PEOPLE OF MI V ANDRE MONTEEK EDWARDS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 21, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 294826
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 08-023861-FC
ANDRE MONTEEK EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and GLEICHER and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Andre Edwards stood trial for the shooting death of Tyrell Lee, the victim,
which took place in Flint during the early morning hours of October 9, 2008. Defendant
admitted having shot the victim, but insisted that he had done so in self-defense. A jury
convicted defendant of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, being a felon in possession of a
firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felonyfirearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth habitual offender,
MCL 769.12, to concurrent terms of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for his murder conviction and
5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession conviction, together with a consecutive
two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right.
We affirm.
I
Defendant first challenges the trial court’s jury instruction regarding whether defendant
had a duty to retreat. “We review a claim of instructional error involving a question of law de
novo, but we review the trial court’s determination that a jury instruction applies to the facts of
the case for an abuse of discretion.” People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 702; 788 NW2d 399
(2010). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the
range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749
NW2d 272 (2008).
“A criminal defendant is entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence
against him.” Dupree, 486 Mich at 712 (internal quotation omitted). “A trial judge must instruct
the jury as to the applicable law, and fully and fairly present the case to the jury in an
understandable manner.” People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 676; 780 NW2d 321 (2009).
This Court considers jury instructions in their entirety to ascertain if error requiring reversal
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occurred. People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 373; 770 NW2d 68 (2009). Even if imperfect,
“reversal is not required if the[] [jury instructions] fairly present the issues to be tried and
sufficiently protect the defendant’s rights.” Id.
Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in instructing the jury about the duty to
retreat because the victim had undisputedly subjected defendant to a sudden, fierce and violent
attack. When a defendant facing a homicide charge asserts self-defense, the finder of fact must
decide whether “the accused, under all the circumstances of the assault, as it appeared to him,
honestly [and reasonably] believe[d] that he was in danger of losing his life, or great bodily
harm, and that it was necessary to do what he did in order to save himself from such apparent
threatened danger.” People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 126-127; 649 NW2d 30 (2002) (internal
quotation omitted). “[A] person is never required to retreat from a sudden, fierce, and violent
attack; nor is he required to retreat from an attacker who he reasonably believes is about to use a
deadly weapon.” Id. at 119 (emphasis in original). However, “[i]f it is possible to safely avoid
an attack then it is not necessary, and therefore not permissible, to exercise deadly force against
the attacker.” Id. at 129.
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury at length with respect to defendant’s selfdefense, including that “defendant must have honestly and reasonably believed that he was in
danger of being killed or seriously injured,” “a person may not kill or seriously injur[e] another
person only to protect himself against what seems like a threat of only minor injury,” and
“defendant must have honestly and reasonably believed that what he did [the amount of force he
employed] was immediately necessary.” CJI 2d 7.15 (“Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense”).
In an instruction tracking CJI2d 7.16, which describes a defendant’s “[d]uty to retreat to avoid
using deadly force,” the trial court additionally elaborated as follows:
A person may use deadly force in self[-]defense only where it is necessary
to do so. If the defendant could have safely retreated but did not do so, you may
consider that fact in deciding whether the defendant honestly and reasonably
believed he needed to use deadly force in self[-]defense. However, a person is
never required to retreat if attacked in his own home, nor if the person reasonably
believes that an attacker is about to use a deadly weapon, nor if the person is
subject to a sudden and fierce and violent attack.
Further, a person’s not required to retreat if the person has not or is not
engaged in the commission of a crime at the time the deadly force is used, and has
a legal right to be where the person is at that time, and has . . . an honest and
reasonable belief that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent
death or great bodily harm of the person or another.
In light of defendant’s self-defense claim, the jury had the prerogative to find as a
question of fact whether it was necessary for defendant to have shot the victim under the
circumstances of this case. Even assuming that the jury found credible defendant’s trial
testimony, the evidence in this case concerning whether defendant could have retreated is not
entirely clear. Defendant testified that he got into a vehicle with the victim. Soon after, the
victim retrieved a gun and placed it in his lap. A physical altercation between defendant and the
victim ensued, and the victim started choking defendant with his left hand and hitting defendant
with his right hand. Eventually defendant took possession of the gun. According to defendant,
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at this point he turned to exit the car, but the victim was lunging towards him, so he shot the gun.
