PEOPLE OF MI V SALAM SHAKER ZORA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 5, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 296508
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2009-002137-FC
SALAM SHAKER ZORA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: FITZGERALD, P.J., and SAWYER and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant
to a prison term of 180 to 360 months for the murder conviction and to a consecutive two-year
term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the January 23, 2009, shooting death of his brotherin-law. The victim and his wife (defendant’s sister) previously lived in defendant’s home. After
they moved out, defendant discovered that approximately $250,000 was missing from a
hideaway at his residence. Defendant suspected that the victim stole the money. On January 20,
2009, defendant confronted the victim about the money and, according to defendant, the victim
agreed to go to their church later that week to swear on a Bible to his innocence. Three days
later, defendant went to the victim’s residence unannounced to again discuss the missing money.
Defendant was armed with a gun and was accompanied by his two brothers. Defendant
ultimately shot the victim five times. Three of the gunshots were to the back of the victim’s
body. There was no evidence of a struggle in the residence. Defendant presented a claim of selfdefense through himself and his two brothers. The defense theory at trial was that the victim
charged toward defendant while shouting an Arabic war death cry and while holding a butcher
knife in his raised right hand and a two-pronged barbecue fork in his left hand.
I. PROSECUTOR’S CONDUCT
Defendant first argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor knowingly
presented “false and nonexistent” evidence through an erroneous stipulation that no fingerprints,
DNA, or blood was found on a knife and fork that were recovered at the scene. Defendant
contends that, although trial counsel agreed to the stipulation, it was false because a latent print
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was discovered on the fork, and no testing for DNA or blood was actually performed on either
instrument.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of
discretion. People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 691; 664 NW2d 174 (2003). A trial court abuses its
discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.
People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 379; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). Further, “in order for
prosecutorial misconduct to constitute constitutional error, the misconduct must have so infected
the trial with unfairness as to make the conviction a deprivation of liberty without due process of
law.” People v Blackmon, 280 Mich App 253, 269; 761 NW2d 172 (2008).
A prosecutor’s knowing use of false evidence violates a defendant’s right to due process.
Napue v Illinois, 360 US 264, 269; 79 S Ct 1173; 3 L Ed 2d 1217 (1959). To prevail under
Napue, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence was actually false; (2) the prosecution knew
that the evidence was actually false; and (3) that the false testimony was material. Id. at 271.
“Material” means that there is a reasonable likelihood that the false evidence could have affected
the verdict. See People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 417-418; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
As an initial matter, defendant’s reliance on a police report statement by the victim’s
four-year-old son and a letter allegedly written by Manal Petros to support defendant’s claim that
the prosecutor knowingly presented false evidence, is misplaced because neither the letter nor the
police report is part of the lower court record. It is impermissible for a party to enlarge the
record on appeal. People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 524 n 1; 616 NW2d 710 (2000); see
also People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 20-21; 776 NW2d 314 (2009).
In any event, we agree with the trial court that defendant has not shown that the
stipulation was actually false. The parties stipulated that no prints, DNA, or blood were found
on the victim’s knife or fork. It is undisputed that no fingerprints were found on the knife. With
regard to the fork, a latent “lift” was recovered from the stainless steel portion of the fork near
the tines. The forensic scientist and fingerprint expert reported, and later testified at a Ginther1
hearing, that the “latent lift” had “no latent prints of comparison value.” She explained that a
latent lift is not synonymous with an identifiable fingerprint, so the statement that there were no
fingerprints is accurate. Further, although there was no testing for blood or DNA on either the
knife or the fork, there also is no evidence that either substance was on either instrument.
Furthermore, there is no reasonable likelihood that the stipulation affected the jury’s
verdict. The evidence shows that a latent, unusable lift was discovered on the stainless steel
portion of the fork near the tines. The scenario described by the defense witnesses did not
present circumstances where the victim’s fingerprint would have been transferred to the tines of
the fork. Rather, the defense witnesses testified that the victim held the fork by the handle in his
palm, inside his closed fist. Defendant makes much of the fact that there was a latent, unusable
lift on the fork, while ignoring other properly admitted evidence that rebuts his self-defense
claim. The evidence indicates that defendant went to the victim’s house unannounced,
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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accompanied by his two brothers, because he believed that the victim had stolen $250,000 from
him. Defendant instigated the confrontation at the victim’s home, and brought a loaded weapon
to the home. According to the defense witnesses, defendant was angry about the victim’s theft,
and the victim refused to go to the church to swear on a Bible that he had not taken the money.
