PEOPLE OF MI V LOUIS BARRY CURRIN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 15, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 294195
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 07-029211-FC
LOUIS BARRY CURRIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and FITZGERALD and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder, MCL 750.84, and the trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender, fourth
offense, MCL 769.12, to a prison term of nine to 18 years. Defendant appeals as of right. We
affirm.
Defendant’s first argument concerns the trial court’s conduct. Although defendant
frames his argument in terms of judicial bias, in actuality he is arguing that certain questions and
actions by the trial judge unfairly influenced the jury and thereby deprived him of a fair trial.
We disagree.
Defendant moved for a mistrial as a result of the trial court’s conduct during trial. “We
review a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion.” People v
Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 175; 561 NW2d 463 (1997).
Pursuant to MRE 614(b), the trial court may question witnesses in order to clarify
testimony or elicit additional relevant information, People v Conyers, 194 Mich App 395, 404405; 487 NW2d 787 (1992), but its actions cannot pierce the veil of judicial impartiality. People
v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 50; 546 NW2d 1 (1996). “[T]he trial court must exercise caution and
restraint to ensure that its questions are not intimidating, argumentative, prejudicial, unfair, or
partial.” Conyers, 194 Mich App at 405. “A trial judge has discretion to question witnesses to
shed light on something unclear in the testimony but must not allow his views on disputed issues
of fact to become apparent to the jury.” People v Pawelczak, 125 Mich App 231, 236; 336
NW2d 453 (1983). The test to determine whether a new trial is warranted is whether the judge’s
questions and comments may well have unjustifiably aroused suspicion in the mind of the jury as
to a witness’s credibility and whether partiality quite possibly could have influenced the jury to
the detriment of the defendant’s case. Conyers, 194 Mich App at 405.
-1-
Defendant first points to the following exchange, which occurred following defense
counsel’s redirect examination of defendant:
THE COURT: I have just a couple of questions. When this little guy started to
get off on you, or reach for the knife, why didn’t you just leave and—or when the
owner came out and say this guy’s ‘s [sic] going nuts on me or whatever, say—
why didn’t you do that?
THE WITNESS: Well, when Shannon came around there, all he did was say stop
it, and I couldn’t stop it because the guy was still sticking me, sticking at me. But
when he did stop, I quit.
THE COURT: When’s the first time you ever said anything to Detective Grigg
about him calling you that name and coming at you with the knife and that,
when—today?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. I don’t have anything further…
Defendant asserts that the trial court’s first question suggested that the trial court believed that
defendant should have fled the scene when one of the store workers pulled a knife. Defendant
claims this undermined his self-defense claim and “suggest[ed] that the court did not believe
[defendant’s] claim that the complainant started the fight.” Defendant asserts that the trial
court’s second question “challenge[d] [defendant’s] version of events” and “communicated its
belief that [defendant] made up the story for purposes of trial.”
Although this exchange might have cast doubt on the credibility of defendant’s testimony
and his defense, that was a result of his answers, not the result of an improper question. These
questions were limited in scope, material to the issues, and did not communicate to the jury any
opinion that the trial judge may have had regarding these matters. Moreover, defendant testified
that he did in fact start the fight. He said that he grabbed the store worker by his collar with both
hands after Neville insulted him. The trial court’s questioning produced fuller testimony and
clarified what defendant told the investigating officer. As such, these questions did not
unjustifiably arouse suspicion in the mind of the jury as to a witness’s credibility or influence the
jury to the detriment of the defendant’s case. Conyers, 194 Mich App at 405.
Defendant next claims that the trial court “expressed fear or distrust” of defendant when
it moved a knife away from the witness stand during defendant’s testimony on direct
examination. Defendant appears to argue that the trial court should have granted his motion for a
mistrial because the trial court’s action unduly influenced the jury.
A criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. People v Mosko, 441
Mich 496, 503; 495 NW2d 534 (1992). A criminal defendant generally has the right to appear
before the jury as a dignified, free, and innocent man. People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 187;
774 NW2d 714 (2009).
-2-
The record shows that defendant received a fair trial. First, this unusual situation was
created by defense counsel, who apparently placed the knife near the witness stand during
defendant’s testimony. Second, although the incident was unfortunate, the trial court explained
that its only concern was safety. A trial court has discretion to take the steps necessary to
prevent injury to persons in the courtroom. Payne, 285 Mich App at 186. Given defendant’s
rather extensive criminal history dating back to 1975, the trial court was clearly justified in
regard to its safety concerns.
Moreover, defendant cannot show he was prejudiced as a result of the trial court’s
questioning or the knife incident. The trial court instructed the jury that its comments, rulings,
questions, and instructions are not evidence, and that a person accused of a crime is presumed
innocent. The trial court also instructed, “If you believe that I have an opinion about how you
should decide this case, you must pay no attention to that opinion.” “[J]urors are presumed to
follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Under
the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion denying defendant’s motion for a
mistrial. Messenger, 221 Mich App at 175.
