PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT RANDY TURNER SR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 15, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 296113
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2009-227139-FH
ROBERT RANDY TURNER, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURPHY, C.J., and MURRAY and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of possession of marijuana, second
offense, MCL 333.7403(2)(d), and third-degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 750.479a(3).
Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to two years’ probation
with one year in the county jail for the fleeing and eluding conviction and to 90 days in the
county jail for the marijuana conviction. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
On appeal, defendant argues that the prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence to
convict him of third-degree fleeing and eluding. We disagree. When reviewing a claim of
insufficient evidence, we examine the record de novo. People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112,
124; 600 NW2d 370 (1999). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597
NW2d 73 (1999). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences that arise from such
evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of
the prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
In People v Grayer, 235 Mich App 737, 741; 599 NW2d 527 (1999), this Court, citing
MCL 750.479a(3), summarized the applicable elements of the offense at issue:
-1-
[T]here are six elements necessary to establish third-degree fleeing and
eluding: (1) the law enforcement officer must have been in uniform and
performing his lawful duties and his vehicle must have been adequately identified
as a law enforcement vehicle, (2) the defendant must have been driving a motor
vehicle, (3) the officer, with his hand, voice, siren, or emergency lights must have
ordered the defendant to stop, (4) the defendant must have been aware that he had
been ordered to stop, (5) the defendant must have refused to obey the order by
trying to flee from the officer or avoid being caught, which conduct could be
evidenced by speeding up his vehicle or turning off the vehicle’s lights among
other things, and (6) some portion of the violation must have taken place in an
area where the speed limit was thirty-five miles an hour or less, or the defendant’s
conduct must have resulted in an accident or collision.
After examining the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that all of the elements of third-degree fleeing
and eluding were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In the present case, state troopers
Whitcomb and Weinrick testified that they were wearing their Michigan State Police Class A
uniforms. The troopers further stated that they were performing their lawful duties of patrolling
the streets in a clearly marked state police vehicle. Troopers Whitcomb and Weinrick also
asserted that defendant was driving a motor vehicle, specifically a 1979 Pontiac. This testimony
was sufficient for the jury to find that elements one and two of the offense were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, i.e., that the troopers were in uniform and performing lawful duties, that they
were in an identifiable law enforcement vehicle, and that defendant was driving a motor vehicle.
There was also sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that elements three and four of
the offense were proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., that defendant was
ordered to stop and that defendant was aware of the order. Specifically, the troopers testified
that, after observing defendant make a right hand turn without using a turn signal, turn off his
lights, and run through several stops signs, they activated their police vehicle’s emergency lights.
They stated that they activated their lights when they were about two car lengths away from
defendant. Furthermore, the troopers testified that there were never any other vehicles between
the police vehicle and defendant’s vehicle during the course of the pursuit. In fact, the troopers
asserted that there were no other vehicles on the street at that late hour. The troopers
subsequently activated their siren, yet defendant did not respond by immediately slowing down;
instead, he accelerated a little. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that the
troopers had ordered defendant to stop by way of activating the police vehicle’s emergency lights
and siren. The evidence was also sufficient for the jury to infer that defendant was aware that he
had been ordered to stop, where there were no other vehicles on the street at that late hour, the
illuminated police vehicle was following close behind defendant’s vehicle, and the police siren
eventually blared.
The prosecution also provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that
element five of the offense, i.e., that defendant refused to obey the order by trying to flee from
the troopers or avoid being caught, was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The troopers
testified that they observed defendant erratically pull out of a restaurant parking lot and speed
down the street. Defendant then made a quick right-hand turn onto a street, turned off his
vehicle lights, and proceeded to run some stop signs. Although this activity in and of itself could
-2-
not constitute acts of fleeing and eluding police, as the troopers had not yet signaled defendant to
stop, it did provide some circumstantial evidence that defendant was attempting to avoid the
troopers that night, that he was aware of their presence, and that his later actions after police
lights and siren were activated reflected an intent to flee and elude police. The troopers testified
that after they activated their police vehicle’s lights, defendant failed to stop despite being given
this visual order to stop. The troopers stated that defendant kept driving fast down the residential
street, exceeding the speed limit and making no attempt to stop. Troopers Whitcomb and
Weinrick also testified that they eventually engaged their siren, yet defendant accelerated,
continued to drive for a block, and then abruptly came to a stop. The evidence was sufficient for
the jury to find that defendant refused to obey the orders to stop and for the jurors to infer that
defendant was attempting to flee and elude the troopers or avoid being caught. See People v
Perez-DeLeon, 224 Mich App 43, 59; 568 NW2d 324 (1997) (given the difficulty in proving a
defendant’s state of mind, circumstantial evidence can suffice to establish that the defendant
possessed the requisite intent).
Defendant argues that his actions in turning off his lights cannot be deemed responsive to
any visual signal to stop because neither the troopers’ lights nor siren had yet been activated. As
indicated above, the evidence that defendant turned off his lights did not constitute an act of
fleeing and eluding, but it could be used as circumstantial evidence of his intent with respect to
subsequent actions following orders to stop. Further, there was other evidence reflecting
commission of the crime of fleeing and eluding. That is, after the troopers engaged the police
vehicle’s lights, defendant sped down two short blocks on Madison, turned on Kettering while
accelerating his speed, and then, despite activation of the police vehicle’s siren, continued to
travel down a long block on Kettering, before he halted to the troopers’ order to stop.
There was also sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that element six of the
offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the troopers testified that defendant
was driving 40 to 50 miles per hour in a 25 miles per hour zone. In sum, there was sufficient
evidence to find that all of the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant argues that a rational
explanation for his vehicle lights shutting off was that his vehicle was old and malfunctioned.
He also argues that he did not immediately stop because there were other vehicles parked on the
street and his old vehicle required more distance to properly stop. Again, the issue regarding the
lights on defendant’s vehicle does not alter the fact that there were subsequent actions taken by
defendant that established the crime of fleeing and eluding. On the argument of parked vehicles
and needing room to stop, it fails to address and negate the evidence that defendant was speeding
and did not slow down after police emergency lights were activated and that defendant even
accelerated after the siren was engaged. Moreover, the prosecution is not required to negate
every possible theory that is consistent with a defendant’s innocence. People v Hardiman, 466
Mich 417, 423-424; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). Rather, the prosecution need only introduce
evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable jury of the defendant’s guilt in light of any
contradictory evidence presented by the defendant. Id. at 424.
Defendant emphasizes the brevity of the chase, arguing that the short time period that
elapsed between when the police first activated their emergency lights and when defendant
-3-
pulled over did not justify the charge or support the conviction. Regardless of the length of time
that elapsed, defendant’s actions in failing to slow down, accelerating, turning down another
road, and then continuing to drive, all supported the conviction. When viewed in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, the evidence presented by the prosecution at trial was sufficient to
meet its burden of proof.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.