PATRIOT PUMPS LLC V JOHN E GREEN COMPANY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRIOT PUMPS, L.L.C., d/b/a THOMPSON
PUMP MIDWEST,
UNPUBLISHED
February 1, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 292919
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-000599-CK
JOHN E. GREEN COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
AMERICAN MARSH PUMPS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: JANSEN, P.J., and OWENS and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant American Marsh Pumps (American Marsh) appeals by right the circuit court’s
order compelling it to participate in arbitration with plaintiff Patriot Pumps, LLC (plaintiff), and
defendant John E. Green Company (Green). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
We review de novo a circuit court’s determination regarding the existence and
enforceability of an arbitration agreement. Watts v Polaczyk, 242 Mich App 600, 603; 619
NW2d 714 (2000). We also review de novo as a question of law the interpretation of a contract.
Kloian v Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich App 449, 452; 733 NW2d 766 (2006).
The arbitrability of an issue and the scope of arbitration are determined by the parties’
agreement. Rooyakker & Sitz, PLLC v Plante & Moran, PLLC, 276 Mich App 146, 163; 742
NW2d 409 (2007). “‘To ascertain the arbitrability of an issue, [a] court must consider whether
there is an arbitration provision in the parties’ contract, whether the disputed issue is arguably
within the arbitration clause, and whether the dispute is expressly exempt from arbitration by the
terms of the contract.’” Fromm v MEEMIC Ins Co, 264 Mich App 302, 305-306; 690 NW2d
528 (2004) (citation omitted). When interpreting a contract, this Court looks to the contractual
language to determine the intent of the parties. Quality Products & Concepts Co v Nagel
Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 375; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). We must examine the language of
the contract and accord words their ordinary and plain meanings if such meanings are apparent.
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Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 47; 664 NW2d 776 (2003). If the language is
unambiguous, courts must interpret and enforce the contract as written. Quality Products, 469
Mich at 375. “[A]n unambiguous contractual provision is reflective of the parties’ intent as a
matter of law.” Id.
On January 25, 2007, Green entered into a contract with Clark-Roncelli to perform
construction services. The contract provided in relevant part:
[A]ny dispute between Clark-Roncelli and Subcontractor [Green] shall, at
Clark-Roncelli’s sole option, be decided by arbitration in accordance with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.
If Clark-Roncelli elects to arbitrate, then the arbitration shall be in Macomb
County, Michigan. The foregoing agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically
enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction.
To perform the contract, Green ordered equipment from plaintiff, which in turn ordered
equipment from American Marsh. The contract between Green and plaintiff stated:
If Buyer [Green] is required under the Buyer’s Contract [Green’s contract
with Clark-Roncelli] to resolve any disputes by arbitration, and any dispute exists
between Buyer and the other party to the Buyer’s Contract that is to be resolved
by arbitration and involves any goods or services provided by Seller [plaintiff]
under this Purchase Order, Seller hereby agrees to submit such dispute concerning
its goods or services to binding arbitration for decision in accordance with the
provisions of the Buyer’s Contract providing for arbitration and under which
Buyer is obligated to resolve such dispute. Seller agrees to be made a party to the
arbitration under the Buyer’s Contract to resolve such dispute concerning the
goods or services provided by Seller under this Purchase Order. If Seller can not
[sic] be made a party to such arbitration, because a party other than Buyer has
objected to such procedure or for any other reason, Seller agrees to arbitrate
separately with Buyer the dispute concerning any of the goods or services
provided by Seller under this Purchase Order, and in such arbitration the same
arbitrators as used in the arbitration under the Buyer’s Contract shall be used to
decide the dispute between Buyer and Seller concerning the goods and services
provided by Seller under this Purchase Order. The rules and procedure governing
such arbitration shall be the same as the rules and procedure used in the
arbitration under the Buyer’s Contract.
On April 9, 2009, the circuit court granted Green’s motion to compel plaintiff to arbitrate
its dispute against Green. Although the court did not specify the basis for its decision, it appears
from the record that the court determined that the Green/plaintiff contract incorporated the
arbitration provision in the Clark-Roncelli/Green contract, which the court deemed enforceable
against plaintiff. The circuit court’s determination was erroneous. The plain, unambiguous
language of the Clark-Roncelli/Green contract gave Clark-Roncelli the “sole option” to arbitrate
any dispute that arose. The arbitration provision did not provide Green with a right to compel
arbitration of disputes. Further, the Green/plaintiff contract required plaintiff to arbitrate a
dispute only to the extent that a dispute arose under the Clark-Roncelli/Green contract that Green
was in fact compelled to arbitrate. The arbitration provision in the Green/plaintiff contract was
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clearly triggered only if Clark-Roncelli and Green participated in arbitration to resolve a dispute
under the Clark-Roncelli/Green contract.
The Green/plaintiff contract also contained the following provision:
Seller and Buyer agree that by this reference the job drawings,
specifications and other documents forming the Buyer’s Contract are incorporated
in, and made a part of this Purchase Order, and all services performed and goods
furnished by Seller under this Purchase Order shall comply with all requirements
of such documents.
Because the Clark-Roncelli/Green contract provided only Clark-Roncelli with the right to
compel arbitration of a dispute, the Green/plaintiff contract’s incorporation of that arbitration
provision did not give Green an option to compel arbitration with respect to plaintiff. The circuit
court’s order requiring plaintiff to arbitrate its dispute against Green contravenes the plain
contractual language, and the court’s ruling was therefore erroneous.1
Because Green did not have a right to compel arbitration against plaintiff, plaintiff did
not acquire such a right with respect to American Marsh. The “terms and conditions” of the
purchase order of March 2, 2007, provided:
Buyer [plaintiff] has the same rights and privileges against Seller
[American Marsh] as Owner of project has against Buyer under Buyer’s contract
documents.[2]
The contract does not specify the identity of the “owner” of the project, and nothing indicates
that the “owner” had a right to compel arbitration against plaintiff. Even assuming that Green
was the “owner” of the project, the provision still does not require arbitration of a dispute
between American Marsh and plaintiff or Green. Quite simply, the plaintiff/American Marsh
contract could not grant to plaintiff by incorporation a right that did not exist under the
Green/plaintiff contract in the first instance. In addition, we note that the “standard terms and
conditions of sales” accompanying plaintiff’s application for credit did not contain an arbitration
provision.
1
We note that it was not incumbent on American Marsh to appeal the circuit court’s order
because it was not aggrieved by the court’s ruling. See Kieta v Thomas M Cooley Law School,
___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2010). In fact, the circuit court specifically determined at
the time that American Marsh could not be compelled to arbitrate the dispute.
2
Although American Marsh posits that the purchase order terms and conditions did not
constitute a contract because American Marsh never accepted the terms, the purchase order
specifically stated that a seller may accept the terms by delivering the products purchased. It is
undisputed that American Marsh delivered the equipment purchased.
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None of the contracts involved in this dispute contains an arbitration provision that
compels American Marsh to engage in arbitration. Therefore, the circuit court erred by ordering
American Marsh to participate in the arbitration involving plaintiff and Green.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. As the
prevailing party, American Marsh may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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