ANDRIE INC V DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANDRIE, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
February 1, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 291758
Court of Claims
LC No. 08-000061-MT
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and FITZGERALD and SAAD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this Single Business Tax Act (SBTA) dispute regarding the state’s authority to tax a
transportation company with vessels plying the waters of the Great Lakes, plaintiff appeals by
right from the order of the Court of Claims granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant alleges that the Court of Claims erred in granting summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) on three grounds: (1) whether defendant violated plaintiff’s
equal protection rights, (2) whether tax on cruise-by miles violated due process and the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and (3) whether sourcing income as
Michigan revenue is appropriate for purposes of apportionment when business income is earned
beyond three miles of Michigan’s shorelines.
The SBTA, MCL 208.1 et seq.,1 is not a tax on income, but rather, a tax placed on the
value-added portion of a product, which allows for certain exclusions, exemptions, and industryspecific adjustments. ANR Pipeline Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 266 Mich App 190, 198; 699 NW2d
707 (2005). “Value added” is considered to be the increase in the value of goods and services
created by whatever a business does to them between the time of purchase and the time of sale.
Id.; see also Trinova Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 433 Mich 141, 149; 445 NW2d 428 (1989), aff’d
498 US 358; 111 S Ct 818; 112 L Ed 2d 884 (1991). “In short, a value-added tax is a tax upon
business or economic activity.” ANR Pipeline, 266 Mich App at 198.
1
The SBTA was repealed by 2006 PA 325, effective December 31, 2007.
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“‘As a general principle, a State may not tax value earned outside its borders.’” Trinova,
433 Mich at 151, quoting ASARCO, Inc v Idaho State Tax Comm, 458 US 307, 315; 102 S Ct
3103; 73 L Ed 2d 787 (1982). “A taxpayer whose business activities are taxable both within and
without this state, shall apportion his tax base as provided in this chapter.” MCL 208.41. The
apportionment formula provides the amount of business activity a taxpayer has had within
Michigan over the taxable year, and dictates what portion of the taxpayer’s tax base should be
subject to Michigan tax.
In the present case, the parties agree that the applicable method of apportionment is found
in MCL 208.57, which provides as follows:
(1) In the case of a taxpayer under section 56 other than one whose
activity consists of the transportation of oil or gas by pipeline, the tax base
attributable to Michigan sources shall be that portion of the tax base of the
taxpayer derived from transportation services wherever performed that the
revenue miles of the taxpayer in Michigan bear to the revenue miles of the
taxpayer elsewhere. A revenue mile means the transportation for a consideration
of 1 net ton in weight or 1 passenger the distance of 1 mile. The tax base
attributable to Michigan sources in the case of a taxpayer engaged in the
transportation both of property and of individuals, shall be that portion of the
entire tax base of the taxpayer which is equal to the sum of his passenger miles
and ton mile fractions, separately computed and individually weighted by the ratio
of gross receipts from passenger transportation to total gross receipts from all
transportation, and by the ratio of gross receipts from freight transportation to
total gross receipts from all transportation, respectively.
This dispute involves the “revenue miles of the taxpayer in Michigan” and how that value
should be calculated for plaintiff’s business activity during the years in question.
Plaintiff first argues on appeal that the court should not have granted summary
disposition on the question whether defendant violated plaintiff’s right to equal protection by
applying different apportionment schemes. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Washington v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit, 478 Mich 412, 417; 733 NW2d 755 (2007). A
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim
based on the pleadings alone. Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129; 631 NW2d 308
(2001). This motion should be granted if the plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief
can be granted and no factual development could possibly justify recovery. Id., citing Spiek v
Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
Equal protection of the law is guaranteed by both the federal and Michigan constitutions.
Brinkley v Brinkley, 277 Mich App 23, 35; 742 NW2d 629 (2007). The purpose of equal
protection is to ensure every person against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution. Village of
Willowbrook v Olech, 528 US 562, 564; 120 S Ct 1073; 145 L Ed 2d 1060 (2000). The equal
protection guarantee requires that persons under similar circumstances be treated alike, but there
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is no requirement that persons under different circumstances be treated the same. El Souri v
Dep’t of Social Servs, 429 Mich 203, 207; 414 NW2d 679 (1987).
When a legislative classification is challenged as an equal protection violation, we apply
one of three tests, depending on the nature of the alleged classification. Heidelberg Bldg, LLC v
Dep’t of Treasury, 270 Mich App 12, 18; 714 NW2d 664 (2006). Absent the implication of a
suspect classification or a fundamental interest, an equal protection challenge is examined under
the rational basis test. Phillips v Mirac, Inc, 470 Mich 415, 434; 685 NW2d 174 (2004). The
rational basis test examines whether a challenged statute creates a classification scheme that is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Harvey v State, 469 Mich 1, 7; 664
NW2d 767 (2003). The burden of proof is on the person attacking the legislation to show that
the classification is arbitrary. Id. A rational basis for legislation exists when any set of facts is
known or can be reasonably assumed to justify the discrimination. Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich
248, 259-260; 615 NW2d 218 (2000).