Whether defendant could have safely exited the vehicle after he obtained possession of the gun is
not readily apparent. For example, a moment may have existed when defendant had possession
of the gun during which a jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant had an
opportunity to safely exit the vehicle. Additionally, no evidence at trial independently
substantiated that an attack by the victim had inflicted any physical injuries on defendant. We
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury on the duty to
retreat. Furthermore, the trial court accurately summarized for the jury the controlling law,
including that defendant had no duty to retreat if he was subject to a sudden, violent and fierce
attack.
II
Defendant next complains that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his rebuttal
closing argument by insinuating that defense counsel lacked competence and did not understand
the law surrounding search warrants. “Because the challenged prosecutorial statements in this
case were not preserved by contemporaneous objections and requests for curative instructions,
appellate review is for outcome-determinative, plain error.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 235.
“Reversal is warranted only when plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent
defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Generally, “[t]he test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a
fair and impartial trial.” People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 134; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). This
Court considers “issues of prosecutorial misconduct on a case-by-case basis by examining the
record and evaluating the remarks in context, and in light of [the] defendant’s arguments.”
People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). “A prosecutor cannot
personally attack the defendant’s trial attorney because this type of attack can infringe upon the
defendant’s presumption of innocence.” People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 607; 560
NW2d 354 (1996). However, we must keep in mind the context of prosecutorial remarks
“because an otherwise improper remark may not rise to an error requiring reversal when the
prosecutor is responding to the defense counsel’s argument.” Id. at 608.
Here, defense counsel made the following relevant arguments in the course of his closing:
[Flint Police Sergeant] Mitch Brown. . . . He is the officer in charge. It is
his responsibility to make sure that they conduct a thorough and respectable
investigation. . . . He failed to effectively search for the gun. Why? Why did he
do that? Does he believe [defendant] at any point? He stated he doesn’t believe
him. But, he accepts it at face value, goes out to the lot, looks for the gun. Says,
“Oop [sic]. Okay, I’m done.” And then heads back on down to make his report.
He effectuates no search warrants. He doesn’t go to all of these residences
that he knows that [defendant] was at. Does he . . . really look for the gun? He
told you he didn’t look for the gun. Does he believe [defendant] or does he not?
In the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument, he responded:
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Now, defense would ask, “well, what did Sgt. Brown do to try to find [the
gun]? Did he look in all the houses? Did he . . . search the city?[”] Okay.
Where is he going to search? Where is going to get a search warrant for? He’s
gotta come to get probable cause. Does he know where the gun is? No. You
can’t just go searching through the houses. You can’t do it. We have a
Constitution that prohibits that.
Contrary to defendant’s position that the prosecutor’s comments insinuated that defense counsel
did not know the law, the challenged passage of the prosecutor’s rebuttal embodies a proper
response to defense counsel’s repeated declarations that the police had botched their
investigation into the victim’s shooting. The prosecutor simply pointed out that Sergeant Brown
had not searched other areas besides the field where defendant purportedly had thrown the gun,
not because he believed defendant, but because he needed probable cause to do so, which he did
not have. We detect no hint of any improper denigration of the defense in the challenged
passage of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument. Moreover, even assuming some improper
argument in this passage of the prosecutor’s rebuttal, the trial court’s instructions remedied any
error. Chapo, 283 Mich App at 370 (observing that jurors are presumed to have followed the
jury instructions, which presumably cure most errors).
III
Defendant next avers that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when defense
counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument about the police search for the gun
used in the shooting and prosecutorial demonstrations during testimony by a forensic pathologist,
Dr. Allecia Wilson. As defendant did not develop a testimonial record regarding the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, we limit our review to any mistakes apparent on the record. People
v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000). Whether a defendant has received the
effective assistance of counsel comprises a mixed question of fact and law. People v LeBlanc,
465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). We review for clear error a trial court’s findings of
fact, if any, regarding the conduct of defense counsel, while we consider de novo questions of
constitutional law. Id.
