OLIVER MATHES III V OAKLAND COUNTY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
OLIVER MATHES III,
UNPUBLISHED
March 17, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 294513
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-095417-NO
OAKLAND COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and SAAD and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
After retiring from the Pontiac Police Department, plaintiff, an African-American male,
was hired as an investigator with the Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office in December 2000.
Plaintiff worked in the Family Support Unit where he located, investigated, and interviewed
people who owed support to minors. Until 2006, two other investigators worked in the Family
Support Unit and other investigators worked in the Economic Recovery Unit, the Domestic
Violence Unit, and the Child Sexual Assault Unit.
In 2006, because of budget constraints and understaffing in the juvenile division, the
prosecutor’s office implemented a personnel reorganization. Plaintiff’s position in the Family
Support Unit was eliminated and, despite plaintiff’s seniority, Terry Healy, who is white, was
retained as the investigator in the Child Sexual Assault Unit based on his superior qualifications
and training. After plaintiff’s union representative demanded special conferences to discuss why
Healy was retained despite plaintiff’s seniority, plaintiff agreed to be reassigned to a newly
created position, Court Service Officer II, rather than lose his employment or submit the matter
to binding arbitration.
Plaintiff began working as a court service officer on June 3, 2006, but resigned on May
15, 2007, citing health problems and dissatisfaction with the job. Thereafter, he filed a
complaint with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights (MDCR) and claimed that his
reassignment to the court service officer position constituted an adverse employment action that
-1-
was racially motivated. At plaintiff’s request, the MDCR dismissed the complaint and plaintiff
filed this action alleging race discrimination on October 20, 2008.
Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition on July 6, 2009, pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). Specifically, defendant argued that plaintiff cannot show that the decision to
eliminate his position but retain Healy was based on race. Defendant further argued that
defendant had a legitimate basis for its decision to retain Healy in the Child Sexual Assault Unit,
specifically citing Healy’s qualifications and experience as the reason it did not allow plaintiff to
“bump” Healy out of his position. Defendant noted that, during his deposition, plaintiff admitted
that he never investigated a child sexual assault case or received training on topics related to
child sexual abuse. Defendant also presented the testimony of the decision makers who testified
that an investigator in the Child Sexual Assault Unit must have experience working with Care
House, an advocacy center for abused and neglected children in Oakland County, knowledge and
experience in conducting interviews with child victims, child victim advocacy experience, and
experience testifying in court in child sexual abuse cases. Defendant submitted the affidavit of
Chief Deputy Prosecutor Deborah Carley, who stated that, based on his lack of experience,
plaintiff would not be able to perform the job of a child sexual assault investigator immediately
or in the near future.
In response, plaintiff argued that his reassignment was an adverse employment action and
that defendant characterized the position in the Child Sexual Assault Unit as “specialized” in
order to justify plaintiff’s demotion. Plaintiff maintained that the position of investigator in the
Child Sexual Assault Unit required no more than general police skills and he presented the
written deposition answers of his union representative, Kermit Peters, who stated that plaintiff
was qualified to perform the job. Plaintiff also submitted the affidavit of an investigator in the
Family Support Unit who stated that any one of the investigators could have done the job in the
Child Sexual Assault Unit if they received additional training. Plaintiff also argued that
defendant evidenced a discriminatory animus by forcing him to re-interview for his investigator
position before his demotion, requiring him to submit documents already in defendant’s
possession, by “arbitrarily” deeming Healy more qualified than plaintiff, and by offering more
training opportunities to Healy. Plaintiff further argued that he should have been retained in the
Family Support Unit instead of another investigator with more seniority, Dominique Tamburrini,
because, unlike Tamburrini, he was certified by the Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement
Standards (MCOLES).
The trial court issued an opinion and order granting summary disposition to defendant on
September 22, 2009. The court ruled that plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of fact that
he was qualified for the position of child sexual abuse investigator, which required specialized
training and experience. The court further held the plaintiff failed to show that his MCOLES
certification made him more qualified than Tamburrini to work in the Family Support Unit. The
court also rejected plaintiff’s claim of racial animus based on the requirement that he reinterview for his investigator position and submit documentation because plaintiff did not submit
evidence to support this assertion or to show that other employees were treated differently.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
-2-
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to defendant on
his claim of racial discrimination. As this Court explained in Campbell v Human Services
Dep’t, 286 Mich App 230, 234-235; 780 NW2d 586 (2009):
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for
summary disposition. Kuznar v Raksha Corp, 481 Mich 169, 175; 750 NW2d
121 (2008). Summary disposition of all or part of a claim may be granted under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) when, “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment
. . . as a matter of law.” “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
sufficiency of the complaint.” Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681
NW2d 342 (2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The moving party
must specifically identify the matters that allegedly have no disputed factual
issues, and the nonmoving party must support its position that a disputed factual
issue does exist by using affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(4); Coblentz v City of Novi, 475 Mich
558, 569; 719 NW2d 73 (2006).
