JUDY COLE V TUSCOLA COUNTY MEDICAL CARE FACILITY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JUDY COLE,
UNPUBLISHED
January 27, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 292449
Tuscola Circuit Court
LC No. 08-024847-CZ
TUSCOLA COUNTY MEDICAL CARE
FACILITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and ZAHRA and FORT HOOD, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. We reverse.
The trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de
novo on appeal. Kuznar v Raksha Corp, 481 Mich 169, 175; 750 NW2d 121 (2008). The
appellate courts apply theories of contract law to disputes surrounding the terms of a release.
Shay v Aldrich, 487 Mich 648, 660; 790 NW2d 629 (2010). We review de novo questions
regarding the proper interpretation of a contract and whether the language of a contract is
ambiguous. Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 463; 663 NW2d 447 (2003).
In Gortney v Norfolk & Western R Co, 216 Mich App 535, 540-541; 549 NW2d 612 (1996), this
Court set forth the following rules addressing the scope and interpretation of a release:
The scope of a release is controlled by the intent of the parties as it is
expressed in the release. If the text in the release is unambiguous, we must
ascertain the parties’ intentions from the plain, ordinary meaning of the language
of the release. The fact that the parties dispute the meaning of a release does not,
in itself, establish an ambiguity. A contract is ambiguous only if its language is
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. If the terms of the release
are unambiguous, contradictory inferences become “subjective, and irrelevant,”
and the legal effect of the language is a question of law to be resolved summarily.
[(Citations omitted).]
A release is an affirmative defense, MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a), and the defendant has the burden of
proof. Will H Hall & Son, Inc v Ace Masonry Constr, Inc, 260 Mich App 222, 234 n 6; 677
NW2d 51 (2003).
-1-
In the present case, plaintiff executed a voluntary layoff agreement. The trial court held
that plaintiff could not dispute the agreement until she returned the consideration received. This
holding was erroneous. Review of the layoff agreement reveals that plaintiff waived “access to
the grievance and arbitration provisions of the Union contract or any other appeal procedures that
may otherwise be available.” The plain language of the release reveals that it was applicable to
grievance and arbitration provisions of the union contract and any appeals. The plain language
of the release did not provide that plaintiff waived access to the filing of an original civil action
unrelated to the union contract. Gortney, 216 Mich App at 540-541. In light of the fact that the
release did not govern the underlying civil action, the trial court erred in applying the tender back
rule and in dismissing the complaint.
Reversed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
