PEOPLE OF MI V RONALD DAVID MARTIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 8, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 293129
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2009-224853-FC
RONALD DAVID MARTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and JANSEN and WHITBECK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Ronald Martin appeals as of right his jury conviction of five counts of firstdegree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I).1 He also appeals his conviction of four counts of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II).2 Both of these offenses involved a minor
relative between ages 13 and 16. The trial court sentenced Martin to concurrent terms of 15 to
30 years in prison for each of his CSC I convictions and 8 to 15 years in prison for each of his
CSC II convictions. We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
The complainant was age 16 at the time of trial in May 2009. Martin is the complainant’s
father. He and the complainant’s mother were never married and do not live together. The
complainant lives with her mother and would normally visit her father on weekends. The
complainant testified that the first time Martin did something inappropriate to her was in midJanuary to early-February 2008. She stated that he grabbed the front of her pants and pulled her
towards him. Later in February, Martin came into the room of the complainant’s sister where the
complainant was watching television, laid down next to her, and began touching her breasts on
top of her bra. He eventually stopped but stayed in the bed with her. The complainant
acknowledged that there were other beds available, but she stayed in the bed with Martin. At the
end of February, she told her friend, OR, about this incident.
1
MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(ii).
2
MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(ii).
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In March or April 2008, Martin, the complainant, and her younger sister stayed at a
Holiday Inn. The complainant testified that, just after her sister left the room to go to the
swimming pool, Martin took the complainant by the arms and pulled her towards him. The front
of their bodies touched, and he tried to kiss her. Later that night, Martin lay down next to the
complainant while her sister was in the other bed. He touched the complainant’s breasts
underneath her bra, put his hand down her shorts, and digitally penetrated her vagina. Martin
then followed her into the bathroom, took off her shorts and his boxers, put her on the counter,
and penetrated her vagina with his penis.
On cross-examination, the complainant testified that Martin had been in the bathroom
and as he was walking out, she was walking in, and he then followed her back in. However, her
testimony at the preliminary exam indicated that he had not been in the bathroom first. In a prior
statement given to Amy Allen at Care House, the complainant said that she and her sister were in
the same bed, that Martin moved her sister to the other bed, and then he got in bed with the
complainant and penetrated her. She explained the discrepancy by saying that she must have
mixed up the events. She acknowledged that she continued to visit Martin after the hotel
incident, even though she was afraid he might rape her again, because she still wanted to see her
dad.
During the summer of 2008, Martin was going through a divorce and began living with
his brother, Don Martin. Martin occupied the guest bedroom in Don Martin’s house. When the
complainant stayed overnight with Martin, they slept in the same bed. The complainant said that
she could not sleep on the couch because it hurt her back. On one occasion, she got into bed
after Martin was already in bed. He touched her breast underneath her bra. She claimed that he
then removed her shorts and asked her to remove her shirt. When she declined to do this, Martin
took off his boxers and then penetrated her vagina with his penis.
Also during the summer of 2008, while the complainant was staying at her grandmother’s
house, Martin followed her into the bedroom and touched her breast underneath her bra. She
initially said that he stopped and left when her sister came into the room to go to bed. On crossexamination, however, she said that he stayed in the room after her sister got in bed and resumed
the inappropriate touching after her sister went to sleep. Also, she contradicted herself with
regard to the timeframe, stating that this happened at the end of Spring 2008.
The complainant testified that, on a subsequent occasion at Don Martin’s house, Martin
joined her while she was in the shower. He pulled her towards him and his chest was touching
her breasts. He asked if she wanted him to get out; he left when she said yes. She then finished
her shower. When she went to the bedroom to get dressed, he was also getting dressed. At that
moment, her sister called, asking to be picked up. After the phone call, Martin penetrated the
complainant’s vagina with his penis. This time he wore a condom. On cross-examination, the
complainant said that she got dressed in the bedroom, whereas at the preliminary examination
she said that she got dressed in the bathroom. Also, she said that Martin was in the kitchen when
she initially entered the bedroom. She also stated that he stopped because of the phone call.
Toward the end of August 2008, the complainant went to a birthday party with Martin
and then returned to Don Martin’s house with him. She got in bed, and Martin joined her. She
claimed that he then penetrated her vagina with his penis. Although she saw Martin after this
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incident, this was the last time the abuse occurred. The complainant had previously told Amy
Allen of Care House that everything started after Martin moved in with Don Martin. She also
told Allen that two of the rapes occurred in her bunk bed. The bunk bed arrived at Don Martin’s
house in August 2008.