“‘[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’” United States
v Cronic, 466 US 648, 654; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984), quoting McMann v
Richardson, 397 US 759, 777 n 14; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763 (1970). In Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), the United States
Supreme Court held that a convicted defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
includes two components: “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.” To establish the first component, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. People
v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). With respect to the prejudice
aspect of the test for ineffective assistance, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have differed. Id. at
663-664. The defendant must overcome the strong presumptions that his “counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of professional assistance,” and that his counsel’s actions represented
sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 US at 689. A defense counsel possesses “wide discretion in
matters of trial strategy.” People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 415; 740 NW2d 557 (2007). This
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Court may not “substitute our judgment for that of counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor will
we use the benefit of hindsight when assessing counsel’s competence.” People v Payne, 285
Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009) (internal quotation omitted).
Regarding defendant’s claim of ineffectiveness by his trial counsel relating to the
prosecutor’s rebuttal argument comments, we reject this claim because any objection lodged by
defense counsel would have been groundless. Unger, 278 Mich App at 256 (noting that a
defense counsel is not ineffective for neglecting to offer a futile objection). As we have
discussed, the prosecutor responded directly and properly to defense counsel’s closing arguments
characterizing the police investigation as inadequate and did not denigrate the defense.
With respect to the prosecutor’s demonstrations and hypothetical questions to Dr.
Wilson, defendant asserts that his trial counsel should have objected because the demonstrations
did not replicate the conditions that existed at the time of the shooting. A court may admit
demonstrative evidence if it helps the factfinder reach a conclusion on a material matter. People
v Bulmer, 256 Mich App 33, 35; 662 NW2d 117 (2003). “[W]hen evidence is offered not in an
effort to recreate an event, but as an aid to illustrate an expert’s testimony regarding issues
related to the event, there need not be an exact replication of the circumstances of the event.” Id.
However, “‘[t]he facts or data . . . upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference shall be in
evidence.’” Unger, 278 Mich App at 248, quoting MRE 703. “An expert witness’s opinion is
objectionable if it is based on assumptions that do not accord with the established facts.” Id. at
248.
We conclude that defense counsel’s lack of objection to the prosecutor’s demonstrations
during Dr. Wilson’s testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial
court certified Dr. Wilson as an expert in forensic pathology, she testified that she performed the
victim’s autopsy, and she described the internal path of the fatal bullet. Demonstrations by both
the prosecutor and defense counsel served to elucidate Dr. Wilson’s testimony about the precise
trajectory of the bullet into the victim, and therefore, the attorneys’ hypothetical inquiries did not
need to exactly duplicate actual events. Bulmer, 256 Mich App at 35. Furthermore, the
demonstrations sprang from facts that Dr. Wilson had discovered in her autopsy, to which she
had already testified. MRE 703; Unger, 278 Mich App at 248. Accordingly, we detect nothing
improper in the prosecutor’s hypothetical questions, to which any objection would have been
futile. Unger, 278 Mich App at 256.
Moreover, apart from a conclusory declaration that the prosecutor’s inquiries qualified as
“highly prejudicial,” defendant has not shown that he suffered any prejudice. Dr. Wilson made
clear in answering the questions that she did not know what position the victim occupied at the
time of the shooting, and that she thus did not know if the demonstrations were accurate. The
trial court instructed the jury that the lawyers’ inquiries were not evidence, and substantial other,
properly admitted evidence in the record proved defendant’s guilt, including defendant’s
admission at trial that he shot the victim and the testimony of two additional witnesses that
shortly before the victim’s death he identified defendant as the shooter, among other evidence.
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In summary, defendant has made no showing that the prosecutor’s demonstrations, and defense
counsel’s lack of objection, likely affected the outcome of the trial.1
IV
In a Standard 42 brief on appeal, defendant raises multiple other claims of prosecutorial
misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court generally reviews claims of
prosecutorial misconduct according to the following standards:
Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided case by case, and the
reviewing court must examine the pertinent portion of the record and evaluate a
prosecutor’s remarks in context. Prosecutors may not make a statement of fact to
the jury that is unsupported by the evidence, but they are free to argue the
evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they relate to the theory
of the case. Prosecutorial comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in
light of defense arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted
at trial. [People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370 (2000),
criticized on other grounds in Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct 1354,
1371; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004).]
We review alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct in context to determine whether the
defendant received a fair and impartial trial. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629
NW2d 411 (2001).
