PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD WALTER LAJDZIAK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 27, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 295361
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2009-225325-FH
RICHARD WALTER LAJDZIAK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and ZAHRA and FORT HOOD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal arising from Defendant Richard Walter Lajdziak’s convictions of
possession of less than 25 grams of methadone1 and possession of a firearm in commission of a
felony.2 Police arrested Lajdziak after they executed a search warrant on his house and
discovered a large amount of marijuana, two firearms, and a small amount of methadone.
Lajdziak was charged with one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana,3 possession
of methadone,4 and two counts of felony firearm.5 A jury found Lajdziak guilty, and the trial
court sentenced him to two years in jail for the two felony firearm charges and consecutive sixmonth sentences for the marijuana and methadone charges. Lajdziak appeals as of right the
methadone conviction and the corresponding felony firearm conviction. We affirm.
I. FACTS
In February 2009, five officers for the Oakland County Narcotics Enforcement Team
(NET) executed a search warrant at a house in Groveland Township in Oakland County,
1
MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v).
2
MCL 750.227b.
3
MCL 33.7401(2)(d)(iii).
4
MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v).
5
MCL 333.750.227b.
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Michigan. The officers entered the home and secured the residents, including Lajdziak, in the
living room.
Detective Michael Miles serves as a member of NET as a narcotics officer. He testified
that, after they secured the occupants of the house in the living room, he searched the basement.
After searching the basement, Detective Miles then searched the southeast corner bedroom of the
residence, where he found clothing belonging to a male occupant and other items indicating that
the bedroom was occupied by a male. Also, while searching the bedroom, Detective Miles found
two guns between the mattress and the frame of the bed closest to the south wall. Both of the
weapons were loaded and in plastic bags. One was a .22-caliber Baretta and the other was a .38caliber Colt revolver.
Detective Miles also used a police dog while searching the southeast corner bedroom,
which Lajdziak later confirmed was his bedroom. The dog raised alerts as to the presence of
drugs in three areas. First, the dog alerted to the nightstand next to the bed. Then, the dog
alerted to the T.V. stand in the bedroom where Detective Miles found “three good-sized bags of
marijuana.” Lajdziak later confirmed that this was his marijuana. The parties stipulated to the
laboratory report, which indicated that the substance was actually marijuana. The dog also
alerted to a triple beam scale at the foot of the bed in the southeast bedroom. The scale was in a
black container, which also contained three plastic bags, marijuana residue, and a piece of tape.
Detective Michael Reeves was also part of the NET that searched the house. At trial, the
prosecution qualified him as an expert in the area of narcotics trafficking. He testified that, after
securing the house, he read Lajdziak his Miranda6 rights and asked if he was willing to waive his
rights. Lajdziak signed a waiver of his rights. After Lajdziak waived his rights, Detective
Reeves asked where Lajdziak got the marijuana that the NET found in the house, and Lajdziak
indicated that he got it from a friend on the east side of Detroit. He further stated that he sold the
marijuana to a few people and that he provided the marijuana to the other residents of the house.
He also indicated that his girlfriend, Deborah Donovan, lived with him but had her own
bedroom, which she confirmed. He also stated that Donovan’s brother, Steven Donovan, and his
wife, Lana Sanders-Donovan, lived in the basement.
Detective Reeves asked Lajdziak why he had not mentioned the two handguns that
Detective Miles found, and Lajdziak said that he assumed that the police already knew about the
guns because they were registered. Lajdziak then indicated that there was a third gun in the
“desk or a dresser type piece of furniture in the dining room area of the home” and that the gun
would be an Uzi.
Sergeant Dwayne Warner searched the desk that Lajdziak indicated, and he found two
leather cases in the bottom right-hand drawer of the desk. One of the cases contained what
appeared to be an assault rifle, and the other contained documents and paperwork. Sergeant
Warner recalled that he opened the desk drawer using a key that “one of the homeowners” gave
6
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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to him. He was unable to recall which of the homeowners gave him the key. Lajdziak also
informed the officers that they would find methadone in the desk, which they found in a
biohazard baggie. When he was asked if he had a prescription for the methadone, Lajdziak
admitted to Detective Reeves that he did not.
Detective Reeves could not recall if keys were needed to open the drawer. Later, he was
asked to use his report to refresh his recollection regarding the keys. After viewing his report,
Detective Reeves recalled that he attained the keys and unlocked the drawer where the Uzi was
found. He believed it was Lajdziak who informed him where to get the keys.
