PEOPLE OF MI V MORRIS JAMES YOUNG SR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 12, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 296214
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC Nos. 08-030940-FH-5,
09-032214-FH-5
MORRIS JAMES YOUNG, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was tried and convicted by a jury during a consolidated trial of two criminal
files, of two counts of delivering less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv) (one
from each case), one count of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine,
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and one count of maintaining a drug house, MCL 333.7405(1)(d).
Defendant appeals his convictions, and we affirm.
These consolidated cases arise out of two drug raids performed roughly a year apart at a
house at 2469 Bewick after two “controlled buys” of crack cocaine made by confidential
informants, only one of whom testified at trial. In 2008, the non-testifying informant, who
identified defendant as going by the nickname of “Hillbilly,” conducted a controlled purchase of
crack cocaine from defendant at defendant’s house. Saginaw Township Police Officer Donald
Morse recognized defendant’s voice over the informant’s electronic monitor during this
transaction. Numerous witnesses familiar with defendant were asked about defendant’s
nicknames, and they uniformly testified that his only known nickname was James and that they
had never heard him called “Hillbilly.”
Approximately a day later, police raided the house and found a substantial quantity of
crack cocaine in a back bedroom. Also in the back bedroom were numerous insulin needles that
defendant claimed ownership of for his diabetes. Also found in the house were numerous
Vicodin pills, “residency papers” addressed to defendant at the house, and a number of Bridge
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cards.1 Two of defendant’s minor sons were present, one of whom claimed that the drugs were
his and that he had been selling crack cocaine since he was 15,2 but neither of them could explain
the presence of the Bridge cards.
Defendant had been observed to leave the residence shortly before the raid. He was
arrested when he stopped on his own at his girlfriend’s house. He was found to have a
considerable amount of money on his person, which he claimed was from recent casino
winnings. It appears that defendant frequented a casino and had recently won a substantial
amount of money, despite losing money overall. Another person, Evelyn Spencer, was also
observed to stop by the house briefly before the raid; she was also detained and arrested on an
outstanding warrant. Defendant was released on bail.
A year later, the police conducted another controlled purchase of cocaine with another
confidential informant, Robert Karp, at the same location. Karp testified that he became a
confidential informant in the hopes of arranging to get help for Spencer and to remove one of her
sources of drugs. Spencer, however, testified that defendant was only a friend from whom she
never received drugs, and Karp was crazy and obsessed with her and jealous of her relationship
with defendant. Karp was fitted with a video recording system during the controlled purchase,
but because he accidentally put his arms over the lens, it apparently revealed little.3 Karp
testified that he bought crack cocaine from defendant; defendant testified that he did not give
Karp any cocaine, but rather accepted repayment for a guitar that defendant had been holding as
collateral for a loan to Karp.
Another raid was performed on defendant’s house, and crack cocaine was again found in
the back bedroom. A spoon with apparent drug residue on it was found in the bathroom. Bridge
cards were again found, as were a large quantity of Vicodin pills prescribed to Warren
Abernathy. Abernathy had stayed at defendant’s house for the previous week because of
domestic difficulties and was on a number of medications that he accidentally left at defendant’s
house. One of defendant’s sons again claimed responsibility for the cocaine.4 The jury found
defendant guilty of delivering cocaine, possessing cocaine with the intent to deliver it, and
maintaining a drug house; it found defendant not guilty of any crime related to the Vicodin and
not guilty of conspiracy.
Defendant first argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of
possessing the cocaine found in 2008 because there was no evidence linking him to the back
bedroom of the house. We disagree.
1
Bridge cards are essentially debit cards used in place of food stamps.
2
This son was not charged with any crime arising out of the 2008 raid.
3
No copy of this recording was provided to this Court.
4
This time, this son was charged, and he pleaded no contest to simple possession and
maintaining a drug house.
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In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the trier of fact could
rationally have found all essential elements of the charged offense proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). This Court must not
interfere with the trier of fact’s role as the sole arbiter of the weight and credibility to be given to
witnesses and inferences from the evidence. Id. at 514. Nonetheless, a reviewing court must
find sufficient evidence to support a conviction, not merely any evidence. Id. at 513-514.
It is true that defendant did not actually own the house; rather, another relative did.
