ALLEN OVERTON V STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT BOARD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALLEN OVERTON,
UNPUBLISHED
March 8, 2011
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT BOARD,
No. 292186
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 07-087461-AA
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and ZAHRA and K.F. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After sustaining two knee injuries while working at a residential treatment facility for
delinquent youth, petitioner Allen Overton applied for disability retirement benefits from the
State Employees Retirement System (SERS). A hearing referee recommended that Overton
receive duty disability retirement benefits pursuant to MCL 38.21. After the SERS filed
exceptions to the hearing referee’s recommendation, respondent State Employees Retirement
Board (the Board) determined that Overton had failed to prove a total disability, and denied his
application. Overton then petitioned for review in the Genesee Circuit Court, which reversed the
Board’s ruling. We granted the Board’s application for leave to appeal,1 and we now vacate the
circuit court’s order and remand to the Board for further proceedings.
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Overton commenced state employment in 1990, and at the time of his injuries worked as
a youth offender supervisor at the Maxey Boys Training School. In June 2003, an unruly inmate
kicked Overton in the left knee, forcing Overton to remain off work for around three weeks.
Shortly after Overton returned to duty another inmate kicked him in the same knee, and Overton
could not return to work for approximately six months. When Overton tried returning, he
worked at a job that Maxey designated as a “sit-down” assignment. However, the job obligated
1
Overton v State Employees Retirement Bd, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
September 1, 2009 (Docket No. 292186).
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Overton to frequently leave his chair to open and close a security gate. Overton’s physician
instructed him to discontinue the gate job. Subsequently, Overton had four surgeries on his knee,
with the most recent in October 2006.
In July 2005, Overton applied for duty disability retirement benefits pursuant to MCL
38.21. He later added an alternative claim for nonduty disability retirement benefits under MCL
38.24.2 In March 2006, the Office of Retirement Services denied Overton’s application.
Overton appealed, and in June 2007 a hearing referee issued a proposal for decision finding
Overton totally and permanently disabled “within the meaning of MCL 38.21 and MCL 38.24.”
The hearing referee further determined that Overton’s disability “occurred as the natural and
proximate result of an injury in the performance of his employment with the State of Michigan
within the meaning of MCL 38.21.” The SERS filed exceptions to the hearing referee’s proposal
for decision. The SERS maintained that Overton’s knee problems derived in part from an
athletic injury sustained in high school, and challenged the hearing referee’s finding that Overton
had a total disability.
In September 2007, the Board issued a decision and order rejecting the hearing referee’s
proposal for decision. In a lengthy and detailed explanation, the Board examined the reports and
testimony supplied by Overton and seven physicians who had rendered opinions concerning
Overton’s knee. The Board began its analysis of the facts by observing the following:
There is no dispute that petitioner has a disability and that the disability is
permanent. After four operations and with other procedures likely in the future, it
is beyond dispute that petitioner will not recover from his left knee problems.
The issues are whether petitioner retains the capacity to perform jobs for which
the petitioner is reasonably qualified by education, training or experience, Knauss
[v State Employees Retirement Sys, 143 Mich App 644, 649-650; 372 NW2d 643
(1985)], and, if not, whether the disability was solely caused by work, rather than
merely an aggravation of a pre-existing condition . . . . [Citations omitted.]
The Board then set forth a number of factual findings and legal conclusions. The pertinent
factual findings include:
(7)
Prior to the work injuries, petitioner had a second job as a
mortgage assistant for six to eight hours per week. In 2004, Petitioner was fired
from his job. At the time of his termination, his leg was giving him many
problems. He was told by his boss that it did not look professional to have
2
To obtain either duty or nonduty disability retirement benefits, a petitioner must show that he or
she “is mentally or physically totally incapacitated for further performance of duty.” MCL
38.21(1)(c), MCL 38.24(1)(b). A duty-related disability may exist if a petitioner proves that his
or her “personal injury or disease is the natural and proximate result of the member’s
performance of duty.” MCL 38.21(1)(b).
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someone sitting at his desk with his leg elevated and that is the reason he was let
go. . . .
***
(15) Dr. [John] Flood found that the condition that necessitated
Petitioner’s first surgery was a chronic condition. Petitioner’s second surgery was
not related to any work injury. … Instead there was a preexisting condition. …
(16) Dr. Flood also stated that the work restrictions that he gave
Petitioner was [sic] due to the surgery that Petitioner had, not the injuries that he
sustained at work. … Dr. Flood concluded that petitioner could do sedentary
work with some restrictions. . . .
***
(19) Independent Medical Advisor Dr. [Russell] Holmes concluded that
Petitioner’s condition was permanent but not total and not duty related and that he
could work with moderate restrictions. …
(20)
No doctor found Petitioner to be totally disabled.
(21) No doctor opined that Petitioner could not work as a mortgage
processor or perform a similar sedentary job.
(22) No doctor concluded that the condition of Petitioner’s left knee
was “the natural and proximate result of the member’s performance of duty.”[3]
In light of these factual findings, the Board concluded as a matter of law that Overton had
failed to prove that the inmates’ kicks naturally and proximately caused his knee condition,
rendering him ineligible for duty-related disability under MCL 38.21. The Board offered the
following additional conclusion:
Petitioner has failed to prove that he is totally disabled as required by
MCL 38.21 and 38.24. No doctor has reached that conclusion and at least Dr.