A
Defendant initially contends that the prosecutor infringed on his constitutional right to
present a defense when the prosecutor improperly failed to conduct DNA, fingerprint and
gunshot residue testing of the victim’s vehicle, which would have yielded physical evidence
corroborating defendant’s trial testimony. Defendant did not move for the trial court to order
DNA, fingerprint or gunshot residue testing of the victim’s vehicle, and we thus employ the plain
error standard of review when considering this issue. Unger, 272 Mich App at 235.
Due process demands that a criminal defendant have “a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense,” which includes a defendant’s receipt of exculpatory evidence.
People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436, 460; 719 NW2d 579 (2006) (internal quotation omitted). A
prosecutor must disclose exculpatory and material evidence in his possession, regardless whether
the defendant has asked for the disclosure. People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 176; 740
NW2d 534 (2007). But,
1
Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the incorrect instructions and the errors
occasioned by the prosecutor and defense counsel entitle him to a new trial. However, none of
the issues raised by appellate counsel evidence actual errors in the trial, and therefore, taken in
the aggregate they do not entitle defendant to a new trial.
2
Supreme Court Administrative Order 2004-6, Standard 4.
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[f]or due process purposes, there is a crucial distinction between failing to
disclose evidence that has been developed and failing to develop evidence in the
first instance. Because the instant case involves the failure to develop evidence,
as opposed to the failure to disclose existing evidence, the bad-faith test in
[Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51; 109 S Ct 333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988),] is
inapplicable.
Defendant’s right to present a defense was not violated because the police
have no constitutional duty to assist a defendant in developing potentially
exculpatory evidence. [Anstey, 476 Mich at 461.]
Here, defendant does not suggest that the prosecutor or the police possessed DNA,
fingerprint or gunshot residue evidence derived from the victim’s vehicle that could potentially
have assisted the defense. Instead, defendant argues that the prosecutor should have developed
that evidence by having the victim’s vehicle tested in several respects. Because neither the
prosecutor nor the police owed defendant a constitutional duty to develop potentially favorable
forensic evidence, defendant has failed to show that any inaction by the prosecutor deprived him
of his due process right to a fair trial. Antsey, 476 Mich at 461-462.
B
Defendant next characterizes as prosecutorial misconduct several passages of the
prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal arguments that purportedly referenced facts not in evidence.
“Because the challenged prosecutorial statements in this case were not preserved by
contemporaneous objections and requests for curative instructions, appellate review is for
outcome-determinative, plain error.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 235.
1
Defendant first submits that the prosecutor improperly argued that the console in the car
where the shooting occurred was askew as a result of defendant’s attempts to rob the victim. The
prosecutor made the following statements during his closing argument:
I think [defendant] went over there to rob [the victim]. He knew he was
sitting up there. He went up there with a gun. He opened the door and he shot
him. And you saw the inside of that car. There’s parts [sic] of the car pulled
apart. Somebody was looking for something. And what did the police find there?
They didn’t find anything. Whatever was there was gone.
The prosecutor elaborated in his rebuttal:
That console in the middle of the car? That little area where you can keep
things? That’s up.
The gearshift thing? That’s popped up. It’s popped up. You heard
Katrina Bailey. (Indiscernible—[the prosecutor] not at microphone).
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That part of the car door is pried, it’s wide open. Somebody was looking
for something in there. Somebody got in there with a gun and was looking for
stuff.
These comments by the prosecutor represent proper argument concerning his theory of the case
premised on facts in the record and reasonable inferences arising from these facts. Bailey, the
victim’s girlfriend and the mother of two children with the victim, testified about the condition of
the car in which the victim was shot, which Bailey and the victim had recently purchased in new
condition, specifically that after the shooting the gearshift was askew and the passenger-side
door paneling had sustained damage. Although the prosecutor’s robbery theory may not have in
fact actually happened, the prosecutor permissibly proffered to the jury, on the basis of the
damage to the victim’s car and reasonable inferences arising from this evidence, that defendant
had killed the victim in the course of a robbery.
2
Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he told the jury
defendant said, “‘I shot at him and I don’t think I hit him. I didn’t do anything wrong.’”