In October 2008, the complainant told her boyfriend, CH, about what happened. Two
days later, she told her best friend, OR, the full story as well. The complainant said that she
finally told someone because she did not want to have to keep visiting Martin and did not want
the same thing to happen to her sister. She could not explain why she waited until October. She
said that OR told her she had to tell someone about the abuse. They decided to tell OR’s mother,
CR. CR is also the complainant’s godmother. OR was the one that actually told CR about what
happened, but the complainant responded to questions. The three of them then told the
complainant’s mother.
On cross-examination of the complainant, defense counsel established that she had
incorrectly told her mother that all four incidents of intercourse happened at Don Martin’s house.
Further, defense counsel established that during the time period of the assaults, the complainant
had visited Martin more often than she previously had. The two of them had done many
activities together, such as going to Cedar Point and Michigan Adventure. Although the
complainant claimed that she went to Don Martin’s home to see her sister, she stayed even when
her sister was not there. Also, the complainant chose to stay with Martin even though she had
the option to go to her grandmother’s house. The complainant had also testified on Martin’s
behalf when a personal protection order was sought regarding visitation rights for her sister.
Further, defense counsel established that, in October 2008, Martin had refused the
complainant’s request that she be put on his cell phone plan. She made her allegations of sexual
abuse shortly after their argument. The complainant wanted to be on Martin’s phone plan
because it would have been easier and cheaper to talk to her friends. She claimed that he put her
off, saying that he would wait to look at her grades. Despite this testimony, the complainant
maintained that, other than the touching and rapes, there was nothing that was making her angry
with Martin during the relevant period.
In his affidavit, Martin claimed that he agreed to put the complainant on the cell phone
plan if her grades improved and she stopped seeing SC. Martin claimed that SC, 18 years old at
the time, was having sexual relations with the complainant. Martin and the complainant got into
numerous arguments over her relationship with SC. In the spring of 2008, Martin told the
complainant that he did not approve of her seeing SC. In the summer of 2008, Martin again told
the complainant not to see SC anymore. Martin also threatened to report SC to the police if the
complainant did not stop seeing him. Martin made a similar threat at the end of the summer of
2008. Before trial, Martin sought to have evidence of the complainant’s relationship with SC
admitted into the record. But the trial court precluded the evidence on the basis of the rape
shield law.3
3
MCL 750.520j.
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The complainant’s mother testified that the complainant was upset and crying when she
told her about what was happening with Martin. Her mother said that the complainant had told
her that sexual intercourse had occurred on four occasions, each time at Don Martin’s house.
She said that during the relevant time period, the complainant would insist on going to Don
Martin’s home. The complainant never indicated that she did not want to go. After the
complainant’s disclosure regarding the abuse, her mother took her to see her pediatrician, Dr.
Stacy Gorman.
Dr. Gorman testified that the complainant told her that Martin had forced her to have
sexual intercourse four times since February 2008. Dr. Gorman took a patient history, which she
said was necessary for treatment to know what happened and who was responsible. Dr. Gorman
subsequently recommended counseling for the complainant. However, she did not perform a
pelvic examination on the complainant. She explained that she did not perform a pelvic
examination because the complainant had already had one in August 2008. Dr. Gorman further
explained that she did not feel the need to repeat the exam because the complainant told her that
August was the last time any sexual abuse had occurred.
After seeing Dr. Gorman, the complainant went to the Waterford Police Department and
then to Care House, where Amy Allen conducted a forensic interview. Without objection, Allen
was qualified as an expert in forensic interviewing, as well as on characteristics of children who
report sexual abuse. Allen stated that she followed a forensic interviewing protocol that involved
open-ended questions. In essence, she testified that it was not unusual for adolescents to delay
reporting sexual abuse by a family member. Further, she said that it would not be unusual if one
did not see outward signs of abuse. She also said it would not be unusual for a victim to show no
fear. She explained that compliance might result because of the body’s response to the abuse or
because the child did not know how to make it stop. Allen also said that a child might return to
the abuser because of a desire to protect someone else and might stay even if the person to be
protected is not present because of compliance with the abuser. She explained that people
change details when remembering traumatic events. Further, she said that a victim’s motivating
factor in reporting abuse was most often to make it stop, not trigger prosecution.
