PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH EDWARD MAXEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 24, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 294418
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-012497-FC
KENNETH EDWARD MAXEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and WILDER and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of two counts of assault with intent
to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, two counts of assault with a dangerous
weapon (felonious assault), MCL 750.82, discharge of a firearm in or at a building, MCL
750.234b, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to
concurrent terms of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for each assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder conviction, three to six years’ imprisonment for each felonious assault
conviction, 48 to 90 months’ imprisonment for the discharge of a firearm in or at a building
conviction, three to six years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction,
and a consecutive two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm
defendant’s convictions and sentences except for the sentences imposed for the convictions of
two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, which we vacate and
remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Defendant first argues that counsel’s failure to introduce into evidence medical records
showing that defendant could not run at the time the shooting occurred, as well as counsel’s not
calling codefendant Shron Bennett and alibi witnesses to testify on defendant’s behalf, denied
him his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
Whether a defendant received effective assistance from his trial counsel presents a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246
(2002). We review findings of fact for clear error and questions of constitutional law de novo.
Id. For unpreserved claims, our review is limited to errors apparent on the record. People v
Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
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Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. LeBlanc, 465 Mich at 578. To meet this burden, “a defendant must show
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the
representation so prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial.” People v Pickens,
446 Mich 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Id. at 312-314. “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. at 314, quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US
668, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).
In claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, “[d]ecisions regarding what evidence
to present, whether to call witnesses, and how to question witnesses are presumed to be matters
of trial strategy.” People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). We will not
substitute our judgment for that of counsel on matters of trial strategy, and we must assess
counsel’s performance without the benefit of hindsight. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210,
242-243; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
According to defendant, the medical records indicating that defendant suffered gunshot
wounds to his left knee less than four months before the shooting, had they been introduced,
would have shown that the person the eyewitness saw running up the alley was not defendant.
Defendant has not shown, however, that counsel’s performance in not introducing the medical
records fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. To do so, a defendant must
overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s decision constituted sound trial strategy.
Strickland, 466 US at 689; Horn, 279 Mich App at 39. Overcoming this presumption requires
the defendant to exclude hypotheses that support a finding that counsel provided adequate
representation. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).
In the instant case, the medical records indicate only that defendant was shot in to his left
knee—the records provide no indication that defendant’s injury made it impossible for him to
run from a crime scene four months later. Accordingly, counsel may have determined that the
evidence lacked sufficient probative value. Alternatively, trial counsel may have reasonably
considered the medical records too prejudicial given that they reveal defendant’s involvement in
another shooting and daily marijuana use. Whatever the case, we cannot conclude that counsel’s
decision to attack the eyewitness’s ability to accurately perceive the incident rather than
introduce the medical records for this purpose fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Moreover, defendant has not shown the alleged error was prejudicial. Without an indication that
the gunshot wounds actually prevented defendant from running four months later, there can be
no reasonable probability that the jury would have discarded the eyewitness’s testimony that she
saw defendant run up the alley because it was fabricated or otherwise inaccurate and acquitted
defendant on that basis.
Similarly, defendant has not shown counsel seriously erred by failing to call codefendant
Bennett to testify that defendant was not present when the shooting occurred. First, defendant
has not established that Bennett would have testified regarding defendant’s absence from the
crime scene. In his guilty plea made during the second day of trial, Bennett never said defendant
was not at the crime scene, nor has he signed any affidavit to that effect. Further, calling Bennett
to the stand would have been a last minute decision. Because Bennett maintained his
constitutional right to remain silent and not testify until he pleaded guilty the second day into
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trial, counsel may have thought it too risky to call him without adequate preparation. In addition,
given Bennett’s long friendship with defendant, counsel may have decided that the testimony
was not sufficiently trustworthy and that, as a matter of trial strategy, the better option was to
attack the eyewitness’s ability to perceive the events. Again, defendant has not excluded these
possibilities or shown a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted him had
Bennett testified.
With respect to defendant’s contention that counsel failed to call alibi witnesses or
otherwise investigate them, we note this claim is unpreserved, so review is limited to errors
apparent on the record. Matuszak, 263 Mich App at 48. Although it is true that “counsel has a
duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary,” Strickland, 466 US at 691, from the record, it is not apparent that
counsel neglected to carry out this duty. The alibi witnesses that defendant purports would
account for his whereabouts at the time the offense occurred are never mentioned in the record,
and defendant offers no evidence to establish the testimony these individuals would provide. As
such, defendant has failed to establish both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that it
resulted in any prejudice. Pickens, 446 Mich at 303, 312-314.
Defendant also argues that error warranting reversal occurred when the trial judge failed
to articulate a rationale for denying his motion for a new trial. See MCR 6.431(B). The court’s
failure to assign reasons either orally on the record or in writing did not prejudice defendant. See
People v Schaner, 302 Mich 6, 11; 4 NW2d 444 (1942). As outlined above, defendant has failed
to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and any failing of the trial court in
denying defendant’s motion for new trial was harmless. MCR 2.613(A).
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial judge misscored
OV 10 at 15 points for alleged predatory conduct when it should have scored the variable at zero
points. We disagree.
We review factual findings at sentencing for clear error and the trial court’s decision to
score an offense variable for an abuse of discretion. People v Houston, 261 Mich App 463, 471;
683 NW2d 192 (2004), aff’d but modified on other grounds 473 Mich 399, 410 n 22 (Young, J.),
416-417 (CAVANAGH, J.); 702 NW2d 530 (2005). The ultimate question we must decide is
whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion and whether the evidence on the record
adequately supports the particular score given. Id.