Defendant insists that, in fact, he testified, “I didn’t shoot at him.” The entire relevant exchange
between defendant and the prosecutor at trial went as follows:
Q. If you shot him . . . . You knew you shot him?
A. I didn’t know I shot him.
Q. You knew you shot . . . . Okay.
You’re saying, according to you, you’re saying you didn’t know that you
hit him. Correct?
A. Yes. Exactly.
Q. Okay.
You shot at him. Is that . . . . You don’t think that you did anything
wrong when you shot at him?
A. I didn’t shoot at him. I didn’t—I didn’t point—aim the gun
particularly at him. I switched the gun in my other hand, and in the motion of
what was going on, I pulled the trigger, yes, ’cause he was coming at me. I didn’t
point the gun at him. I shot the gun to put a time—let me stop—stop, ’cause
everything was going too quick—to (indiscernible) so I can get out this car. I
needed to get out that car.
Q. Okay.
And you felt like you didn’t do anything wrong, even after you found out
he died. Is that right?
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A. I protected my life.
The prosecutor mischaracterized during his closing argument defendant’s trial account of his
firing of the gun. In contrast to defendant’s testimony that he did not shoot at the victim, the
prosecutor told the jury that defendant had acknowledged shooting at the victim. But defendant
has not shown that this unpreserved error affected the outcome of the proceedings in light of the
trial court’s instructions to the jury that the prosecutor’s closing argument was not evidence and
the properly admitted evidence of defendant’s guilt. Unger, 272 Mich App at 235.
3
Defendant additionally challenges as improper the prosecutor’s declaration, “Now, . . .
the defendant testified, and he told you he knew that [the victim] would be there. That he’s
always there. He told you he hangs out there. And then he told you, again, his version of what
he thought happened, or what he claims happened, rather.” Defendant disputes that he ever
testified that the victim was always around the house near which the shooting occurred. Our
review of the record reveals that the prosecutor’s argument had a foundation in defendant’s
testimony. Defendant explained at trial that the shooting had happened near 906 East York
Street, in a neighborhood where he had lived for a long time and that he traversed by foot “all the
time.” Defendant expressed that he had known the occupants of 906 East York, Michael
Johnson and Ricky Johnson, for around 12 years, the Johnsons and the victim were friends, and
defendant’s acquaintance with the victim stretched back approximately 15 years. In defendant’s
direct examination, when asked whether he knew if the victim “h[u]ng out at 9-0-6 East York,”
defendant replied, “Outside. Basically, it be next door.” Defendant later specified the location
where the victim routinely parked his van near 906 East York and his knowledge that the victim
often played “a video game TV in” his van. In summary, the prosecutor accurately argued on the
basis of defendant’s testimony and reasonable inferences flowing from defendant’s testimony
that defendant knew the victim always or frequently spent time near 906 East York.
4
Defendant further criticizes the following, italicized portions of the prosecutor’s rebuttal
argument made in the course of the prosecutor’s discussion that “[t]he physical evidence doesn’t
support [defendant’s] story, either”:
There was no fight in that car. There was no fight in that car. Look at the
photos. Look at the photos of the seats in that car. The passenger’s seat was
leaning way back.
***
The defendant would have you believe that [the victim] was able to grab
him by one hand, his left hand, and showed him sitting in the car while the
passenger’s seat is way back, while at the same time, balancing a gun on his lap
and punching him like this. He’s gonna be holding him up there with just one
hand while he’s leaning over and punching him.
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And he’s claiming that he couldn’t get out of that position. Just think
about it. It doesn’t make sense. Let’s apply the laws of physics. Okay? Can
someone actually hold someone up like that? If it were really the case, [the
victim] would’ve been having to grip him so hard to hold him up to keep him
from leaning back and leaning against the door. If he was leaning all the way
against that door, [the victim] could not have stayed in the driver’s seat and done
that. And if he had to lean over like that, do you think he could’ve held a gun on
his lap? It just doesn’t make sense.
The defendant would’ve been able to get out. I mean, . . . it doesn’t take
much to jerk back. In fact, wouldn’t that be your natural response? . . .
***
. . . And most importantly, what flies is the explanation of how he was
positioned when he shot. It flies in the face, and it’s— it’s just disbelieved. It
defies belief the way the car was set up. [Emphasis added.]