Detective Reeves asked Lajdziak if he would like to give a written statement. Detective
Reeves testified that he never tells a suspect what to write in the written statement. Detective
Reeves testified that Lajdziak’s statement, in his own writing, indicated that he admitted to
smoking marijuana and selling it in small quantities at times. Lajdziak also indicated that he got
the marijuana from a friend in Detroit. But he declined to tell the police the name of the friend
from whom he got the marijuana.
After the prosecution rested, Lajdziak moved for a directed verdict. He argued that the
prosecutor presented insufficient evidence with regard to the methadone and the Uzi because
neither of the officers could recall who gave them the key to the desk. In response, the
prosecution responded that the key was in the house and that the methadone was not in a locked
drawer. Further, the prosecution asserted that, even without the testimony concerning who
provided the key, the jury could find that Lajdziak exercised dominion and control over the
contraband. The trial court denied Lajdziak’s motion.
The trial court then asked Lajdziak how his expert, Joseph Bruce, would assist his case.
Lajdziak explained that Bruce would testify regarding the standard operating procedure of police
with respect to taking statements during drug arrests. Lajdziak explained that Bruce’s testimony
could bear on the credibility of the officers that testified. Lajdziak clarified that he believed
Detective Reeves was lying with regard to the statements concerning the methadone during the
search. Lajdziak asserted that his personal written statement did not mention methadone and that
he did not sign off on it. However, the record indicated that Lajdziak signed the bottom of his
statement. While Lajdziak’s statement did not mention the methadone, the police report did.
The trial court ruled that it would not allow Bruce’s testimony because it would not assist the
trier of fact in determining a fact in issue.
Following closing arguments and jury instructions, after approximately 30 minutes of
deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged to all four counts. On September 1,
2009, the trial court sentenced Lajdziak to six months in the Oakland County Jail for the
marijuana and methadone convictions, and two years in the Michigan Department of Corrections
on the felony firearm counts. The felony firearm sentences were to run consecutively to the drug
sentences. Lajdziak now appeals.
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II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Lajdziak argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction for possession of methadone. According to Lajdziak, his mere presence at the
location of the drugs did not establish constructive or actual possession of the methadone.
This Court reviews de novo insufficiency of the evidence claims.7 When reviewing a
sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and considers whether there was sufficient evidence to allow a rational trier of fact
to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.8 However, this Court does not interfere
with a jury’s resolution of credibility disputes.9
B. LEGAL STANDARDS
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, a reviewing court must determine
whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.10 Due process requires that a verdict be supported by legally sufficient
evidence on every element of the crime.11 The element of possession requires a proof of
“dominion or right of control over the drug with knowledge of its presence and character.”12
“Possession may be either actual or constructive, and may be joint as well as exclusive.”13
“[C]onstructive possession exists when the totality of the circumstances indicates a sufficient
nexus between the defendant and the contraband.”14
C. APPLYING THE STANDARDS
Lajdziak relies on People v Wolfe15 to show that his presence at the house was not
sufficient to show that he had possession of the methadone. Lajdziak’s argument is without
7
People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).
8
People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
9
People v Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376, 380; 465 NW2d 365 (1990).
10
People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 722-723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
11
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992).
12
People v McKinney, 258 Mich App 157, 165; 670 NW2d 254 (2003) (quotations and citations
omitted).
13
People v Fetterly, 229 Mich App 511, 515; 583 NW2d 199 (1998).
14
Wolfe, 440 Mich at 521.
15
Id.
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merit. In Wolfe, the defendant was charged with possession of cocaine after police executed a
search warrant on an apartment that he and five others were located.16 The drugs were not
directly on the defendant.17 The police found a 12-gauge shotgun as well as numerous packets of
crack-cocaine.18 On appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, the defendant asserted that the
element of possession was not sufficient to sustain his charge. He explained that his mere
presence at the apartment that contained the drugs was not related to any possession of or intent
to sell the drugs.19
The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the evidence produced at trial showed that the
defendant constructively possessed the cocaine.20 First, the Supreme Court noted that a person’s
mere presence at a location where drugs are found is insufficient to prove constructive
possession.21 However, the factors surrounding the defendant led the Supreme Court to find a
link between him and the drugs.22 The fact that the defendant controlled the premises, attempted
to conceal the narcotics, and was working with other drug dealers constructively showed that he
had possession.23 The Supreme Court ruled that, when there is not actual possession, evidence
that a defendant “‘had the right to exercise control of the cocaine and knew it was present’” is
sufficient for constructive possession.24
This case is similar to Wolfe. While Lajdziak attempts to use Wolfe to prove that he did
not possess of the methadone, the standards in Wolfe actually show that he had constructive
possession of it. Here, the police found proof of Lajdziak’s residing at the house containing the
methadone. Further, Lajdziak knew that there were drugs and guns in the drawer. Also,
Detective Reeves testified that Lajdziak helped him get the key to open the drawer containing the
methadone. These circumstances indicate that Lajdziak obviously knew the methadone was
present because he told the officers where it was before they even found it. The circumstances
also prove that Lajdziak could easily exercise control over the methadone because it was located
in his residence and he had access to the drawer that it was located in. Also, the fact that
Lajdziak admitted to using and selling drugs suggests that there was a nexus between him and
any contraband found in his house.
