HANTZ GROUP INC V JASON VANDUYN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HANTZ GROUP, INC., HANTZ TAX &
BUSINESS, LLC, HANTZ BENEFITS, LLC,
HANTZ FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC, and
HANTZ AGENCY, INC,
UNPUBLISHED
June 30, 2011
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
JASON VAN DUYN, HAROLD PARSLOW III,
JONATHAN BAILEY, and AQUEST WEALTH
STRATEGIES,
No. 294699
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2009-101563-CK
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and DONOFRIO and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion to set aside
the defaults entered against defendants Harold Parslow III and Jonathan Bailey and the trial
court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ claims and ordering all parties into arbitration. We reverse
and remand.
Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of alleged violations of the non-solicitation and
confidentiality agreements that defendants signed while in plaintiffs’ employ. Hantz Group
(HG) offered financial services, including advice and planning. Hantz Financial Services (HFS)
was a broker-dealer licensed to sell securities and insurance and was a wholly owned subsidiary
of HG. Hantz Tax & Business (HTB) provided tax and business consulting services. Hantz
Benefits (HB) provided health care benefits for individual and business clients, and Hantz
Agency (HA) provided property and casualty insurance.
Van Duyn was employed by HFS from October 13, 1999, to May 1, 2009. Parslow was
employed by HFS from August 6, 2007, to May 1, 2009. Bailey was employed by HTB as an
accountant from December 10, 2007, to August 6, 2008. Defendants signed agreements with HG
as a condition of their employment acknowledging that HG was providing them with
confidential information, that the confidential information was critical to the success of the
company and must not be disseminated or used outside of their employment, and agreeing that
they would not use the confidential information or disseminate it to any other individual or
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entity. Defendants also signed non-solicitation agreements that, for a period of one year after
their employment was terminated, they would not contact, solicit, retain, or accept business from
any of plaintiffs’ clients. Both plaintiffs and defendants agreed that HFS’s claims against
defendants Van Duyn and Parslow had to be submitted to arbitration under the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA). In a stipulated order entered in the trial court, HFS agreed to
dismiss all of its claims against Van Duyn and Parslow in the trial court. Defendants failed to
file a timely answer to the complaint, and plaintiffs sought and were granted defaults against
Parslow and Bailey.
Defendants Parslow and Bailey filed a motion to set aside the defaults against them.
Defendants argued that they did not timely file their answer to the complaint because of the
ongoing settlement discussion with regard to a breach of contract claim against Van Duyn for
repayment of an educational loan and the preliminary injunction sought by plaintiffs.
Defendants also argued that their attorney completed and filed the answer as soon as possible.
Defendants asserted that, given the amount of damages sought by plaintiffs and the minimal
delay in filing their answer, the default would result in a manifest injustice, because the
injunction had already been granted. Defendants’ affidavit of meritorious defenses averred that
the matter belonged in arbitration and that defendants planned to file a motion for summary
judgment (sic) pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), demanding arbitration.
At a hearing on the motion to set aside the default, the trial court granted defendants’
motion to set aside the default and dismissed all plaintiffs’ claims, ordering the case into
arbitration. The trial court also denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in dismissing all of its claims and
ordering the parties into arbitration. This Court reviews de novo a circuit court’s determination
that an issue is subject to arbitration. In re Nestorovski Estate, 283 Mich App 177, 184; 769
NW2d 720 (2009).
In the lower court, the parties stipulated to the order for preliminary injunctive relief
against defendants. The trial court ordered that all defendants were enjoined from soliciting
business from plaintiffs’ clients. The trial court also ordered that HFS could only pursue its
remaining causes of action against Van Duyn and Parslow in FINRA arbitration. However, the
remaining plaintiffs, HG, HTB, HB, and HA submit that they also suffered damages as a result
of defendants’ violation of the non-solicitation agreements and that they were under no
contractual obligation to arbitrate those claims pursuant to FINRA because they were not
“members” or “associated persons” of FINRA. Defendants respond that the other Hantz
companies were irrelevant and had no valid claims against defendants because defendants Van
Duyn and Parslow were only employed by HFS. However, the question of whether HG, HTB,
HA, and HB had actionable claims against defendants was not addressed by the trial court. The
primary question before this Court is whether the trial court erred in dismissing all plaintiffs’
claims against defendants because they were obligated to arbitrate those claims under FINRA.