Defendant admitted shooting his gun toward the victim repeatedly. The autopsy revealed that
the victim was shot five times, none at close range. Three shots were to the back, and two of the
three gunshot wounds to the back occurred while the victim was down or close to the floor.
There was no evidence of a struggle. Given the substantial evidence against defendant, to the
extent the stipulation could be considered false, it was not material.
In a related claim, defendant also argues that the prosecutor impermissibly used the false
stipulation during opening statement and closing argument. In opening statement, when listing
certain “undisputed facts,” the prosecutor stated that the fork and knife has “no evidentiary
value,” and “no fingerprints, no DNA, no blood as to anyone involved, possibly involved in this
incident.”
“The purpose of an opening statement is to tell the jury what the advocate proposes to
show.” People v Moss, 70 Mich App 18, 32; 245 NW2d 389 (1976). Viewed in context, the
prosecutor’s reference during opening statement was designed to show that he intended to prove
during trial that there was no evidence on the fork and knife, and that defendant’s self-defense
claim was not credible. The statement was based on the stipulation, which was accurate;
therefore, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by referring to it during opening
statement and closing argument. In closing argument, the prosecutor was free to argue the
evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they related to his theory of the case.
See People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
With regard to closing argument, defendant argues that the prosecutor impermissibly
used the stipulation to falsely assert that the defense witnesses wiped the fork clean and staged
the scene. We agree that the prosecutor’s remark that the fork was clean was inaccurate because
a latent lift was present. But the defendant bears the burden of showing actual prejudice, People
v Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 274; 715 NW2d 290 (2006), and reversal is only warranted if the error
affected the outcome of the proceedings. See Blackmon, 280 Mich App at 269.
Viewed in context, the prosecutor’s remark did not cause defendant’s conviction. The
remark was focused on establishing the lack of evidence to support defendant’s self-defense
claim. While there was no evidence that the fork and knife had been wiped clean, it is true that
the victim’s prints were not on either instrument, and neither the fork nor the knife were found in
close proximity to the victim’s body. In addition, as previously indicated, there was evidence
that defendant was angry because he believed that the victim had stolen a large amount of money
from him, that he arrived at the victim’s house unannounced and accompanied by his two
brothers, that he was armed with a weapon, and that he shot the victim multiple times, including
three times in the back. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that the lawyers’ statements
and arguments are not evidence, and that the jury was to decide the case based only on the
properly admitted evidence. These instructions were sufficient to dispel any possible prejudice.
People v Long, 246 Mich App 582, 588; 633 NW2d 843 (2001). “It is well established that
jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581
NW2d 229 (1998).
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For these reasons, the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion for a new trial
based on the prosecutor’s conduct, after first evaluating the accuracy of the stipulation and the
prosecutor’s comments, was a principled decision and, therefore, not an abuse of discretion.
II. BRADY VIOLATION
Next, defendant argues that he was denied his right to due process because the prosecutor
failed to timely provide discovery, contrary to Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L
Ed 2d 215 (1963). We disagree. Because defendant did not raise a Brady-violation claim below,
we review this unpreserved claim for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines,
460 Mich 750, 752-753, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
A criminal defendant has a due process right of access to certain information possessed
by the prosecution if that evidence might lead a jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about a
defendant’s guilt. People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 280; 591 NW2d 267 (1998), citing
Brady, 373 US 83. “Impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence falls within the
Brady rule because, if disclosed and used effectively, such evidence ‘may make the difference
between conviction and acquittal.” Lester, 232 Mich App at 281 (citation omitted). To establish
a Brady violation, a defendant must prove: (1) that the state possessed evidence favorable to the
defendant; (2) that the defendant did not possess the evidence and could not have obtained it
himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable
evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability
exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 281-282.
A. FORENSIC REPORT
There is no indication that the prosecutor suppressed the forensic report. During posttrial proceedings, the prosecutor averred that the report would have been provided to the defense
thorough discovery. Defense counsel acknowledged that it was possible that the forensic report
was misplaced among the more than 200 pages of discovery provided to the defense. He also
acknowledged that he knew from a police report that a latent print was found on the fork, and
that the knife and fork were being tested. Thus, the defense was aware of the latent lift and the
testing, and defendant could have followed through to obtain the report with reasonable diligence
had he planned to review it. Indeed, trial counsel admitted that he did not consider the forensic
report relevant to defendant’s case. Moreover, given the substance of the forensic report and the
overwhelming evidence against defendant, the absence of the forensic report was not the
difference between conviction and acquittal.