Furthermore, the evidence showed that defendant spent much of his time at his girlfriend’s
house, and when he stayed at 2469 Bewick, he slept on a sofa in the living room. However,
insulin needles to which defendant claimed ownership were found in the back bedroom. There is
no evidence that the needles were actually used for any illicit purpose; the prosecution witness
conceded that they are used by diabetics, and that was the purpose for which defendant claimed
them. However, the inescapable fact is therefore that defendant’s insulin needles were located in
the back bedroom, where the cocaine was found. Therefore, even presuming defendant did not
sleep in that room, he appears to have had some extensive connection to it.
Additionally, neither of defendant’s sons could explain the Bridge cards; not even the son
who claimed responsibility for the drugs and admitted that he sometimes accepted Bridge cards
as payment. Defendant did not otherwise have a substantial income: SSI checks and
occasionally fixing cars. He nevertheless maintained the house with food in it for several
children and an occasional guest despite an overall losing trend at the casino. Furthermore, the
same kind of drugs were found in the same place in the same house a year later, despite
defendant’s inability not to be aware of them at that point. Based on defendant’s admission that
he was the adult in charge of the house, this suggests that the drugs were either his all along, or
he had no control over the house whatsoever. Morse positively identified defendant’s
“distinctive” voice over the informant’s electronic monitor, and the jury would have been in the
position to evaluate the distinctiveness of defendant’s voice as he testified at trial.
We find that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant did possess the cocaine found at 2469 Bewick in 2008.
Defendant next argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
“Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact
and constitutional law.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). A trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and questions of law are reviewed de novo.
Id. A defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel was effective by showing that
counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that proceedings likely would
have had a different outcome but for counsel’s error. People v Swain, 288 Mich App 609, 643;
794 NW2d 92 (2010).
Defendant first argues that Spencer “was not questioned about the marked money paid to
the defendant for a guitar, and not for drugs.” Defendant does not explain what questions should
have been put to Spencer, what her anticipated response might have been, or how they would
have helped defendant. Spencer and Karp each testified to utterly incompatible stories of their
relationship with each other and Karp’s motivation for participating in the controlled drug
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purchase in 2009. It appears that the jury found Karp’s version of events more credible. It is
therefore unclear that any additional testimony from Spencer would have made any difference, in
any event.
Defendant next argues that the prosecution elicited impermissible hearsay through Morse
from the 2008 confidential informant identifying defendant as “Hillbilly.” Given that no other
witness had ever heard of defendant going by the name of “Hillbilly,” or even having any reason
to do so, the informant’s identification would seem to cast doubt on the informant rather than
bolster the prosecution’s case. The informant’s identification of defendant as “Hillbilly” is
unlikely to have been seriously prejudicial to defendant, irrespective of its admissibility.
Defendant finally argues that a witness who did not testify would have provided more
definitive testimony, and documentary proof, that the money defendant had on his person in
2008 came from recent casino winnings. We note that the jury was clearly willing to find other
witnesses more credible than defendant, as shown by Abernathy’s testimony and defendant’s
acquittal of any Vicodin-related charges. However, defendant was actually able to make the
point to the jury that he had just won at the casino, and his subpoenaed records were given to the
jury. We are simply not persuaded that there is a substantial likelihood, under the circumstances
of this case, that this proposed additional testimony would have changed the outcome.
Defendant finally argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
operating a drug house. Defendant argues that he was not really in control of 2469 Bewick and
had no knowledge of drug sales transpiring there. We disagree.
Defendant’s argument would have some merit if he had only been charged on the basis of
the 2008 raid. As discussed, part of the evidence supporting defendant’s 2008 conviction is the
subsequent finding of drugs in the house again a year later. Furthermore, although maintenance
of a drug house does not require a defendant to make it available for the sale of drugs
“continuously for an appreciable period,” a single occasion is insufficient. People v Thompson,
477 Mich 146, 152-158; 730 NW2d 708 (2007). A single drug transaction cannot, without more,
be a predicate for a conviction for maintaining a drug house.
However, as discussed, defendant admitted that he was the adult responsible for the
house, even if he was not the owner. He stocked it with food, authorized guests, bought furniture
for it, received his mail there, and had residency papers addressed to him there. By 2009,
defendant simply could not have been unaware that drugs were not just being sold in the
neighborhood, but in his house. At the very least, he would have known that law enforcement
believed drugs were being sold out of his house and that there had, in fact, been drugs found
there. The fact that the same kind of drugs was found there again, a year later, suggests, as
discussed, only two possible explanations: defendant genuinely had no control over the house,
or defendant authorized the drugs to be there. The evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the latter explanation
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kristen Frank Kelly
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
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