PEOPLE OF MI V PAUL BRIAN VANBIBBER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 14, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 297186
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-206991-FH
PAUL BRIAN VANBIBBER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and DONOFRIO and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of operating while intoxicated (OWI),
third offense, MCL 257.625, and driving with a suspended license (DWSL), second or
subsequent offense, MCL 257.904(3). He was sentenced to 120 days in jail and 18 months of
probation for both offenses. We reverse defendant’s conviction for OWI and remand for a new
trial, but affirm defendant’s conviction for DWSL.
Defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed in light of People v Feezel, 486
Mich 184; 783 NW2d 67 (2010). The prosecutor concedes that the OWI conviction must be
reversed in light of Feezel, but contends that Feezel was wrongly decided and should be reversed
by the Supreme Court. Our role as an intermediate appellate court is limited, and we cannot
disregard clear Supreme Court precedent. Tait v Ross, 37 Mich App 205, 207; 194 NW2d 554
(1971). Accordingly, the prosecutor must direct her argument to the Supreme Court.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because Officer Switala presented conflicting evidence regarding lane straddling. We disagree.
The trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error, but the trial
court’s ultimate decision is reviewed de novo. People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 313; 696
NW2d 636 (2005). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
People v Lanzo Constr Co, 272 Mich App 470, 473; 726 NW2d 746 (2006).
“In order to effectuate a valid traffic stop, a police officer must have an articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or one of its occupants is subject to seizure for a violation of
law.” People v Williams, 236 Mich App 610, 612; 601 NW2d 138 (1999). A traffic stop is
permissible when an officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred or
was occurring. People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 363-364; 649 NW2d 94 (2002). Therefore,
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upon “reasonable grounds shown, a police officer may stop and inspect a motor vehicle for a
equipment violation.” Williams, 236 Mich App at 612. Additionally, “[a] police officer who
witnesses a civil infraction may stop and temporarily detain the offender for the purpose of
issuing a written citation.” People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 366; 770 NW2d 68 (2009). An
actual violation of the vehicle code need not be proven. Rather, the officer’s reasonable
impression that a violation may have occurred is the dispositive question. People v Fisher, 463
Mich 881, 882; 617 NW2d 37 (2000) (Corrigan, J.) A traffic violation or civil infraction
provides sufficient cause to justify the stop of a vehicle. People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411,
420 n 8; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). As a reviewing court, we may not substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court, but must respect the trial court’s factual findings and issues involving
credibility. People v Rodney Williams, 470 Mich 634, 641; 683 NW2d 597 (2004).
In the present case, there was an evidentiary hearing regarding the motion to suppress.
Officer Switala testified that the videotape was not clear and that her visual observations were
more accurate than the videotape. Indeed, defense counsel acknowledged on multiple occasions
during the evidentiary hearing that the videotape clarity was poor. At the conclusion of the
evidentiary hearing, the trial court expressly found that the officer’s testimony regarding lane
straddling was credible, and there was a valid reason to stop defendant for the civil infraction.
We defer to the trial court’s factual findings and the assessment of credibility. Rodney Williams,
470 Mich at 641. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to
suppress.1
Defendant’s conviction for DWSL is affirmed. We reverse defendant’s conviction for
OWI and remand for a new trial in light of the blood alcohol evidence. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
1
The statement of the issue as raised by the defense challenges the trial court’s decision
regarding the motion to suppress. However, in the discussion section of defendant’s brief, it
takes issues with testimony by Officer Switala at trial. The ruling on the motion to suppress
occurred following an evidentiary hearing and was issued before trial. Furthermore, the
credibility of the officer’s testimony, and any inconsistencies in light of the four-year period
during which defendant absconded, presents an issue for the trier of fact.
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