B. MANAL PETROS’S LETTER
Likewise, there is no indication that the prosecutor either possessed or suppressed a letter
written by Manal on the second day of the Ginther hearing. Further, Manal is defendant’s sister,
and, accordingly, defendant could have discovered with reasonable diligence any information
she allegedly had about the shooting. Moreover, according to defendant’s trial testimony, Manal
did not witness the events leading up to the shooting or the shooting itself, but came into the
room afterward. Thus, despite her claim that she arrived in the room so quickly that her brothers
could not have “staged the scene,” her proposed statement would have done little to rebut
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defendant’s self-defense claim given the physical evidence that defendant shot the victim five
times, three times in the back, and none at close range. Further, although Manal claimed that the
victim knew that defendant was planning to visit to talk about the money, the defense witnesses
admitted that they did not call the victim before going to his house. Because there is no basis for
finding a Brady violation, defendant has failed to show a plain error.
III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant further argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to
numerous errors on the part of trial counsel. Again, we disagree.
Although defendant moved for a new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of
counsel and a Ginther hearing was held, defendant raises additional ineffective assistance of
counsel claims on appeal. Our review of those unpreserved issues is limited to mistakes apparent
from the record. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Sabin
(On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). With regard to those
issues that were raised in the trial court, we review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error
and its constitutional determinations de novo. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d
246 (2002). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v
Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different but for counsel’s error. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d
713 (2007).
A. THE STIPULATION
Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for entering into an erroneous
stipulation without first reviewing the forensic report, which contained contrary findings. As
previously discussed, the stipulation was accurate to the extent that the latent “lift” found on the
stainless steel part the fork had “no latent prints of comparison value.” Further, given the
location of the latent lift and the defense witnesses’ description of how the victim held the fork,
evidence that the latent left existed would not have supported defendant’s self-defense claim.
Although there was no testing for blood and DNA, there is no evidence that either substance was
actually on the knife or the fork, and defendant has failed to explain how any DNA would have
altered the outcome at trial. Moreover, given the substantial unchallenged evidence as discussed
in section I, supra, defendant has not established that but for the alleged erroneous stipulation,
the result of the trial would have been different.
B. UNPRESERVED CLAIMS
We reject defendant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call various
witnesses to support his self-defense theory. “Ineffective assistance of counsel can take the form
of a failure to call a witness or present other evidence only if the failure deprives the defendant of
a substantial defense.” People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538 NW2d 465 (1995), mod
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453 Mich 902 (1996). A defense is substantial if it might have made a difference in the outcome
of the trial. Id.
Here, defendant claims that trial counsel should have called (1) the victim’s four-year-old
son to testify that defendant shot his father after his father approached defendant with a knife, (2)
two liquor control commission representatives to testify regarding defendant’s whereabouts
shortly before going to the victim’s house, (3) Tasab Zelem to testify that the victim stole
defendant’s money, (4) Manal to testify what she observed immediately after the shooting, and
(5) Hanna Batris and Sabhan Kejbou to testify about instances when the victim was violent.
Defendant failed to call these witnesses at the Ginther hearing and he has not provided any
affidavits of their proposed testimony. Further, he has not identified any evidence of record to
establish that they would have provided testimony favorable to the defense that may have
affected the outcome of the trial. On appeal, defendant has submitted letters from Manal and
Kejbou, and a police report concerning the victim’s four-year-old son’s statement. Because
these letters and police report were not offered below, they are not part of the existing record,
MCR 7.210(A)(1). Defendant’s unsupported assertion that the witnesses would have testified
and supported his defense is insufficient to demonstrate that he was deprived of a substantial
defense. In re Ayres, 239 Mich App 8, 22; 608 NW2d 132 (1999).
Defendant also claims that the trial counsel should have retained a self-defense expert to
testify regarding the self-defense training provided to people who are licensed to carry firearms.
The failure to call an expert witness “only constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel if it
deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.” People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688
NW2d 308 (2004). Trial courts have clear discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony. See
People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691, 713; 456 NW2d 391 (1990). The threshold determinations are
whether expert testimony will be helpful to the jury and relevant to the case. People v Christel,
449 Mich 578, 592; 537 NW2d 194 (1995).
Contrary to defendant’s argument, trial counsel’s failure to call an expert witness was not
objectively unreasonable. Defendant has failed to make the necessary showing that the proposed
expert testimony would not have assisted the trier of fact in making its decision. See MRE 702.
Defendant’s self-defense theory was based on his claim that the victim charged toward him while
armed with a butcher knife and a two-pronged meat fork. The jury could determine from the
defense witnesses’ testimony and the physical evidence whether the victim’s alleged conduct
caused defendant to have an honest and reasonable belief that his life was in danger. Expert
testimony regarding defendant’s concealed weapons training would not have been relevant to
assist the jury in determining any fact at issue. Consequently, defendant cannot establish a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel on this basis.