Plaintiff contends that defendant violated Section 202 of the Civil Rights Act, MCL
37.2101 et seq. which provides:
(1) An employer shall not do any of the following:
(A) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate
against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term,
condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national
origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. [MCL 37.2202.]
According to plaintiff, he established a prima facie case of discrimination under a mixed motive
theory and based on circumstantial evidence. As our Supreme Court explained in Sniecinski v
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 133-134; 666 NW2d 186 (2003):
In a direct evidence case involving mixed motives, i.e., where the adverse
employment decision could have been based on both legitimate and legally
impermissible reasons, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's discriminatory
animus was more likely than not a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in the
decision. In addition, a plaintiff must establish her qualification or other
eligibility for the position sought and present direct proof that the discriminatory
animus was causally related to the adverse decision. Stated another way, a
defendant may avoid a finding of liability by proving that it would have made the
same decision even if the impermissible consideration had not played a role in the
decision.
In cases involving indirect or circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must
proceed by using the burden-shifting approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 LEd2d 668 (1973). This approach
allows “a plaintiff to present a rebuttable prima facie case on the basis of proofs
-3-
from which a factfinder could infer that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful
discrimination.” [DeBrow v Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc (After Remand), 463
Mich 534, 538; 620 NW2d 836 (2001)]. To establish a rebuttable prima facie
case of discrimination, a plaintiff must present evidence that (1) she belongs to a
protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was
qualified for the position, and (4) her failure to obtain the position occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Once a
plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts
to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. If a defendant produces such evidence, the
presumption is rebutted, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the defendant's reasons were not the true reasons, but a mere pretext for
discrimination. [Some citations omitted.]
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY DISPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erroneously made findings of fact in deciding the
motion for summary disposition that should have been decided by the jury. Plaintiff is correct
that “[a] court may not make findings of fact when deciding a summary disposition motion.”
Price v Kroger Co of Michigan, 284 Mich App 496, 500; 773 NW2d 739 (2009). However,
contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the trial court did not make factual findings, but ruled that
plaintiff failed to present evidence to establish an issue of fact that he was qualified for the
position of investigator in the Child Sexual Assault Unit.
Defendant submitted the deposition testimony of Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Deborah Carley who stated that, in the event of personnel cuts, the prosecutor’s office follows
the collective bargaining agreement and considers an employee’s seniority as well as his or her
ability to perform the remaining work, which requires a consideration of whether the employee
can perform the job immediately or within the near future. She further testified that the position
of investigator in the Child Sexual Assault Unit requires forensic interview training and
certification, a working relationship with Care House, knowledge of how to conduct interviews
of child victims of sexual assault, an ability to make charging decisions in sexual assault cases,
victim advocacy experience, knowledge of all aspects of conducting a child sexual assault
investigation, and experience testifying in court in child sexual assault cases.
Defendant presented evidence that, when Carley and Mary Larkin, Chief Attorney Administration, asked both plaintiff and Healy to outline their experience and qualifications for
the position of investigator for the Child Sexual Assault Unit, Healy submitted an extensive list
of his training and qualifications. Healy had worked in the Child Sexual Assault Unit for three
years, he previously worked as a victims advocate in the Victim’s Services Section and, as a
detective sergeant in the Pontiac Police Department, he was assigned to the sexual assault/child
abuse section when he “investigated hundreds of child sexual assaults” and assisted in their
prosecution. Healy was the law enforcement representative for the Care House case review
committee, he received certification as a forensic interviewer for children, and he had conducted
hundreds of investigations and interviews with child abuse victims. Healy also reported that he
completed training in, among other subjects, human trafficking, family violence, child abuse
-4-
investigation, detection of child sexual exploitation and advanced sex crimes investigation. In
contrast, plaintiff submitted a brief summary of his experiences:
P.A.L. Director for youth baseball, basketball, football, work with children to help
them grow up and be successful adults. One of the kids in the program is current
Chief of Police for city of Pontiac Valard Gross. As detective with the Pontiac
Police I was assigned major crimes cases. I investigated gang activity in Pontiac,
children in the ages from youth 13 yrs up to 17 yrs, involving assaults and gang
activity. Worked with the juvenile section, and youth officers investigating
serious crimes. [A]ttended and competed [sic—completed] Homicide School and
trained in crime scene investigations. Work[ed] hundreds of assaults cases with
juvenile victims as well as juvenile offenders.
