PEOPLE OF MI V DALE EDWARD CUTLER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 16, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 296078
Montcalm Circuit Court
LC No. 296078
DALE EDWARD CUTLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and FITZGERALD and BORRELLO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily
harm, MCL 750.84, and sentenced as a habitual offender-fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to serve a
term of 11 to 25 years’ imprisonment, with credit for 61 days served. The trial court also ordered
defendant to pay $6,256 in restitution, $785 of which was for lost wages, “with additional
reserved.” Defendant appeals as of right. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm
defendant’s conviction and sentence. However, we vacate the portion of the judgment of
sentence requiring defendant to pay restitution of $785 and remand for further proceedings
limited to the calculation of post-tax wages.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from the beating of Ryan Young. In the early morning hours of June 11,
2009, Young was celebrating his birthday with friends at a local bar. Defendant was also at the
bar. Young did not know defendant, but defendant joined Young and his friends at their table
and defendant and Young talked and became acquainted. At about 3:30 a.m., Young and
defendant were dropped off at Young’s apartment. Young testified that he went into his
bedroom to change and asked defendant: “did you want to do anything or did you just want to
go to bed,” to which defendant responded: “yeah, I’m going to do something you fucking
faggot.” Young testified that defendant choked him “so bad” that he “could not get away from
him” and Young thought he was going to die because defendant “wouldn’t get off me and just
stop punching me.” Young believed that he was fighting for his life. Young remembered
defendant cutting off his oxygen until he passed out and that, when he came to, defendant was
“just still bashing my face in” until he went unconscious again. Young believed defendant hit
him “a good 30 times.” According to Young, he never tried to touch defendant and neither of
them ever fell asleep—except when Young went unconscious from the assault. Young testified
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that there was no discussion about flipping the television on or anything and that he believed this
was because defendant had the assault already planned.
Defendant’s description of the events both prior to and during the assault was somewhat
different. Defendant testified that after entering Young’s apartment, defendant asked if there
was any beer because he assumed they were going to drink, but Young told him he didn’t think
he had any; defendant looked in the refrigerator and found none. Defendant then stated that he
might as well crash and Young told him he could have the bedroom to sleep in because he had a
friend who was supposed to come over in the morning and he didn’t want her to find a strange
guy sleeping on the sofa. Defendant testified that he was tired and crashed on the bed still
wearing his shoes. The next thing defendant remembered was waking up “to a very bad smell in
my face, really bad alcohol. And there was wetness on my ear and my pants were unzipped and
there was pressure on my genital area.” Defendant described himself as “in shock.” Young was
on his side next to defendant with “his mouth on my neck” and “his hand in my pants” and
defendant shoved/pushed him over. Young then put his leg over top of defendant, at which time
defendant tried to push him away with his hands. Young stopped touching defendant’s genitals
and punched defendant in the head. According to defendant:
there was a struggle. I think it was my momentum that threw him off the bed but
we ended up rolling off the bed and I ended up on top. . . . I think the hold broke
when we fell to the ground. . . . Then I was on top then and I punched him . . .
Probably about four or five [times] . . . . Then I got up and left.
Defendant never said anything like “get off of me,” and there were no words or
conversation during the struggle described by defendant. He admitted that he struck Young and
that Young was badly injured, but defendant explained that he was a “pretty good size guy,” an
unofficial bouncer at the bar, and had trained for cage fights so that he “d[id] strike pretty hard.”
Defendant explained that the hitting was “an explosive burst” and that Young was on the ground
and unconscious when he left. Asked his purpose in striking Young, defendant stated, “I was
trying to get him. I wanted to get away but I wanted to make sure he couldn’t do anything to me
when I left.” After leaving, defendant walked “many miles home.” Defendant admitted that he
never shared his story that Young assaulted him with the police or anyone else before that day in
court and never filed a police report regarding the incident.
Young was taken to the hospital that morning by a neighbor. While at the hospital,
Young was interviewed several times, initially informing police he thought his attacker was a
neighbor against whom he had obtained a personal protection order. The officer who
interviewed Young testified that he “was in and out” of consciousness and spent many days in
the hospital, and Young testified that he did not recall what he initially told the officer.