Defendant avers in his Standard 4 brief that “[t]here was no evidence in the record (1) that the
actual positions of the car seats were discussed or duplicated, (2) that [the victim] was
‘balancing’ the gun on his lap, (3) that [the victim] was ‘holding’ [defendant] up, or (4) that [the
victim] had the gun on his lap when [defendant] was leaning towards the door.”
We conclude that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct. The prosecutor relied on
the evidence admitted at trial, and reasonable inferences derived from the evidence, to advance
his theory that defendant’s account of the fatal confrontation between him and the victim lacked
credibility. The prosecutor introduced into evidence at trial photographs of the interior of the
victim’s vehicle, including one showing the front passenger seat leaning back. An evidence
technician testified that the photographs depicted what she found at the scene on the morning of
the shooting. Consequently, evidence substantiated the prosecutor’s argument concerning the
position of the seat. Moreover, defendant testified that the victim choked him with his left hand
and punched him with his right, and that defendant grabbed the gun from the victim’s lap.
Because the prosecutor premised his argument on facts of record and reasonable inferences
arising from the evidence, no misconduct occurred.
B
In a final claim of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant contends that the prosecutor
improperly bolstered the credibility of Michael Johnson, a friend of the victim’s who briefly
interacted with the victim after the shooting. “A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of
his witnesses by suggesting that he has some special knowledge of the witnesses’ truthfulness.”
People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 22; 776 NW2d 314 (2009). A prosecutor may, however, argue
from the facts in evidence that the defendant or another witness is worthy or not worthy of belief.
Id.; People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 67; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
The prosecutor discussed as follows in his rebuttal closing argument Johnson’s
testimony:
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Michael Johnson, [defense counsel] says, said nothing important. He told
you that [the victim] names his murderer, Yogi. That’s what Michael Johnson
told you. That was true. He told you that [the victim] fell dead in his arms, and
he got blood on him. That was true. He told you that [the victim] was in pain,
that he was yelling. Both Rickey and Michael Johnson told you that.
And he was honest to you. He said he didn’t want to be here. He didn’t
want to get involved. He didn’t want to talk to the police. He didn’t want to be a
snitch. That’s probably the worst thing that can happen in that neighborhood. He
doesn’t want to be a snitch. … He’s friends with ’em both. He didn’t want to be
here, but he came in here and he told you the truth.
Michael Johnson told you that he had seen [the victim] with a gun before.
That’s true. I asked him and he told you.
And the defendant would have you believe that that is the only useful
information that anyone has told you, that is not named on the evidence. [sic]
But that’s just not true.
The defendant wants you to remember only the parts that might help with
his case. Not the fact that it wasn’t even [the victim]’s gun that was used.
Because what did Michael Johnson say? He’d seen it before, now and then,
(indiscernible—[the prosecutor] not at microphone). Now and then he’s seen him
with a .45.
And as Ryan Larrison told you from the lab, a .45 is a bigger gun than a
9mm. It’s a much bigger gun. We know a 9 mm was used in this case because
we got the casing. And we got the bullet. So it was not [the victim]’s gun.
But when he testified that it was a .45, what was the cross-examination
like? What did [defense counsel] ask him? “You talked to the prosecutor, didn’t
you?” What’s that about? He tried to make it sound like I did something
improper by interviewing him. That I shouldn’t discuss the case with him.
He told you I didn’t tell him what to say. And I didn’t tell him what to
say. I don’t tell any witness what to day [sic]. I told him—what did he say when
I asked him? What did I tell you? I told him to tell the truth.
So, the gun that the defendant says was [the victim]’s, that wasn’t [the
victim]’s. In fact, Michael Johnson said [the victim] did not even always carry a
gun. Guess what? The gun that the defendant murdered [the victim] with is not
his. Of course, . . . [defense counsel] didn’t discuss that, did he?
Our review of the record reflects that the prosecutor accurately summarized Johnson’s testimony,
and properly argued on the basis of Johnson’s testimony that he was worthy of belief. Seals, 285
Mich App at 22; Dobek, 274 Mich App at 67. In no respect did the prosecutor insinuate that he
possessed some special knowledge about Johnson’s veracity. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261,
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276; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). In summary, defendant has not shown improper prosecutorial
vouching.
