IN RE JOHNSON/MCKNIGHT MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
April 12, 2011
In the Matter of JOHNSON/McKNIGHT, Minors.
No. 299751
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-470054
Before: DONOFRIO, P.J., and CAVANAGH and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental
rights to the three children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication not
rectified) and (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody). Respondent has failed to preserve
her challenge to the statutory grounds for termination. However, we have considered the issue
and because the evidence shows that the trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s
parental rights under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g), and because the trial court did not clearly err in
finding that termination was in the children’s best interests, we affirm.
Petitioner initially filed a permanent custody petition after respondent brought D. B.
McKnight, her youngest child, to the hospital with unexplained head injuries, and respondent
admitted that she lacked housing or an income. The petition also alleged that D. R. Johnson, Jr.
had tested positive for marijuana at birth. After test results showed that D. B. McKnight had
suffered no trauma or internal bleeding and that her injuries were consistent with a seizure,
petitioner amended its petition to seek to place the children in the court’s temporary custody.
After respondent admitted to the allegations in the petition that she did not have housing or
income and was suffering from depression, the court found that it had jurisdiction over the
children and placed the children in its temporary custody.
Petitioner provided respondent with a parent-agency agreement that required that she
complete and benefit from parenting classes, individual therapy, and substance abuse treatment;
participate in a psychological evaluation and a psychiatric evaluation; obtain suitable housing
and a legal source of income; maintain monthly contact with petitioner; consistently visit the
children; attend all court hearings; and submit random weekly drug screens.
Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for termination of respondent’s parental rights a
little more than 16 months later, but, following a trial on the petition, the court concluded that
termination was contrary to the children’s best interests. The court dismissed the supplemental
petition and ordered petitioner to resume services to respondent.
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After another 16 months, petitioner filed a second supplemental petition for termination
of respondent’s parental rights. Evidence at the termination hearing showed that respondent had
maintained monthly contact with petitioner and attended all court hearings. She had completed
and benefited from parenting classes. She had participated in psychological and psychiatric
evaluations, which showed that she had an IQ of 66, placing her in the extremely low level of
cognitive function, but she was not depressed or in need of pharmacological assistance. She was
fairly consistent with her visits with the children. These visits were appropriate, and the children
very much enjoyed spending time with respondent. Respondent was permitted to have
unsupervised and overnight visits with the children.
However, respondent never completed substance abuse counseling or individual therapy.
While she submitted many of the requested random drug screens during the last year of the
court’s wardship and these screens were negative, she had one positive screen and admitted that
she had used marijuana that day because she was stressed.
The biggest barriers to reunification that respondent failed to address in the nearly three
years the children were in the court’s custody were her lack of suitable housing and a legal
source of income. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent was living with an aunt
who was listed with Central Registry. Petitioner had advised respondent that the children could
not be placed in a home with an individual listed on the Registry, but respondent continued to
live with her aunt. Before living in the unsuitable home with her aunt, respondent had lived in a
home with her mother where the court had been prepared to place the children, but respondent
left that home before the children could be placed there. Respondent also failed to establish a
legal source of income. She relied on family for necessities, and her only financial plan for
caring for the children was to apply for disability benefits for D. R. Johnson, Jr.
The court terminated respondent’s parental rights, finding that the evidence supported
termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) and that termination was in the children’s best interests
because of their need for permanency and stability. Respondent appealed as of right.
Because the question presented in her brief on appeal addresses only the children’s best
interests, respondent failed to preserve the issue of the statutory grounds for termination. See
VanBuren Twp v Garter Belt Inc, 258 Mich App 594, 632; 673 NW2d 111 (2003). Furthermore,
while respondent challenged termination of her parental rights under § 19b(3)(c)(i), she did not
challenge termination under § 19b(3)(g). Because only a single ground needs to be established
to terminate parental rights and respondent has not challenged termination under § 19b(3)(g),
respondent’s argument that the trial court lacked statutory grounds to terminate her parental
rights must fail. See In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991).
Notwithstanding the deficiencies in respondent’s brief on appeal, consideration of the
foregoing evidence shows that the trial court did not clearly err in finding termination was
appropriate under §§19b(3)(c)(i) and (g). MCR 3.977(H)(3); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337;
445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further, the evidence showed that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-
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357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental
rights to the children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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