On cross-examination of Allen, defense counsel established that there were some
similarities among child sexual abuse victims. Defense counsel further established that the
complainant had not run away from home, did not use drugs, did not have poor hygiene, and was
not underweight or overweight. Allen clarified, however, that an abused child could have really
poor or extremely good hygiene, and really poor or extremely good grades. Allen did not know
if the complainant suffered from low self-esteem. Defense counsel called into question that a 14or 15-year-old child would withhold reporting abuse because he or she was close to
independence. Further, defense counsel ascertained that Allen was not assessing truthfulness.
Allen told the defense counsel that, in embellishing a story, a 15-year-old child would likely
focus on what should have been done, like fighting the molester. Allen also acknowledged that
inconsistent stories might result from blending events or from outright lying. Further, defense
counsel established that Allen could not tell the difference between when a child was lying and
when a child was changing the story based on more legitimate factors.
On a redirect examination, Allen testified that an investigator tries to develop alternative
explanations for why a child is making the statement. She explained that when younger children
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are involved, an alleged touching could be for hygienic purposes. Allen did not speak to
alternative hypotheses in this case. Yet, she explained that her team ruled out any alternative
hypotheses for the complainant.
As stated, the jury convicted Martin of five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
and four counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Martin now appeals.
II. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Martin argues that defense counsel deprived him of his right to effective assistance of
counsel in several respects. We will address each of Martin’s claims in turn below.
Effective assistance of counsel claims involve mixed questions of fact and constitutional
law. A judge must first find the facts and then decide if they establish a violation of the
defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. This Court reviews the
lower court’s factual findings for clear error while reviewing de novo any constitutional
determinations.5
4
B. LEGAL STANDARDS
“Generally, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1)
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under professional
norms and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would
have been different and the result that did occur was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.”6
Counsel’s performance must be measured without the benefit of hindsight.7 Effective assistance
is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.8 “This presumption
can only be overcome by a showing of counsel’s failure to perform an essential duty, which
failure was prejudicial to the defendant. The burden is on [the] defendant.”9
Defense counsel has wide discretion regarding matters of trial strategy.10 This Court will
not substitute its judgment for that of defense counsel regarding such matters.11 “An attorney’s
4
People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
5
People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 484-485; 684 NW2d 686 (2004).
6
People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 16; 776 NW2d 314 (2009).
7
People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009).
8
Seals, 285 Mich App at 17.
9
People v Reinhardt, 167 Mich App 584, 591; 423 NW2d 275 (1988).
10
People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 415; 740 NW2d 557 (2007).
11
Payne, 285 Mich App at 190.
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decision whether to retain witnesses, including expert witnesses, is a matter of trial strategy. . . .
In general, the failure to call a witness can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel only when
it ‘deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.’”12 A determination regarding what evidence
to present is also a matter of trial strategy,13 as is the decision not to object to evidence.14 There
is no obligation to make a futile objection.15
C. RAPE SHIELD MOTION
Martin argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by inadequately
arguing for the admission of evidence pertaining to the complainant’s prior sexual experience
with SC. However, we find no merit to this argument because, as the trial court found, defense
counsel did not engage in deficient conduct where he did in fact “argue[] for admission of the
[complainant’s] prior sexual conduct with an older boy named [SC] to show bias and because it
might be probative of the victim’s ulterior motive in making a false charge.” Again, defense
counsel has wide discretion regarding matters of trial strategy.16 And the fact that Martin’s
current counsel would have handled the argument differently does not support a conclusion that
the former counsel’s handling of the case was deficient. Defense counsel is not ineffective
where he raises an argument, albeit unsuccessfully.17
Martin also argues that defense counsel should have presented the motion again
following Dr. Gorman’s and Amy Allen’s testimonies. However, their testimonies did not give
rise to the inferences that Martin posited. There was no basis for inferring that the complainant’s
hymen was or was not ruptured. Dr. Gorman simply did not speak to the issue. Similarly, Allen
testified that investigators generally try to develop alternative hypotheses. She did not speak one
way or the other regarding whether there were any other hypotheses in this case. Given these
considerations, there is no indication that a renewed motion would have been successful. In fact,
the trial court’s opinion implies that it would have denied a renewed motion. Accordingly,
defense counsel was not ineffective, neither for his initial arguments nor for failing to renew the
motion.