C
Defendant also sets forth several instances in which his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance, specifically by failing to present a defense, acting on the basis of loyalty to the
prosecution, not keeping defendant adequately informed, neglecting to call crucial witnesses, and
failing to request a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter. In reviewing defendant’s
ineffective assistance contentions, we keep in mind the legal standards set forth in Part III, supra
at 6-7.
1
Defendant initially contends that defense counsel should have presented a trial defense
premised on the victim’s vehicle having been parked on the street at the time of the shooting,
instead of in the driveway of 906 East York as depicted in some police photographs, and the
existence of an additional bullet casing collected by the victim’s mother, Maxine Lee, from the
scene. In support of this ineffective assistance claim, defendant attached to his Standard 4 brief a
written statement from Lee, which does not appear in the trial court record. Nor did defendant
develop an evidentiary record for us to consider regarding whether Lee should have testified
about collecting a second shell casing. Because we must limit our review of trial counsel’s
performance to mistakes apparent in the record, we decline to consider Lee’s written statement.
More importantly, our review of the entire record in light of the argument in defendant’s
Standard 4 brief convinces us that defense counsel competently, professionally and thoroughly
presented defendant’s self-defense theory to the jury.
2
Defendant also asserts that defense counsel was ineffective because of his loyalty to the
prosecution and a conflict of interest. To the extent that defendant reiterates his complaints
about defense counsel’s presentation of the self-defense theory at trial, the record confirms that
defense counsel adequately presented the self-defense theory and in no respect deprived
defendant of a substantial defense. Defendant has not otherwise shown that any actual conflict
of interest prevented defense counsel from suitably and vigorously representing defendant. It
appears that defendant was displeased with defense counsel based primarily on hindsight, which
does not suffice to show ineffective assistance of counsel.
3
Defendant additionally complains that defense counsel did not apprise him before trial of
counsel’s decision against “present[ing] an accurate defense.” Presumably, defendant’s
argument concerning this shortcoming of defense counsel intends to reference the perceived
shortcomings in the self-defense presentation at trial. However, as we have already observed,
the record reveals that defense counsel argued defendant’s self-defense claim to the jury,
introduced evidence supporting the defense, and effectively cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses, and did not deprive defendant of a substantial defense. In light of the existing record,
no evidence tends to show that defense counsel failed to adequately communicate with
-12-
defendant. To the contrary, when defendant took the stand to testify on his own behalf,
defendant indicated that he and defense counsel had discussed trial strategy and that counsel did
not deem it necessary for defendant to testify, but defendant nonetheless opted to testify.
4
Defendant further argues that defense counsel should have called two witnesses,
defendant’s mother, Carolyn Edwards, and his girlfriend, Victoria McCree, to corroborate that
defendant suffered injuries as a result of his altercation with the victim. “Decisions . . . whether
to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy.” People v Rockey, 237
Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). Defendant did not move for a new trial or a Ginther3
hearing with respect to this alleged instance of ineffective assistance of counsel, thus limiting our
review to mistakes apparent on the existing record. Although defendant attached written
statements by Edwards and McCree to his Standard 4 brief, no evidence in the trial record exists
that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call Edwards or McCree because no
information in the record substantiates to what they might have testified. Even were we to
consider the contents of Edwards’s and McCree’s statements, the statements, which in pertinent
part describe Edwards’s and McCree’s sightings of swelling in defendant’s face and possible
bruising around his neck near the time of the shooting, corroborate defendant’s trial account that
the victim attacked him before the shooting. Given the corroborative nature of Edwards’s and
McCree’s statements, trial counsel’s failure to produce these witnesses at trial would not have
deprived defendant of a substantial defense that “might have made a difference in the outcome of
the trial.” People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538 NW2d 465 (1995), vac’d in part on
other grounds 453 Mich 902 (1996).
5
In defendant’s ultimate ineffective assistance contention, he urges that defense counsel
should have requested an instruction on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter.
“When a defendant is charged with murder, instructions for voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter must be given if supported by a rational view of the evidence.” People v Tierney,
266 Mich App 687, 714; 703 NW2d 204 (2005). Involuntary manslaughter is “the killing of
another without malice and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a
felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act
lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.” People v Herron, 464
Mich 593, 604; 628 NW2d 528 (2001) (internal quotation omitted).
