PEOPLE OF MI V JASON MATTHEW KLEES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 14, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 297310
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2009-226901-FH
JASON MATTHEW KLEES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and DONOFRIO and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial convictions of possession with intent to
deliver 50 to 449 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), and operating a vehicle with a
suspended license, second or subsequent offense, MCL 257.904(3). Defendant was sentenced to
7 to 30 years’ imprisonment for the possession with intent to deliver cocaine conviction and four
days, time served, for the operating a vehicle with a suspended license conviction. Defendant
challenges the constitutionality of two separate searches of his vehicle. The first was a consent
search at the scene of a traffic stop, and it revealed nothing illegal. The second, which revealed a
sizeable amount of cocaine, occurred after defendant was in custody and the vehicle impounded.
We affirm.
I. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Three police officers received a dispatch regarding a complaint of loud music and
suspected narcotics activity involving a gray car and a white SUV at a mobile home park. At the
scene, one officer observed a white minivan arguably matching the description given by the
complainants, and he did not notice any other white vehicles in the vicinity. He observed the
vehicle traveling very slowly with its headlights off. The vehicle stopped in front of a mobile
home. An individual approached the vehicle and leaned in but quickly returned to his residence
when the officer neared. The officer considered this activity evidence that a drug transaction had
taken place and followed the vehicle when it pulled away. A second officer was following close
behind. The second officer noted that the vehicle was traveling without running taillights but
could not see whether the vehicle’s headlights were working.
The first officer then initiated a traffic stop and both officers approached the vehicle.
When asked why he was in the mobile home park, defendant responded that he was loaning
money to someone he met in a bar. When asked for more details, however, defendant did not
-1-
know who the person was and kept changing his story. Defendant had a Michigan Identification
Card but did not produce a driver’s license or vehicle information. When asked, defendant
consented to a search of his vehicle. A search of defendant’s person revealed a $50 bill in his
front pocket, and more money and a tally sheet in his wallet. The tally sheet had names on one
side and numbers on the other. Defendant was placed in the back of the squad car, and the two
officers searched the vehicle together. The officers performed an extensive search of the vehicle,
yet did not discover any drugs. The officers placed defendant under arrest for driving on a
suspended license, second offense, which is a one-year misdemeanor, and transported him to the
police station. Defendant’s vehicle was impounded.
While in custody, defendant expressed extreme concern about his vehicle, asking where it
was going to be kept, where it was going to be parked, and when he could get it out. The officer
conducting the interview had never had anyone ask so many questions about a vehicle. At some
point, a canine officer and drug dog were summoned to the impound lot to search the vehicle a
second time. The dog alerted during an exterior sweep of the vehicle, indicating that a narcotic
odor was present. When let inside the vehicle, the drug dog alerted to a pair of tennis shoes. The
canine officer discovered bags of suspected narcotics beneath the shoes’ lining. At no point did
the officers obtain a search warrant. A report noting “taillights or headlights off” as the reason
for the traffic stop was prepared after the drugs were seized.
Defendant admitted to selling drugs at the mobile home park and driving on a suspended
license. Nonetheless, he moved to suppress all of the seized evidence, arguing that the officers
did not have reasonable suspicion to support the initial traffic stop and that no exception to the
warrant requirement applied to the second warrantless search of the vehicle at the impound lot.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion and found defendant guilty of both charged offenses.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the trial court’s factual findings underlying its ruling on a motion to
suppress evidence for clear error. People v Attebury, 463 Mich 662, 668; 624 NW2d 912 (2001).
A factual finding is clearly erroneous where, although there is evidence to support it, a review of
the record leaves this Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 397; 648 NW2d 648 (2002). The trial court’s application
of the law to the facts, and its ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, are reviewed de
novo. People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005).
III. REASONABLE SUSPICION TO EFFECTUATE THE TRAFFIC STOP
“[T]o effectuate a valid traffic stop, a police officer must have an articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or one of its occupants is subject to seizure for a violation of
the law.” People v Williams, 236 Mich App 610, 612; 601 NW2d 138 (1999). Reasonable
suspicion exists if an officer observes a traffic violation or civil infraction or has probable cause
to believe a traffic violation has occurred. People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 363; 649 NW2d
94 (2002); Williams, 236 Mich App at 612. Defendant does not dispute that driving on a
highway at night with his headlights off is a civil infraction, see MCL 257.684(a) and MCL
257.683(6), but argues that there was insufficient evidence that his headlights actually were off.
We disagree.
-2-
In this case, there was simply a conflict of testimony: defendant testified that his
headlights were on, one officer could not observe defendant’s headlights, and another officer
testified that defendant’s headlights were off. Witness credibility determinations are to be
decided initially by the trial court, and we give great deference to the trial court’s resolution.
People v Geno, 261 Mich App 624, 629; 683 NW2d 687 (2004). Deference is appropriate given
the special opportunity of the trial court to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and judge their
trustworthiness. MCR 2.613(C). The trial court found all of the testimony somewhat suspect,
given that defendant admitted that he lied to the police officers and the squad cars suspiciously
lacked video recordings. The trial court concluded that, in part on the demeanor of the
witnesses, the headlights had been off. We are not in a position to find clear error in the trial
court’s determination.1
IV. CONSENT TO THE SECOND WARRANTLESS SEARCH
Defendant next argues that the trial court properly held that defendant’s initial consent to
search his vehicle at the scene of the traffic stop did not extend to the second warrantless search
of the vehicle at the impound lot. The prosecution does not contest this holding on appeal, and it
does not change the outcome in this matter, but we briefly note that we agree.
