IN RE X LITCHARD MINOR

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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS UNPUBLISHED February 10, 2011 In the Matter of X. LITCHARD, Minor. No. 299816 Cheboygan Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 09-004452-NA Before: OWENS, P.J., and MARKEY and METER, JJ. PER CURIAM. Respondent appeals by right the circuit court’s order terminating her parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), (l), and (n)(i). We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E). Although respondent argues that termination of her parental rights was not warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h), the trial court did not rely on that statutory subsection as a basis for termination. Rather, the court found that §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), (l), and (n)(i) were each proven by clear and convincing evidence. Because respondent does not challenge the trial court’s findings with respect to those statutory subsections, she has abandoned any issue relating to those grounds. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 712; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). In any event, the law is clear that a petitioner need establish only one statutory ground for termination, In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350, 360; 612 NW2d 407 (2000), and it is not disputed that respondent’s parental rights to another child were previously terminated after that child became the subject of child protective proceedings. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in finding, at a minimum, that § 19b(3)(l) was established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent’s claim that she was not provided with reunification services is without merit. Before the court enters an order of disposition, the Department of Human Services (DHS) must prepare a case service plan. MCL 712A.18f(2). The plan must include “[e]fforts to be made by the child’s parent to enable the child to return . . . home” and a “[s]chedule of services to be provided to the parent, child, and . . . the foster parent, to facilitate the child’s return . . . home or to facilitate the child’s permanent placement.” MCL 712A.18f(3). However, services are not always required, In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 25 n 4; 610 NW2d 563 (2000), and reasonable efforts at reunification are not required if “[t]he parent has had rights to the child’s siblings involuntarily terminated.” MCL 712A.19a(2)(c). Although the petition in this case was filed in April 2009, the child remained in his home with his father and the case was placed on hold, apparently pending the resolution of the child -1- protective proceeding or criminal case in another county. The trial court did not assume jurisdiction over the child until February 2010, and did not enter an order of disposition until March 2010, by which time respondent’s parental rights to another child had been terminated. Respondent’s reliance on In re Mason, 486 Mich 142; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), is thus misplaced, because there were no “aggravated circumstances” in that case that would have excused reunification efforts. Id. at 152. Finally, considering that respondent had not visited the child for several years and there was no apparent bond between respondent and the child, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). We affirm. /s/ Donald S. Owens /s/ Jane E. Markey /s/ Patrick M. Meter -2-

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