liquidation.” Id. at 298. As in Kurz,
the current plaintiff should not be required to invade her property award and substantially
decrease the assets’ values in order to pay her counsel. Id.4
There is also reason to distinguish the current case from Kurz. Given the disparity of the
current property division, it is not readily apparent that plaintiff’s assets would be unfairly
4
We note that defendant has not challenged the reasonableness of plaintiff’s attorney fees or the
amount awarded by the circuit court. Accordingly, it was unnecessary for plaintiff to present
evidence regarding her legal bills or for the circuit court to making specific findings in that
regard.
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reduced if she were required to liquidate a portion to pay her legal fees. On remand, we instruct
the circuit court to explain whether it would be inequitable to require plaintiff to liquidate a
portion of her marital assets. The circuit court is similarly instructed to review defendant’s
portion of the marital estate to determine whether this additional financial onus inequitably
reduces his share.
We vacate the circuit court’s property division and award of attorney fees. We remand to
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the instructions provided in this opinion.
We retain jurisdiction to ensure that the circuit court makes adequate findings of fact on the
record and based on the evidence to support its valuation of the assets, the ultimate division of
the marital property, and the award of attorney fees.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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