The existence of an arbitration agreement and the enforceability of its terms are legal
questions for the court. Fromm v MEEMIC Ins Co, 264 Mich App 302, 305; 690 NW2d 528
(2004). “Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be forced to submit to arbitration
in the absence of an agreement to do so.” Ehresman v Bultynck & Co, PC, 203 Mich App 350,
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353-354; 511 NW2d 724 (1994). The non-solicitation and confidentiality agreements that
plaintiffs based their claims on did not contain arbitration clauses nor does either side argue that
they did. The only agreement to arbitrate in this case was based on membership in FINRA.
“Each member of FINRA agrees, by membership, to submit to arbitration if a ‘dispute arises out
of the business activities of a member or an associated person and is between or among
Members; Members and Associated Persons; or Associated Persons.’” Bank of America, NA v
UMB Fin Servs, Inc, 618 F3d 906, 909 (CA 8, 2010) (citation omitted). “‘Associated persons’
are defined under the FINRA code as individuals who are registered with FINRA, whereas
‘members’ refers to the organizations regulated by FINRA.” Id.
HFS is a “member” of FINRA, and Van Duyn and Parslow are “associated persons” of
FINRA. Plaintiffs claim, and defendants do not dispute, that plaintiffs HG, HTB, HA, and HB,
and defendants AQUEST and Bailey are not “members” or “associated persons” of FINRA. As
such, they are not subject to FINRA’s arbitration agreement, and a party cannot be forced to
submit to arbitration in the absence of an agreement to do so. Ehresman, 203 Mich App at 353354.
In Bank of America, 618 F3d 906, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a similar
case. UMB Financial Services and the individual defendants appealed the district court’s order
declining to compel Bank of America (“BOA”) to submit to arbitration. Id. at 908. The
individual defendants all worked for BOA as financial advisors, were licensed to broker
securities, and also received commissions from Banc of America Investment Services
(“BOAIS”). Id. The defendants signed non-solicitation clauses, which prohibited them from
soliciting BOA customers if they were to leave BOA’s employment. Id. All the individual
defendants left BOA’s employ and started to work for UMB. Id. at 909.
BOA filed suit to enforce the non-solicitation agreements and sought damages. Id. UMB
and the individual defendants filed a statement with FINRA to commence arbitration
proceedings against BOA and BOAIS. Id. On appeal, UMB argued that the district court should
have compelled BOA and BOAIS to arbitrate in the FINRA proceedings. Id. at 910. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that because BOA was not a FINRA member, it did not directly
agree to subject itself to arbitration under FINRA’s terms. Id. at 912. Accordingly, the court
concluded that defendants had to provide an alternate reason for finding the arbitration
agreements were enforceable against BOA. Id. The Court further held that state contract law
governed the question whether an enforceable arbitration agreement existed between litigants
and whether non-signatories could be forced to abide by arbitration provisions. Id. This
approach has also been adopted in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:
As the district court correctly stated, nonsignatories may be bound to an
arbitration agreement under ordinary contract and agency principles. Five
theories for binding nonsignatories to arbitration agreements have been
recognized: (1) incorporation by reference, (2) assumption, (3) agency, (4) veilpiercing/alter ego, and (5) estoppel. [Javitch v First Union Securities, Inc, 315
F3d 619, 629 (CA 6, 2003) (citations omitted).]
In Bank of America, the court rejected a theory of incorporation by reference because the
employment contracts signed by BOA did not in any way incorporate the FINRA membership
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contract arbitration clauses. The court also rejected the estoppel theory because even though
BOA’s claims were inextricably intertwined with BOAIS’s claims under the employment
contract, BOA’s claims were not inextricably intertwined with the FINRA arbitration
agreements. The court held that the defendants had not shown that BOA sought the benefit of
the FINRA membership agreements in any way related to the dispute. The court also rejected
the third-party beneficiary theory because there was no evidence that the FINRA agreement
referenced BOA as a third-party beneficiary or that it contained any language benefiting a third
party in BOA’s position. Bank of America, 618 F3d at 912-914. Ultimately, the court concluded
that “the district court did not err when it denied the motion to compel BOA to arbitrate its
claims against UMB and the individual appellants.” Id. at 914. “BOA did not agree in writing
or otherwise to arbitrate claims with any of them and cannot be compelled to do so.” Id.
