REBECCA A PITSCH V CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
REBECCA A. PITSCH,
UNPUBLISHED
March 1, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 295485
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 08-011382-CK
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: OWENS, P.J., and MARKEY and METER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order entering a consent judgment
after the court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition. At issue is the scope of a
release signed by plaintiff in 1994 regarding an automobile accident that occurred in 1992. We
affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
After the accident, plaintiff settled her third-party negligence claim against the driver of
the vehicle, Jennifer DeWitt, and the vehicle’s owners, Leon and Jolynn Bekius, for their
American States Insurance policy limit of $50,000. In connection with the settlement, plaintiff
signed a release. The relevant language in the release states:
. . . I/we the undersigned, . . . have released and discharged . . . the said
JENNIFER DE WITT, LEON AND JOLYNN BEKIUS heirs, executors,
administrators, insurers, successors and assigns, of and from any and all liability,
claims, demands, controversies, damages, actions and causes of actions on
account of personal injuries and any and all other loss and damage of every kind
and nature . . . resulting to the undersigned from [the] accident . . . and of and
from all liability, claims, judgments, demands, controversies, agreements,
damages, actions, and causes of action whatsoever, either in law or equity against
any other persons, firms or corporations which the undersigned, their heirs,
executors, administrators, successors and assigns, can, shall or may have . . .
resulting from the accidents . . . and from the beginning of the world to the day of
these presents.
After signing this release, plaintiff initiated a series of lawsuits against her own insurer,
defendant, for first-party benefits it failed to pay. According to plaintiff, each of these lawsuits
was settled after case evaluation, with defendant agreeing to pay disputed first-party benefits.
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Defendant did not argue during any of this litigation that the above-quoted release operated to
release it from liability for first-party benefits. Nor did defendant raise the issue of release in its
answer to plaintiff’s instant lawsuit. Defendant first raised the matter in its motion for summary
disposition.
The trial court disagreed that the 1994 release acted to release plaintiff’s first-party
claims against defendant, finding that the release was “a settlement involving third party issues.
This is not a third party case, it’s a first party case, and so I believe it’s separable.” The court
additionally found that collateral estoppel “justifiably would be a separate basis to deny
summary disposition in this regard, since we’re dealing with the same subject matter, the same
statutory scheme, and the same claim for recovery.” The court summed up its reasons for
denying the motion “based on my assessment that the release does not apply to the first party
case, based on my assessment that the language of the release, even if it does apply, doesn’t
preclude this cause of action, and based upon my assessment independently to [sic] collateral
estoppel would be a sufficient basis to deny the motion.”
In this Court, defendant argues that the language in the release is identical in meaning to
the release language in Romska v Opper, 234 Mich App 512, 514; 594 NW2d 853 (1999), and
Shay v Aldrich, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 5, 2009
(Docket No. 282550).1 The Shay Court held that a release of “all other persons” was to be
construed as broadly as it was written, citing Romska, which employed similar broad language.
Id., slip op at 4. Defendant also argues that collateral estoppel cannot apply to this case because
the earlier suits were concluded by settlement and the pertinent issue was not actually litigated
and decided.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). When a court
assesses a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), substantively admissible evidence submitted at the
time of the motion must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,
and, to survive the motion, the nonmoving party must come forward with at least some
evidentiary proof upon which to base his case. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120-121; 597
NW2d 817 (1999); Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).
Issues of contract interpretation are questions of law, also reviewed de novo. Sweebe v
Sweebe, 474 Mich 151, 154; 712 NW2d 708 (2006).
We agree with plaintiff that the language in the release did not bar her suit. Even
assuming, solely for purposes of argument, that Shay and Romska had remained good law, they
are distinguishable. The language of the release at issue here, while broad in places, is not broad
1
We note that Romska was recently overruled and Shay was reversed. See Shay v Aldrich, 487
Mich 648; 790 NW2d 629 (2010). Because we find that the language in this case is not
controlled by those cases, this occurrence has no bearing on our decision.
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in its statement of who is being released, unlike the language in Shay and Romska. The
language at issue in Shay read:
release
For the sole consideration of TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
AND NO/100 ($ 12,500.00) DOLLARS to me in hand paid by Michigan
Municipal Liability and Property Pool do for ourselves, executors,
administrators, successors and assigns, discharge, ALLEN PARK POLICE
OFFICER [Locklear/Allbright] and Michigan Municipal Liability and
Property Pool, insurer, together with all other persons, firms and corporations,
from any and all claims, demands and actions which I have now or may have
arising out of any and all damages, expenses, and any loss or damage resulting
from an incident occurring on September 8, 2004. [Shay, slip op at 2.]
In short, the signers in Shay “discharged . . . all other persons.” Similarly, the language at issue
in Romska read:
I/we hereby release and discharge Boyan Daskal and Veliko Velikov, his
or her successors and assigns, and all other parties, firms, or corporations who are
or might be liable, from all claims of any kind or character which I/we have or
might have against him/her or them, and especially because of all damages, losses
or injuries to person or property, or both, whether developed or undeveloped,
resulting or to result, directly or indirectly, from an accident which occurred on or
about May 16, 1994 at [left blank] and I/we hereby acknowledge full settlement
and satisfaction of all claims of whatever kind or character which I/we may have
against him/her or them by reason of the above-named damages, losses or
injuries. [Romska, 234 Mich App at 514 (emphasis removed).]
Shortened to its fundamentals, this language serves to “release and discharge . . . all other parties,
firms, or corporations who are or might be liable.”
The language of the present release, similarly reduced, shows that plaintiff “released and
discharged . . . [the tortfeasors,] heirs, executors, administrators, insurers, successors and
assigns, of and from any and all liability . . . and from all liability . . . against any other persons,
firms or corporations which the undersigned, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors
and assigns, can, shall or may have . . . resulting from the accidents" (emphasis added). The only
entities released are the tortfeasors and their heirs, executors, administrators, insurers, successors
and assigns, not “any other persons.” The “any other persons” language comes into play only in
delineating the scope of the release from liability that is applicable to the tortfeasors and their
heirs, executors, administrators, insurers, successors and assigns. Defendant is disingenuous in
arguing in its appellate brief that the language at issue in this case is “identical” to that in Romska
and Opper.
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The language at issue here simply does not bar plaintiff’s suit against defendant.
Summary disposition was properly denied.2
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
2
We need not address defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in applying collateral
estoppel. Moreover, although this is not argued by the parties, we note that defendant failed to
raise the release defense in its answer, as required by MCR 2.116(D)(2), and thus the defense
was barred by MCR 2.116(D)(2) and waived under MCR 2.111(F)(2) and (3). Kemerko
Clawson LLC v RxIV Inc, 269 Mich App 347, 351 n 2; 711 NW2d 801 (2005). Defendant never
sought to amend its answer; the scheduling order required amendment to take place “no later
than January 28, 2009.” Defendant’s motion was not filed until February 13, 2009. Therefore,
affirmance is also proper based on defendant’s failure to timely plead the defense of release.
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