Plaintiff failed to respond when asked for timeframes for his relevant experiences and, as noted,
he conceded at his deposition that he had never investigated a child sexual assault case as a
police officer and he never received any special training in any areas related to child sexual
assaults. Prosecutor David Gorcyca also stated in his affidavit that plaintiff simply did not have
the experience or qualifications to be the investigator in the Child Sexual Assault Unit. To put it
succinctly, Healy had overwhelmingly superior qualifications compared to plaintiff and plaintiff
had no experience in this highly specialized area.
In response to defendant’s motion, plaintiff submitted written statements from two
investigators who worked in the Family Support Unit, who asserted that plaintiff or any of the
other investigators were qualified to be an investigator in the Child Sexual Assault Unit.
However, neither of the investigators offering this evidence had any decision-making authority
or any role in comparing the relative qualifications of plaintiff and Healy, and neither had
experience working in the Child Sexual Assault Unit. Based on the evidence submitted, plaintiff
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to show that plaintiff was, indeed, qualified for
the position in the Child Sexual Assault Unit. Rather, the evidence showed that the position
required specialized experience and training that plaintiff simply lacked and that he would not be
able to perform the job immediately or in the near future.
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that plaintiff failed to show
he was more qualified than another, more senior, white employee, Dominic Tamburrini, because
plaintiff is MCOLES certified and Tamburrini is not. Plaintiff presented no further evidence
with regard to the relative experience or qualifications of Tamburrini. Moreover, as the trial
court correctly ruled, plaintiff failed to present evidence or arguments to show that MCOLES
certification was necessary or beneficial to perform the job of investigator in the Family Support
Unit or how this certification in any way made him more qualified than Tamburrini to perform
that job.
C. ALLEGED ADMISSION BY DEFENDANT
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by failing to consider his argument that
defendant admitted there are issues of fact to be decided by a jury. In response to defendant’s
motion for summary disposition, plaintiff argued that, in a motion in limine to exclude a draft
-5-
report from the MDCR or witnesses from the MDCR, defendant asserted there is a disputed issue
of fact about whether plaintiff was treated differently than other employees.
When the motion was filed, the motion for summary disposition was pending in the trial
court. The motion in limine was submitted to prevent certain evidence from being introduced at
trial with the assumption that all disputed issues would be presented to the jury. The motion in
limine could not assume that the motion for summary disposition would be granted in whole or
in part and, thus, defendant presented an argument that the jury must decide issues in dispute
without evidence that might unfairly usurp the jury’s role. We reject plaintiff’s assertion that
defendant made a binding admission; defendant simply made a legal argument in the event that
all issues raised by the plaintiff would be presented to the jury at trial.
Moreover, contrary to plaintiff’s position, defendant’s argument in the motion in limine
does not constitute a “judicial admission,” which is defined as “a statement made by a party or
his counsel, in the course of trial . . . [that] is a distinct, formal, solemn admission made for the
express purpose of, inter alia, dispensing with the formal proof of some fact at trial.” Ortega v
Lenderink, 382 Mich 218, 222-223; 169 NW2d 470 (1969). Defense counsel’s assertions in the
motion in limine are not admissions of fact, but are merely legal arguments related to the
admissibility of specific evidence. Moreover, the statements were not made at trial and can in no
way be considered “distinct, formal, solemn” concessions of fact. Plaintiff’s argument is wholly
without merit.
D. MDCR REPORT
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it failed to address in its opinion and order
a report purportedly drafted by an MDCR investigator, Tracey Buchanan Brown. Though
plaintiff claims that the investigative report falls within the business records exception to the
hearsay rule, MRE 803(6), plaintiff failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the
document and plaintiff ignores that Brown’s opinions and conclusions are based on numerous
other documents and statements that may or may not fall within a hearsay exception. To admit a
document containing hearsay statements or conclusions based on hearsay evidence, the party
must establish that such statements or documents are also admissible. Merrow v Bofferding, 458
Mich 617, 629; 581 NW2d 696 (1998). Plaintiff failed to make this showing. Further, even if
Brown drafted investigation reports in the regular course of business, elements of the document
lack the inherent trustworthiness of business records when the subject matter is inherently
adversarial. People v McDaniel, 469 Mich 409, 412; 670 NW2d 659 (2003). Accordingly,
plaintiff’s argument that the trial court should have relied on the investigative report is
unavailing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.