Eventually, based on Young’s account and those of his friends, the police began to believe that
defendant was involved in the assault. When police officers went to pick-up defendant from the
Kent County Correctional Facility, defendant asked the transporting officer what charge was
being brought. The transporting officer informed defendant that the charge was great bodily
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harm less than murder. Defendant responded, “how can I be charged with that? I didn’t even
use a weapon this time.”1
Following the conclusion of testimony, but prior to closing arguments, defendant
requested CJI2d 7.20 and 7.22 for self-defense. The trial court responded:
Looking at my trial manual, the test for self-defense is whether a
defendant honestly and reasonably believed that he was in danger of imminent
death or serious bodily harm and used an the amount of force it appeared
immediately necessary to protect against that danger. . . . In this particular case I
did try to take notes as Mr. Cutler testified. The testimony from the defendant
was that he woke to being sexually molested by Mr. Young and that Mr. Young
then punched him in the head. The defendant then pushed him back, they rolled
off onto the floor, defendant then was on top and then in an explosive burst he
punched him four to five times. Mr. Young did not move after that. In
conjunction with Mr. Cutler’s testimony so far as training for cage fights, being
a[n] unofficial bouncer at the bar, and then his testimony in essence as to why he
did this that he wanted to get away and make sure that Mr. Young did not follow
him. I’m not seeing a basis then for self-defense.
It really is somewhat clear from his testimony later on that he did this
because he was sexually molested by someone else and just as he never thought
about reporting it, he was surprised that Mr. Young would report it. In essence
that he got what he deserved and I’m not seeing anything that indicates that Mr.
Cutler was in any way in any fear of being assaulted or any type of harm that
would justify what he did. The request is noted but it is denied.
It took the jury only 23 minutes to convict defendant.
II. SELF-DEFENSE INSTRUCTION
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to
instruct the jury on self-defense. As this Court explained in People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58,
82; 732 NW2d 546 (2007):
Claims of instructional error are generally reviewed de novo by this Court, but the
trial court’s determination that a jury instruction is applicable to the facts of the
case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A defendant in a criminal trial is
entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence against him or
1
Testimony revealed that the transporting officer had not asked defendant any questions prior to
the statement and there was no conversation afterwards.
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her. The trial court’s role is to clearly present the case to the jury and to instruct it
on the applicable law. Jury instructions must include all the elements of the
offenses charged against the defendant and any material issues, defenses, and
theories that are supported by the evidence. Jury instructions are reviewed in their
entirety, and there is no error requiring reversal if the instruction sufficiently
protected the rights of the defendant and fairly presented the triable issues to the
jury. [Citations omitted.]
A successful self-defense claim requires a defendant to have had an honest and
reasonable belief that he was in danger and used only that amount of force necessary to defend
himself. See People v George, 213 Mich App 632, 634-635; 540 NW2d 487 (1995); People v
Kemp, 202 Mich App 318, 322; 508 NW2d 184 (1993). Generally, a defendant cannot claim
self-defense where he used excessive force, or was the initial aggressor. Kemp, 202 Mich App at
322-323.
We find this is a close question. However, having reviewed the record, and the trial
court’s reasoning for denying the instruction, because the testimony in the record supports the
trial court’s characterization of the evidence, and the question whether an instruction is
applicable to the facts of the case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Dobek, 274 Mich App at
82, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny the instruction.
The victim was about 5’6”, with a thin build at only 130-140 pounds. Defendant was “a
pretty good size guy,” trained in cage fighting, and was an unofficial bouncer at the bar where he
met the victim. According to defendant, the victim initiated the altercation, first by sexually
assaulting him and then by punching him once in the head. Defendant testified that, in response,
he threw the victim off the bed and “ended up on top” and that, in the process, the victim no
longer had hold of him as “the hold got broke when we fell to the ground.” Defendant further
testified, “Then I was on top then and I punched him” four or five times; “I was trying to get
him. I wanted to get away but I wanted to make sure he couldn’t do anything to me when I left”
(emphasis added). After these four or five punches, “[the victim] didn’t move.” Defendant
admitted he caused the severe injuries sustained by the victim and there was no indication that
defendant was injured. He further admitted that, based on his cage fight training, “I do strike
very hard.”
