AUTOMOBILE CLUB INS ASSOCIATION V STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
AUTOMOBILE CLUB INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION,
UNPUBLISHED
June 21, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 294324
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 08-001249-NF
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and WILDER and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s1 motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court found that Sarah
Campanelli, a minor, was domiciled in Michigan at the time of the motor vehicle accident that
resulted in her death; consequently, plaintiff was the priority insurer responsible for paying
personal injury protection benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. Because we
find that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Sarah’s domicile, we reverse.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition in favor of
defendant and failed to grant summary disposition in its favor. We agree that summary
disposition should not have been granted in favor of the defendant, but we also conclude that
1
References to “defendant” in the singular throughout this opinion are to defendant State Farm
only. Defendant Allstate Insurance was dismissed earlier in the case by stipulation of the parties.
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summary disposition was not appropriately granted in favor or either party on the facts of this
case.
A trial court’s determination of a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.
Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 52; 684 NW2d 320 (2004). When reviewing a
motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court considers the affidavits, depositions,
pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Rose v Nat’l Auction Group, Inc, 466 Mich 453, 461; 646 NW2d 455
(2002). Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
The question of which insurance policy has coverage in the instant matter revolves
around the issue of Sarah’s domicile at the time of the accident. Under MCL 500.3114(1)2, if
Sarah resided in Michigan, then plaintiff was responsible for Sarah’s personal injury protection
benefits. On the other hand, if Sarah’s domicile was in Tennessee, then defendant was
responsible under MCL 500.3114(4)(a)3.
The statutory term, “domiciled in the same household,” has no absolute meaning; rather,
its meaning may vary according to the circumstances. Cervantes v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of
Mich, 272 Mich App 410, 414; 726 NW2d 73 (2006). Generally, however, “domicile” is defined
as “[t]hat place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment
and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” In re Servaas, 484 Mich
634, 679; 774 NW2d 46 (2009), citing Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed); see also Dairyland Ins
Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675, 680; 333 NW2d 322 (1983).
Generally, a determination involving a person’s domicile is a question of fact. Fowler v
Airborne Freight Corp, 254 Mich App 362, 364; 656 NW2d 856 (2002). Only where facts are
undisputed is domicile a question of law for the court. Id. Although plaintiff and defendant
assert that the underlying facts pertaining to Sarah’s domicile are not in dispute, we hold that
there are genuine issues of material fact that make it inappropriate for the trial court to have
properly resolved this issue as a matter of law. See Dobson v Maki, 184 Mich App 244, 252; 457
NW2d 132 (1990) (holding that denial of summary disposition is proper where there is
conflicting evidence regarding domicile).
2
MCL 500.3114(1) provides, in relevant part: “Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and
(5), a personal protection insurance policy described in section 3101(1) applies to accidental
bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either
domiciled in the same household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident.”
3
MCL 500.3114(4) provides, in relevant part: “Except as provided in subsections (1) to (3), a
person suffering accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident while an
occupant of a motor vehicle shall claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in
the following order of priority: (a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the vehicle
occupied.”
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When determining a person’s domicile, a number of factors are weighed and balanced
with each other with no one factor being determinative, or given special weight. Cervantes, 272
Mich App at 415-416; Univ of Mich Regents v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 250 Mich App 719, 730;
650 NW2d 129 (2002). Relevant factors in deciding whether a person is domiciled in the same
household as the insured include the following:
(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either
permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he
contends is his “domicile” or “household”; (2) the formality or informality of the
relationship between the person and the members of the household; (3) whether
the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or
upon the same premises; (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the
person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household. [Workman v DAIIE,
404 Mich 477, 496-497; 274 NW2d 373 (1979) (internal citations omitted).]
“These four factors do not make a comprehensive and exclusive list; they are merely ‘[a]mong
the relevant factors’ to be considered.” Cervantes, 272 Mich App at 415, quoting Workman, 404
Mich at 496 (brackets in original). Accordingly, in addition to the four Workman factors, this
Court has identified other relevant factors, such as:
(1) whether the child continues to use the parents’ home as the child’s mailing
address, (2) whether the child maintains some possessions with the parents, (3)
whether the child uses the parents’ address on the child’s driver’s license or other
documents, (4) whether a room is maintained for the child at the parents’ home,
and (5) whether the child is dependent upon the parents for support. [Fowler, 254
Mich App at 364-365.]
Here, there was extensive testimony regarding the first Workman factor, Sarah’s
subjective or declared intent. Sarah’s sister, Ashley, recalled Sarah going to Michigan in the
summer of 2007 to stay with their mother and their mother’s uncle. Ashley reported that Sarah
told her that she was going to try to stay in Michigan for a year to try to build a relationship with
their mother and to go to school in Michigan. Ashley said that she later spoke with Sarah around
Thanksgiving 2007 and that Sarah stated she wanted to return to Tennessee around Christmas to
live and go to school.