Flood and Dr. Holmes have said he could work in a sedentary job. Petitioner held
a sedentary job as a mortgage processor. There is no evidence that Petitioner has
tried to perform the job of mortgage processor or a similar job subsequent to his
last surgery.
3
A “member” is “a state employee included in the membership of the retirement system.” MCL
38.1f(1).
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Overton petitioned for circuit court review, and in March 2009 the circuit court
announced a bench ruling reversing the Board’s decision and order and adopting the hearing
referee’s proposal for decision. The circuit court summarized as follows:
Following a review of the complete record, this Court is persuaded that the
well documented, well analyzed decision of the [hearing referee] is correct. The
Court finds the Board’s decision to be arbitrary and capricious in that there was
no meaningful analysis of the evidence and, further, the Board’s conclusion that
no doctor had disabled Overton is clearly erroneous based on the certified file
provided to this Court.[4]
II. ANALYSIS
A circuit court may review a final agency decision, but must generally uphold the agency
if the decision “is not contrary to law, is not arbitrary, capricious, or a clear abuse of discretion,
and is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record.”
VanZandt v State Employees’ Retirement Sys, 266 Mich App 579, 583; 701 NW2d 214 (2005).
“‘Substantial’ means evidence that a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a
conclusion.” Dignan v Michigan Pub School Employees Retirement Bd, 253 Mich App 571,
575; 659 NW2d 629 (2002). This Court reviews a circuit court’s ruling in an administrative
appeal “to determine whether the circuit court applied correct legal principles and whether the
court misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test to the agency’s factual
findings, which essentially constitutes a clearly erroneous standard of review.” Nason v State
Employees’ Retirement Sys, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 290431, issued
10/28/10), slip op at 5. “A finding is clearly erroneous when, after review of the record, this
Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” Id.
The Board first challenges the circuit court’s consideration of the medical form signed by
Dr. Sattar. Overton’s counsel submitted the form to the hearing referee on January 19, 2007, and
the form appears within the administrative record bearing a Bates stamp consistent with its
submission in 2007. Given that the Board has presented no authority supporting its contention
that the circuit court incorrectly reviewed the form under the circumstances of this case, we find
no merit in this argument.
The Board further asserts that because competent, material and substantial evidence
supported its decision, the circuit court improperly reversed the Board. Dr. Holmes opined that
Overton’s knee condition “is long-standing and was exacerbated by the incidents at work.”
Although other physicians disagreed with Dr. Holmes’s opinion, the applicable legal standards of
4
The “certified file” of the administrative proceedings contains a form signed by Overton’s
personal physician, Dr. Syed Sattar, conveying Dr. Sattar’s conclusion that Overton was “totally
disabled from [his] usual occupation” and will “never” “be able to return-to-work” at “any
reasonable occupation.” The parties disagree whether the circuit court should have considered
this form. We address this issue infra at 5-6.
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review constrain us to conclude that Dr. Holmes’s report constitutes competent, material and
substantial evidence refuting that Overton’s knee condition qualified as duty-related. Because
the circuit court clearly erred by rejecting the Board’s conclusion that Overton’s injury was not
duty-related, we reverse the circuit court’s order adopting the hearing referee’s proposal for
decision regarding Overton’s claim under MCL 38.21.
However, on the basis of this Court’s recent decision in Nason, we apply a different
analysis to Overton’s claim for nonduty disability retirement benefits under MCL 38.24. The
petitioner in Nason, a corrections officer, submitted an application for nonduty disability
retirement benefits. Id., slip op at 1. The Board denied the petitioner’s application in light of its
finding that he could perform jobs other than a corrections officer. Id. at 2.5 The circuit court
reversed and remanded for entry of an order approving the petitioner’s application for nonduty
disability retirement benefits. Id. at 4-5. This Court vacated the circuit court’s order, but did not
reinstate the Board’s ruling. The Court instead held that “the term ‘duty’ in § 24(1)(b) refers or
relates to state employment, and thus the total incapacitation must relate to the member’s
performance as a state employee.” Id. at 7. Because the Board had denied nonduty disability
retirement benefits on the ground that the petitioner could perform jobs other than a corrections
officer, the Court remanded to the Board for a determination whether the petitioner could do the
work required of a corrections officer. Id.
Here, the Board ruled that Overton had not substantiated a total disability under MCL
38.24: “No doctor has reached that conclusion and at least Dr. Flood and Dr. Holmes have said
he could work in a sedentary job. Petitioner held a sedentary job as a mortgage processor. There
is no evidence that Petitioner has tried to perform the job of mortgage processor or a similar job
subsequent to his last surgery.” Because the Board neglected to specifically address whether
Overton was totally incapacitated relative to his job as a youth specialist, pursuant to Nason, slip
op at 7, we vacate the circuit court’s order and remand for the Board to directly decide that issue.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
ZAHRA, J. did not participate.
5
The Board in Nason found that “the Petitioner can still perform other jobs that he has
performed in the past, as he possesses experience and training in a number of occupations that he
was employed in prior to working for the state.” Id. at 4.
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