EDWARDS PUBLICATIONS INC V TRACY KASDORF
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EDWARDS PUBLICATIONS, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
May 3, 2011
Plaintiff/Counter DefendantAppellee/Cross Appellant,
v
No. 293617
Tuscola Circuit Court
LC No. 06-023444-CK
TRACY KASDORF,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross
Appellee,
and
BILBEY PUBLICATIONS, LLC,
Defendant/Counter Plaintiff.
Before: TALBOT, P.J., and SAWYER and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff proceeded to trial on three counts: (1) breach of contract; (2) intentional
interference with business relationships; and (3) civil conspiracy. The jury found no cause of
action on the first two claims. However, the jury did find in plaintiff’s favor on the claim for
civil conspiracy and awarded $15,822.
Defendant Kasdorf1 moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, alternatively, a new trial. At the same time, plaintiff
moved for an amended judgment and attorney fees or, alternatively, a new trial. Both motions
were denied. Because we conclude that the jury’s verdict was irreconcilably inconsistent and
contrary to law, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
1
Defendant Bilbey Publications was dismissed by stipulation below and is not a party to this
appeal. Thus, references to “defendant” in the singular throughout this opinion pertain to
defendant Kasdorf only.
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I. BASIC FACTS
Defendant began working as a sales representative for plaintiff in 1992. As a condition
of employment, defendant signed a non-competition agreement2 which prohibited her from
working for a competitor within a 25-mile area for a period of two years after leaving plaintiff’s
employment. Defendant was compensated for her concurrence to this agreement.
In 2005, defendant discontinued her employment relationship with plaintiff and began
working as a sales representative for Bilbey, a direct competitor of plaintiff located within a 25mile distance. Bilbey was aware of the agreement defendant had signed with plaintiff but
nevertheless decided to hire her. Defendant was assigned customers when she went to work for
Bilbey, some of whom had been her customers while working for plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff
sent cease-and-desist letters to defendant and her new employer. While defendant acknowledged
receiving the letters, she continued to work for Bilbey.
In 2006, the year after defendant left plaintiff’s employment, plaintiff’s sales revenue
decreased dramatically. While small gains were made in later years, overall sales figures were
still lower than when defendant worked for plaintiff. In contrast, Bilbey expanded its sales
routes and increased sales dramatically in the same time period.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After plaintiff instituted its multi-count lawsuit, defendant moved for summary
disposition on all counts, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appealed that decision. In that
prior appeal, this Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter for further
proceedings. See Edwards Publications v Kasdorf, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued January 20, 2009 (Docket No. 281499). This Court upheld the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract based on
non-disclosure or confidentiality provisions, and for violation of the uniform trade secrets act,
MCL 445.1901 et seq. Id. at slip op 6, 8. However, this Court concluded that at least one of the
employment agreements was valid and had been violated as a matter of law requiring further
proceedings to determine causation and damages. Id. at slip op 7. In addition, this Court found
that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference and
civil conspiracy. Id. at slip op 6-8.
Following remand, the matter proceeded to trial on the remaining counts. A three-day
trial was held and the jury reached the result detailed above.
2
Defendant signed a second agreement in 2002. However, at trial plaintiff relied solely on the
agreement executed in 1992.
-2-
III. JNOV
Both parties argue that the trial court should have granted JNOV in their favor or,
alternatively, a new trial.3 Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court should have entered
a judgment of no cause of action on all of plaintiff’s claims. In contrast, plaintiff argues that the
trial court should have entered a judgment in plaintiff’s favor for it claims of tortious interference
and civil conspiracy, rather than just civil conspiracy. Both parties premise their arguments on
the fact that the jury found no cause of action on plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference, yet
found in plaintiff’s favor on the claim for civil conspiracy.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for JNOV de novo. Sniecinski v Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 131; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). We also review a claim
of inconsistent verdicts, which is a question of law, de novo. See Lagalo v Allied Corp, 457
Mich 278, 282-285; 577 NW2d 462 (1998).
When deciding a motion for JNOV, the trial court must view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether
the facts presented preclude judgment for the nonmoving party as a matter of law. Merkur Steel
Supply, Inc v Detroit, 261 Mich App 116, 123-124; 680 NW2d 485 (2004). If the evidence is
such that reasonable jurors could disagree, JNOV is improper. Foreman v Foreman, 266 Mich
App 132, 136; 701 NW2d 167 (2005).
We conclude that the trial court properly declined to grant JNOV to either party. The
evidence presented at trial did not preclude judgment for either party as a matter of law.
However, even though JNOV was inappropriate for either party, a new trial should have been
granted due to the irreconcilable verdict reached by the jury.
“A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons, by some concerted action to
accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplice a lawful purpose by criminal or
unlawful means.” Admiral Ins Co v Columbia Casualty Ins Co, 194 Mich App 300, 313; 486
NW2d 351 (1992). For a claim of civil conspiracy to succeed, “it is necessary to prove a
separate, actionable tort.” Early Detection Center, PC v New York Life Ins Co, 157 Mich App
618, 632; 403 NW2d 830 (1986). The instruction provided to the jury accurately reflected the
law and required the jury to find that all of the elements of the claim had been proven, including
proof of the underlying claim for tortious interference, to find in plaintiff’s favor. In spite of this
instruction, the jury concluded that plaintiff had failed to prove its claim for tortious interference,
yet could succeed on its claim for civil conspiracy.
Trial courts are required to make every effort to reconcile a seemingly inconsistent
verdict. Bean v Directions Unlimited, Inc, 462 Mich 24, 31; 609 NW2d 567 (2000). The verdict
should be upheld “if there is an interpretation of the evidence that provides a logical explanation
3
Plaintiff framed its motion as a request to amend the judgment. However, the relief requested
effectively amounts to a request for JNOV.
-3-
for the findings of the jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, there is no
logical explanation for the jury’s conclusion that plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference should
fail, yet also conclude that plaintiff’s conspiracy claim should succeed despite receiving specific
instruction prohibiting such a result. It is tempting to merely conclude that the conspiracy
verdict should be set aside in light of the verdict on the tortious interference claim. But that
would require that we have the ability to read the jurors’ minds and be able to confidently
conclude that their error lay in a misunderstanding of the elements of conspiracy and that the jury
would have returned a verdict for defendants had they properly understood it. But it is also
possible that the jury merely felt more comfortable with their understanding of civil conspiracy
over the more complicated tort of tortious interference and merely hung their judgment on that
claim. And because we lack the ability to read the jurors’ minds, we are not confident in
divining which result they truly reached. Accordingly, we conclude the proper remedy is to
remand for a new trial to allow a new jury to reach a consistent verdict.
IV. ATTORNEY FEES
Plaintiff’s cross appeal included an argument that the trial court improperly denied its
request for attorney fees. In light of our conclusion that a new trial is required, it is not necessary
to address this issue.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction. No costs.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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