IN RE E C BALLWEG MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
February 15, 2011
In the Matter of E. C. BALLWEG, Minor.
No. 298901
Chippewa Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 10-013868-NA
Before: OWENS, P.J., and MARKEY and METER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm.
Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the statutory
grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. In termination
proceedings, this Court must defer to the trial court’s factual findings if those findings do not
constitute clear error. MCR 3.977(K). Both the trial court’s decision that a ground for
termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence and the best-interests
determination are reviewed for clear error. In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90-91; 763 NW2d 587
(2009). “A finding is clearly erroneous [if] although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.” In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that respondent failed to provide proper care
and custody for the child. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). The home was filthy and littered with animal
feces, respondent did not clean or sterilize the child’s bottles, the child was treated for chronic
and severe diaper rash, and there were several instances of improper supervision and evidence of
excessive alcohol use and violence in the home. The child sustained numerous injuries in her
first few months of life, including broken ribs, a bump on her forehead, a forehead puncture, a
broken clavicle, and various bruises. Respondent maintains that she had no knowledge of how
the child was injured and therefore cannot be held responsible for the injuries. Nevertheless, her
apparent lack of knowledge regarding such a large number of injuries is further evidence of
improper supervision. Petitioner clearly established that respondent did not provide proper care
and custody for the minor child.
The trial court also did not clearly err in finding that there was no reasonable expectation
that respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time,
-1-
considering the child’s young age. Id. Respondent avoided Child Protective Services (CPS) by
not answering the door, by not allowing CPS workers into her home when she did answer the
door, and by not allowing CPS workers to see her whole home when she did allow them into the
house. She delayed starting a parent nurturing program and a program called “Early On” and did
not follow instructions when she did start the parent nurturing program. Further, she gave
different versions of when a head injury occurred and untruthfully said that she brought the
injury to the parenting instructor’s attention when she did not. Respondent did not take the
parenting instructor’s advice about burping and there was evidence that she did not otherwise
take sufficient positive steps to learn better parenting and protect the child. Further, the child
became hysterical at supervised visitation with respondent, although the child did fine at
visitation with her father. Based on this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that
respondent would not be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time and
that § (g) was established by clear and convincing evidence.
The trial court also did not clearly err in finding that § (j) was established by clear and
convincing evidence. Indeed, there was a reasonable likelihood, based on respondent’s conduct
or capacity, that the child would be harmed if she were returned to respondent’s home. MCL
712A.19b(3)(j). While in respondent’s care, the child was injured several times in her first three
months of life and there was additional evidence, as noted above, of improper care that posed a
danger to the child. There was ample evidence to support the trial court’s finding that § (j) had
been established.
Given our conclusions with regard to §§ (g) and (j), we need not decide whether §§ (b)(i)
and (b)(ii) were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 712A.19b(3); see also In re
Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 540-541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005) (termination warranted if at least one
of the statutory grounds for termination has been established and termination is in the child’s
best interests).
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred in its best-interests determination. “If
the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of
parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights
and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL
712A.19b(5). Given the reasonable fear of injury and harm to the young child if she were
returned to respondent and the lack of bond between them, the trial court did not clearly err in
finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
