MICHAEL STALEC V DONALD STEPHENS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL STALEC and VONDA STALEC,
UNPUBLISHED
March 17, 2011
Plaintiffs/Counter-DefendantsAppellees,
v
DONALD STEPHENS and KARI J. STEPHENS,
No. 295656
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 07-008239-CH
Defendants/Counter-PlaintiffsAppellants,
and
ANDY K. ST. DENIS and SHERRY A. ST.
DENIS,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and TALBOT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Donald and Kari Stephens (hereinafter “Stephens”) challenge the trial court’s
determination that title to the property owned by Michael and Vonda Stalec was not burdened by
an easement to and from Lake Wabasis and denying the existence of any boat docking rights by
the Stephens. We affirm.
The Stephens own real property without lakeshore frontage, which they purchased in
2006 with the understanding that there was a valid easement granting access over the Stalec
property to Lake Wabasis with boat docking privileges. The Stalecs contend that the purported
easement is invalid. The origin of the disputed easement is a 1949 warranty deed issued by
Kenneth and Leona Lewis (hereinafter “Lewis”). When Lewis granted the warranty deed that
included the disputed easement they were not record title owners of the property. Lewis did not
actually become the record title owners until 1951. The parcels now owned by the Stalecs and
the Stephens were originally part of one large parcel owned by Lillian and Carl Hull (hereinafter
“Hull”).
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The Stalecs’ chain of title began in 1955 when Hull granted a portion of their parcel to
Lena Wood. Wood later conveyed her parcel to Ace and Alma Wisinski in 1962. In 1981,
Wisinski conveyed the property to the Stalecs. Each deed in this chain of title refers only to
driveway easements without any indication of an easement for lake access.
The Stephens’ chain of title began in 1951 when Hull granted Lewis a portion of their
parcel. This deed included an easement for driveway purposes, but did not mention an easement
for lake access. In 1954, Hull granted another warranty deed to Lewis extending a driveway
easement. But this subsequent deed did not mention a lake access easement. The alleged
easement did not appear in Stephens’ chain of title until 2003, when the Jenks family obtained
the Lewis property and divided it into five smaller parcels. In each deed dividing the property,
Jenks included the lake access easement and referenced the 1949 deed. Jenks sold a parcel to the
Ross family and Stephens purchased that parcel from Ross.
The instant lawsuit arose from a 2003 claim by Ross regarding the validity of a lake
access easement over the Stalec property. The Stalecs contested the validity and existence of the
easement, but before the dispute was resolved Ross conveyed the land to Stephens. There is no
evidence in the proffered record that the Stalecs or their predecessors ever acknowledged the
existence of a lake access easement or that any previous owner of the Stephens’ property ever
exercised the lake easement rights now asserted. The Stephens’ contention that past recognition
of the easement is possible is premised solely on speculation.
An action to quiet title is equitable in nature. In an equitable action the factual “findings
of the trial court are reviewed for clear error while its holdings are reviewed de novo.”1 The
applicability of a statute is a question of law that is also reviewed de novo.2
The Stephens argue that the 1949 warranty deed granting the lake access easement is
valid in accordance with the Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA). The MRTA provides that
any person with an unbroken chain of record title for at least 40 years will be considered to have
marketable record title free and clear of any and all interest, claims and charges based in whole
or part on events occurring more than 40 years previous. Any claims to the interest based on
defects outside the 40-year period are barred unless notice of such claims is filed during the 40year period.3 A person has an unbroken chain of title if public records disclose “[a] conveyance
[that] . . . purports to create the interest in that person, with nothing appearing of record
purporting to divest that person of the purported interest.”4 To invoke the protections of the
MRTA the Stephens must establish an unbroken chain of title extending back at least 40 years.
The Stephens cannot meet this burden as the 1949 warranty deed which originated the easement
1
Fowler v Doan, 261 Mich App 595, 598; 683 NW2d 682 (2004).
2
Id. at 598-599.
3
MCL 565.101; MCL 565.103.
4
MCL 565.102(a).
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is not in either the Stalecs’ or the Stephens’ chain of title. The first mention of the lake access
easement in the Stephens’ chain of title is in a deed issued in 2003.
