IN RE FARLEY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
February 15, 2011
In the Matter of FARLEY, Minors.
No. 299024
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC Nos. 2008-000033-NA
2008-000034-NA
2008-000035-NA
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and JANSEN and FORT HOOD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from an order that terminated her parental rights to the
minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). The parental rights of the
children’s father were also terminated, but he is not participating in this appeal. For the reasons
set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND ANALYSIS
The children were removed from respondent’s care in January 2008 on allegations that
respondent was being evicted from her home and was suffering from mental health issues.
Respondent admitted allegations in the petition in February 2008, at which time the children
were made temporary wards. Respondent was asked to submit to a psychological evaluation,
attend parenting classes, attend individual counseling, take her medication, obtain housing and
income, and visit with the children. Respondent’s visits were briefly suspended in June 2008
because she continued to display disturbing behavior during visits. However, almost
immediately thereafter respondent began to whole-heartedly embrace her treatment plan and was
fully compliant for a year. Respondent’s sister supervised her drug regimen and, along with the
agency, made sure that respondent got to her appointments. The children, although doing well in
foster care, enjoyed their time with respondent and each other during visits. Respondent was
granted unsupervised day visits, which progressed to unsupervised night visits, until the Family
Reunification Program (FRP) could begin services.
The children were eventually returned to respondent’s care in June 2009. Two referrals
were received shortly thereafter; however, neither was substantiated and neither served as the
basis for the children’s second removal in October 2009. Rather, it was respondent’s behavior
toward the children and the FRP workers that was problematic. Though initially grateful for the
assistance FRP provided to help her secure SSI income and provide access to food and furniture
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pantries, respondent began to act differently once the focus shifted from concrete and basic needs
to her actual parenting techniques and rule-making. When workers attempted to discuss
parenting issues with respondent, she would simply say she did not want to talk about it. In the
meantime, it was clear that respondent was under a great deal of stress with all three children at
home. Workers observed her to be very anxious and unsettled. In August 2009, when a Judson
worker was driving the family to register respondent’s oldest child, then 15 years old, for school,
respondent became enraged at the children. In a voice the worker described as “more than
yelling . . . to the point where she was spitting on my arm . . . ,” respondent threatened the
children that she “would give them to their Aunt [] when this was all over.”1 She told the worker
that she was sick of the children’s behavior and ordered the 15-year-old to walk home from the
school. The Judson worker did not fear for the children’s physical safety, but she worried about
their emotional well-being. An emergency hearing was held a few days later. Respondent was
admonished to allow the workers to counsel her on substantive parenting issues. Respondent
was also reminded to maintain her drug regimen and attend therapy.
Things only got worse after the August 28, 2009, hearing. In fact, respondent no longer
allowed the workers into her home. She became belligerent and none of the workers felt safe
going alone to respondent’s home. As a result of respondent’s behavior and noncompliance,
FRP discontinued services. There were also several instances where respondent could not
account for the children’s whereabouts. It was clear that she was having difficulty supervising
them. Respondent was invited to participate in a Team Decision-Making Meeting to see whether
the issues could be resolved without removing the children, but respondent said she could not
attend because her “brain hurt” and hung up on the worker. The children were removed from her
care once again in October 2009. Even at a November 2009 hearing, the worker and the
children’s GAL remained hopeful that respondent was experiencing a momentary lapse and
would soon get back on track with increased therapy. However, the caseworker sadly declared
in February 2010 that, based on the progress reports she had reviewed, the goal of the case
needed to be changed from reunification to termination. The GAL reluctantly agreed.
At the termination hearing, it was revealed that respondent’s failure to attend therapy
from November 2009 until January 2010 was not entirely her fault. New Passages was
undergoing a structural change that left many patients looking for alternative programs.
Respondent entered the Ventures program and appeared to be doing well. She was compliant
with the therapeutic aspect of treatment and was actually receiving her medication via shots.
