PEOPLE OF MI V MARTEZ CEDRICK WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 16, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 294561
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2009-225795-FC
MARTEZ CEDRICK WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and DONOFRIO and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529,
conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a, assault with intent to commit murder,
MCL 750.83, third-degree fleeing or eluding a police officer, MCL 750.479a(3), receiving or
concealing a stolen motor vehicle, MCL 750.535(7), possession of marijuana, MCL
333.7403(2)(d), and driving with a suspended license, MCL 257.904(1). He was sentenced to
concurrent prison terms of 15 months to 40 years each for the conspiracy, armed robbery, and
assault convictions, and two to five years each for the receiving a stolen vehicle and fleeing or
eluding convictions. He also received concurrent jail terms of 90 days each for the possession of
marijuana and driving with a suspended license convictions. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from his participation in the armed robbery and assault of
the victim in a hotel parking lot. The prosecutor’s theory was that defendant conspired to
commit armed robbery, and aided and abetted his friends, codefendants Deangelo Anthony and
Gary Tolbert, in committing the robbery and assault crimes primarily by driving the stolen
minivan used during the criminal episode. In a statement to the police, defendant admitted
knowing that his associates wanted to commit a “carjacking robbery,” and that they were armed
with weapons when they exited the minivan. Defendant’s theory at trial was that defendant was
merely present, had no knowledge of an intended robbery, carjacking, or assault, and remained at
the scene only because he did not want to leave his friends. On appeal, defendant argues that
there was insufficient evidence to support his armed robbery and assault convictions under an
aiding and abetting theory, and insufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction
because he did not specifically agree to commit an armed robbery. We disagree.
Whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a conviction, this Court
must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a
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rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441
Mich 1201 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence
can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v Truong (After Remand),
218 Mich App 325, 337; 553 NW2d 692 (1996). “[A] reviewing court is required to draw all
reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury’s verdict.” People v
Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
The elements of armed robbery are (1) an assault, and (2) a felonious taking of property
from the victim’s presence or person, (3) while the defendant is armed with a dangerous weapon
or with an article used or fashioned in such a way as to lead a reasonable person to believe that it
is a dangerous weapon. People v Ford, 262 Mich App 443, 458; 687 NW2d 119 (2004); MCL
750.529. To sustain a conviction for assault with intent to commit murder, the prosecution must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed “(1) an assault, (2) with an
actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Hoffman,
225 Mich App 103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997); see also MCL 750.83.
A person who aids or abets the commission of a crime may be convicted and punished as
if he directly committed the offense. MCL 767.39. “To support a finding that a defendant aided
and abetted a crime, the prosecution must show that (1) the crime charged was committed by the
defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that
assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant [either] intended the commission of
the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time he gave aid
and encouragement[,]” People v Izarraras-Placante, 246 Mich App 490, 496-497; 633 NW2d 18
(2001), “or, alternatively, that the charged offense was a natural and probable consequence of the
commission of the intended offense,” People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 15; 715 NW2d 44 (2006).
“Aiding and abetting” describes all forms of assistance rendered to the perpetrator of a crime and
comprehends all words or deeds that might support, encourage, or incite the commission of a
crime. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Rockwell, 188
Mich App 405, 411-412; 470 NW2d 673 (1991). “The quantum of aid or advice is immaterial as
long as it had the effect of inducing the crime.” People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 352; 492
NW2d 810 (1992). An aider or abettor’s state of mind may be inferred from all the facts and
circumstances, including a close association between the defendant and the principal, and the
defendant’s participation in the planning or execution of the crime. Carines, 460 Mich at 757.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to show,
first, that codefendants Anthony and Tolbert committed the crime of armed robbery by attacking
the victim with handguns as they took money from her pockets. Further, there was sufficient
evidence that Tolbert assaulted the victim, intending to commit murder, by shooting her in the
abdomen with a semiautomatic firearm. Second, there was sufficient evidence that defendant
assisted Anthony and Tolbert in the commission of the crimes by (1) parking the stolen minivan
in a manner that blocked the victim’s minivan and staying in that position as his associates
fought the victim, hit her in the head with guns, went through her pockets, and stole her money,
(2) acting as a lookout for the co-defendant, (3) warning his co-defendants that the victim had
garnered Anthony’s gun, (4) urging his associates to “hurry up, hurry up,” and (5) by being the
proverbial “get away” driver.
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Third, the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant knew and intended for Anthony
and Tolbert to commit a robbery, and the evidence that defendant admitted that he knew his
codefendants were armed with guns when they exited the stolen minivan to rob someone, and
that he did nothing as the victim was beaten and shot, indicates that defendant was aware that the
firearms might be used to carry out the robbery, and thus an assault with intent to commit murder
was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the intended offense. Further, the
evidence that defendant drove to the hotel with the armed codefendants in the stolen van,
discussed committing a crime, searched the parking lot after 2:00 a.m., acted in concert with the
codefendants when he parked the stolen van behind the victim’s van as the codefendants
confronted and attacked the victim, left only after his codefendants were safely back inside the
van after robbing and shooting the victim, and thereafter led the police on a high-speed chase,
considered together, was sufficient to support a finding that defendant knew and intended for the
codefendants to commit the charged crimes or that the charged crimes were a natural and
probable consequence of the intended offense. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to
support defendant’s convictions of assault with intent to commit murder and armed robbery
under an aiding and abetting theory.
Further, this evidence established a basis for the jury to infer that defendant conspired
with the codefendants to commit armed robbery. Conspiracy is a specific intent crime, requiring
the intent to combine with others and the intent to accomplish an illegal objective. MCL
750.157a; People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 629; 628 NW2d 540 (2001). To prove the intent to
combine with others, it must be shown that the intent, including knowledge, was possessed by
more than one person. People v Blume, 443 Mich 476, 482, 485; 505 NW2d 843 (1993). For
intent to exist, the defendant must know of the conspiracy, know of the objective of the
conspiracy, and intend to participate cooperatively to further that objective. Id.
Defendant’s and the codefendants’ interactions and concordant behavior were evidence
of their concert of action, which created an inference of conspiracy. Contrary to what defendant
argues, direct proof of a conspiracy is not essential. Rather, a conspiracy may be proven by
circumstantial evidence or by reasonable inference, and no formal agreement is required. People
v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 347; 562 NW2d 652 (1997); People v Cotton, 191 Mich
App 377, 393; 478 NW2d 681 (1991).
Although defendant suggests alternative ways of viewing the evidence, the trier of fact
must evaluate the evidence and, for purposes of resolving defendant’s sufficiency challenge, we
are required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen Fort Hood
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
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