TEJUANE CARROLL V CITY OF FLINT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TEJUANE CARROLL,
UNPUBLISHED
February 10, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 296134
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 09-091252-NO
CITY OF FLINT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: TALBOT, P.J., and SAWYER and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Tejuane Carroll appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition to the
City of Flint (hereinafter “the City”) based on the failure to provide adequate notice of his claim.
We affirm.
Carroll’s complaint alleges that he was injured when he fell on a snow-covered pothole in
the roadway on December 8, 2008. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the
City because Carroll failed to comply with the statutory pre-suit notice requirement.1 Carroll
contends that he substantially complied with the statutory notice requirement and that the trial
court erred in dismissing his claim.
The City sought summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). The
trial court did not specify the subrule under which it granted the motion, but because the court
relied on evidence beyond the pleadings, it apparently granted the motion in accordance with
MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (10).2 Summary disposition may be granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when
the claim is barred because of “immunity granted by law . . . .” Summary disposition may be
granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when “there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the
1
MCL 691.1404.
2
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is limited to the pleadings alone.
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moving party is entitled to judgment . . . as a matter of law.” This Court reviews a trial court’s
decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.3
The City, as a governmental agency, is generally immune from tort liability while
engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.4 An exception to this general
grant of immunity is a duty imposed on governmental agencies that have jurisdiction over a
highway to “maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and
convenient for public travel.”5 Liability under this exception is subject to specific statutory
conditions, which provide, in relevant part:
(1) As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any
defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the injury
occurred, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) shall serve a notice on
the governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The
notice shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury
sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant.
(2) The notice may be served upon any individual, either personally, or by
certified mail, return receipt requested, who may lawfully be served with civil
process directed against the governmental agency, anything to the contrary in the
charter of any municipal corporation notwithstanding. . . .6
Civil process directed against a city “may be made by serving a summons and a copy of the
complaint on . . . the mayor, the city clerk, or the city attorney of a city.”7
It is undisputed that Carroll did not serve the required notice on the City’s mayor, city
clerk, or city attorney. Instead, the notice was mailed to the City’s Risk Management Division.
Before this Court, Carroll relies on a letter sent by the city attorney to her counsel, in which the
city attorney acknowledged the receipt of Carroll’s January 9, 2009, letter and requested
additional information about the alleged accident and injuries. Carroll did not submit the city
attorney’s letter with his response to the summary disposition motion; rather, it was first
submitted with Carroll’s motion for reconsideration.8 In reviewing a ruling on a motion for
3
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
4
See MCL 691.1407(1).
5
MCL 691.1402(1).
6
MCL 691.1404.
7
MCR 2.105(G)(2).
8
Carroll does not challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration.
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summary disposition, this Court will not consider evidence that was first presented as part of a
motion for reconsideration.9
Carroll further argues that use of the term “may” in the statutory subsection indicates that
the service requirements in that provision are discretionary.10 We disagree. While “may” is
generally recognized as designating discretion11 that construction will not be employed where “to
do so would clearly frustrate legislative intent as evidenced by other statutory language or by
reading the statute as a whole.”12
We disagree with Carroll’s suggestion that service in compliance with the statutory
directive is discretionary.13 The relevant statute specifically requires “[a]s a condition for
recovery for injuries . . .” that the injured person “shall serve a notice[.]”14 This provision
unambiguously indicates that service of the required notice is mandatory. A separate subsection
of the statute specifies a method for accomplishing the required service and provides that service
be on “any individual, either personally, or by certified mail, return receipt requested, who may
lawfully be served with civil process directed against the governmental agency . . . .”15 This
Court previously considered an ordinance which provided that an aggrieved person “may make
complaint . . . before the board of assessors . . . .” The Court examined the pertinent ordinances
and concluded that the
[r]espondent has by ordinance, established only one procedure to review
assessment, a procedure that requires a hearing before the board of assessors. The
obvious inference that can be drawn is that there are no original proceedings
before the board of review.16
Similarly, in this case, the obvious inference from reading the relevant statutory subsections
together is that the service mandated by subsection (1) must be accomplished as provided in
subsection (2).17
9
Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 366-367 n 5; 547 NW2d 314 (1996); Maiden, 461
Mich at 126 n 9.
10
MCL 691.1404(2).
11
Old Kent Bank v Kal Kustom Enterprises, 255 Mich App 524, 532; 660 NW2d 384 (2003).
12
Browder v Int’l Fidelity Ins Co, 413 Mich 603, 612; 321 NW2d 668 (1982).
13
MCL 691.1404(2).
14
MCL 691.1404(1).
15
MCL 691.1404(2).
16
Fink v Detroit, 124 Mich App 44, 50-51; 333 NW2d 376 (1983).
17
MCL 691.1404(1), (2).
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Carroll argues that service on the City’s Department of Street Maintenance and Risk
Management Division is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement because those departments
are the “governmental agency of the occurrence,” inasmuch as the City has jurisdiction over the
area and both the Department of Street Maintenance and the Risk Management Division are the
City’s “agents.”18 Carroll emphasizes that the relevant statutory provisions do not refer to
“governmental entity” or “city.” 19
The term “governmental agency” is statutorily defined as “the state or a political
subdivision.”20 The definition of “political subdivision” includes a municipal corporation and
“an agency [or] department . . . of a political subdivision.”21 Although these definitions lend
support to Carroll’s contention that a department of a municipal corporation is a “governmental
agency,” they are not dispositive. The problem that arises is that Carroll brought his action
against the City, not one of its divisions or departments. Because notice to “the governmental
agency” is a pre-condition to recovery of damages under the statute22, a notice served on one
“governmental agency” does not satisfy the requirement with respect to a different
“governmental agency.” In other words, Carroll cannot salvage his lawsuit against the City by
claiming that notice to another governmental agency satisfied the relevant statutory
requirement.23
Carroll also argues that, at a minimum, his notice substantially complied with the
statutory requirements. Carroll relies on a recent published decision by this Court that rejected
the defendant’s argument that the notice provided in that case did not adequately identify the
allegedly defective condition and concluded that substantial compliance with the statutory
requirements is sufficient.24 This case is readily distinguishable as the record here does not
support Carroll’s contention that his notice substantially complied with the statutory
requirements. Carroll did not serve the notice on the City’s mayor, clerk, or city attorney. The
notice merely refers to a “defective roadway,” without specifying the exact nature of the defect
or its precise location. The described location of the defect, “Eastbound traffic lane in the
intersection of Burr Street and Lippincott Street,” is 97 feet wide and a traffic lane in width. The
pothole that Carroll identified in the photographs that accompanied his affidavit is in the
westbound lane of Lippincott Street (in the immediate vicinity of the stop sign for southbound
Burr Street.) Unlike the case he cites25, Carroll’s notice did not “reasonably apprise” the City of
18
MCL 691.1404(2).
19
MCL 691.1404(1), (2).
20
MCL 691.1401(d).
21
MCL 691.1401(b).
22
MCL 691.1404(1)
23
Id.
24
Plunkett v Dep’t of Transp, 286 Mich App 168; 779 NW2d 263 (2009).
25
Id. at 178-179.
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the nature and location of the alleged defect. Because Carroll did not substantially comply with
the statutory requirements, the trial court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary
disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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