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, and evidence obtained from a warrantless
search cannot be admitted in the face of a motion to suppress unless a specific exception to the
warrant requirement applies. People v Beydoun, 283 Mich App 314, 323; 770 NW2d 54 (2009);
People v Martinez, 192 Mich App 57, 61-62; 480 NW2d 302 (1991). A defendant’s voluntary
consent to search provides one such exception. People v Dagwan, 269 Mich App 338; 342; 711
NW2d 386 (2005). But the scope and duration of consent may be restricted to what an objective,
reasonable person would have understood the consenting party to have granted. People v
Frohriep, 247 Mich App 692, 703; 637 NW2d 562 (2001). “When consent is given to search an
area, it does not mean the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
has been waived forever.” People v Chism, 32 Mich App 610, 630-632; 189 NW2d 435 (1971),
aff’d 390 Mich 104 (1973).
In Chism, the defendant consented to a search of his home, and on a subsequent day, the
officers returned to the home, entered it, and took a notebook and checkbook that they had seen
during the previous search. Chism, 32 Mich App at 630-632. This Court distinguished the
defendant’s consent in Chism from the consent given in People v Nawrocki, 6 Mich App 46, 5657; 150 NW2d 516 (1967), where a second search of the defendant’s automobile in the
afternoon, after it had been searched in the morning, was found permissible based on the fact that
defendant told police that they could search his car “at any time.” Chism, 32 Mich App at 631.
Defendant’s consent here did not give the officers broad authority to search at any time; we find
that an objective, reasonable person would have believed that defendant’s consent in this case
extended only to a search “right then and there.” The search was unambiguously terminated, and
1
It is clear from the record, and from the officers’ own admissions, that the officers also stopped
defendant for suspected drug activity. This is irrelevant, because one valid ground to effectuate a
traffic stop is sufficient.
-3-
thereafter no subsequent search could be pursuant to defendant’s initial consent. The trial court
properly held that the subsequent search was without defendant’s consent.
V. APPLICATION OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE SECOND
WARRANTLESS SEARCH
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in holding the second warrantless search
was constitutional under the automobile exception, for two reasons. We disagree.
Under the automobile exception, police officers never need a warrant to search a car if
they have probable cause to believe contraband is inside, irrespective of whether the police
would have the time and opportunity to obtain a warrant. United States v Ross, 456 US 798; 102
S Ct 2157; 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982); People v Clark, 220 Mich App 240, 242; 559 NW2d 78
(1996). To have probable cause, there must be a fair probability that the search of a particular
place will uncover contraband or evidence of a crime. People v Garvin, 235 Mich App 90, 102;
597 NW2d 194 (1999). “The basis for this rule is the lessened expectation of privacy in an
automobile.” Clark, 220 Mich App at 242. Whether probable cause exists in a given case is
determined “in a commonsense manner in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Garvin, 235
Mich App at 102.
A drug dog sniff of a legally detained car is not a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment because the dog only alerts to an illegal drug, and, therefore, no legitimate
privacy interest is compromised. Illinois v Caballes, 543 US 405, 409; 125 S Ct 834; 160 L Ed
2d 842 (2005). While a person might have a personal expectation of privacy in one’s vehicle in
a general sense, society is not prepared to consider reasonable a specific expectation that
illegality will not come to the attention of law enforcement. Id, 408-410. The United States
Supreme Court emphasized, however, that a canine sniff is not a “search” only if the dog is welltrained, because the only thing detected thereby is the presence or absence of contraband. Id.
Therefore, no legally recognized reasonable privacy interest is compromised: anything else a
person might have in his or her car that he or she would prefer to remain private will remain
undetected. Id. The record clearly indicates that the dog in this case was properly trained and
certified.
Unlike the drug dog in Caballes, supra, the dog sniff in this case did not take place at the
scene of the traffic stop; it took place at a private impound lot. We find no relevance to this. If a
drug dog sniff is not a search, then neither a warrant nor probable cause was required.
The existence of probable cause, however, even in dog-alert cases, depends on the facts
known to the officers at the time and the totality of the circumstances. Garvin, 234 Mich App at
101-102. The Sixth Circuit has held that a “positive indication by a properly trained dog is
sufficient to establish probable cause for the presence of a controlled substance.” US v Diaz, 25
F 3d 392, 393-394 (CA 6, 1994). Even if a drug dog alert is insufficient per se, additional
evidence here included defendant’s suspiciously high level of concern about his vehicle, the
apparent drug transaction just before the traffic stop, the report of drug activity involving a
vehicle matching the description of defendant’s vehicle, and the cash and tally sheet. Indeed,
after the initial search, and despite its thoroughness, one of the officers continued to believe that
the vehicle contained narcotics.
-4-
Under the totality of these circumstances, we believe that the officers had probable cause
to search defendant’s vehicle at the impound lot. Therefore, they were permitted to search it
without a warrant, even though it had been impounded and was immobilized in police custody.
People v Carter, 250 Mich App 510, 514-518; 655 NW2d 236 (2002); People v Wade, 157 Mich
App 481, 486; 403 NW2d 578 (1987); Michigan v Thomas, 458 US 259, 261-262; 102 S Ct
3079; 73 L Ed 2d 750 (1982). The trial court did not err in finding the warrantless search
constitutional under the automobile exception.
VI. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not clearly err when it found that defendant was driving with his
headlights off, so it properly found that officers had reasonable suspicion to effectuate the traffic
stop. The trial court properly held that the second warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle was
constitutional under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, given
the constitutionality of the traffic stop and subsequent search of defendant’s vehicle, the trial
court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence later recovered.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen Fort Hood
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.