16
Id. at 511.
17
Id. at 511-512.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 517.
20
Id. at 520.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 522.
23
Id. at 522-523.
24
Id. at 520.
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Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Lajdziak of
possession of methadone because the circumstances surrounding the search of his house indicate
that he had constructive possession of it.
III. ADDITION OF NEW CHARGE
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Lajdziak argues that the prosecutor’s addition of the methadone charge and
corresponding felony firearm charge violated his right to a preliminary examination on both
charges. According to Lajdziak, the defense was unfairly prejudiced because it only had one
week to prepare for the new charges.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend
information for an abuse of discretion.25 An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision results
in an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes.26
B. LEGAL STANDARDS
MCL 767.76 provides that “[t]he court may at any time before, during or after the trial
amend the indictment in respect to any defect, imperfection or omission in form or substance or
of any variance with the evidence.” MCR 6.112(H) also provides that “[t]he court before,
during, or after trial may permit the prosecutor to amend the information unless the proposed
amendment would unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant.” “[A]ll laws applying to
prosecutions on indictments also apply to prosecutions by information.”27
“‘An information shall not be filed against any person for a felony until such person has
had a preliminary examination therefor, as provided by law, before an examining magistrate,
unless that person waives his statutory right to an examination.’”28 “However, the information
‘is not predicated upon the complaint or the examination upon the warrant issues[.]’”29 “[A]n
examining magistrate may examine not only the truth of the charge in the complaint, but also
other pertinent matters related to the charge.”30 “The magistrate is not bound by the limitations
of the written complaint.”31
25
People v McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 686-687; 672 NW2d 191 (2003).
26
Woodard v Custer, 476 Mich 545, 557; 719 NW2d 842 (2006).
27
McGee, 258 Mich App at 687, citing MCR 6.112(H).
28
People v Hunt, 442 Mich 359, 362-363; 501 NW2d 151 (1993), quoting MCL 767.42(1).
29
Id. at 363, quoting People v Kahler, 93 Mich 625, 627; 53 NW 826 (1892).
30
Id.
31
Id.
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A prosecutor may add a charge to a complaint as long as the prosecutor shows probable
cause, at a preliminary exam, that the defendant committed the crime.32 In People v Hunt, the
defendant was charged with gross indecency between males.33 At the preliminary examination,
the victim testified that the defendant sexually assaulted him, which included sexual
penetration.34 The prosecutor was unaware of this information until the preliminary examination
because the report said there was only sexual contact.35 After the examination, the prosecutor
moved to amend the information to charge third-degree criminal sexual conduct.36
On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the trial court should allow the
amendment.37 The Supreme Court held that a prosecutor must show probable cause in order to
have a proper bindover, authorizing the prosecution to file an information against a defendant.38
The Supreme Court made its ruling by first examining the facts brought out at the preliminary
examination and comparing them with the requirements of the new charge sought.39 The
Supreme Court held that prosecution showed the required elements of the new charge during the
preliminary examination.40 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution showed
probable cause for a bindover of the amended charge.41
After ruling that there was sufficient proof presented to support a bindover on the new
charge, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the amendment would have caused “unacceptable
prejudice to the defendant because of unfair surprise, inadequate notice, or insufficient
opportunity to defend.”42 The Supreme Court explained that these factors are relevant to give the
defendant a fair opportunity to meet the charges against him.43 The Supreme Court ruled that
adding the new charge did not impose an unfair burden on the defendant because there was no
indication that the defense counsel’s questioning would have changed had the new charge been
32
Id. at 362.
33
Id. at 360.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 363-364.
36
Id. at 361.
37
Id. at 365.
38
Id. at 362.
39
Id. at 363-364.