The facts of this case, like in Bank of America, support the conclusion that HG, HTB,
HB, and HA did not agree in writing or otherwise to arbitrate claims arising out of the nonsolicitation agreements and could not be compelled to do so. The non-solicitation agreements
signed by the parties did not incorporate the FINRA membership contract arbitration clauses.
Although plaintiffs’ claims were inextricably intertwined with HFS’s claims under the nonsolicitation agreements, they were not inextricably intertwined with the FINRA arbitration
agreements. There was no evidence that plaintiffs sought the benefit of the FINRA membership
agreements in any way related to the dispute regarding the non-solicitation agreements. The
third-party beneficiary theory should also be rejected because there was no evidence that the
FINRA agreement referenced HG, HTB, HB, or HA as third-party beneficiaries or that it
contained any language benefiting a third party in plaintiffs’ position. Accordingly, the trial
court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims and ordering them into arbitration as they did not
agree in writing or otherwise to arbitrate claims arising out of the non-solicitation agreements
and cannot be compelled to do so.
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to set aside
the defaults against Parslow and Bailey. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding
whether to set aside a default for an abuse of discretion. Alken-Ziegler, Inc v Waterbury Headers
Corp, 461 Mich 219, 223-224; 600 NW2d 638 (1999). It is unclear from the record whether the
trial court granted defendants’ motion to set aside the default based on a lack of jurisdiction
because of the FINRA arbitration provisions or because defendants had shown good cause and a
meritorious defense. The trial court simply stated that it was granting the motion and ordering
the case into arbitration.
On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court properly granted their motion to set aside
the default because the court lacked jurisdiction based on the FINRA requirement to arbitrate.
However, as discussed above, plaintiffs, except for HFS, could not be compelled to arbitrate their
claims against defendants. Accordingly, the trial court did not lack jurisdiction over the case. In
addition, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement regarding a claim does not deprive the
trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Campbell v St John Hosp, 434 Mich 608,
615; 455 NW2d 695 (1990). Accordingly, the defaults should not have been set aside for lack of
jurisdiction based on an arbitration agreement between the parties.
A motion to set aside a default can also be granted if the defaulted party establishes good
cause and a meritorious defense. MCR 2.603(D)(1). A defaulted party can show good cause by
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showing either a procedural defect or irregularity or a reasonable excuse for the inaction that
caused the default. Alken-Ziegler, Inc, 461 Mich at 229. The defaulted party’s obligation to
show good cause and to show, through submission of an affidavit of facts, that a meritorious
defense exists are separate requirements. Id. The merits of the proposed defense may not be
considered when determining if good cause exists to set aside the default. Id. at 233-234.
In its motion to set aside the default, defendants did not allege a procedural defect or
irregularity. Rather, defendants argued that its failure to file a timely answer should have been
excused because of the negotiations that were taking place between the parties regarding the
injunction and the breach of contract claim against Van Duyn for the educational loan. In
addition, defendants argued that the answer that Van Duyn filed was exactly the same as their
answer and, as such, plaintiffs would not suffer any prejudice if the default against Parslow and
Bailey were set aside. Defendants further asserted that their attorney completed and filed the
response as soon as possible. Defendants argued that, considering the amount of damages sought
by plaintiffs and the minimal delay in filing defendants’ response, the default would result in
manifest injustice to defendants and that, since defendants had already filed an answer, setting
aside the default would not result in any prejudice to plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court has cautioned appellate courts not to substitute their judgment in
matters within the discretion of the trial court, and has insisted upon deference to the trial court
in such matters. Alken-Ziegler, Inc, 461 Mich at 228. Because it appears that the trial court
based its decision to set aside the defaults for lack of jurisdiction due to the arbitration
agreements, as evidenced by it ordering the parties into arbitration, and because of the deference
due to the trial court’s exercise of discretion with regard to this decision, we remand this matter
to the trial court to make a decision on the record applying the requirements of MCR 2.603(D)(1)
to defendants’ motion to set aside the default against Parslow and Bailey.
This Court reverses the order sending all the parties’ claims to arbitration and remands
for clarification of the basis for the trial court’s decision to set aside the default and for other
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
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