WALTER EDWARD KRYZANOSKI V PHILIP JOSEPH KAULE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WALTER EDWARD KRYZANOSKI,
UNPUBLISHED
February 22, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 295430
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 09-002295-NI
PHILIP JOSEPH KAULE and
MAUREEN KAULE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: SAAD, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and DONOFRIO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action to recover noneconomic damages under the no-fault act, plaintiff
appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Because our Supreme Court’s decision in McCormick v Carrier,
487 Mich 180; ___ NW2d ___ (2010), established a new standard for evaluating third-party
claims under MCL 500.3135(1) and (7), we are compelled to reverse the trial court’s decision in
this regard and remand for further proceedings consistent with McCormick’s directives. We
reverse and remand.
In May 2008, defendant Philip Joseph Kaule’s vehicle struck plaintiff’s vehicle at an
intersection. Plaintiff suffered a fracture of the third metacarpal of his dominant, left hand, with
significant shortening of the middle finger, and separation of the fracture fragments. Plaintiff
was in outpatient surgery the following day, and had three screws placed in his hand. Plaintiff
wore a splint and underwent eight weeks of physical therapy. Plaintiff filed his complaint in
February 2009, claiming that defendant Philip Joseph Kaule’s negligence in operating a motor
vehicle caused him to suffer injuries constituting serious impairment of body function pursuant
to MCL 500.3135(1) and (7). Defendants moved for summary disposition, asserting that
plaintiff’s injury did not meet the no-fault threshold under Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109; 683
NW2d 611 (2004), because the injury did not impact plaintiff’s ability to lead his normal life.
The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order, and in the interim,
the Supreme Court released its decision in McCormick overruling Kreiner.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 551; 739 NW2d 313 (2007). “In reviewing a motion under
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MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant
documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine
whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial.” Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich
App 618, 621; 689 NW2d 506 (2004). “A motion under subrule (C)(10) must specifically
identify the issues as to which the moving party believes there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact.” MCR 2.116(G)(4); Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817
(1999). The nonmoving party then has the burden to produce admissible evidence setting forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. MCR 2.116(G)(4); Al-Maliki v
LaGrant, 286 Mich App 483, 485; 781 NW2d 853 (2009).
In Michigan, a person “remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by
his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has
suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” MCL
500.3135(1). A serious impairment of body function is defined as “an objectively manifested
impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or
her normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7). Whether a person has suffered serious impairment of body
function is a question of law for the court if there is no factual dispute concerning the nature and
extent of the injuries, or if there is a factual dispute but it is not material to the determination of
whether the person has suffered serious impairment of body function. MCL 500.3135(2)(a).
The trial court correctly cited as then-applicable precedent Kreiner, 471 Mich at 132, which held,
in relevant part, that courts must analyze whether any difference between a plaintiff’s pre- and
post-accident lifestyle has affected his “‘general ability’ to conduct the course of his life.” Id. at
132-133. Because the Kreiner analysis has been supplanted by McCormick’s directives, the trial
court’s analysis is flawed and the threshold issues must be revisited.
First, “the threshold question whether the person has suffered a serious impairment of
body function should be determined by the court as a matter of law as long as there is no factual
dispute regarding ‘the nature and extent of the person’s injuries’ that is material to determining
whether the threshold standards are met.” McCormick, 487 Mich at 193. Second, if the court
decides there is no material factual dispute, it must then consider whether the plaintiff has “(1) an
objectively manifested impairment (2) of an important body function that (3) affects the
[plaintiff’s] general ability to lead his or her normal life.” Id. at 195. Regarding the third factor,
which is at issue in this case, the Court stated, “the common understanding of ‘to affect the
person’s ability to lead his or her normal life’ is to have an influence on some of the person’s
capacity to live in his or her normal manner of living. By modifying ‘normal life’ with ‘his or
her,’ the Legislature indicated that this requires a subjective, person- and fact-specific inquiry
that must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 202.
The Court added the following:
. . . First, the statute merely requires that a person’s general ability to lead
his or her normal life has been affected, not destroyed. Thus, courts should
consider not only whether the impairment has led the person to completely cease
a pre-incident activity or lifestyle element, but also whether, although a person is
able to lead his or her pre-incident normal life, the person’s general ability to do
so was nonetheless affected.
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Second, and relatedly, ‘general’ modifies ‘ability,’ not ‘affect’ or ‘normal
life.’ Thus, the plain language of the statute only requires that some of the
person’s ability to live in his or her normal manner of living has been affected, not
that some of the person’s normal manner of living has itself been affected.
***
Third, and finally, the statute does not create an express temporal
requirement as to how long an impairment must last in order to have an effect on
‘the person’s general ability to live his or her normal life.’ [McCormick, 487
Mich at 202-203.]
We must determine whether McCormick applies retroactively to this case. “[T]he general
rule is that judicial decisions are to be given complete retroactive effect. We have often limited
the application of decisions which have overruled prior law or reconstrued statutes. Complete
prospective application has generally been limited to decisions which overrule clear and
uncontradicted case law.” Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 240; 393
NW2d 847 (1986) (internal citations omitted). The threshold question in determining the
application of a new decision is whether the decision in fact clearly established a new principle
of law. Paul v Wayne Co Dep’t of Pub Service, 271 Mich App 617, 621; 722 NW2d 922 (2006).
If the answer is yes, then a court must weigh three factors: (1) the purpose to be served by the
new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactive application on
the administration of justice. Id.
Our Supreme Court clearly established a new principle of law in setting forth new rules
for analyzing serious impairment of body function under the statute, but the Court applied its
holding in McCormick to the facts of that case, indicating that it intended the holding to have
retroactive effect. McCormick, 487 Mich at 216-219. Regarding the purpose to be served by the
new rule, the McCormick Court held that Kreiner was due to be overruled because it departed
from the plain language of MCL 500.3135(7), therefore defying “practical workability” and
resulting in confusion and inconsistent interpretation of the statutory language. Id. at 211-212.
In examining the extent of reliance on the old rule, the Supreme Court noted that Kreiner was
only six years old and was “contrary to the plain text of the statute, which had been in place since
1995,” and it was unlikely that motor vehicle drivers, and the victims of motor vehicle accidents,
have altered their behavior in reliance on Kreiner. Id. at 213. Regarding the effect of retroactive
application on the administration of justice, while retroactively applying McCormick to pending
cases might have an adverse effect on courts and their caseload, the McCormick Court noted that
“our interpretation of the statute in this case is truer to the statute’s text than that of the Kreiner
majority, and, thus, our interpretation most closely reflects the policy balance struck by the
Legislature.” Id. at 214. Thus, McCormick should have retroactive effect in this case. We
therefore vacate the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants, and remand
for further consideration in light of McCormick.
On remand it will be incumbent on the trial court to reassess the factual presentation in
accordance with the McCormick directives. The change in law and the passage of time will
necessarily require new briefing should defendants continue to pursue summary disposition.
Updated medical information will be especially important.
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Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Plaintiff, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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