D. DR. GORMAN’S TESTIMONY
Martin further argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Dr.
Gorman’s claim that the complainant had reported that he was the perpetrator.
12
Id., quoting People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App 531, 537-538; 462 NW2d 793 (1990) (citations
omitted).
13
People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004).
14
People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 242, 253; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
15
People v Davenport, 286 Mich App 191, 199; 779 NW2d 257 (2009).
16
Odom, 276 Mich App at 415.
17
See People v Weatherford, 193 Mich App 115, 122; 483 NW2d 924 (1992).
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Defense counsel did not object when Dr. Gorman testified that the complainant identified
Martin as her sexual assailant. However, the trial court concluded that the testimony was
admissible since Gorman testified that it was necessary for medical diagnosis and treatment.18
And such statements are deemed inherently trustworthy because of a patient’s self-interest in
receiving proper care.19 Thus, even had defense counsel made the objection, the trial court
would have denied it. And, as noted, futile objections are not required.20
E. MEDICAL RECORDS
Martin also argues that defense counsel should have secured Dr. Gorman’s medical
records, as they may have identified an alternate source of the complainant’s medical condition.
We disagree. Regarding the medical records, the trial court noted that defense counsel had been
given the medical record concerning the October visit. And Martin failed to show that a request
for the earlier records would have been successful given their privileged nature. The issue was
not whether the complainant had previously had sexual intercourse, but whether the evidence
would have been admissible to support Martin’s defense. Thus, because Martin has only offered
speculation regarding how the records would have been relevant in that respect, counsel was not
ineffective for failing to request the earlier medical records.
F. DEFENSE EXPERT
According to Martin, his defense counsel was also ineffective because he should have
consulted with an expert to assist in effectively cross-examining Allen and should have presented
a defense expert to respond to her claim of no alternative hypothesis.
With his motion for a new trial, Martin attached a compelling affidavit from psychologist
Katherine Okla, Ph.D. to support his claim that defense counsel should have secured an expert to
counter Amy Allen’s testimony and to assist with cross-examining her. In the opinion denying
the motion, the trial court failed to address this aspect of Martin’s motion.
In retrospect, it is possible that defense counsel could have secured a counter expert.
Allen tended to undermine various bases for the argument that the complainant’s inconsistencies
demonstrated a lack of truthfulness. While she did not say that the complainant was telling the
truth, Allen explained the delay in reporting the abuse, gave an innocent reason for the
inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony, and offered a plausible explanation for why the
complainant may have voluntarily returned to Martin’s home after suffering the abuse.
However, ahead of trial, defense counsel may have legitimately thought that cross-examination
would suffice. As previously noted, whether to call an expert witness is a matter of trial strategy,
18
MRE 803(4); People v Meeboer, 439 Mich 310, 322; 484 NW2d 621 (1992).
19
Meeboer, 439 Mich at 322-323; People v Crump, 216 Mich App 210, 212; 549 NW2d 36
(1996).
20
Davenport, 286 Mich App at 199.
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and this Court will not judge defense counsel’s performance with the benefit of hindsight.21 For
these reasons, we conclude that Martin has not established ineffective assistance of counsel
based on the failure to call an expert witness.
G. HEARSAY STATEMENTS
Finally, Martin contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object on
hearsay grounds to the complainant’s alleged statements to others that Martin had molested her.
We first note that these were not excited utterances. An excited utterance is “[a]
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition.”22 Although the passage of time is not
conclusive, the focus is on the “possibility for conscious reflection.”23 Here, the complainant
had such an opportunity for reflection during the approximately two- to three-month interval
between the last instance of abuse and the statements she made to others.
Nonetheless, the prosecution argues that these statements were made to explain the
complainant’s ensuing actions. That is, the statements the complainant made to her mother and
godmother served as the catalyst for Amy Allen’s ensuing investigation. Moreover, defense
counsel could have made a tactical decision that nothing was to be gained by objecting to these
statements. Accordingly, Martin has not established ineffective assistance of counsel based on
the failure to object.
III. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE TO REBUT EXPERT TESTIMONY
Martin argues that his motion for a new trial should have been granted based on the need
for the evidence of the complainant’s relationship with SC to rebut the testimony by Amy Allen
of Care House and Dr. Gorman.