Under the circumstances, even accepting defendant’s testimony that the victim sexually
assaulted him and punched him once in the head, defendant cannot assert self-defense because he
used excessive force to repel the attack he claims was mounted by the victim. Indeed, defendant
did not try to merely subdue the victim, but punched the victim in the face hard enough to knock
out teeth until the victim was unconscious. Given defendant’s fight training and the size
difference between him and the victim, this far exceeded the force necessary for defendant to
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defend himself. Kemp, 202 Mich App at 322. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s request for self-defense instruction because the evidence did not support it.2
III. MRE 404(b)
Defendant next alleges that the failure to redact his statement to police officers
constituted a violation of MRE 404(b) because it resulted in the admission of prior bad act
evidence.
Defendant made the statement, which we quoted supra, while riding in a police car.
Defendant concedes that the statement “I didn’t even use a weapon” is admissible as an implied
admission, but argues that the words “this time” were required to be redacted and that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to their inclusion.
In People v Rushlow, 179 Mich App 172, 176; 445 NW2d 222 (1989), this Court held
that “a prior statement does not constitute a prior bad act coming under MRE 404(b) because it is
just that, a prior statement and not a prior bad act.” Id., citing People v Goddard, 429 Mich 505,
518; 418 NW2d 881 (1988). Defendant contends that these cases are distinguishable because the
words “this time” were not a threat, as were the prior statements found admissible in Rushlow
and Goddard. Although defendant is correct that the statements at issue in those two cases were
threats, this Court has never limited Rushlow’s application only to prior statements that were
threats. Rather, multiple panels of this Court have used Rushlow to conclude that the admission
of non-threat statements that evidence prior bad acts were admissible. See, e.g., People v
Treadway, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 8, 2009
(Docket No. 286573) (admitting statements that the defendant “was not afraid to fight the
employees, and that he would ‘kill all you motherfuckers’ because he was just released from
prison after 14 years and was not afraid to return there”); People v Postell, unpublished opinion
per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 29, 2004 (Docket No. 245728) (holding in a
case involving an armed robbery charge that statements the defendant made to his girlfriend
“regarding how to mail marijuana to jail would not be inadmissible bad acts evidence”); People v
Payne, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 22, 2004
(Docket No. 243032) (holding in a case involving first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge
that the defendant’s statement that “he traded the complainant in for a ‘newer model—when he
met [another child]’ and that defendant responded by telling her that ‘[the other child] stole his
heart the same way [the complainant] did’ was not inadmissible bad acts evidence); People v
Verbruggen, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 11, 2002
(Docket No. 231970) (in a first-degree criminal sexual conduct case, holding that the admission
of the defendant’s statement, “Why don’t you shave. If you did shave, you’d look like a tenyear-old and I’ve fucked ten-year-olds before” did not constitute a prior bad act under MRE
404(b)).
2
Because we find no error, we need not address defendant’s argument regarding the proper
standard under which to evaluate whether an instructional error requires remand.
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Furthermore, as these cases make clear, not only does the statement not need to be a
threat to be admissible, but the statement is admissible even when it references an act almost
identical to the charge. Payne, slip op at 3; Verbruggen, slip op at 2. Accordingly, there was no
error in admitting defendant’s entire statement, including the words “this time.” Our conclusion
that there was no error in the admission of the statement also requires the conclusion that there is
no ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object or redact the statement, as counsel is not
required to make a meritless objection. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d
502 (2000).
IV. RESTITUTION
Defendant’s final claim on appeal is that the trial court improperly required defendant to
pay restitution for the victim’s pre-tax lost wages because MCL 780.766(4)(c) requires the order
of restitution for income to be calculated on an after-tax basis. The prosecution concedes that the
trial court committed plain error in this regard. Accordingly, remand is necessary for the trial
court to properly calculate the after-tax amount of lost wages that defendant must reimburse the
victim.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence, but vacate the restitution portion of the
judgment of sentence as it relates to the victim’s lost wages and remand the case only for
reconsideration of that issue. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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