C. THEKRA ZORA
Defendant argues that trial counsel should have called his sister-in-law to testify that, at
defendant’s behest, she made an appointment with a priest for the victim to swear on the Bible,
and that defendant was at her store shortly before going to the victim’s house. In the trial court,
defendant submitted a letter purportedly authored by Thekra indicating that she did not appear at
trial because of threats against her by the victim’s family. On appeal, defendant has not
demonstrated the failure to call Thekra at trial deprived him of a substantial defense. Defendant
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and his brothers testified in support of defendant’s version of the events. Defendant testified that
three days before the shooting, the victim came to his house and, following a discussion, the
victim agreed to meet at their church to swear on a Bible, and that a meeting was scheduled for
the following Friday or Saturday. At trial, defendant’s brother Hamid testified that he was also
at defendant’s house, and Hamid corroborated defendant’s testimony that defendant told the
victim that if he did not take the money, “we go to the church, put [his] hands in the bible[] and
[defendant] don’t want nothing else from [him],” and that a meeting was scheduled. Defendant
testified that on the morning of the shooting, he met his sister-in-law, Hamid, and some liquor
control commission representatives at his sister-in-law’s store in Detroit. Hamid testified that he
confirmed that he and defendant were at the store that morning. Hamid and defendant’s other
brother Maher both testified that they went to the victim’s house where defendant talked to the
victim about going to a church to see a priest to swear on the Bible that he did not take the
money. In sum, because the proposed evidence was presented at trial through other witnesses,
Thekra’s testimony would only have been cumulative and there is no reasonable probability that
the outcome would have been different had she testified.
D. REMOVAL OF JURORS
Defendant’s last ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that trial counsel should have
requested the removal of the entire jury pool, or at least one other juror, because of some
prospective jurors’ negative opinions about Chaldeans, which defendant now maintains tainted
the entire pool. During voir dire, a prospective juror stated that he has “not [had] good
experiences” with Chaldeans, and would be prejudiced toward the defense. Defense counsel
asked several follow-up questions and moved to dismiss the juror for cause, and the trial court
excused the juror. Thereafter, another prospective juror indicated that he had witnessed a fight
between six Chaldeans on the morning of the first day of trial. When asked how he knew they
were speaking Chaldean, the prospective juror responded that “they looked like the people who
work at the gas stations and party stores in this area.” The trial court questioned the juror, and
ultimately removed him for cause. Defendant now argues that trial counsel should have moved
to excuse the entire jury pool because the excused jurors’ comments tainted the entire jury. We
disagree.
A defendant has a right to a fair and impartial jury. People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77, 88;
566 NW2d 229 (1997). To show the denial of a fair and impartial jury in this context, a
defendant must show that the jury was exposed to extraneous influences and that the extraneous
influences “created a real and substantial possibility that they could have affected the jury’s
verdict.” Id. at 88-89. A reviewing court must closely examine the entire voir dire to determine
if an impartial jury was impaneled. People v Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich 495, 516-517; 566 NW2d
530 (1997). Due process only demands that jurors act with a “lack of partiality, not an empty
mind.” Id. at 519.
The record does not support defendant’s claim that the jury was exposed to extraneous
influences that tainted it. Defendant has not identified any record evidence that any impaneled
juror was biased against him because of his nationality. Although the jury heard the prospective
jurors’ comments, trial counsel and the court immediately addressed the comments. The two
jurors were excused. The trial court instructed the remaining members of the jury pool that the
fight witnessed by the juror had “absolutely nothing to do with the parties in this case, the
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defendant or any witness.” The trial court and counsel also had an opportunity to question the
remaining prospective jurors to test their reaction to Chaldeans. The impaneled jurors explicitly
indicated that they could be fair and impartial. The purpose of voir dire is to expose potential
juror bias so that a defendant may be tried by a fair and impartial jury. People v Sawyer, 215
Mich App 183, 186; 545 NW2d 6 (1996). The trial court instructed the jury on the presumption
of innocence, to consider only the evidence properly admitted in court and, before deliberations,
reminded the jury that it took an oath to decide the case based only on the properly admitted
evidence and the law as instructed by the court. See Graves, 458 Mich at 486. Because the
record does not disclose a basis for trial counsel to request the removal of any additional jurors,
this ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot succeed.
IV. EVIDENCE
A. MANAL’S LETTER
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit his sister’s
letter at the Ginther hearing to prove that trial counsel was ineffective for not calling her to
testify. We disagree. Contrary to what defendant argues, there is no indication that Manal’s
letter was ever properly offered into evidence.
