PEOPLE OF MI V JACKSON TAYLOR JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 14, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 296758
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 09-032231-FH
JACKSON TAYLOR, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with a dangerous
weapon, 750.82, five counts of possession of a firearm while committing a felony (felonyfirearm), MCL 750.227b, two counts of assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83, one count of
felon in possession, MCL 750.224f, one count of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL
750.227, and one count of carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, MCL 750.226.
Defendant was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to serve a prison sentence
of 2 years for the felony firearm convictions, which were to be served concurrently to each other
but consecutive to and preceding the remaining sentences of 2 to 5 years on the CCW conviction
and 70 to 111 years on the remaining counts, which were to be served concurrently to each other.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arose as a result of two incidents that occurred during the
evening hours of Friday, September 26, 2008, and into the early morning hours of Saturday,
September 27, 2008. Defendant, along with several other people, had gathered for a party. At
some point, defendant’s niece was involved in a physical altercation with another woman at the
party, Charricka Moten, who bit defendant’s niece’s finger. Defendant observed the dispute and
later threatened Charricka Moten and her mother, Tara Moten, while holding a handgun and
pointing it in their direction.
Tara Moten reported the incident to her cousin, Ernest Moten, who then traveled to her
home along with another cousin, Dion Kelley, to check on his relatives. Almost immediately
after Ernest arrived, defendant was heard yelling at Ernest, who attempted to placate him.
Shortly thereafter, several gunshots were discharged toward Ernest and Dion, who were standing
outside in front of the Moten home. Ernest was hit in the leg by one bullet, resulting in severe
and near fatal injuries. Charricka, who was inside the home at the time, was also injured by a
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bullet that grazed the left side of her abdomen. Defendant’s vehicle was observed speeding away
a few minutes after the shooting.
On appeal, defendant first argues he was denied a fair trial as a result of two instances of
prosecutorial misconduct.
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are generally reviewed de novo to determine whether
defendant was denied a fair trial. People v Wilson, 265 Mich App 386, 393; 695 NW2d 351
(2005); People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 448; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). However, because
defendant failed to properly preserve these claims of prosecutorial misconduct, he must
demonstrate plain error that affected his substantial rights. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450,
454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).
The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Prosecutorial
misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the reviewing court must examine the
record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context. Thomas, 260 Mich App at 454.
“Generally, prosecutors are accorded great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct.”
People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995) (internal quotation omitted).
Nevertheless, a prosecutor may not engage in conduct or make an argument that rises to the level
of denying defendant a fair and impartial trial. Dobek, 274 Mich App at 63.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by inviting the jury to
convict defendant using the prior inconsistent statement of his fourteen-year-old niece
concerning her observations of defendant during the altercation as substantive evidence. We
disagree.
Defendant is correct that impeachment testimony generally cannot be used as substantive
evidence of a defendant’s guilt. See People v Jenkins, 450 Mich 249, 260-261; 537 NW2d 828
(1995). However, defendant has mischaracterized the nature of the prosecutor’s statements, as
well as their content. First, the summary of the witness’ testimony did not include an improper
reference to a prior inconsistent statement because none of her testimony at trial conflicted with
her prior statements. Rather, the witness testified that she was unable to remember the events of
the evening of the shooting and the prosecutor used her prior testimony from the preliminary
exam to refresh her recollection. After reviewing the statements that had been made at the prior
hearing, the witness repeatedly agreed that the prior testimony was accurate.
We also note that the remarks defendant complains of on appeal constituted a response to
defense counsel’s closing argument. A prosecutor may respond to defense counsel’s closing
argument, and his remarks will be considered in light of those of defense counsel. People v
Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 592-593; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). As noted by the Watson Court,
“[i]t was not improper for the prosecutor to respond by emphasizing the truth of the big picture,
despite defense counsel’s attempts to find discrepancies between the testimony of various
witnesses.” Id. at 593. Because the prosecutor’s remarks were a proper response to those made
by defense counsel during closing argument, defendant’s alternative claim that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the challenged statements
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must fail. See People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000) (counsel is not
required to advocate a meritless position).
Defendant next argues he was denied a fair trial when the prosecution introduced the
testimony of his parole officer. We disagree.
Defendant’s status as a convicted felon was relevant to the charge of felon in possession,
MCL 750.224f. When a defendant fails to stipulate to the fact that he has a prior felony
conviction, he is precluded from later arguing that the admission of evidence beyond the mere
fact of his conviction constituted error. People v Mayfield, 221 Mich App 656, 661; 562 NW2d
272 (1997). Here, there was no stipulation regarding defendant’s status as a convicted felon.
Thus, defendant’s argument that the parole officer’s testimony should have been limited to the
fact that he had a prior felony conviction without providing further detail as to the nature of the
prior conviction is not permitted. Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed that it could
only use the evidence of defendant’s status as a convicted felon in its consideration of the charge
of felon in possession and was admonished that such evidence could not be used to find that
defendant was a bad person likely to commit crimes. “Jurors are presumed to follow their
instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most errors.” People v Abraham, 256 Mich
App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003).
Defendant next argues he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on the ground
that trial counsel improperly vouched for credibility of the investigating detective during closing
argument when counsel discussed the detective’s treatment of defendant’s fourteen-year old
niece when he took her statement after the shooting. Review of unpreserved claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v
Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, defendant must show: (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different;
and (3) the resultant proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Rodgers,
248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001).
We find defendant’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel cannot
succeed. We first note that defendant mischaracterizes defense counsel’s statements concerning
the officer’s interview of the witness. Rather than insinuating that the eyewitness was a liar, trial
counsel made clear in his closing argument that, while he did not believe that defendant’s niece
was actually threatened by police officers, counsel did believe that she had that perception during
her interview.