However, respondent became angry at a report that indicated she showed signs of having
hallucinations and may have been suffering from a delusional disorder. Respondent thus
voluntarily discontinued the program and went back to New Passages. Although she claimed to
be compliant with the New Passages program, respondent refused to sign a release so that the
agency could receive progress reports, stating that she would only sign the release if the reports
would be favorable to her case. Therefore, at the time of the termination hearing, there was no
way to gauge respondent’s progress.
1
Testimony presented indicated that respondent had on numerous occasions told the children
that she would give them to their aunt when these proceedings had concluded.
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On appeal, the GAL takes a very strong position that a mistake was made in terminating
respondent’s parental rights. Rather then speaking for the children, which is the proper role of
the GAL, the GAL appears to have taken on the role as respondent’s advocate, as she is
extremely critical of her real clients, the minor children. We are not persuaded by the arguments
of the GAL based in large part because she is too dismissive of important and legally
determinative events. For example, the GAL believed it was perfectly reasonable for respondent
to order her 15-year-old son to walk home after he misbehaved in the car. However, the worker
who observed the exchange indicated that respondent had completely over-reacted to the
situation. In the opinion of the worker who actually witnessed the events, respondent evidenced
disgust with the children in a way that was not acceptable and caused the worker to fear for the
children’s mental and emotional well-being. Additionally, even if respondent was merely
dealing with normal teenage behavior, the simple fact remains that she was not amenable to
services. At some point after the children’s return in the summer of 2009, respondent simply
refused to allow the services to continue. Respondent was either not taking her medication, or
she was taking her medication but not benefiting from it. Either way, the record is clear that
respondent was completely overwhelmed and unstable. Once respondent’s sister encountered
problems of her own that necessitated her immediate attention and was therefore unable to assist
respondent, the support system which the GAL put so much faith in, ceased to exist. Following
the collapse of her support system, according to the testimony of all of those involved in this
matter, respondent’s level of agitation increased dramatically and it was accompanied by an
increasingly frustrating refusal to cooperate with service providers. Her refusal to allow anyone
to help or advise her resulted in the children’s second removal.
II. LAW AND CONCLUSIONS
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence.
In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). If a statutory ground for termination is
established, and the trial court finds “that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best
interests the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for
reunification of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). On appeal from
termination of parental rights proceedings, this Court reviews the trial court’s findings under the
clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(K); Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357. A finding is clearly
erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 455 NW2d 161
(1989). To be clearly erroneous, a decision must be more than maybe or probably wrong. In re
Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520, reh den 460 Mich 1205 (1999). Further, regard is to
be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who
appeared before it. MCR 2.613(C); Miller, 433 Mich at 337.
Respondent’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g),
and (j), which provide:
(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
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(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this
chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial
dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either
of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.
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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or
custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be
able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the
child’s age.
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of
the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the
home of the parent.
In recommending termination of respondent’s parental rights, the referee found:
Not one of the professionals working with the parents and the children
were recommending return of the children to the care of the parent, even with
services. Though efforts have been utilized for two and a half years without much
success, there is no likelihood that these services would be successful now.
*
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I’m confident that Ms. Farley loves her children very much and wants
them to return to her care. However, the reasons that the children were removed,
both times, was due to Ms. Farley’s inability to provide proper care for them. She
is unable to meet her own needs without assistance, and is unable to maintain
contact with the children when they become too loud for her, much less having
any other teenage problems.
The foregoing facts established clear and convincing evidence that statutory bases existed
for terminating respondent’s parental rights. The more difficult question was the children’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). It was agreed that respondent and the children shared a very close
bond. However, respondent was extremely overwhelmed while they were in her care. She did
not provide proper supervision and began behaving strangely again. Unfortunately, respondent
was not receptive to services that would have enabled her to properly supervise and care for the
children. Additionally, because respondent refused to sign the necessary releases, there was no
way to judge her progress in terms of her mental health. The children had been wards for two
and a half years. Although there was a point when respondent was making leaps and strides,
those improvements came only when the children were out of her care. The actual day-to-day
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parenting was simply too much for her. Given the length of time the children had been in care,
and respondent’s regression and noncompliance, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on the
record and the arguments presented, termination of respondent’s parental rights was established
by clear and convincing evidence. Additionally, we find that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MCR 3.977(K); In re
Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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