Defendant claims that on the day of closing arguments at the Ginther hearing, Manal
unexpectedly showed up and attempted to personally give a letter to the court. The letter was
apparently returned along with a memo explaining that ex-parte communication with a judge is
not permitted, and that such matters must be addressed in open court. There is no indication in
the record that the letter was discussed or that defendant made any attempt to properly present it
to the court for its review. Further, after closing arguments, the following exchange occurred:
The court: Were there any other exhibits that this court should receive at
this time in conjunction with the arguments? I have exhibits, People’s Exhibits 1
through 5.
Defense counsel: I believe not, your Honor. [Emphasis added.]
Contrary to what defendant suggests, the letter is not part of the lower court record.
Further, although a trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,
People v McDaniel, 469 Mich 409, 412; 670 NW2d 659 (2003), the trial court here did not have
an opportunity to exercise its discretion because Manal’s letter was never properly presented to
the court. Therefore, defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
admit the letter is misplaced. Moreover, because defendant specifically informed the court that
there were no defense exhibits, he has waived appellate review of this issue. People v Carter,
462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Defendant’s waiver extinguished any error. Id.
at 216.
B. DENIAL OF POST-TRIAL DISCOVERY REQUEST
Defendant issued a subpoena duces tecum to the forensic scientist and the lead detective
to appear to testify at the Ginther hearing, and also requested access to the fork, the forensic
scientist’s notes, a reproduction of the print, and copies of the comparison prints. Defendant now
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argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his post-trial discovery attempts. We
disagree.
Issues involving a trial court’s ruling on a discovery matter in a criminal case are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Lemcool, 445 Mich 491, 497; 518 NW2d 437
(1994). Criminal defendants do not have a general right to discovery. People v Stanaway, 446
Mich 643, 680; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Discovery is generally left to the trial court’s discretion
and will be ordered when “the thing to be inspected is admissible in evidence and a failure of
justice may result from its suppression.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). Defendant bears
the burden of presenting the court with facts indicating that the information is necessary to the
interests of a fair trial and a proper preparation of a defense and not simply part of a “fishing
expedition.” Id.
In this case, the discovery requested by defendant was not necessary to present his case at
the Ginther hearing. Defendant sought to prove that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
review the forensic report. At the hearing, defense counsel acknowledged that he should have
done so. Further, the forensic report was presented and evaluated, the forensic scientist testified
at length about her report and findings, and defense counsel cross-examined her extensively
about her opinion that no fingerprints were found on the fork. Defendant offers only generalized
assertions that there may be useful evidence on the fork and the related documents. There were
no specific allegations that would be relevant to proving a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, and the trial court properly characterized defendant’s efforts as a “fishing expedition.”
Consequently, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s post-trial discovery request was not an abuse
of discretion.
V. JUROR MISCONDUCT
Defendant lastly argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury impermissibly
conducted an experiment that exposed them to extraneous information. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 228; 530 NW2d 497 (1995). “A mistrial
should be granted only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and
impairs his ability to get a fair trial.” Id. (citation omitted).
Consistent with a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury, “jurors may only consider
the evidence that is presented to them in open court.” Budzyn, 456 Mich at 88. “Any conduct,
even if misguided, that is inherent in the deliberative process is not subject to challenge or
review.” People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 540-541; 679 NW2d 127 (2004).
Defendant’s claim fails because he has not presented any admissible evidence to support
his argument. He relies on his trial attorney’s affidavit, in which counsel avers that after the jury
was discharged, certain jurors stated that they tested the fork and knife to determine if
fingerprints would be left if the items were handled. Defense counsel’s affidavit concerning the
jurors’ statements constitutes inadmissible hearsay. See Budzyn, 456 Mich at 92, n 14.
Moreover, even if we were to consider trial counsel’s affidavit, the jurors’ test or reenactment
cannot be characterized as extraneous information. It was based on properly admitted
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testimonial and physical evidence introduced at trial, remained within the purview and scope of
that evidence, collectively conducted by the jurors, and occurred in the jury room during the
deliberative process. See Fletcher, 260 Mich App at 542-543. The jurors were free to consider
and scrutinize the evidence that they believed was important to the resolution of the case,
including whether prints would be left on the handle of the knife and fork. Because defendant
claims error in the jury’s deliberative process rather than improper influence by extraneous or
outside factors, he has failed to establish a right to relief. Budzyn, 456 Mich at 91; Fletcher, 260
Mich App at 540-541. Consequently, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial
on this basis was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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