A judge may score OV 10 at 15 points only in instances where the defendant engaged in
“predatory conduct,” MCL 777.40(1)(a), defined as “preoffense conduct directed at a victim for
the primary purpose of victimization,” MCL 777.40(3)(a). A trial judge must ask the following
three questions to determine whether the defendant engaged in predatory conduct within the
meaning of the statute:
(1) Did the offender engage in conduct before the commission of the offense?
(2) Was this conduct directed at one or more specific victims who suffered from a
readily apparent susceptibility to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or
temptation?
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(3) Was victimization the offender’s primary purpose for engaging in the
preoffense conduct? [People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152, 161-162; 749 NW2d 257
(2008).]
In the instant case, defendant engaged in conduct before the commission of the offense.
Defendant committed a felonious assault approximately an hour and a half before the shooting
when he approached the two men, who were in a vehicle stopped at a stoplight, and lifted his
shirt in a manner suggesting that he possessed a gun. Further, one of the men testified that he
saw a black handgun protruding from defendant’s waistband. With respect to the second inquiry,
one could reasonably conclude that the individuals at whom defendant directed his preoffense
conduct were vulnerable victims. The two men were unarmed and thus susceptible to injury.
They were also restrained to some degree inside the vehicle stopped at a stoplight. Finally, the
record supports a finding that defendant’s primary purpose in committing the assault was to
victimize the two men. “Victimize” means “to make a victim of”—i.e., to make a potential
victim an actual victim. Cannon, 481 Mich at 161. Here, in approaching the vehicle and
brandishing a gun, defendant exhibited his intent to make the two men actual victims. For that
reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in scoring OV 10, and the evidence on the
record adequately supports assessing defendant 15 points for predatory conduct.
In his final argument on appeal, defendant argues that the trial court relied on offense
characteristics already accounted for under other scoring variables to justify a departing sentence
but failed to articulate that such characteristics were given inadequate weight. This error,
defendant contends, entitles him to resentencing. We agree, in part.
As the Michigan Supreme Court outlined in People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 264-265;
666 NW2d 231 (2003), we review claims challenging a trial court’s decision to depart from the
appropriate sentencing guidelines range under three standards. Whether a particular factor to
support the departure exists is reviewed for clear error; whether the factor is objective and
verifiable is reviewed de novo, and whether the court’s reason for departing is substantial and
compelling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
A court may depart from the sentencing guidelines range only where it has a substantial
and compelling reason for departing and articulates that reason on the record. MCL 769.34(3);
Babcock, 469 Mich at 256-260. A substantial and compelling reason, which exists only in
exceptional cases, is an objective and verifiable reason that keenly or irresistibly grabs the
court’s attention and is of considerable worth in determining the length of sentencing. Id. at 257258. In addition, any sentence that departs from the guidelines must also satisfy the principle of
proportionality, and in fact, be more proportionate than a sentence within guidelines. Id. at 264.
Further, a “court shall not base a departure on an offense characteristic or offender characteristic
already taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence range unless the court finds
from the facts contained in the court record . . . that the characteristic has been given inadequate
or disproportionate weight.” MCL 769.34(3)(b).
Just as a trial court deciding to issue a departure sentence must state on the record a
substantial and compelling reason for doing so, in cases where it bases its departure on offense
characteristics already taken into account under other scoring variables, it must specifically
articulate that such characteristics were given inadequate or disproportionate weight. See People
v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 302 n 21; 754 NW2d 284 (2008); People v Jackson, 474 Mich 996; 707
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NW2d 597 (2006). In Smith, for example, as a basis for departing from the appropriate
sentencing guidelines range, the trial judge referred to the fact that the defendant exploited the
victim’s vulnerability, which OV 10 partially takes into account. Smith, 482 Mich at 302 n 21.
In remanding the case for resentencing, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to infer that the
judge considered the offense characteristics already accounted for under other variables and
found that they were given inadequate weight. Id. Similarly, in Jackson, 474 Mich at 996, the
Court noted that, although the trial court referred to excessive brutality, violence, and terrorism
to justify imposing a departing sentence, OV 7 already accounted for these characteristics.
Because the trial court did not expressly find that the characteristics accounted for under OV 7
were given inadequate or disproportionate weight, the Court remanded the case for resentencing.
Here, the trial court’s reasons for departing from the appropriate sentencing guidelines
range were: (1) defendant was on parole at the time the offense occurred; (2) a jury convicted
defendant of seven felonies in connection with the offense; and (3) the perpetrators possessed
and discharged firearms during the offense.1 These offense characteristics were accounted for by
the guidelines. Specifically, defendant’s parole status was accounted for under Prior Record
Variable (“PRV”) 6, for which the trial judge assessed him ten points; his concurrent felony
convictions were accounted for under PRV 7, for which the trial judge assessed him 20 points;
and the fact that the perpetrators possessed and discharged firearms was accounted for under OV
1 and OV 2, for which the trial judge assessed him 25 and five points, respectively. Thus, to
justify departing from the appropriate sentencing guidelines range on the basis of these factors,
the trial court was required to explicitly state a finding that these guidelines characteristics were
given inadequate or disproportionate weight. MCL 769.34(3)(b); Jackson, 474 Mich at 996.
Because the trial court failed to do so, we must vacate the sentences imposed for the two counts
of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and remand for resentencing
within the appropriate sentencing guidelines range, or, if the sentencing judge believes that a
departure is justified, for a statement of substantial and compelling reasons supporting the
departure that complies with MCL 769.34(3).
We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences except for the sentences imposed for
the convictions of two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder,
which we vacate and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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Only defendant’s sentences for his convictions of two counts of assault with intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder exceeded the guidelines recommended range. Consequently, we
must affirm the defendant’s sentences for the other convictions. MCL 769.34(10).
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