In addition, defendant is not entitled to relief because he has failed to establish prejudice
as a result of any alleged error. In reaching this conclusion, we reject defendant’s assertion that
the only evidence connecting him to the shooting that injured Ernest Moten and Charricka Moten
was the prior inconsistent testimony of defendant’s niece. Circumstantial evidence and the
reasonable inferences it engenders are sufficient to support a conviction, provided the
prosecution meets its burden of proof. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78
(2000). Here, the testimony of Tara and Charricka Moten established that defendant was armed
with a firearm the evening of the shooting, with which he threatened both women after observing
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a prior altercation between Charricka and his niece. In addition, Tara Moten positively identified
defendant, based on her familiarity with his voice, as the man yelling at Ernest Moten when he
arrived in the neighborhood. Tara Moten further testified that the shots that were fired shortly
after defendant’s comments to Ernest came from the same location that she had heard
defendant’s voice. Tara Moten also testified that she saw a vehicle she recognized as
defendant’s speed away a few minutes after the shooting. A reasonable jury could infer from
this testimony that defendant was the shooter. Thus, even if defendant’s niece’s testimony was
to be completely discounted, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that
the prosecution had met its burden to establish that defendant was the shooter on the night in
question.
In light of the foregoing, defendant’s concurrent assertion that there was insufficient
evidence to support his convictions for two counts of assault with intent to murder and the
attendant felony-firearm convictions also fails. People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 457; 628
NW2d 105 (2001). The essential elements that must be established beyond a reasonable doubt to
sustain a conviction for assault with intent to commit murder are: “(1) an assault, (2) with an
actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Brown,
267 Mich App 141, 147-148; 703 NW2d 230 (2005) (quotations omitted). “Because of the
difficulty of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence [of intent to kill]
is sufficient.” People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999). “The
elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of,
or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864
(1999). In addition, identity is an essential element of any crime. People v Oliphant, 399 Mich
472, 489; 250 NW2d 443 (1976). Here, defendant challenges whether the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence to support his convictions. However, given the above evidence presented at
trial, we find that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the shooter.
Defendant has also filed a supplemental standard 4 brief alleging he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel attempted to introduce an alibi defense not
supported by the record. We find this argument to be without merit because there is nothing in
the record to support defendant’s assertion that his counsel advocated an alibi defense at any
point during the trial.
We decline to address defendant’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel because trial counsel failed to move for a directed verdict. Defendant’s discussion of the
issue consists mainly of conclusory statements with little or no citation to authority. “An
appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no
citation of supporting authority.” People v Kelley, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480
(1998). “An appellant’s failure to properly address the merits of his assertion of error constitutes
abandonment of the issue.” People v Harris, 261 Mich App 44, 50; 680 NW2d 17 (2004).
We further reject defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s scoring of the sentencing
guidelines. Michigan’s sentencing guidelines generally require a sentencing court to impose a
minimum sentence within the appropriate sentence range as determined by the OV and prior
record variable (PRV) points assigned to the defendant. MCL 769.34(2); People v McCuller,
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479 Mich 672, 684-685; 739 NW2d 563 (2007). “A sentencing court may consider all record
evidence before it when calculating the guidelines, including, but not limited to, the contents of a
presentence investigation report, admissions made by a defendant during a plea proceeding, or
testimony taken at a preliminary examination or trial.” People v Ratkov (After Remand), 201
Mich App 123, 125; 505 NW2d 886 (1993), remanded 447 Mich 984 (2004). Scoring decisions
for which there is any evidence in support will be upheld. People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App
462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002).
OV 1 pertains to aggravated use of a weapon and requires that 25 points be scored if a
firearm was discharged at or toward a person. MCL 777.31(1)(a). The evidence presented at
trial established that, not only was a firearm discharged at or toward a person, but that two
people were struck with bullets. This was sufficient evidence to uphold the scoring decision.
Defendant also states that OV 3 should have been scored at 10 points. However, our
review of the record demonstrates that OV 3 was appropriately scored at 25 points. OV 3 is
scored for the degree of physical injury to a victim and calls for the assessment of 25 points
when a life threatening injury occurred to the victim. MCL 777.33(1)(c). Here, Ernest Moten
testified that the bullet that hit his leg struck a main artery. Moten also testified that he had to be
rushed to surgery, subsequently lapsed into a coma lasting approximately two months, later
underwent more than ten additional surgeries, and suffered a blood infection as a result of the
shooting. Moten specifically stated that his life was in jeopardy because of this injury. In
addition, the lead investigator testified that it was initially believed that Moten would not survive
his injuries. Thus, there was ample support for the scoring decision.
Defendant argues that OV 13 was improperly scored at 25 points. We disagree. A court
must assess 25 points under OV 13 if the offense was part of a continuing pattern of felonious
criminal activity involving three or more crimes against a person. MCL 777.43(1)(b). In
determining the number of points to assess, all crimes within a five-year period, including the
sentencing offense, must be counted regardless of whether the offense resulted in a conviction.
People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 85; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). In this trial alone defendant was
convicted of more than three crimes against a person, including assault with intent to murder as
to Charricka Moten, assault with intent to murder as to Ernest Moten, felonious assault as to Tara
Moten, and felonious assault as to Charricka Moten, all from conduct occurring within a half
hour period. Thus, there was support for this scoring decision as well.
Because the offense variables were correctly scored, defendant’s claim that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to the scoring is without merit. Counsel is not required to
advocate a meritless position. Snider, 239 Mich App at 425.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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