Notably, “[a] taxpayer challenging a tax on constitutional grounds must overcome a
strong presumption in favor of the taxing statute’s validity and point out with specificity the
constitutional provision that is violated.” Caterpillar, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 440 Mich 400,
414; 488 NW2d 182 (1992) . A tax statute must be shown to clearly and palpably violate the law
before it is declared unconstitutional. Id.
Here, plaintiff did not overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality, as it did not
prove that similarly situated taxpayers were treated differently. Under MCL 208.57(1), a
transportation company is required to apportion revenue miles in Michigan with revenue miles
elsewhere. However, MCL 208.57(2) provides the following:
If it is shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner that the foregoing
information in not available or cannot be obtained without unreasonable expense
to the taxpayer, the commissioner may use such other data which may be
available and which in the opinion of the commissioner will result in an equitable
allocation of the receipts of this state.
Plaintiff fails to recognize the above section, and does not question the constitutional validity of
this section. Based on MCL 208.57(2), it is plausible that similarly situated taxpayers took
advantage of the above section and successfully proved to the commissioner that they could not
economically ascertain revenue mileage as required by MCL 208.57(1), and opted to “use such
other data . . . which in the opinion of the commissioner will result in an equitable allocation of
the receipts of this state,” MCL 208.57(2), which could reasonably result in different
apportionment methodologies being approved by the commissioner. The purpose of this law is
to ensure that all transportation taxpayers arrive at an equitable allocation of the receipts of this
state, which is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose of revenue collection. The
law, as written, provides that taxpayers could be treated differently, without an equal protection
violation resulting therefrom.
Plaintiff next argues that the court erred in granting summary disposition on the question
of whether taxation of revenue miles beyond three miles from Michigan’s shoreline violates the
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Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution, and that these revenue
miles were properly “in Michigan” for purposes of apportionment. We disagree.
Under both due process and the Commerce Clause, there must be “some definite link,
some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to
tax.” Allied-Signal, Inc v Director, Div of Taxation, 504 US 768, 777; 112 S Ct 2251; 119 L Ed
2d 533 (1992). Where there is a tax on an activity, there must also be a rational relationship with
the income attributed to the state. Id. at 778. The state’s power to tax the taxpayer’s activities is
justified by the protection, opportunities, and benefits the state confers upon those activities. Id.
If a business has the proper connections under the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause, then the state has jurisdiction to tax the activity.
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc v Brady, 430 US 274; 97 S Ct 1076; 51 L Ed 2d 326
(1977), the United States Supreme Court established a four-part test that a state must satisfy to be
compliant with the Commerce Clause. The four-part test requires the following: (1) there must
be a substantial nexus with the taxpayer and the state, (2) the tax must be fairly apportioned, (3)
the tax cannot discriminate, and (4) the tax must be fairly related to the services provided by the
state. Id. at 279.
Here, plaintiff questions whether the tax is fairly apportioned, and specifically argues that
the law is not externally consistent. A law is fairly apportioned if it is internally and externally
consistent. Under the externally consistent prong, this tax will be upheld only if the statute taxes
that portion of revenues that reasonably reflect the in-state component of the activities. This test
is a practical inquiry that looks for fair apportionment between taxpayers.
In order to successfully prove that this statute was not externally consistent, plaintiff
needed to show that the tax was manifestly unfair and out of all appropriate proportions to the
business transacted in the state. Plaintiff contends that the tax was unfair because it taxed
plaintiff on cruise-by miles where no benefit accrued, and discriminated against plaintiff where
vessels of other maritime transportation companies that did not stop at Michigan ports were not
taxed. However, plaintiff is uniquely situated in comparison to vessels that do not stop at
Michigan ports. In fact, part of the benefit that plaintiff obtains from the state is the use of the
ports and convenience of the inland and port infrastructure.
Nevertheless, if plaintiff’s vessels were, in fact, “in Michigan” as required by the statute,
any contention that the tax was not fairly apportioned would be nullified because the
apportionment formula provided in MCL 208.57 was created specifically to fairly apportion the
tax based on each taxpayer’s activity in the state. Thus, the crux of this issue is whether
plaintiffs’ vessels were “in Michigan.”