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to preclude
evidence.24 An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome that falls
outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.25
A. TESTIMONY OF DR. STACY GORMAN
Dr. Gorman testified that she did not perform a pelvic examination in October 2008,
because one had been performed in August 2008, and the incidents ended in August. Martin
21
Payne, 285 Mich App at 190.
22
MRE 803(2).
23
People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 551; 581 NW2d 654 (1998).
24
See People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 349; 365 NW2d 120 (1984).
25
See People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
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argues that this testimony led the jurors to believe that the complainant’s hymen was ruptured
and that the complainant had engaged in sexual activity. He further argues that, because of this
inference, the jurors would assume that he ruptured her hymen. For these reasons, Martin
contends that the evidence of the complainant’s sexual conduct with SC would have given
another explanation for her hymen being ruptured. However, Dr. Gorman gave absolutely no
indication whether the complainant’s hymen was or was not intact. Therefore, this argument has
no merit.
B. TESTIMONY OF AMY ALLEN
Amy Allen testified that an investigator tries to develop alternative explanations. She
also testified that her team concluded that there were no alternative explanations for the
allegations the complainant made in her interview. Martin posits that the jury must have inferred
that there were no other hypotheses in this case and no other suspects. He suggests that a
reference to SC would have given rise to another hypothesis and another suspect. While
evidence of the complainant’s sexual past may have developed an alternative hypothesis, such
evidence is precluded by the rape shield law, and Martin has failed to show sufficient cause to
circumvent the statutory prohibition.
IV. SENTENCING
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Martin argues that, despite the Michigan Supreme Court’s contrary determination,
Michigan’s sentencing guideline system cannot be squared with Blakely v Washington.26 Thus,
he argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his sentence should have been based on facts
found by a jury. Apart from Blakely considerations, Martin challenges the trial court’s scoring of
offense variables (OVs) 8 and 13 and prior record variable (PRV) 7.
This Court reviews the scoring of the sentencing guidelines to determine if the lower
court properly exercised its discretion and if the evidence adequately supported a particular
score. If there is any evidence to support a score, this Court will uphold the score.27
B. BLAKELY v WASHINGTON
Martin, in essence, argues that the Michigan Supreme Court improperly decided People v
Drohan.28 However, this Court is bound by the Supreme Court’s decisions.29 Accordingly,
Drohan is dispositive of this issue.
26
Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004).
27
People v Steele, 283 Mich App 472, 490; 769 NW2d 256 (2009).
28
People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140; 715 NW2d 778, cert den sub nom Drohan v Michigan, 549
US 1037 (2006).
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C. OV 8
Martin challenges the trial court’s scoring of OV 8 at 15 points. A trial court should
score 15 points when “[a] victim was asported to another place of greater danger or to a situation
of greater danger or was held captive beyond the time necessary to commit the offense.”30
Asportation does not require a forceful movement.31
The trial court appears to have based its 15-point score on the prosecutor’s argument that
Martin took the complainant to a hotel where there were no other adults around, creating a
greater danger. Martin essentially claims that the purpose of the hotel visit was a family outing
and the fact that the crime allegedly occurred in the hotel room did not establish any greater
danger. While the location of the sexual assault may have been incidental to the crime, as
opposed to part of the Martin’s design for purposes of committing the crime, we conclude that
the evidence supported the trial court’s scoring. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s scoring
of 15 points for OV 8.
D. OV 13 AND PRV 17
Martin argues that the trial court’s scoring of 25 points for OV 13 and 20 points for PRV
7 amounted to impermissible “double counting.” We disagree. Taking into account the same
conduct when scoring an OV and a PRV does not result in double counting when the two
separate categories address two different situations.32 PRV 7 addresses “subsequent or
concurrent felony convictions,”33 whereas OV 13 addresses a “continuing pattern of criminal
behavior.”34 Accordingly, the trial court’s scoring was not improper.
We affirm.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
29
People v Tims, 202 Mich App 335, 340; 508 NW2d 175 (1993), rev’d on other grounds 449
Mich 83 (1995).
30
MCL 777.38(1)(a).
31
People v Spanke, 254 Mich App 642, 647; 658 NW2d 504 (2003).
32
People v Jarvi, 216 Mich App 161, 164; 548 NW2d 676 (1996).
33
MCL 777.57.
34
MCL 777.43.
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