IN RE PUTMAN/NICHOLSON/MOSELEY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
March 10, 2011
In the Matter of
MOSELEY, Minors.
PUTMAN/NICHOLSON/
No. 299466
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 09-489705
Before: MURPHY, C.J., and STEPHENS and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the
four minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (g), and (j). Because we conclude that there
were no errors warranting relief, we affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights. MCR
3.977(K). The statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing
evidence, and the evidence established that termination of her parental rights was in the
children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407
(2000).
Respondent contends that the agency was under an obligation to provide reasonable
reunification services, but did not. In this case, the allegation that led to adjudication was that
respondent failed to protect her second child, then seven years old, from sexual abuse perpetrated
by the father of the two youngest children. Termination was sought at original disposition and,
therefore, the agency was under no obligation to provide reunification services. MCL
712A.19a(2)(a); MCL 722.638; MCR 3.965(D)(2); In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 462; 781
NW2d 105 (2009). Respondent makes the novel argument that no “judicial determination”
regarding aggravating circumstances was made until the termination order itself. However, if the
trial courts’ authority were so limited, then reasonable efforts would have to be made in every
case unless and until final disposition. That is simply not what the law requires. Additionally,
when a parent argues that the agency did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family, she
must demonstrate that she would have fared better if the agency had offered services. In re
Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). Respondent does not indicate how she
would have benefited from services. She had a profound lack of insight into the problem, as
evidenced by the fact that she allowed the perpetrator to return to the family home after he was
released on bail. Moreover, she attempted to coach the child and her older sister, who by this
time had made her own allegations of abuse, into saying that the abuse was done by a man
named “Junior” who lived in Pennsylvania, and not by their stepfather. For these reasons, it was
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clear that respondent failed to protect her children, lacked the ability to provide proper care or
custody for the children, and that the children would have likely been harmed if returned to her
care. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii); MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
Having found the statutory grounds for termination proven by clear and convincing
evidence, the trial court then had to consider whether termination of respondent’s parental rights
was in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). The most severely abused child had
serious problems and was even admitted to the hospital for some of her behaviors. Whether
these problems existed before the abuse was of little consequence where respondent simply
lacked the insight or means to care for the child’s special needs. Given respondent’s poor
decision-making and history of failure to protect, the trial court did not clearly err in determining
that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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