Sarah’s father, Frank, said there was no intent for Sarah to permanently remain in
Michigan. Frank said that Sarah spoke to him on Thanksgiving, requesting to return to
Tennessee, but he told her that she would have to finish the semester. Frank believed that Sarah
understood that Christmas was the earliest she could return home, and that he probably would
have picked Sarah up at that time.
Sarah’s mother, Tina Taylor, believed that Sarah wanted to stay in Michigan to get to
know her more. Taylor said that Sarah expressed a desire to visit Tennessee over Thanksgiving
to see her boyfriend. Taylor stated that Sarah was going to stay with her for a year, and that she
was going to Tennessee to visit her boyfriend for Christmas.
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The trial court, while acknowledging that Sarah had in the past maintained her domicile
in Tennessee, determined that, as a matter of law, the circumstances of the summer and fall of
2007 changed her domicile to Michigan. We disagree. It is undisputed that Sarah expressed her
intention to return to Tennessee with both her sister and her father. Had she been of majority
age, the evidence is sufficient to infer that she would in fact have acted on her intentions.
However, as the trial court recognized, Sarah was a minor child, and her legal custodian, her
father, told her that she had to finish the school semester in Michigan and was not permitted to
return to Tennessee until the Christmas break at the earliest. These circumstances raise genuine
issues of material fact related to Sarah’s intentions. Rather than the facts simply reflecting a
hope to return to Tennessee, the facts could just as easily be interpreted as showing a firm
intention to return that was stifled only by the fact that Sarah was not legally permitted, because
of her age, to act on her intention at that time.
The second factor, concerning the “formality or informality of the relationship between
the person and the members of the insured’s household,” favors neither location because Sarah’s
residence with both parents was in the context of a minor child living under the care of a parent.
Likewise, the third and fourth Workman factors favored neither location. Under the third factor,
Sarah resided in the same home with the parent with whom she was living. Regarding the fourth
factor, there was no testimony about Sarah having access to “another place of lodging.”
Turning to the additional Fowler factors, we note there was little evidence in the record
regarding what address Sarah used for mailing, for forms, or regarding the status of her
possessions or finances. Taylor stated that she enrolled Sarah in a Michigan school, giving the
school a Michigan address for Sarah. Sarah began working at a Michigan restaurant and was
socially active. Sarah’s Tennessee probation officer testified that Sarah told her that she was
doing well in Michigan. Although Frank provided for the needs of his daughters in Tennessee
and maintained a room for Sarah, Taylor stated that she and Sarah lived with Taylor’s uncle in a
three-bedroom house trailer in Michigan. Taylor said that Sarah arranged her bedroom and was
painting it. Taylor paid Sarah’s expenses during her time in Michigan, including medical
insurance.
It is clear that the trial court based its decision to grant summary disposition in favor of
defendant on its finding that there was “no real evidence that Sarah intended to return to
Tennessee to live.” However, as noted earlier, while it is true that Sarah’s mother stated that
Sarah planned to stay with her in Michigan for a year, there was contradictory testimony from
her sister and father indicating that Sarah intended to return to Tennessee. Accordingly, because
a trial court is not permitted to determine facts or assess credibility on a motion for summary
disposition, Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994), there was a
genuine issue of material fact, and summary disposition was improper.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court should have found that Sarah was domiciled in
Tennessee based on previous decisions of the Livingston Probate Court and the Wayne Circuit
Court that Sarah was domiciled in Tennessee. However, those courts did not determine Sarah’s
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domicile for the purpose of insurance coverage, and there is no authority that suggests that the
trial court was required to adopt the ruling of different jurisdictions deciding the issue for a
different purpose for different parties.4 The probate court was considering a petition for formal
probate and a determination of the personal representative, and a petition for funeral
arrangements. The Wayne Circuit Court, on an emergency motion to change custody while
Sarah was in a coma, ordered ex parte that the domicile of Sarah not be removed from Michigan
but subsequently set aside this order as “void ab initio.” Although plaintiff argues that the trial
court ignored these orders, it is evident that the trial court considered the transcripts of the
probate proceeding, because, as the only substantial testimony submitted in the case, the trial
court had to rely on the probate court testimony for its factual findings. Regardless of the prior
proceedings in other courts, this appeal involves review only of the trial court’s independent
determination of Sarah’s domicile for the purpose of no-fault act priorities.
We reverse. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219, neither party having prevailed in
full.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
4
Plaintiff concedes the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel do not apply. See Monat v
State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 682-685; 677 NW2d 843 (2004) (collateral estoppel), and
Sewell v Clean Cut Management, Inc, 463 Mich 569, 575; 621 NW2d 222 (2001) (res judicata).
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