In this case, the facts did not support instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter.
Defendant consistently testified at trial that he intentionally pulled the trigger in self-defense
when the victim physically assaulted him. Defendant’s act of pulling the trigger on a gun in
close proximity to the victim amounted to an unlawful act that “tend[ed] to cause death or great
bodily harm,” rendering inapplicable the elements of involuntary manslaughter. Herron, 464
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-13-
Mich at 604. Accordingly, the evidence did not support an involuntary manslaughter instruction,
and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request an inapplicable charge to the jury.
D
Lastly, in a supplement to defendant’s Standard 4 brief, he asserts that the trial court
violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a public trial when the court cleared the
courtroom of spectators for the voir dire of potential jurors. “A defendant is guaranteed the right
to a public trial by the United States Constitution, US Const, Am VI, and the Michigan
Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 20.” People v Bails, 163 Mich App 209, 210; 413 NW2d 709
(1987). The United States Supreme Court has recently clarified that a defendant’s “Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial extends to the voir dire of prospective jurors.” Presley v
Georgia, 558 US ___; 130 S Ct 721, 724; 175 L Ed 2d 675 (2010). “Although the right to an
open trial is not absolute, that right will only rarely give way to other interests. Waller v
Georgia, 467 US 39; 104 S Ct 2210; 81 L Ed 2d 31 (1984). In Waller, the Court . . . emphasized
the need for specific findings to help determine whether an order of closure is proper . . . .”
People v Kline, 197 Mich App 165, 169; 494 NW2d 756 (1992). “However, this right is not selfexecuting: the defendant must timely assert the right.” People v Vaughn, ___ Mich App ___;
___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 292385), slip op at 7.
The trial court announced before beginning jury selection, “And, ladies and gentlemen,
the unfortunate thing, I’m really sorry, is, we just don’t have room for you. We’re going to fill
up this whole room with jurors. So, just wait out in the hallway. It’s going to take us several
hours to do this.” The record gives no indication of the identities of the “ladies and gentlemen”
that the court excluded, neither the prosecutor nor defendant voiced any concern about the
courtroom closure, and the courtroom remained closed over the course of around 5-1/2 hours of
voir dire.
Defendant characterizes this constitutional error as structural in nature, but a review of
Michigan case law examining public trial violations reveals that reversal is not always warranted,
especially when a defendant fails to raise a timely objection.
In discussing a defendant’s right to a public trial under the Sixth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has made the matter of the
accused’s objection a pivotal point. Waller[, 467 US 39.] If an objection had
been made, other alternatives could have been considered. Given the lack of an
objection, the short period the courtroom doors were locked, and the court’s
motive for ordering the closure, this Court finds the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial was not violated. [Bails, 163 Mich App at
211.]4
4
This Court in Kline, 197 Mich App at 172 n 4, declined to apply the harmless-error analysis set
forth in Bails, 163 Mich App at 211. However, Kline does not control the outcome of this case
because the defendant in Kline did lodge a constitutional objection to a courtroom closure,
whereas defendant here raised no objection. Id.
-14-
More recently, in Vaughn, slip op at 7, a case in which the defendant offered no objection to a
courtroom closure during jury voir dire, this Court rejected as follows the defendant’s
protestation on appeal that the trial court had committed a structural error:
A defendant has the right to a public trial, which includes the right to have
the courtroom open to the public during jury voir dire. Although there are
exceptions to the right, the trial court may not close the courtroom to the public
unless the party seeking closure advances an overriding interest that is likely to be
prejudiced and the trial court considers all reasonable alternatives to closing the
proceeding. However, this right is not self-executing: the defendant must timely
assert the right. . . . [T]he failure to timely assert the right to a public trial
forecloses the later grant of relief.
Here, defendant’s trial counsel did not object to the trial court’s decision
to close the courtroom to the public during the selection of his jury. Therefore,
the error does not warrant relief. [Id. (citations omitted).]
In light of the absence in this case of a defense objection that might have prompted the
trial court to consider alternatives to courtroom closure, we conclude that the allegedly erroneous
courtroom closure “does not warrant relief.” Vaughn, slip op at 7.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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