Plaintiff relies on In re Income Tax Cases, 157 Mich App 525; 403 NW2d 182 (1987),
for the proposition that income earned on the Great Lakes was not income earned “in Michigan”
and such income could not be taxed. The In re Income Tax Cases Court considered whether
seamen, or the wives of seamen, employed on the Great Lakes had a sufficient connection with
the State of Michigan that would subject them to Michigan income tax. This Court recognized
that the Legislature provided no formula for apportioning income between Michigan and other
states. In agreeing with the Tribunal’s decision, the Court ruled that income earned merely from
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services provided on ships plying the Great Lakes did not provide a sufficient nexus to justify the
imposition of a tax for that activity. Id. at 531-533.
The present case is distinguishable from In re Income Tax Cases on several grounds.
First, the taxpayers in In re Income Tax Cases were not residents of Michigan, and therefore
there was no clear connection between the taxpayers and the state. Second, In re Income Tax
Cases dealt with Michigan income tax, whereas this case deals with the Michigan SBT. Third,
the statute at issue here clearly provided a method of apportionment, which was not present in
the applicable statute in In re Income Tax Cases. And finally, plaintiff here was not merely
providing services on ships plying the Great Lakes, but instead was earning business income
based on its services provided in the Great Lakes, and its primary place of business was in
Muskegon, Michigan. The In re Income Tax Cases Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer based on
the state’s failure to specify apportionment standards, and it also recognized that the state had not
demonstrated what services it rendered to plaintiff. In the present case, plaintiff clearly has a
sufficient nexus with the state based on its primary location in Muskegon.
We question plaintiff’s reliance on In re Income Tax Cases based on the factual
distinctions and also based on our finding that the disposition of that case was dependent upon a
combination of the taxpayer’s lack of residency in Michigan and the lack of apportionment in the
taxing statute, factors not present here.
The goal in statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature. Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 665; 685 NW2d 648 (2004). The intent of the
Legislature is most reliably evidenced through the words used in the statute. Id. If the language
in the statute is unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted. Nastal v
Henderson & Assoc Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 720; 691 NW2d 1 (2005). However, if a
statute is ambiguous, judicial construction is appropriate. Adrian School Dist v Michigan Pub
School Employees Retirement Sys, 458 Mich 326, 332; 582 NW2d 767 (1998). A statute “‘is
ambiguous only if it “irreconcilably conflict(s)” with another provision or when it is equally
susceptible to more than a single meaning.’” Fluor Enterprises, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 477
Mich 170, 177-178 n 3; 730 NW2d 722 (2007) (emphasis in original), quoting Lansing Mayor v
Pub Service Comm, 470 Mich 154, 166; 680 NW2d 840 (2004), overruled in part by Peterson v
Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300; 773 NW2d 564 (2009).
A statute should be construed “as a whole to harmonize its provisions and carry out the
purpose of the Legislature.” Macomb Co Prosecutor v Murphy, 464 Mich 149, 159; 627 NW2d
247 (2001). “Statutes should be construed so as to prevent absurd results, injustice, or prejudice
to the public interest.” McAuley v Gen Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 282 (1998),
overruled in part on other grounds in Rafferty v Markowitz, 461 Mich 265; 602 NW2d 367
(1999); see also Detroit Int’l Bridge Co v Commodities Export Co, 279 Mich App 662, 675; 760
NW2d 565 (2008) (“a statute need not be applied literally if no reasonable lawmaker could have
conceived of the ensuing result”).
The statute in question here does not define “in Michigan.” Because this term is not
statutorily defined, it should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning within the context of the
statute. MCL 8.3a; Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269, 276; 753 NW2d 207 (2008). The
plain and ordinary meaning of “in Michigan” would include anything that occurs within the state
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boundaries. On the contrary, plaintiff argues that the Great Lakes are “high seas” and not within
Michigan’s taxing jurisdiction. We disagree.
Plaintiff correctly points out that United States v Rodgers, 150 US 249, 14 S Ct 109, 37 L
Ed 1071 (1893), characterized the Great Lakes as “high seas” subject to admiralty jurisdiction.
Notably, this characterization is unique based on the fact that the Lakes are also within the state
boundary line. Other references to “high seas” are to those lands not governed by a state
authority. Nevertheless, the tax in question does not impermissibly interfere or intrude with the
federal admiralty jurisdiction, and there is no indication that the admiralty authority would
occupy the field and preempt a state from apportioning a tax based on travel on the high seas
within a state’s boundaries. The authority to tax plaintiff is warranted based on plaintiff’s
residence and primary location in Muskegon. The apportionment formula established in MCL
208.57 is used merely for ease of administration in determining what portion of the taxed activity
occurred in Michigan. Therefore, we adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of “in Michigan” to
include activity occurring within the State’s geographical boundaries to avoid an absurd result.
McAuley, 457 Mich at 518.
Based on the apportionment formula, and our conclusion that defendant properly sourced
the revenue miles as “in Michigan” for purposes of apportionment, we conclude that plaintiff has
not overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality, and has not demonstrated that the
statute violates due process or the Commerce Clause.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Henry William Saad
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