STEPHANIE MARIE SCHIEPKE V LATOYA SMILEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
STEPHANIE MARIE SCHIEPKE,
UNPUBLISHED
February 24, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
LATOYA SMILEY and SUBURBAN MOBILITY
AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL
TRANSPORTATION,
No. 293192
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-005182-NI
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and JANSEN and WHITBECK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants, Latoya Smiley and Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation
(SMART), appeal as of right from the trial court’s order denying their motion for summary
disposition. We reverse.
On June 5, 2008, the Detroit Red Wings won the Stanley Cup. According to police
reports, traffic was very heavy on Gratiot Avenue, and thousands of people were walking on the
sidewalk parallel to the avenue. Plaintiff was struck by a SMART bus when she stepped into
Gratiot Avenue. Plaintiff admitted that she stepped into the avenue, but she did not know if she
examined the traffic conditions because she had no recollection of the moments before the
collision. Eyewitnesses to the accident also indicated that plaintiff stepped into the avenue.
Police and representatives of SMART came to the scene of the accident. Plaintiff was taken to
the hospital for treatment of her injuries, and her blood alcohol level was 0.21 grams per 100
milliliters. On November 18, 2008, a lawyer representing plaintiff sent a letter to SMART
indicating that the letter served to provide statutory notice of her claim.
Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8),
and (C)(10), asserting that plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements for
filing a claim. Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that defendant SMART had notice of
the accident within 60 days in light of its investigation into the accident and that the legislative
intent for the notice provision was satisfied. She also alleged that defendants had to demonstrate
actual prejudice arising from plaintiff’s failure to provide written notice in the 60-day period.
The trial court denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition, concluding that “a
governmental agency asserting a statutory notice defense must show actual prejudice from the
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failure to provide the notice.” The trial court also held that the case law cited by defendants was
factually distinguishable. Defendants appeal as of right.
The trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de
novo on appeal. Kuznar v Raksha Corp, 481 Mich 169, 175; 750 NW2d 121 (2008). Questions
involving statutory interpretation present questions of law subject to review de novo. Hunter v
Hunter, 484 Mich 247, 257; 771 NW2d 694 (2009). The fundamental purpose of judicial
construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Sun Valley
Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). The most reliable evidence of the
Legislature’s intent is the words of the statute. Id. Once the intention of the Legislature is
discovered, it must prevail regardless of any rule of statutory construction to the contrary. In re
Certified Question, 433 Mich 710, 722; 449 NW2d 660 (1989). A clear and unambiguous statute
is not subject to judicial construction. Dep’t of Transp v Tomkins, 481 Mich 184, 191; 749
NW2d 716 (2008). Stated otherwise, when a statute plainly and unambiguously expresses the
legislative intent, the role of the court is limited to applying the terms of the statute to the
circumstances in a particular case. Id.
The provision at issue in this case, MCL 124.419, provides:
All claims that may arise in connection with the transportation authority
shall be presented as ordinary claims against a common carrier of passengers for
hire: Provided, That written notice of any claim based upon injury to persons or
property shall be served upon the authority no later than 60 days from the
occurrence through which such injury is sustained and the disposition thereof
shall rest in the discretion of the authority and all claims that may be allowed and
final judgment obtained shall be liquidated from funds of the authority: Provided,
further, That only courts situated in the counties in which the authority principally
carries on its function are the proper counties in which to commence and try
action against the authority.
In Nuculovic v Hill, 287 Mich App 58, 62; 783 NW2d 124 (2010), this Court held that the
statutory notice provision of MCL 124.419 was mandatory in light of the Legislature’s use of the
term “shall.” Further, the Nuculovic Court held that the term “claim” meant that a plaintiff had
to “provide notice of a court-enforceable right based on a personal injury within 60 days of the
date of the accident.” Nuculovic, 287 Mich App at 63.
In Nuculovic, it was undisputed that the plaintiff failed to provide notice within 60 days
of the alleged personal injury. Id. However, the plaintiff asserted that proper notice was given
because SMART received a copy of the police report for the incident and SMART employees
prepared reports regarding the accident. Id. at 66. This Court rejected the contention that these
documents satisfied the statutory notice requirement, holding that SMART’s possession of these
documents did not satisfy the requirement that a plaintiff “serve” notice of any “claim.” Id. at
68. Moreover, the plaintiff’s argument failed to distinguish between notice of some kind of an
occurrence from notice of a claim. Id. at 69. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s failure to serve notice
of a claim on the defendant within 60 days of the occurrence was fatal to the claim, and dismissal
was appropriate. Id. at 69-70.
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In the present case, plaintiff admits that she did not serve notice of a claim on defendants
within 60 days of the occurrence. MCL 124.419. However, she asserts that defendants obtained
the requisite notice from the police reports and its own investigation into the incident. Pursuant
to Nuculovic, plaintiff’s argument is without merit. The statute does not contain a provision for
substitute notice, and the deficiency warrants dismissal. Nuculovic, 287 Mich App at 69-70.
To avoid summary disposition, plaintiff asserts that defendants must demonstrate actual
prejudice arising from the noncompliance with the statutory notice provision, and the trial court
agreed, relying on Trent v Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transp, 252 Mich App 247;
651 NW2d 171 (2002). However, the actual prejudice concept utilized in Trent is not the
product of statutory language, but rather was a judicial creation set forth in Brown v Manistee Co
Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354; 550 NW2d 215 (1996) and Hobbs v Dep’t of State Hwys, 398 Mich
90; 247 NW2d 754 (1976). More importantly, the Brown and Hobbs decision were expressly
overruled in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 200, 215; 731 NW2d 41
(2007). Plaintiff contends, and the trial court agreed, that Rowland was factually distinguishable
because it involved a different statute, the defective highway exception to governmental
immunity, not the statute at issue here, and therefore, Trent remains binding precedent. We
disagree. The Rowland Court held that imposing the actual prejudice requirement onto the
defective highway exception to governmental immunity statute usurped the Legislature’s power.
Rowland, 477 Mich at 213. Additionally, the Rowland Court held that “[n]othing can be saved
from Hobbs and Brown because the analysis they employ is deeply flawed.” Id. at 214. Like
the defective highway exception, the plain language of MCL 124.419 does not contain an actual
prejudice requirement to avoid noncompliance with the notice provision. In light of the Supreme
Court’s express rejection of a showing of actual prejudice to allow a case to proceed where there
is noncompliance with the notice requirements of a statute, the trial court erred in denying
defendants’ motion for summary disposition.1
Reversed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
On January 20, 2011, the Supreme Court heard oral argument on whether to grant the
application for leave to appeal or other peremptory action in Pollard v Suburban Mobility
Authority for Regional Transp, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, Docket No.
288851, issued November 24, 2009. The issue raised in this appeal is also the subject matter of
the Pollard decision.
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