Contrary to the position assumed by the Stephens, this issue would not be resolved in
their favor even if we were to presume that the 1949 warranty deed is part of their chain of title.
Quite simply, it is well established that a grantor cannot convey a right he does not possess,5 and
since Lewis did not have record title to the property when granting the 1949 deed, any assertion
of a lake access easement stemming from that deed is rendered invalid.6
The Stephens alternatively contend that even if the 1949 deed is not valid, equitable
revision should apply because omission of the lake access easement from the 1951 and 1955
deeds comprised a mutual mistake. Reformation of a deed comprises a form of equitable relief.7
A trial court’s factual findings regarding a grant of equitable relief are reviewed for clear error,
and whether equitable relief was proper under the facts is a question of law reviewed de novo.8
“There is abundant authority for reforming a deed or mortgage which, through error, fails
to express the result of the meeting of the minds of the parties, particularly when it is clear that
the description fails to embody the clear, undisputed visual standard of the parties.”9 To obtain
this remedy, the Stephens must prove that reformation is warranted by “clear and satisfactory”
evidence.10 Reformation is warranted when mutual mistake results in a deed that does not
express the true intent of the parties.11 The Stephens contend that the original parties, Lewis and
Hull, intended to include the lake access easement in the 1951 and 1955 deeds. In support of
their position, the Stephens note the existence of the 1949 deed granting the lake access
easement, that Hull later deeded this property to Lewis, and that both the 1951 and 1955 deeds
included the driveway easement extending in the direction of the lake but stopping short of the
lakeshore. The Stephens assert the existence of a mutual mistake because this easement has no
conceivable purpose except to provide access to the lake as it simply ends in the middle of
landlocked property with no other discernable purpose or destination.
These assertions fail to substantiate the existence of a mutual mistake. The 1951 and
1955 deeds explicitly recognize the two driveway easements and unambiguously explain their
intended purpose as being for “driveway purposes.” If the parties wished to include a lake
5
Gowdy v Gordon, 240 Mich 558, 564; 215 NW 702 (1927).
6
Von Meding v Strahl, 319 Mich 598, 606; 30 NW2d 363 (1948).
7
Johnson Family Ltd Partnership v White Pine Wireless, LLC, 281 Mich App 364, 371; 761
NW2d 353 (2008).
8
McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 480 Mich 191, 197; 747 NW2d 811 (2008).
9
Etherington v Bailiff, 334 Mich 543, 552; 55 NW2d 86 (1952).
10
Johnson Family Ltd Partnership, 281 Mich App at 379.
11
Troff v Boeve, 354 Mich 593, 596-597; 93 NW2d 311 (1958).
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access easement they could have designated such or incorporated the language of the 1949 deed.
Historically, cases that permit or decline to grant reformation have required more specific and
concrete evidence than that which the Stephens have proffered.12 The Stephens have failed to
present any direct evidence of an agreement to establish a lake access easement. In contrast, the
evidence demonstrates that for the immediately preceding 55 years of ownership of the Stalec
parcel there has been no lake access easement claim asserted until Ross in 2003. Although the
Stephens contend that the easement for lake access is logical and that the 1949 deed proves the
easement was intended, no one involved in the original land transaction is available to testify to
confirm such an assertion, leaving the Stephens to rely solely on limited circumstantial evidence
and speculation to support their position. The minimal evidence proffered by the Stephens in
support of their claim is significantly less, on both a qualitative and quantitative level, when
compared to cases in which the parties were found to be deserving of the remedy of reformation.
Based on the evidence presented and the better position of the lower court to judge the credibility
of witnesses13, we find that the trial court did not err in its determination that the Stephens had
failed to establish a basis for reformation.
Finally, the Stephens challenge the trial court’s ruling that even if the 1949 deed granting
lake access was valid its use today impermissibly surpasses the scope originally intended and
unreasonably burdens the servient estate. Because we find that the 1949 deed was invalid and
that the Stephens do not have the right to a lake access easement over the Stalec property, this
claim is rendered moot.
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
12
See Johnson Family Ltd Partnership, 281 Mich App at 381-382.
13
Troff, 354 Mich at 597.
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