40
Id. at 364.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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initially brought.44 The Supreme Court also ruled that there was no evidence to suggest that the
overall defense would have changed due to the added charge.45
C. APPLYING THE STANDARDS
Here, two weeks before trial, the prosecution moved to add the charge of possession of
less than 25 grams of methadone along with the corresponding additional count of felony
firearm. The trial court granted the motion over Lajdziak’s objection.
This Court must first determine whether there was proper information at the preliminary
examination to show probable cause for the amended charge of possession of less than 25 grams
of methadone and the corresponding felony firearm charge.46 A defendant is in violation of
MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v), if he possessed a controlled substance of less than 25 grams without a
valid prescription. At the preliminary examination, Detective Reeves testified that he found
“some methadone in a zip-lock style baggie in a desk in the dining room.” He went on to explain
that an “Uzi weapon” was also found in the same drawer as the methadone. Detective Reeves’s
testimony at the preliminary hearing suggests that there was probable cause for the subsequent
methadone charge against Lajdziak. Further, because Detective Reeves’s testimony also
indicated that there were guns in the house, there was probable cause for the corresponding
felony firearm charge.47
Having concluded that the prosecution showed probable cause at the preliminary hearing
to satisfy the methadone and felony firearm charges, the next step of the analysis is to determine
whether adding these charges caused unacceptable prejudice to Lajdziak because of unfair
surprise, inadequate notice, or insufficient opportunity to defend.48 In this case, similar to Hunt,
there is no evidence that shows prejudice against Lajdziak by allowing the amended charges.
Lajdziak’s only argument on this issue appears to be that he only had one week to prepare for the
new charges. However, his overall defense against the possession charges was that he did not
possess the drugs because they could have belonged to the others in the house. Lajdziak also
argued that the police officers did not perform a proper investigation. These arguments were
made with regard to all charges brought against Lajdziak. Therefore, Lajdziak’s defense was not
unfairly prejudiced because his arguments would not have changed regardless of the amended
charges.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the amended charges because
there was sufficient evidence at the preliminary examination to show probable cause that the
44
Id. at 365.
45
Id.
46
See id. at 362.
47
MCL 750.227b.
48
See Hunt, 442 Mich at 364.
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methadone and corresponding felony firearm charges could be brought. Allowing the two
charges did not unfairly prejudice Lajdziak’s defense.
IV. ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Lajdziak argues that Joseph Bruce’s expert testimony was necessary to present a proper
defense. He asserts that Bruce’s testimony would have shown that Detective Reeves was lying
about Lajdziak saying where the methadone was located.
This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on admission of evidence, including relevancy,
for an abuse of discretion.49 Similarly, this Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding
qualifying an expert witness and the admissibility of the expert testimony for an abuse of
discretion.50 An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision results in an outcome falling
outside the range of principled outcomes.51
B. LEGAL STANDARDS
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible at trial.52 “‘Relevant evidence’ means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.”53 However, even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if “‘its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.’”54
In People v Crawford, the Michigan Supreme Court held that evidence is relevant if two
material components are present: materiality and probative value.55 The Supreme Court went on
49
People v Adair, 452 Mich 473, 485; 550 NW2d 505 (1996); People v Triplett, 68 Mich App
531, 536; 243 NW2d 665 (1976).
50
People v Murray, 234 Mich App 46, 52; 593 NW2d 690 (1999).
51
Woodard, 476 Mich at 557.
52
MRE 402; People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 497; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
53
MRE 401.
54
Starr, 457 at 498, quoting MRE 403 (emphasis by Starr).
55
People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
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to emphasize that “‘[i]f the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition which is not a matter
in issue, the evidence is immaterial.’”56
C. APPLYING THE STANDARDS
In this case, Lajdziak wanted Joseph Bruce, a retired police officer, to testify as an expert
on standard police protocol when dealing with drug arrests. Lajdziak argued that Bruce’s
testimony would discredit the testimony of Detective Reeves, proving that Detective Reeves was
lying.
The testimony offered by Bruce was immaterial to this case because his testimony would
not have helped the trial court’s ruling on the methadone or felony firearm charges in question.
Bruce’s testimony would have merely alluded to the standards that he was accustomed to for
drug arrests during his career at a different police station. Moreover, allowing Bruce’s testimony
would have created confusion, undue delay, and unfair prejudice in this case. Therefore, the trial
court properly excluded this evidence.
The trial court did not deny Lajdziak his right to present a proper defense because the
testimony offered by Joseph Bruce was not relevant, it would have been immaterial, and its
probative value would have been substantially outweighed by its risk of unfair prejudice.
We affirm.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
56
Id., quoting McCormick, Evidence (4th ed.), § 185, 773.
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