Defendant next argues he was denied his right to a speedy trial. However, defendant
waived his right to a speedy trial at the November 14, 2007, hearing on his motion for an
adjournment. Based on the questioning from the trial court during that hearing, it is clear that
defendant specifically considered and intentionally waived this right. People v Williams, 475
Mich 245, 261; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). As such, we decline to review this issue.
Defendant next argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he (1)
failed to raise a claim of violation of defendant’s right to a speedy trial, and (2) failed to seek a
jury instruction on the necessarily lesser-included offense of simple assault. We disagree.
The determination as to whether there has been a deprivation of the effective assistance
of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640
NW2d 246 (2002). The factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and the matters of law are
reviewed de novo. Id. The ultimate decision whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance is
also reviewed de novo. Id.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that: (1) counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 129; 695 NW2d
342 (2005); People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). Effective
assistance of counsel is presumed, and a defendant claiming ineffective assistance is required to
overcome a strong presumption that sound trial strategy motivated defense counsel’s conduct.
LeBlanc, 465 Mich at 578.
Defendant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a violation of his
right to a speedy trial is without merit because, as noted, he waived his right on the record to a
speedy trial. Trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to advocate a meritless position. Mack,
265 Mich App at 130. Counsel’s failure to argue a meritless position clearly falls within
prevailing professional norms.
-3-
Further, defense counsel might have elected not to request an instruction on the lesser
included offense as a matter of trial strategy. This Court will not second-guess counsel on
matters of strategy. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843
(1999). Despite defendant’s contention that the instruction could only have helped him, it may
have been defense counsel’s strategy to forego an instruction on a charge that defendant’s
testimony clearly supported. Thus, if the jury believed defendant’s testimony that he did not
have a weapon and only responded more aggressively in self defense when the store worker
reached for a weapon, it would be left with no choice but to acquit defendant of assault with
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. However, had the jury been instructed on simple
assault, even if the jury believed defendant’s testimony that he did not have a weapon and only
responded more aggressively in self defense, it could have convicted him of simple assault based
on his testimony that he grabbed the store worker by the collar when worker made him angry.
Moreover, in light of the evidence of defendant’s guilt, the outcome would not have been
different even if defense counsel had requested the instruction. Accordingly, defendant was not
denied effective assistance of counsel.
Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court erred in scoring ten points for offense
variable (OV) 9. We disagree.
Defendant preserved this issue by challenging the scoring of OV 9 at the sentencing
hearing. MCL 769.34(10); People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 309; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). “A
sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points to be scored [when
calculating the sentencing guidelines], provided that evidence of record adequately supports a
particular score.” People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). Thus, this
Court reviews the scoring to determine whether the sentencing court properly exercised its
discretion and whether the evidence adequately supported a particular score. People v Steele,
283 Mich App 472, 490; 769 NW2d 256 (2009).
A score of ten points for OV 9 is appropriate if “[t]here were 2 to 9 victims who were
placed in danger of physical injury or death…” MCL 777.39(1)(c). The statute defines “victim”
as “each person who was placed in danger of physical injury or loss of life or property...” MCL
777.39(2)(a).
Defendant clearly placed the store worker in danger of physical injury. The issue is
whether defendant placed a second store worker in danger of physical injury. Defendant argues
that he should not be charged with putting a second store worker in danger of physical injury
because he attempted to distance himself from the second store worker, but that the second store
worker chased him. However, defendant’s argument completely ignores defendant’s behavior
before he was chased by the second store worker.
The second store worker testified that he was working in the service area, pulling out
vehicles, when he heard “some ruckus.” The worker came “around the corner” and saw the first
worker curled up into a ball with defendant on top of him. The second worker saw defendant
strike the first worker 10 to 15 times, and heard the worker repeatedly yelling, “he’s got a gun …
he’s got a gun.”
-4-
The second worker indicated that he “started yelling and making a bunch of noise,
screaming … [defendant] stood up, and he turned around and he came at me.” Defendant ran
toward the second worker, who then fled the store to get away from defendant. As the second
worker was running, defendant continued to yell, “Come here, come here, come here.” The
second worker ran out of the building and called 911 as defendant chased him down the street
through a parking lot. At some point, defendant gave up the chase and left the scene. The
second worker then followed defendant to keep sight of him until the police arrived.
The second store worker’s testimony adequately supports the trial court’s finding that two
victims were placed in danger of physical injury. Steele, 283 Mich App at 490. The second
worker was placed in danger of physical injury when defendant chased him in a threatening
manner after assaulting the first worker. The trial court did not err in assigning ten points for OV
9. Steele, 283 Mich App at 490.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.